Kono, Kenji

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 31, 2020

13700119 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/700,119 11/26/2012 Kenji Kono 005000-K00048 1052
78198 7590 08/31/2020
Studebaker & Brackett PC
8255 Greensboro Drive
Suite 300
Tysons, VA 22102
EXAMINER
ALMEIDA, CORY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
info@sbpatentlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte KENJI KONO
____________________

Appeal 2019-003059
Application 13/700,119
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.

PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–6. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The claims are directed to an apparatus for providing a tactile
sensation in response to reception of an input to a touch sensor. According
to the Specification, the apparatus provides “a realistic tactile sensation
matching an object as feedback based on an operation to the touch sensor.”
Spec. ¶ 16.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Kyocera
Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 13/700,119

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Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative.
1. A tactile sensation providing apparatus comprising:
a touch sensor;
a load detector configured to detect a pressure load on a
touch face of the touch sensor;
a tactile sensation provider configured to vibrate the
touch face; and
a controller communicatively coupled to the tactile
sensation provider to drive the tactile sensation provider such
that, upon detecting that a position of the pressure load
satisfying a predetermined standard load shifts into a
predetermined area corresponding to an input object, a first
tactile sensation with a magnitude is provided to a pressing
object pressing the touch face, wherein
the controller drives the tactile sensation provider such
that, upon detecting that the position of the pressure load
satisfying the predetermined standard load shifts out of the
predetermined area, a second tactile sensation with a magnitude
is provided to the pressing object, and
the controller drives the tactile sensation provider such
that, upon detecting that the position of the pressure load
satisfying the predetermined standard load slides along a
continuous path from the predetermined area into another
predetermined area corresponding to another input object and
adjoining the predetermined area without passing through an
area not corresponding to the input object or the another input
object, a tactile sensation with a magnitude different from the
magnitude of the first tactile sensation and the second tactile
sensation is provided, wherein each of the input object and the
another input object indicates an area for receiving an
operation.
Appeal Br. 9 (Claims Appendix). Independent claims 2 and 3 are
directed to a method and an apparatus, respectively, and similarly
require tactile sensations having different magnitudes. Id. at 9–10.
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Application 13/700,119

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Name Reference Date
Hoshino US 2004/0108995 A1 June 10, 2004
Mahesh US 2010/0023857 A1 Jan. 28, 2010
Burrough US 2010/0156818 A1 June 24, 2010
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the rejection of claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Hoshino in view of Mahesh and Burrough.
Ans. 3; Final Act. 5.
ANALYSIS
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because the cited prior art
does not disclose “tactile sensations that simulate actual buttons, as recited
in independent claims 1–3.” Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 1–2. Specifically,
Appellant contends Mahesh “fails to teach, suggest, or otherwise render
obvious the idea of executing a control based on a pressure lead so as to
provide a ‘realistic tactile sensation’” as disclosed in the Specification.
Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 2. Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s
reliance on Mahesh’s teaching that a finger touch has a capacitance that
changes with pressure is unreasonable because the pressure of a touch does
not linearly correspond to the capacitance of the finger, thus it is difficult to
detect a pressure load by way of detecting a capacitance of the finger.
Appeal Br. 7.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection for the reasons provided by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action and the Answer. We add the following for emphasis.
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Application 13/700,119

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Each of independent claims 1–3 recites “a tactile sensation with a
magnitude different from the magnitude of the first tactile sensation and the
second tactile sensation.” Appeal Br. 9–10 (Claims Appendix).
As the Examiner points out, “realistic tactile sensation” is not recited in the
claims. Ans. 13. Limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied
upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982).
Therefore, Appellant’s arguments differentiating the claims over the cited
prior art on the basis of “realistic tactile sensation” are not persuasive of
error.
To the extent that Appellant argues “realistic tactile sensation” is an
inherent result of the claimed apparatus and method, the Examiner responds
that if the prior art teaches the claim language, then it would also teach the
result of a “realistic tactile sensation.” Id. The Examiner cites Burrough ¶ 71
for describing “realistic clicking sensations to the user” with Burrough’s
click off vibration embodiment when the user begins lifting off of the touch
screen, and Burrough’s hard press initiating a selection that results in a click
vibration while a light touch provides notification to the user that the user is
in a location suitable for making a selection. Id. at 13–14. Appellant’s
assertion that Burrough’s differentiating between a light touch and a hard
press does not suggest a “realistic touch sensation” (Reply Br. 2) is not
persuasive of error because (1) “realistic touch sensation” is not recited in
the claims and (2) Appellant does not direct us to limitations in the claims
that differentiate Burrough’s different touch events producing clicking
sensations.
Regarding the capacitance of a finger to detect pressure load, the
Examiner points out that Mahesh is only relied upon to teach different areas,
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Application 13/700,119

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i.e. buttons, receiving different force feedback and boundaries between areas
while Hoshino is relied upon for teaching a load detector for detecting a
pressure on a touch screen and Burrough for teaching a user can slide a
finger from the different buttons of Hoshino as modified by Mahesh. Ans.
15. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of the prior
art rejection, but, rather, maintains that none of the cited references discloses
a “realistic tactile sensation.” Reply Br. 3. For the reasons discussed above,
we do not find this argument persuasive of error.
Thus, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1–3 and in the Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion
of obviousness based upon the teachings and suggestions of Hoshino in
combination with Mahesh and Burrough.
For the above reasons and those provided in the Final Office Action
and the Answer, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of claims 1–3.
We also sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 4–6,
argued for their dependency from claim 3. Appeal Br. 7.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–6 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

Appeal 2019-003059
Application 13/700,119

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DECISION
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§ Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1–6 103(a) Hoshino, Mahesh, Burrough 1–6
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED