Knowmadics, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 12, 2020

14620491 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/620,491 02/12/2015 Paul MAGUIRE 6564-3 7539
23117 7590 02/12/2020
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
WAESCO, JOSEPH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PAUL MAGUIRE, LISA CINNAMON, CLAIRE OSTRUM,
STEVEN EDGETT, and CHARLES CORCORAN
___________

Appeal 2019-002538
Application 14/620,491
Technology Center 3600
_________________

Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–11, and 13–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “[A]pplicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
KNOWMADICS, INC. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 3 and 12 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 31, 32.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
According to Appellant, the claimed invention relates to “a web-based
market place that allows corporations, governments, and private individuals
- called ‘taskers’ - to task the collection of information (audio, video,
imagery, text, location, temperature, observation, and other data) anywhere
in the world.” Spec. ¶ 30.3

Representative Claim
Independent claim 1 is representative of the claimed subject matter
and is reproduced below:
1. An electronic device comprising a display, at least one
processor and a memory comprising instructions, the
instructions being executable by the at least one processor to at
least:
create a request for data associated with an upcoming
event, the request for data including one or more specifications
of data to be requested to collect data associated with the
upcoming event and complying with the one or more
specifications, the one or more specifications indicating a type
of the data to be requested, a date and/or time for collecting the
data to be requested, and a location of the upcoming event
associated with the data to be requested;
transmit the request for data to a plurality of collecting
devices,

3 We refer to: (1) the originally-filed Specification filed February 12, 2015
(“Spec.”); (2) the Non-Final Office Action mailed August 16, 2018 (“Non-
Final Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed October 23, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4)
the Examiner’s Answer mailed December 13, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (5) the
Reply Brief filed February 8, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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receive one or more bids from one or more collecting
devices in response to the request for data, each bid including a
type of data to be collected by at least one collecting device, a
location of the at least one collecting device, a delivery date for
the at least one collecting device to deliver the data to be
collected, and/or proposed payment for the at least one
collecting device to collect the data;
receive one or more data collections complying with the
one or more specifications from the one or more collecting
devices after the event has occurred;
display one or more attributes of at least one data
collection received from at least one of the plurality of
collecting devices on the display, to enable accepting the at
least one data collection in accordance with the specifications
of the request for data;
transmit an acceptance message to the at least one of the
plurality of collecting devices; and
transmit payment to each of the at least one of the
plurality of collecting devices to which the acceptance message
was sent.
Appeal Br. 30 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4–11, and 13–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 2–9.

OPINION
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
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Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).

I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the US Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice and Mayo.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
217.
If the claim recites an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the
Alice and Mayo framework, in which “we must examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
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The Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Guidance”). In October 2019, the USPTO
published an update to that guidance. October 2019 Patent Eligibility
Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (hereinafter “Guidance Update”).
Under the Guidance and the Guidance Update, in determining whether a
claim falls within an excluded category, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) Step 2A — Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Step 2A — Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP4
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”). Only if a claim (1)
recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then look to whether the claim (Step 2B):
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).

4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
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II. The Examiner’s § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines that representative5 claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception: an abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 2–9; Ans. 3–7.
According to the Examiner, claim 1 “describe[s] the concept of organizing
and scheduling worker activity, which is a Certain Method of Organizing
Human Activity.” Non-Final Act. 6. The Examiner determines “[t]here is
no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology, and their collective functions
merely provide conventional computer implementation utilizing a computer
to implement the abstract ideas.” Id. at 7 (citing Spec. ¶ 28). The Examiner
also determines the claims do “not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.” Non-
Final Act. 7.

III. Appellant’s Arguments
We summarize Appellant’s arguments in favor of eligibility as
follows: (1) “the claimed method improves the functionality of traditional
data collection systems by. . . collecting data associated with an upcoming
event and complying with detailed specifications.” (Appeal Br. 13); (2) the
claims are “directed to concrete technical features ( e.g., requesting for and
collecting data associated with an upcoming event and complying with
detailed specifications) that are carried out by a tasking device and plural
collecting devices” (id. at 14); (3) the claims are not abstract because “the

5 Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 4–11, and 13–22 as a group with respect to
the § 101 rejection. Appeal Br. 13–24. We, thus, select independent claim 1
as representative of the claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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claimed method/device enables collecting desired data associated with an
event to be occurred in the future and complying with particular
specifications indicated in a request for data” (id. at 15); (4) the claims “are
directed to an improved data collection system, in which the claimed tasking
device and/or collecting devices operate in a particular and unconventional
way to enhance the functionality of the data collection system” (id. at 17);
(5) as in Finjan6, “the claims employ a new kind of request for data that
defines the specifications of the data to be collected for an upcoming event
and enables the data collection system to do things it would not do before”
(id. at 18); (6) the claims “provide[] a technical solution to technical
problems” (id. at 19); (7) “[t]he particular combinations of elements recited
in the pending claims are not simply ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional’ activities” (id. at 21); (8) “the Examiner failed to provide any
of the above evidences [required in Berkheimer7] in his step 2B analysis to
prove the combination of the above-identified additional elements are well-
understood, routine, and conventional” (id. at 22); (9) the “claims recite
limitations directed to purported improvements to computer functionality”
(id. at 23); and (10) the “claims recite a physical display device” (id.
(emphasis omitted)).

IV. Our Review, Guidance, Step 1
We analyze the representative claim and the Examiner’s rejection in
view of the Guidance, and we adopt the nomenclature for the steps used in
the Guidance. As an initial matter, the claims must recite at least one of four

6 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
7 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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recognized statutory categories, namely, machine, process, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter. MPEP § 2106(I); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Independent claims 1 and 10 recites a device and claims 18 and 19
recite a method. Thus, the pending claims recite recognized statutory
categories under § 101, i.e., machines and processes. We next turn to the
two-step Alice/Mayo analysis applied in accordance with the Guidance.

V. Step 2A, Prong 1 in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo–Step 1)
(Judicial Exceptions)
Here, we determine whether claim 1, being directed to a statutory
class of invention, nonetheless recites a judicial exception. Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 51.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a certain method of
organizing human activity and thus is an abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 6.
According to the Guidance, certain methods of organizing human activity
that qualify as abstract ideas may include claims that relate to “managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people[, and]
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 52. Aside from the additional limitations discussed separately
below in sections VI and VII, the claimed invention recites steps that can be
carried out by humans without the use of a computer. More specifically, a
human tasker may create and transmit requests for information, including
one or more specifications, to a plurality of collectors, e.g., by telephone or
U.S. mail. A human collector then may collect information, e.g., by taking
photographs, and sending the photographs by U.S. mail along with a bid to
the tasker. The tasker, after receipt of the data, may send an acceptance
message and payment to the collector.
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Appellant argues “the claims are not directed to methods of
organizing human activity or mental processes,” as set forth in the Guidance.
Reply Br. 2. We find this argument unpersuasive for lack of evidence or
persuasive reasoning. Thus, we conclude that claim 1 recites “the concept of
organizing and scheduling worker activity,” which is an example of
managing interactions between people that qualifies as a certain method of
organizing human activity under the Guidance. See Non-Final Act. 6;
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Claim 1, therefore, recites a judicial exception,
i.e., an abstract idea. See Guidance at 52.

VI. Step 2A, Prong Two in the Guidance
(Integration into a Practical Application)
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now determine whether
the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception or exceptions; and (b)
evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. This evaluation requires an additional
element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely
on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit
on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. Id.
The Examiner finds claim 1 recites additional elements including “a
display, at least one processor and memory comprising instructions, [and] a
plurality of collecting devices.” Non-Final Act. 7. The Examiner
determines the additional elements do not integrate the exception into a
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practical application because “[t]here is no indication that the combination
of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other
technology, and their collective functions merely provide conventional
computer implementation utilizing a computer to implement the abstract
ideas” and this “amount[s] to no more than implementing the abstract idea
with a computerized system such as in Alice.” Id. at 7 (citing Spec. ¶ 28).
In summary, Appellant argues “the claimed method improves the
functionality of traditional data collection systems” and that the claims are
“directed to concrete technical features,” and “an improved data collection
system” that “provides a technical solution to technical problems.” Appeal
Br. 13–19; see also section III, arguments (1) – (6) above.
We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. We agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 does not recite an “improvement to any technology.”
Ans. 4. Rather, the problem being solved in claim 1 is old and well known
in the pre-Internet world. As acknowledged by Appellant’s own
Specification, the focus of Appellant’s invention is not to improve the
performance of computers or any computer-related technologies; instead, the
focus is to “propose a marketplace that facilitates commercial transactions
centered around tasking by an individual, agency, and/or corporation for the
purposes of knowledge generation from individuals, agencies, and/or
corporations.” Spec. ¶ 4. Here, the described improvement is in using
crowd-sourcing to collect data from different sources. Spec. ¶ 6.
Essentially, the disclosed invention seeks to use generic computer
technology to perform the crowd sourcing such as by allowing individual
mobile device users to upload data at the request of a tasker. Using crowd
sourcing to collect data from varied sources as recited in claim 1 is not a
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solution to a technical problem. Claim 1 does not, for example, use
technology to improve how the data is collected or how it is transmitted to
the tasker. In this way, claim 1 is unlike the technology-based integrations
cited by Appellant. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the patent-eligible claim was directed to
a self-referential table to improve computer databases), cited in Appeal
Br. 6.
Using a generic “electronic device that can collect, transmit, and
receive data, such as a laptop or desktop computer, a tablet, a digital camera,
or a smart phone” (Spec. ¶ 27, Figure 1) “as intended to send, receive, store,
and process information” (Ans. 5) is insufficient to show integration into a
practical application. See MPEP § 2106.05(f); see also Spec. ¶¶ 12, 13, 16,
80–85. Instead, these generic computing components are used simply for
the automation of the abstract idea. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[M]erely requir[ing] generic
computer implementation . . . does not move [a claim] into [§] 101 eligibility
territory.”).
Next, Appellant argues the claimed invention provides an
improvement to computer functionality because claim 1, like the claims in
Finjan8, “employ a new kind of request for data.” Appeal Br. 18.
We are not persuaded. In Finjan, the court found the claimed
behavior-based virus scan constituted an improvement in computer
functionality over “traditional, ‘code-matching’ virus scans.” Finjan, 879

8 Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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F.3d at 1304. The court determined that the Finjan claimed method
employed a new kind of file that allowed access to be tailored to different
users, and allowed the system to accumulate and use newly available,
behavior-based information regarding potential threats. Id. at 1305. The
court ultimately held the Finjan claims were “directed to a non-abstract
improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of
computer security,” and “recite[d] specific steps––generating a security
profile that identifies suspicious code and linking it to a downloadable––that
accomplish the desired result.” Id.
Unlike the claims in Finjan, Appellant’s claim 1 does not claim the
improvement over traditional functionality of the computer technology.
With regard to the technology involved in Finjan, claim 1 here further fails
to employ a newly generated file containing a security profile in a
downloadable. Nor does the claim use a new file to enable a computer
security system to improve on or add a computer functionality by reciting
specific steps accomplishing the desired improved security results. We are,
therefore, not persuaded that claim 1 is sufficiently analogous to the claims
in Finjan. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that claim 1 “provides an
improvement to computer functionality,” as argued by Appellant. Appeal
Br. 18. Considering the claim as a whole, Appellant’s invention lacks a
technical solution to a technical problem.
Alternatively, an additional element may integrate a judicial exception
into a practical application when the “additional element implements a
judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 55. In this case, claim 1 lacks such a machine. At best, the
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processor simply executes the abstract idea described above. Notably, the
claimed processor can be a general-purpose computer. See Spec. ¶ 27
(“Tasking device 10 and collecting devices 14 may be any kind of electronic
device that can collect, transmit, and receive data, such as a laptop or
desktop computer, a tablet, a digital camera, or a smart phone.”). But a
general-purpose processor that merely executes the judicial exception is not
a particular machine. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–
17 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cited in MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I).
In addition, Appellant’s claimed additional elements do not transform
matter; at best, they transform information. That is, the claim simply
collects, manipulates, transmits, and displays data such as by “display[ing]
one or more attributes of at least one data collection received from at least
one of the plurality of collecting devices on the display.” Appeal Br. 30; see
MPEP § 2106.05(c); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72
(1972) (holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms data
from one form to another is not patent-eligible). As such, the claim has no
other meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and merely recites
instructions to execute an abstract idea on generic computer hardware (see
MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
We, therefore, determine claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted
improvement in computer-related technology or otherwise integrated into a
practical application, and thus is directed to a judicial exception.

VII. Step 2B in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo, Step 2) (Inventive Concept)
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
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providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). To determine whether the claim provides an inventive
concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in
combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The Examiner determines that the “additional elements of a display, at
least one processor and memory comprising instructions, a plurality of
collecting devices, and respective collecting devices are generic computer
components/software claimed to perform their basic functions of storing,
retrieving, sending, and processing data” and thus do “not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception.” Non-Final Act. 7.
Appellant argues “the pending claims are not simply ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional’ activities as demonstrated, for example,
by . . . the Examiner’s failure of providing prior art to show these
combinations.” Appeal Br. 21.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Although the second
step in the Alice/Mayo analysis includes a search for an inventive concept,
the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a
search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo,
132 S. Ct. at 1294). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to an abstract
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idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. As the
Federal Circuit has stated, the “appropriate question is not whether the entire
claim as a whole was ‘well-understood, routine [and] conventional’ to a
skilled artisan (i.e., whether it lacks novelty).” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v.
Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Rather,
the determination of whether the additional elements recited in the claim are
well-understood, routine, and conventional is an analysis conducted apart
from the abstract idea recited in the claim. Id. Appellant’s argument that
there is no evidence that the “[t]he particular combinations of elements
recited in the pending claims” are taught by the prior art incorrectly focuses
on the novelty or obviousness of the abstract idea, rather than the
additionally recited elements, which we consider separately from the
abstract idea. Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant next argues “the Examiner failed to provide any of the
above evidences [required by Berkheimer] in his step 2B analysis to prove
the combination of the above-identified additional elements are well-
understood, routine, and conventional.” Appeal Br. 22 (citing Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. In Berkheimer, the
Federal Circuit held that “[w]hether something [(i.e., additional elements
beyond the abstract idea)] is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a
skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” See
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. In response to Berkheimer, the USPTO
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issued a new examination procedure (“the Berkheimer Memorandum9”),
requiring the Examiner to support expressly a finding that limitations
beyond the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional.
The Examiner, although not expressly mentioning Berkheimer, does
comply with the Berkheimer Memorandum’s requirement to support
expressly a finding that an additional limitation beyond the abstract idea is
well-understood, routine, and conventional. See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d
at 1369. The Examiner identifies claim 1’s additional elements as “a
display, at least one processor and memory comprising instructions, a
plurality of collecting devices, and respective collecting devices” and finds,
based on the Specification, that the limitations are “generic
components/software claimed to perform their basic functions of storing,
retrieving, sending, and processing data, and does not add meaningful limits
to practicing the abstract idea.” Non-Final Act. 7 (citing Spec. ¶ 28). Thus,
the Examiner cites to Appellant’s Specification to find certain additional
limitations are well-understood, routine, and conventional as set forth the in
the Berkheimer Memorandum. Berkheimer Memorandum 4 (III. A. 1 “[a]
citation to an express statement in the specification.”). Appellant, in turn,
fails to specifically address the Examiner’s reliance on the Specification or
to point out which “claim elements” are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional, whether under Berkheimer or any other authority. See Appeal
Br. 21–22; see also Reply Br. 2–6. We decline to speculate as to which
limitations Appellant refers.

9 April 19, 2018 Memorandum to the Patent Examining Corps, entitled
“Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.).”
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Appellant further argues “[t]he question is whether the associated
recitations in their respective entireties––and as an ordered combination––
are well-understood, routine, and conventional. And that has not, and cannot
be, demonstrated on this record.” Reply Br. 7.
This argument incorrectly focuses on the abstract idea, rather than the
additionally recited elements, which are considered separately from the
abstract idea. Chamberlain Grp., 935 F.3d at 1348–49. Appellant fails to
provide persuasive arguments indicating which additional limitations, alone
or in combination, amount to more than the abstract idea. To the contrary, in
analyzing the additional limitations both alone and as an ordered
combination, we agree with the Examiner that “[t]he claim does not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception.” Non-Final Act. 7.
Neither does Appellant direct our attention to anything in the
Specification that indicates the claimed components, as an ordered
combination, perform anything other than well-understood, routine, and
conventional processing functions, such as retrieving, manipulating, and
generating data. See Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.,
876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that considering claims
reciting data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
transmission as an “‘ordered combination”’ reveals that they “amount to
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea”
using generic computer technology) (internal citation omitted). In short, as
previously noted, claim 1 does no more than use conventional hardware to
implement the claimed abstract idea.
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Next, Appellant argues “[t]he claims are not merely directed to the
alleged abstract limitations,” but recite significantly more than the abstract
idea because the claims recite a physical display device. Appeal Br. 23, 24
(citing Ex parte Scott, Appeal No. 2012-009834, at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 10,
2015)).
We are not bound by non-precedential Board opinions. Nor does the
Board’s non-precedential holding in Scott stand for the proposition that all
claims reciting a display are non-abstract. Claim 1 broadly recites
“display[ing] one or more attributes of at least one data collection” at a high
level of generality and on a conventional display. Spec. ¶ 28. Thus, the
claim’s recitation of displaying data is unlike patent-eligible claims directed
to displaying data such as the claimed user interface in Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In Core Wireless, the court held that claims which recited an interface were
patent eligible because the claims recited specific limitations of the interface
such as: an application summary that can be reached through a menu, the
data being in a list and being selectable to launch an application, and
additional limitations directed to the actual user interface displayed and how
it functions. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The court found that the
claims were directed to an improved user interface and not the abstract
concept of an index as the claim “limitations disclose a specific manner of
displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using
conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a
computer.” Id.; see also Trading Tech v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. Appx. 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that a user interface with a prescribed functionality
directly related to the interface’s structure, that is addressed to and resolves a
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problem in the art, is patent eligible). In Appellant’s claim 1, there are no
limitations directed to a specific manner of displaying a limited set of
information to the user or to how the user interacts with the displayed data
and, therefore, we find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. We, thus,
conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept because the
additional elements recited in claim 1 do not provide significantly more than
the recited judicial exception.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude claim 1 does not recite
patent-eligible subject matter. Appellant does not provide separate
substantive arguments for any of claims 2, 4–11, or 13–22. Accordingly, we
conclude for the same reasons provided for claim 1, that claims 2, 4–11, and
13–22 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Consequently, we sustain
the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–11, or 13–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Dependent Claims 23 and 24
Appellant argues claims 23 and 24 are similar to the claims of Core
Wireless, and thus “recite a specific improvement over prior systems,”
because “claim 23 discloses displaying an icon or label indicating received
at least one data collection on a part of the display, and displaying the one or
more attributes of the received at least one data collection on another part of
the display as one or more menu items” and “claim 24 discloses displaying
an icon or label indicating the received request for data on a part of the
display, and displaying the one or more specifications of the data to be
requested on another part of the display as one or more menu items.”
Appeal Br. 25–26.
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The Examiner determines dependent claims 23 and 24 do not confer
eligibility because the claims “describe displaying an icon or a label
indicative of information received. This is transmission of information,
which has been collected and analyzed, and not significantly more as
displaying an icon indicating information is old and well-known.” Ans. 6.
We agree with the Examiner because the limitations argued by
Appellant from claims 23 and 24 merely describe the desired layout of the at
least one data collection received from the at least one of the plurality of
collecting devices. That is, the solution offered by the claims lies in the
layout of information, rather than some technical improvement. Further, as
the Federal Circuit has stated, a claim, like the claim here, “focused on
providing information . . . in a way that helps [a human] process information
more quickly,” does not recite some manner of “improving computers or
technology.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2019). Moreover, the claims’ broad recitation of “an icon or
label” and displaying certain data “on another part of the display” (Appeal
Br. 34–35) is unlike the specifically claimed user interface in Core Wireless
and thus do not recite a patent eligible “improved user interface for
computing devices.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362.
Accordingly, we conclude claims 23 and 24 do not recite patent-
eligible subject matter. We sustain the rejection of claims 23 and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–11,
13–24
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–11,
13–24

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED