Kerry Woolsey et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2019

14482880 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/482,880 09/10/2014 Kerry Woolsey 355296-US-NP 1908
69316 7590 10/01/2019
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
MUSHAMBO, MARTIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2674
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KERRY WOOLSEY and PETER HAMMERQUIST
____________

Appeal 2018-008807
Application 14/482,8801
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before ERIC B. CHEN, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is “Microsoft
Technology Licensing, LLC.” Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to improving coordination of “[t]ime and
location . . . for a successful meet-up.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter.
1. One or more computer-readable memories storing
instructions which, when executed by one or more processors
disposed in a device, implement real-time sharing of location
during a phone call between a local party and a remote party
using respective local and remote devices, comprising:
during the phone call, exposing a user interface (UI) for
initiating the real-time sharing of a current location of the local
device with the remote device;
exposing one or more controls for selecting an expiration for
the location sharing, in which location sharing is discontinued
at the expiration, the expiration being expressed using time or
the expiration being expressed using an occurrence of an event
in which the occurrence is indefinite with respect to time;
displaying a map that graphically shows one of a location of the
local device, a location of the remote device, or the locations of
both the local and remote devices;
monitoring context data associated with one or more of the
local or remote devices, wherein the monitored context data
includes that an estimated meet-up time between the local and
remote devices will occur after the expiration of a time period
for the location sharing;
determining that one or both of the local or remote devices will
be late based on the monitored context data, wherein the
determination is based on a probability that satisfies a
predetermined threshold; and
in response to the late determination, providing a notification
and an option to extend location sharing.
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REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
Claims 1–7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Tysowski (US 2012/0100875 A1; April 26, 2012), Bocking
(US 2010/0262915 A1; Oct. 14, 2010), and Aaron (US 2008/0195312 A1;
Aug. 14, 2008). Final 3–7.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Tysowski, Bocking, Aaron, and Van Os (US 2009/0325603 A1; Dec. 31,
2009). Final 7–8.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Tysowski, Bocking, Aaron, and Trussel (US 2013/0226453 A1; Aug. 29,
2013). Final 8–9.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Tysowski, Bocking, Aaron, and Kim (US 2012/0284789 A1; Nov. 8, 2012).
Final 9–10.
Claims 11–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Tysowski, Bocking, Aaron, and Adamczyk (US 7,328,029 B1; Feb. 5,
2008). Final 10–12.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–20
Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–20 are argued collectively. Br. 6–9. We
address the arguments with reference to claim 1.
Appellants contend the Examiner errs by finding Bocking and Aaron
suggest the claimed determination that an estimated meet-up time will occur
after the expiration of a time period for location sharing (claimed
“monitoring” and “determining” steps). Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 3–4.
Specifically, Appellants contend that neither reference “disclose[s] an
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interdependence between location sharing and . . . an estimated meet-up
time.” Reply 3. Appellants contend Bocking discloses to set a time limit for
how long location sharing is enabled. Br. 7–8. Appellants contend Aaron
discloses a determination that a user will be late to a meeting. Id. at 7.
We are unpersuaded of error.
The Examiner finds Tysowski teaches the claimed location sharing
(Final 3; Ans. 5), which tracks the locations of multiple cellphones and
displays those locations on each cellphone (i.e., such that two cellphone
users can monitor each other’s location). We agree because Tysowski
teaches the claimed hardware (Tysowski Fig. 2), real-time determination and
sharing of cellphone locations (id. at Fig. 1), and displaying of all shared
locations on the display of each sharing cellphone (id. at Fig. 12).
The Examiner finds Bocking teaches the claimed expiration of
location sharing (Final 3–4; Ans. 5–6), which discontinues location sharing
as a function of time. We agree because Bocking teaches “allowing the user
to choose exactly when to share location information” (Bocking ¶ 5), e.g.,
“[s]etting a time limit for how long location sharing is enabled” (id. ¶ 27).
The Examiner finds Aaron teaches the claimed time extension (Final
4–5; Ans. 6–7), which estimates the cellphones will ‘meet-up’ after a set
time limit (i.e., meeting time) and accordingly prompts the users to reset the
time limit (i.e., delay the meeting). We agree because Aaron teaches that, if
the system estimates a user will be late (based on the user’s current location,
meeting location, and meeting time), the system may prompt all users to
reschedule the meeting. Aaron ¶¶ 51–53.
The Examiner finds it would have been obvious, in view of Bocking
and Aaron, to coincide Bocking’s location-sharing expiration and Aaron’s
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meeting time—i.e., such that location sharing occurs until the start of a
meeting and is thus extended if the meeting is delayed. Final Act. 4–5. We
agree because Bocking teaches to share locations amongst people that meet
at scheduled times, e.g., a golf foursome (Bocking ¶ 17), and Aaron teaches
that shared location information can indicate whether someone will be late
(Aaron ¶¶ 51–53). Thus, the combination of Bocking and Aaron teach
sharing location information to monitor whether someone will be late for a
meeting and, in turn, extending the sharing of location information if the
meeting is delayed because someone will be late. The combination of
Bocking and Aaron also teach performing Bocking’s location sharing until
the start of a meeting and providing an option to extend the location sharing,
beyond the originally-set meeting time, as taught by Aaron’s option to delay
a meeting (because someone will be late).
Appellants do not persuasively rebut the above findings. See In re
Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“After a prima facie case
. . . has been established, the burden of . . . [r]ebuttal is . . . a showing of
facts supporting the opposite conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); SHOW, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“To
make (facts, etc.) apparent or clear by evidence; to prove”). Rather,
Appellants contend that none of the references (i.e., no single reference)
teaches an interdependence between location sharing and an estimated
meet-up time. Even assuming that is correct, the claimed interdependence is
reached by combining the prior art as proposed. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not . . . that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references[,
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but rather] what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–20. Accordingly, we sustain their
rejections.
Claims 5 and 11–16
Remaining claims 5 and 11–16 are argued collectively. Br. 9–10;
Reply 4–5. We address the arguments with reference to claim 5, which
depends from claim 1 and adds a step of “providing a notification when the
local and remote devices are within a predetermined distance of each other.”
The Examiner cites Aaron as teaching this feature. Final 6 (citing
Aaron ¶¶ 50–51); Ans. 16–17. Specifically, the Examiner finds Aaron’s
system prompts a cellphone user to depart for a meeting (to ensure they will
be on time) and, as part thereof, determines the cellphone will soon exceed
an achievable distance from the meeting location (achievable via an
estimated speed of travel). Id. The Examiner further finds that, at times, the
second tracked cellphone user (i.e., other meeting invitee of the proposed
combination) will already be at the meeting location, such that the prompt
occurs when the cellphones are within the foregoing distance of each other.
Ans. 16–17.
Appellants contend: “Aaron . . . pertains to comparing users’ locations
to a particular location, such as for a meeting[.] . . . [C]laim 5 recites
utilizing information for when “the local and remote devices are within a
predetermined distance of each other” (Emphasis added).” Br. 9.
Appellants further contend “[t]here is a distinct difference between the
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. . . claimed . . . distance between two devices and [a] distance between a
user and a geographical location.” Reply 5.
We are unpersuaded. A statement of “when” an action occurs will not
alone convey an if/then-type instruction for performing the action; “when”
can mean the action occurs while or if something else occurs. See WHEN
(entry 2). Merriam Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/when (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) (“1a : at or during the time that
: WHILE[;] . . . 2 : in the event that : IF”). Accordingly, a broadest
reasonable interpretation of claim 5 is that the notification occurs while two
devices are within a predetermined distance of each other. This
interpretation reads on Aaron’s notification occurring at a time one device is
within that distance of a location occupied by the other device. Aaron
¶¶ 50–51.
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 5 and 11–16. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections.
CONCLUSION
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7 103 Tysowski,
Bocking, and
Aaron
1–7
8 103 Tysowski,
Bocking, Aaron,
and Van Os
8
9 103 Tysowski,
Bocking, Aaron,
and Trussel
9
10 103 Tysowski,
Bocking, Aaron,
and Kim
10
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11–20 103 Tysowski,
Bocking, Aaron,
and Kim
11–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED