Kelly A. Hormanski, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 27, 1999
01975192 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 27, 1999)

01975192

08-27-1999

Kelly A. Hormanski, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy, Agency.


Kelly A. Hormanski, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01975192

v. ) Agency No. 95-65923-049

) Hearing No. 140-96-8075X

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

U.S. Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of race (white), sex

(female), and mental disability (stress), in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.

Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when she was required

to submit to the procedures for requesting an exemption from night-shift

rotation set forth in NAVAVNDEPOTNOTICE 12335 dated January 6, 1995.<1>

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that appellant, a Sheet Metal Worker, Naval Aviation

Depot, at the agency's Cherry Point, North Carolina facility, filed a

formal EEO complaint with the agency on August 28, 1995, alleging that

the agency had discriminated against her as referenced above. At the

conclusion of the investigation, appellant requested a hearing before an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ).

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e), the AJ issued a Recommended Decision

(RD) without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The facts of the case are not disputed. Appellant is a single parent of

a five year old daughter. In the fall of 1994, appellant was transferred

to the agency's Cherry Point facility. As she was new to the area and

did not know any babysitters, in January 1995, she asked her second

level supervisor (S2)(white male, no disability) for an exemption from

working the night shift. S2 advised appellant that it was standard

practice for the agency and union to approve two 90-day exemptions,

which carried appellant through the school year. In February or March

1995, appellant asked her first level supervisor (S1)(white male, no

disability) for an exemption �until she and her daughter were released

from counseling or her child reached the age of majority.�<2> S1 asserted

that appellant's request was approved for one year. Appellant then

made a third request through her third level supervisor (S3)(white

male, no disability). S3 testified that he denied appellant's request

because she had not submitted updated medical documentation supporting

her request. Soon thereafter, the newly established hardship committee,

defined in NAVAVNDEPOTNOTICE 12335, reviewed S3's denial of appellant's

exemption request. The hardship committee approved appellant's request

for an exemption. Appellant has not worked the night shift since she

was transferred to the facility.

The AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination because she failed to establish that she had

been treated differently than similarly situated employees not in her

protected classes. Although appellant avers that other males were

granted longer exemptions, and did not have to submit documentation,

she cited individuals who agency officials were not familiar with.

With respect to the only two comparatives cited by appellant that agency

officials were familiar with, Comparative 1 (male) had neither requested

nor received an exemption. Comparative 2 (male) had received a six-month

exemption as a single parent, but was later returned to the rotation.

As for her allegation of discrimination on the bases of disability,

the AJ found that appellant had failed to demonstrate that she has

a mental disability that substantially limits a major life activity.

Specifically, the AJ found that appellant's hardship was based on her

failure to have adequate child care. However, as the record did not

contain medical documentation which supports appellant's allegation

that she suffered from an impairment, the AJ found that appellant did

not have a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.

In sum, the AJ found that appellant was not discriminated against,

as alleged. On May 2, 1997, the agency issued a final decision adopting

the AJ's finding of no discrimination. Appellant makes no new contentions

on appeal, and the agency requests that we affirm the FAD.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We note that appellant failed to

present any evidence which would raise an inference of discrimination

and ultimately failed to establish, with sufficient evidence, that the

hardship procedures were applied disparately on any protected basis.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

8/27/99

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1Appellant also alleged in her complaint

that she was discriminated against when the agency failed to

accommodate her disability. However, she later withdrew this issue

in her affidavit and has not raised it on appeal. As such, this

decision will not address this issue.

2Appellant and her daughter were enrolled in �parenting� counseling,

as her daughter was experiencing stress from the move to North carolina.