K&B Under-writers, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 14, 2008

No. 78528124 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2008)

Hearing: Mailed:
December 11, 2007 March 14, 2008

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re K&B Underwriters, LLC
________

Serial No. 78528124
_______

Michael C. Whitticar of Dunlap Grubb & Weaver, P.C. for K&B
Underwriters, LLC.

James A. Rauen, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
109 (Dan Vavonese, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Rogers, Zervas and Bergsman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

K&B Underwriters, LLC filed a use based application on
the Principal Register for the mark K&B UNDERWRITERS, in
standard character format, for use in connection with
services ultimately identified as “insurance brokerage
services, namely providing business-to-business insurance
brokerage services,” in Class 36 (Serial No. 78528124).
The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on
the ground that applicant’s mark, when used in connection
with business-to-business insurance brokerage services, is
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE T.T.A.B.
Serial No. 78528124
2
likely to cause confusion among consumers because of the
following previously registered marks owned by KB Home
Corporation which are very similar to applicant’s mark:
1. KB HOME, in typed drawing format, for “mortgage
lending and escrow services in connection with
the construction and brokerage of single family
and multiple family dwelling units,” in Class 36;1
and,
2. KB HOME MORTGAGE, in typed drawing format, for
“mortgage lending services in connection with the
construction of, and to assist in the purchase
of, single family and multiple family dwellings,”
in Class 36.2
Our determination of likelihood of confusion under
Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion.
In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,
1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion

1 Registration No. 2825554, issued March 23, 2004. Registrant
disclaimed the exclusive right to use the word “home.”
2 Registration No. 2774497, issued October 21, 2003. Registrant
disclaimed the exclusive right to use the words “home mortgage.”
Serial No. 78528124
3
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
between the marks and the similarities between the goods.
See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry
mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods
and differences in the marks”).
A. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the
services, and classes of consumers.

In an ex parte appeal, likelihood of confusion is
determined on the basis of the services as they are
identified in the application and the cited registrations.
In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981); In re William
Hodges & Co., Inc., 190 USPQ 47, 48 (TTAB 1976). See also
Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The
authority is legion that the question of registrability of
an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the
identification of goods set forth in the application
regardless of what the record may reveal as to the
particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the
particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to
which the sales of goods are directed”).

Serial No. 78528124
4
In this case, the cited registrations are for the
registrant’s “mortgage lending and escrow services in
connection with the construction and brokerage of single
family and multiple family dwelling units,”3 on the one
hand, and applicant’s “business-to-business insurance
brokerage services,” on the other. Because applicant did
not define, explain, or submit any evidence clarifying the
meaning of “business-to-business insurance brokerage
services,” nor did the Examining Attorney seek any
clarification, we construe the description of services to be
insurance brokerage services between businesses, as opposed
to between a business and an individual. In other words,
applicant’s services may be considered insurance brokerage
services in connection with insuring businesses.
To prove that the services at issue are related, the
Examining Attorney submitted copies of 20 of 123 third-
party registrations that include both “insurance brokerage”

3 Registration No. 2825554 for the mark KB HOME. Although the
descriptions of services in registrant’s two registrations are
somewhat different, we consider them to be the same for our
purposes. For example, Registration No. 2774497 for the mark KB
HOME MORTGAGE does not include “escrow” services. However,
escrow services are generally associated with mortgage services
because property owners with mortgages frequently pay money for
insurance and taxes on their properties into an escrow account
each month. The holder of the mortgage then pays the insurance
and tax bills out of the escrow account when the bills are due.
Serial No. 78528124
5
and “mortgage lending” in the description of services.4
Third-party registrations based on use in commerce that
individually cover the activities identified in both the
applicant’s description of services and the registrant’s
descriptions of services suggest that the listed services
are a type that may emanate from a single source. In re
Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-1786 (TTAB
1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467,
1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).
In addition, the Examining Attorney submitted excerpts
from 10 websites whose owners provide insurance services
and mortgage lending services.5 The excerpts were from the
following companies: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,

4 In Registration No. 2763779, one of the 20 registrations
submitted by the Examining Attorney, the registrant deleted
“insurance brokerage in the field of real estate titles.”
5 Applicant objected to the websites submitted by the Examining
Attorney on the ground that the Examining Attorney introduced
them into evidence in his denials of applicant’s two requests for
reconsideration, and therefore introduced them after applicant
filed the appeal. Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 CFR §2.142(d) (the
record should be complete prior to appeal). However, when the
applicant requested reconsideration, it opened the door for the
Examining Attorney to submit additional evidence. “Regardless of
whether an applicant submits new evidence with a request for
reconsideration, the examining attorney may introduce additional
evidence directed to the issue(s) for which reconsideration is
sought. TBMP §1207.04. See In re Giger, 78 USPQ2d 1405 (TTAB
2006).” TMEP §715.03 (5th ed. 2007). Because applicant sought
reconsideration after the final refusal by the Examining
Attorney, the Examining Attorney was entitled to introduce
additional evidence in denying the requests for reconsideration,
and applicant’s objection to such evidence is overruled.
Serial No. 78528124
6
American International Group, Inc. (AIG), State Farm Mutual
Automobile Company, Allstate Insurance Company,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide Financial), Southwest
Business Corporation (SWBC), Bank of the West, The
Adirondack Trust Company, and Sovereign Bank.
Based on the third-party registrations and the
excerpts from the websites showing that the same companies
render mortgage lending services and insurance brokerage
services, the Examining Attorney concluded that those
services were related.
On the other hand, applicant argued that its services
and the registrant’s mortgage and escrow services are not
competitive.6 “This is evident from the fact that a company
offering [business-to-business] insurance services and a
company offering new home mortgage services do not compete
for the same purchasers. A reasonable purchaser seeking
[business-to-business] insurance services would not
encounter KB Home providing new home mortgage lending
services.”7 To support its argument, applicant submitted,

6 Applicant’s Brief, p. 14.
7 Applicant’s Brief, p. 14; Applicant’s August 7, 2006 Second
Request for Reconsideration, p. 4. We note that the services of
the applicant and the registrant do not have to be competitive to
support a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. It is
sufficient if the respective services are related in some manner
and/or that the conditions surrounding their marketing are such
Serial No. 78528124
7
inter alia, the insurance and mortgage entries from the
2003-2004 Yellow Book USA, Inc. (Northern Virginia) and a
GOOGLE search hit list featuring the first 50 entries for
the search term “insurance” and the first 40 entries for
the search term “mortgage.” Applicant asserted that this
evidence shows “that no company advertises or offers
[business-to-business] insurance services with new home
mortgage services.”8
Two of the insurance companies in the insurance
section of the Yellow Books USA, Inc. were offering
financial services. The following advertisements appeared
in the insurance section of the directory:
Nationwide® Insurance & Financial Services
Auto · Home · Financial Products · Business ·
Life

CHEVY CHASE BANK
Full Service Bank

that they would be encountered by the same persons under
circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks
used in connection therewith, give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from or are associated with a single source.
In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d at 1785; In re
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911
(TTAB 1978).
8 Applicant’s Brief, p. 15.
Serial No. 78528124
8
In addition, many of the trade names include the word
“Financial.” Representative examples of such names include
the following:
Segal Financial Services Inc.
Raymond James Financial Services
Sahouri Insurance & Financial Services LLC
While the nature of the “financial services” in the
trade names is not defined, financial services could
include mortgage lending services. Thus, the use of
“financial services” in advertising and trade names leaves
open the possibility that business consumers will encounter
insurance brokerage services with all types of financial
services, including mortgage lending services.
Applicant further contends that the evidence of record
is not probative of any alleged relationship between the
services at issue because the Examining Attorney
artificially broadened the registrations to encompass
mortgage lending services per se, instead of mortgage
lending services in connection with single family and
multiple family dwellings. “Without this artificial
broadening, none of these third party registrations shows
the combination of the Appellant’s services and the new
home residential mortgage lending services of the
Serial No. 78528124
9
[registrant] in a single third party registration.”9 We are
not persuaded by this argument because the applicant is
drawing too fine a distinction between mortgage lending
services per se and mortgage lending services in connection
with single and multiple family dwellings. First, mortgage
lending services per se encompass mortgage lending services
in connection with single and multiple family dwellings.
Second, applicant has not introduced any evidence to
support its contention that consumers draw a distinction,
if any, among the different types of mortgage lending
services and their respective sources. Finally, the
Examining Attorney correctly contends that because “the
appropriate inquiry is into the goods and services that are
similar or related to those of the parties,” the
determination of whether the services of the parties are
related is not necessarily limited to the precise language
in the description of services. In other words, while the
services at issue may be subject to limitations or
restrictions as to the channels of trade and classes of
consumers, such limitations or restrictions may, or may
not, having a bearing on whether specific services are
related. That finding of fact will depend upon the facts
in the case.

9 Applicant’s Brief, p. 11.
Serial No. 78528124
10
Applicant also contends that the inference to be drawn
from the third-party registrations is rebutted by the fact
that “only a tiny fraction of all registrations that contain
the services of either ‘insurance brokerage’ or ‘mortgage
lending’ actually contain both services.”10 Applicant
submitted results from a Trademark Office database search
demonstrating the following relationship between “mortgage
lending” and “insurance brokerage” services:

Number of
Registrations
Services

2764 Insurance brokerage services

2063 Mortgage lending services

13011 Insurance brokerage and mortgage lending
services

4697 Insurance brokerage services or mortgage
lending services, but not both

Moreover, applicant points out that because a single
entity may own more than one registration, there are
actually only 75 different entities that own registrations
for both insurance brokerage services and mortgage lending
services. Accordingly, applicant concludes that “[b]ased on

10 Applicant’s Brief, p. 12.
11 The difference between the search results of the Examining
Attorney and applicant is a function of the fact that the
searches were conducted at different times. For purposes of our
analysis, we will consider the results to be essentially the
same.
Serial No. 78528124
11
the evidence provided by the Examiner, it is clear that the
third party registrations fail to support the proposition
‘[i]t is quite commonplace for a single company to offer a
wide range of financial services, including both insurance
brokerage and mortgages.’ To the contrary, the third-party
evidence indicates that it is exceedingly rare that a single
company uses a mark on both insurance brokerage services and
mortgage lending services.”12
While applicant is correct that there are many more
registrations for either mortgage lending services or
insurance brokerage services than for both services, there
may be separate registrations for each service by the same
individual registrants. Also, the Examining Attorney’s
conclusion that mortgage lending services and insurance
services may emanate from a single source is based on
excerpts from third-party websites, as well as third-party
registrations. In fact, some of the websites are from very
large, well-known companies such as Allstate, State Farm,
MetLife, Nationwide and AIG. Thus, even assuming the
correctness of applicant’s premise (i.e., that only a small
number of entities offering mortgage or insurance services
offer both), the fact that large, well-known companies
render both insurance services and mortgage lending

12 Applicant’s May 5, 2006 Request for Reconsideration, p. 13.
Serial No. 78528124
12
services will color consumer perception despite their small
number. Finally, we agree with the Examining Attorney that
while the existence of third-party registrations for
different goods and/or services serves to suggest that
those goods and/or service may emanate from a single
source, the lack of third-party registrations for the
different goods and/or services does not serve to suggest
that they are unrelated. As indicated supra, registrants
may have separate registrations for different goods and
services. Moreover, registration is not the sine qua non
of whether goods and services are related.
Applicant contends that the differences between its
insurance services and the registrant’s mortgage services
is emphasized by the fact that the insurance industry and
mortgage lending are regulated by different state agencies.
Thus, the fact that nearly all states
have two different agencies regulating
the two different industries reflects
the differences in the marketplace and
product lines between insurance and
mortgage lending. [Internal citation
omitted]. This evidence shows
insurance brokerage and mortgage
lending are sufficiently different
since the services are regulated
differently in the marketplace.
Therefore, a reasonable consumer would
not be likely to confuse the services
of insurance and mortgage lending, and
is not likely to be confused into
Serial No. 78528124
13
believing that such services originate
from a single source.13

However, there is no evidence that consumers are aware
that the mortgage and insurance industries are regulated by
different state agencies. To the extent that consumers may
be aware that the industries are regulated by different
state agencies, there is no evidence that consumers care
about this fact or that it has any bearing on their
purchasing decisions. Finally, in today’s society, it is
common knowledge that individuals, as well as businesses,
are subject to the rules and regulations of many different
local, state and federal agencies (e.g., restaurants are
subject to local zoning requirements, health department
standards, and liquor law regulations).
Applicant concludes that reasonable consumers will not
confuse applicant’s marks and services with the registrant’s
marks and services.14 However, the issue is not whether
consumers will confuse the marks and services; the issue is
whether consumers will be confused as to the source or
sponsorship of the services. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d
1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Based on this

13 Applicant’s Brief, p. 16.
14 Applicant’s Brief, p. 13. Applicant also characterized one of
the issues to be decided as “[w]hether a reasonable consumer
would confuse the services of Appellant’s mark with the services
of the ‘554 and ‘497 Registrations.” (Applicant’s Brief, p. 4).
Serial No. 78528124
14
record, we find sufficient evidence to conclude that
purchasers of business insurance would be exposed to
entities rendering both business insurance services and
mortgage lending services, including mortgages for single
and multiple dwelling units. In other words, applicant’s
services and the registrant’s services would be rendered to
the same consumers.
Applicant’s services are business-to-business insurance
brokerage services. On the other hand, the registrant’s
services are mortgage lending services in connection with
the construction of single and multiple family dwelling
units. Presumably, mortgages for single family dwelling
units are written primarily for individual consumers,
however, there is nothing prohibiting an individual or a
small business from borrowing money from registrant to build
a single family dwelling for investment purposes, and
therefore businesses could engage registrant for its
mortgage lending and escrow services. In this regard, we
note that there is no restriction in the registrant’s
descriptions of services excluding businesses from engaging
registrant’s mortgage lending and escrow services.15

15 In its Brief, applicant incorrectly restricts registrant’s
trade channels to “purchasers of a mortgage from a builder of
dwelling units.” (Applicant’s Brief, p. 21). Applicant is
basing this argument on extrinsic evidence it obtained regarding
registrant’s business. However, there is no such restriction in
Serial No. 78528124
15
Likewise, with respect to registrant’s mortgage lending and
escrow services in connection with multiple family dwelling
units, there is no restriction preventing registrant from
writing mortgages to businesses wishing to build such units.
Indeed, individuals, including individuals acting in a
business capacity (e.g., a sole proprietorship) and other
small businesses that acquire single and multiple family
dwelling units as rental units for a real estate business
will need insurance. In fact, they may require some sort of
business insurance.
Even individuals who may have used registrant’s
services only their capacity as individuals, may be employed
in business positions that would prompt them to consider
purchasing insurance from applicant. Such individuals may
assume that there is a relationship between the different KB
and K&B services.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the services of
the parties are related and that the classes of consumers
for applicant’s and registrant’s services overlap.

registrant’s description of services. As indicated in the
discussion in Section A supra, our analysis is based on the
description of services in the registration at issue regardless
of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of
registrant’s services.
Serial No. 78528124
16
B. The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-
to-continue trade channels.

Applicant contends that the channels of trade are
different because applicant sells its services “directly to
businesses with insurance needs” while registrant’s services
are “limited to mortgages sold in connection with the
construction of single family and multifamily residential
dwellings.”16 Applicant stated that it renders its services
to businesses seeking to minimize risk and that registrant
is a homebuilder who provides mortgages and escrow services
in connection with its construction services. However, as
discussed in the preceding section, the problem with
applicant’s argument is that it does not take into account
that there are no restrictions in the registrant’s
description of services. Therefore, we may presume that
registrant’s mortgage lending and escrow services may be
sold to businesses who also require business insurance,
through all normal channels of trade for marketing services
to businesses. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

16 Applicant’s Brief, p. 21.
Serial No. 78528124
17
C. The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales
are made (i.e., impulse vs. careful sophisticated
purchasing.

Applicant contends that the purchasers of the services
of both parties are sophisticated arguing, in essence, that
because the services involve finances, they are purchased
only after careful planning and deliberation.17 We agree
that consumers are likely to exercise a high degree of care
in selecting vendors for financial services. However, this
factor does not carry as much weight as it might have
because applicant did not provide any evidence regarding
the decision-making process used by these purportedly
careful and sophisticated purchasers when selecting
insurance providers or mortgage lenders, the role
trademarks play in their decision making process, or how
observant and discriminating consumers are in practice.
The problem with applicant’s “degree of consumer care”
argument is that there is no corroborating evidence.
Nevertheless, because the services involve financial
services, we find that this likelihood of confusion factor
weighs slightly in favor finding that there is no
likelihood of confusion.

17 Applicant’s Brief, p. 21.
Serial No. 78528124
18
D. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.

We now turn to the du Pont likelihood of confusion
factor focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont
De Nemours & Co., supra. In a particular case, any one of
these means of comparison may be critical in finding the
marks to be similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 9 USPQ2d 1534,
1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1042
(TTAB 1988). Also, we are mindful that the test is not
whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a
side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of overall commercial
impression so that confusion as to the source of the
services offered under the respective marks is likely to
result. San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics
Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977);
Spoons Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ 1735,
1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir.
June 5, 1992). In this case, the proper focus is on the
recollection of the average business customer, who retains
a general rather than specific impression of the marks. In
re Box Solutions Corp., 79 USPQ2d 1953, 1957 (TTAB 2006)
Serial No. 78528124
19
(applicant’s products are computer hardware, namely,
communications servers and the registrant’s products are
computers and computer peripherals); Sealed Air Corp. v.
Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975) (opposer’s
products are sold to industrial, retail or commercial, and
military users and applicant’s products are sold to
industrial and institutional consumers such as
manufacturing plants, transportation companies, office
buildings, utilities, restaurants, hospitals, and nursing
homes).
At the outset of our analysis of the marks, we note
that there is no evidence of record regarding whether the
letters “K&B” or “KB” have any significance in applicant’s
business-to-business insurance brokerage services or
registrant’s mortgage lending and escrow services. In
other words, the letters “K&B” and “KB” do not connote
anything about the services at issue. Accordingly, the
letters “K&B” and “KB” are fanciful or arbitrary when used
in connection with applicant’s business-to-business
insurance brokerage services or registrant’s mortgage
lending and escrow services.
The letters “K&B” in applicant’s mark and the letters
“KB” in registrant’s marks are the dominant portions of
their respective marks. The term “Underwriters” in
Serial No. 78528124
20
applicant’s mark K&B UNDERWRITERS is descriptive of
insurance brokerage services. Applicant disclaimed the
exclusive right to use the word “Underwriters” in response
to the Examining Attorney’s requirement to do so because
that word is descriptive of insurance brokerage services.18
Also, we take judicial notice that the term “Underwriter”
is defined as “one that underwrites a policy of insurance:
an individual or company that insures: insurer.”19
Likewise, the word “Home” in applicant’s mark KB HOME
and the term “Home Mortgage” in applicant’s mark KB HOME
MORTGAGE are descriptive when used in connection mortgage
lending services for single and multiple dwelling units
(i.e., homes). A descriptive feature of a mark is entitled
less weight than inherently distinctive elements when
weighing the similarity of marks. In re National Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“there is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a
particular feature of a mark, provided that the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their

18 July 19, 2005 Office Action.
19 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged, p. 2491 (1993). The Board may take judicial
notice of dictionary evidence. University of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982),
aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Serial No. 78528124
21
entireties”). Accordingly, the letters “K&B” and “KB” are
entitled to more weight in the comparison of the marks than
the descriptive words “Underwriters,” “Home,” and “Home
Mortgage.”
The significance of the letters “K&B” in applicant’s
mark and the letters “KB” in registrant’s marks are
highlighted by their location at the beginning of the
marks. As such, they are the first features consumers will
see when encountering the marks. Thus, they are likely to
have a greater impact on purchasers and be remembered by
them. Presto Products Inc. v. Nice-Pak Inc., 9 USPQ2d
1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a
mark which is most likely to be impressed on the mind of a
purchaser and remembered). See also See Palm Bay Imports
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d
1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Veuve” is the most prominent
part of the mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the
first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the
label); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir.
1992)(upon encountering the marks, consumers must first
notice the identical lead word).
In view of the preceding framework for analyzing
marks, we find that consumers will look to the letters
Serial No. 78528124
22
“K&B” and “KB” as source indicators and the terms
“Underwriters,” “Home,” and “Home Mortgage” as describing
the services. Under these circumstances, the marks are
similar in appearance because the registered marks both
include the letters “KB,” in the same order, and
applicant’s mark feature the letters “K&B.” The ampersand
between the letters “K” and “B” in applicant’s mark is not
a sufficient visual distinction between the marks. See
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dayco Corp., 201 USPQ 485,
488 n.1 (TTAB 19878) (FAST-FINDER with a hyphen is
substantially identical to FASTFINDER without a hyphen).
Cf. In re Seaman & Associates Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1657 (TTAB
1986) (use of ampersand did not render descriptive terms
distinctive).
The marks are aurally similar and have a similar
connotation to the extent that the dominant portions of
each mark share the letters “K” and “B” in that order.
Because the letters “K&B” and “KB” are arbitrary or
fanciful when used in connection with services at issue,
the marks engender similar, if not identical, commercial
impressions. We are cognizant that we must consider the
marks in their entireties. However, in view of the fact
that the marks are used in connection with related
financial services and the similarity of the letters “K&B”
Serial No. 78528124
23
or “KB” in the marks, consumers encountering applicant’s
mark and who are familiar with the registered marks are
likely to believe that applicant’s business-to-business
insurance brokerage services are somehow associated or
affiliated with registrant’s mortgage lending and escrow
services with which they are familiar.
E. Balancing the factors.
Considering all of the relevant du Pont factors, and
the reasons we have discussed, we conclude that there is a
likelihood of confusion between applicant’s mark K&B
UNDERWRITERS and registrant’s marks KB HOME and KB HOME
MORTGAGE. Any doubt as to whether there may be a
likelihood of confusion is resolved against applicant. In
re Shell Oil Co., 16 USPQ2d at 1691.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.