Katrina L. Webster, Complainant,v.Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 6, 2008
0120064640 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 2008)

0120064640

03-06-2008

Katrina L. Webster, Complainant, v. Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Katrina L. Webster,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. Donald C. Winter,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200646401

Hearing No. 100-2005-00799X

Agency No. 040023A004

DECISION

On August 11, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July

6, 2006, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final order.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Secretary, GS-318-06, at the agency's Strategic Systems Programs,

in Washington, D.C. On September 14, 2004, complainant filed an EEO

complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of race

(African-American) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when

she applied, but was not selected for a Management Analyst position, under

Vacancy Announcement 03-ADP-099A, at the Navy Engineering and Logistics

Office in Arlington, Virginia. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and

notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing.

The AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's motion for a decision

without a hearing, dated January 24, 2006. The AJ found that the

complaint did not warrant a hearing and over the complainant's objections,

issued a decision without a hearing on May 15, 2006. Specifically,

the AJ found that the agency's motion for a decision without a hearing

correctly stated the material facts and applicable legal standards.

The AJ then found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of race or retaliation since none of the agency employees who

participated in the selection process had knowledge of complainant's

race or prior EEO activity at the time of the selection. Further,

he noted that complainant's supervisor stated that he did not have any

knowledge of her or her husband's prior EEO activity, and that no one

contacted him about complainant. The AJ also found that complainant's

husband and representative provided an affidavit stating that he had

no evidence to support his speculation that the agency discriminated or

retaliated against his wife. Ultimately, AJ concluded that complainant

failed to establish that material issues of fact existed such that a

hearing was warranted. The agency subsequently issued a final order

adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that she was

subjected to discrimination as alleged.

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal

and factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them,

de novo. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a); EEOC Management Directive 110,

Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999). We must first determine whether

it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing

on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a

decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given

the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,

there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather

to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.

The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary

judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine"

if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in

favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).

A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of

the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

In the present case, we find that the record was adequately developed

for the AJ to issue a decision without a hearing. Further, we find that

complainant was given ample notice of the agency's motion and adequate

time to respond.

The record reveals the following facts in the light most favorable to

complainant: Complainant applied for a Management Analyst position,

vacancy announcement number 03-ADP-088A. She was rated qualified

along with fourteen other qualified candidates but was not referred

for consideration on the merit promotion certificate. Complainant

participated in previous EEO activity, as did her husband. In December

2003, the selecting official, Director of Information Systems and

Technology Directorate, with the Navy Engineering and Logistics Office

(SO), chose three candidates for the position, two African-American

women and a Caucasian woman.

Preliminarily, we note that the AJ erred in adopting the facts contained

in the agency's motion for a decision without a hearing. When issuing

a decision without a hearing, the AJ should consider the facts in

the light most favorable to complainant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Nevertheless, we find that even taking the facts in the light most

favorable to complainant, she failed to establish that genuine issues

of material fact exist such that a hearing was warranted.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex,

complainant must show that she is a member of a protected group and that

she was subjected to an adverse employment action. Packard v. Department

of Health & Human Serv., EEOC Appeal Nos. 01985494, 01985495 (March 22,

2001). She must also show either that she was treated less favorably

than other similarly situated employees outside of her protected group,

id., or must present other, noncomparative evidence which supports an

inference that the agency was motivated by unlawful discrimination.

See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312

(1996); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin

Caterers Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at n.4 (September 18, 1996).

We find that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination since she failed to show that other similarly situated

employees outside of her protected group were treated more favorably in

the selection process. Specifically, the record reflects that two of the

three offers for employment were given to two African-American women.

Further, nothing in the record supports an inference that the SO was

motivated by unlawful animus on the basis of race with regard to this

selection process. As such, we find that complainant failed to show

that a genuine issue of material fact existed such that a hearing was

required on this claim.

Similarly, in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation,

complainant must present facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give

rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security

Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a

reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of

reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a

nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.

Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340

(September 25, 2000).

The Commission finds that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation since she failed to show that the agency was

aware of her prior EEO activity or that of her husband's. The SO, in

his affidavit, provided that he had no knowledge of complainant's, her

husband's, or any of the applicant's prior EEO activity. Although the

record shows that complainant was employed by the same agency to which

she applied for the position, the record also reflects that the SO and

other members of the selection process were not in the same division

or location as complainant. Further, even though complainant contends

that her supervisor must have informed the SO and the members of the

selection process of her EEO activity, her supervisor provided in his

affidavit that he had not provide the alleged information. As such,

we find that complainant failed to show that a genuine issue of material

fact exists such that a hearing is warranted.

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the agency's

adoption of the AJ's finding of no discrimination without a hearing.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____03-06-2008_____________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above referenced appeal number.

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0120064640

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120064640