0120101775
02-17-2011
Karen Boone, Complainant, v. Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.
Karen Boone,
Complainant,
v.
Timothy F. Geithner,
Secretary,
Department of the Treasury
(Internal Revenue Service),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120101775
Hearing No. 490-2009-00070X
Agency No. EEODFS-07-0883-F
DECISION
On March 25, 2010, Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's
February 26, 2010, final decision concerning her equal employment
opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.
The Commission accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are: (1) whether a portion of Complainant's
complaint should be dismissed for untimely EEO Counselor contact;
(2) whether Complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation of her
claimed disability; (3) whether the Agency violated the Rehabilitation
Act by disclosing Complainant's medical documentation; and (4) whether
Complainant was subjected to disparate treatment and harassment as
alleged.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked
as a Senior Information Security Specialist, GS-13, at the Agency's
Disaster Recovery Office, Modernization and Information Technology
Services facility in Memphis, Tennessee. ROI, EEO Counselor's Report,
at 38-41. Complainant has been diagnosed with, among other things,
Congestive Heart Failure, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease,
Gastrointestinal Reflux, Fibromyalgia, Immune Deficiency, Hypertension,
and Bronchitis. ROI, Complainant's Decl., at 125. Complainant has provided
medical documentation from her doctor to her first-level Supervisor
(S1) supporting her conditions. Id. Complainant, due to her conditions,
has difficulty attending work regularly because she has shortness of
breath and difficulty with concentration and stamina. Id. at 126. As a
result, Complainant was absent in excess of eight months for her 2007
rating period. ROI, January 14, 2008, Letter to Complainant, at 456.
Beginning in March 2007, Complainant submitted reasonable accommodation
requests to be allowed to work at home on a full-time basis. ROI,
Complainant's Decl., at 129.
On May 16, 2007, Complainant mailed to the Agency medical documentation
that S1 requested. Id. at 141. Erroneously assuming the documentation
pertained to a tax matter, the Agency's tax office correspondence
extraction unit scanned Complainant's medical documentation into the
Agency's document management system, which was forwarded to the tax
examination unit. ROI, IT Security Specialist Decl., at 530. The tax
office was unable to determine that Complainant's documentation, intended
for S1, pertained to the internal employment matter. Id. On July 30,
2007, S1 notified Complainant that she had not received the requested
medical information. ROI, S1 Decl., at 426; ROI, Complainant's Decl.,
at 141. However, Complainant notified S1 that she had already sent
the information. ROI, Complainant's Decl., at 141. After receiving
notification from the extraction unit, management removed Complainant's
medical documentation from the tax document management system. ROI,
S1 Decl., at 427.
In a letter dated August 17, 2007, to Complainant, S1, citing
Complainant's use of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
noted:
I am sympathetic regarding your medical condition. However, even if you
choose to use FMLA leave, your absence from work cannot be tolerated
indefinitely. Your absence has caused hardships in your unit, since it
has one less person to do required work. Your fellow employees are forced
to do work that you would perform if you were present. This negatively
affects the morale of the unit. Thus, if you choose to use FMLA leave,
as described above, you must be available for duty onsite on a regular,
full-time basis by the
time your FMLA leave expires, i.e., when you have used 480 hours of
FMLA leave. If not, you will be recorded as AWOL and adverse action up
to and including removal from
the service may result.
ROI, August 17, 2007, Letter, at 97-98.
Complainant continued to request that she be allowed to work from home as
accommodation. On September 11, 2007, management found that it could not
accommodate Complainant because much of her job duties required customer
interaction to develop compliance security reviews, reports, and audits
that required her physical presence in the office. ROI, Complainant's
Decl. at 131; ROI, S1 Decl., 420-421. Thereafter, On September 12, 2007,
Complainant requested that she be reassigned to a GS-13 position, which
would allow her to work at home. As a result, the EEO specialist sent
an email to Complainant notifying her that her request for reassignment
had been assigned for processing. ROI, Complainant's Decl. at 131.
On January 7, 2008, S1 sent Complainant her appraisal for the year ending
November 30, 2007, noting, "Due to a chronic illness situation, which
has prohibited the employee from being able to come into the office to
complete work, I am not able to rate the employee at this time." ROI,
Complainant's Performance Appraisal, at 319. Therefore, Complainant
received a "Not Ratable" rating from S1. Id.
After searching from October 2007 to March 2008, the Agency found a
vacant position for Complainant. ROI, S1 Decl., at 418. Thereafter,
on April 4, 2008, the Agency reassigned Complainant to the position of
Management and Program Analyst, GS-13. Id. at 430.
As a result of the above events, on August 9, 2007, Complainant made
initial contact with an EEO counselor. Thereafter, on October 11,
2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint, amended on April 19, 2008,
alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race
(African-American), disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO
activity1 when:
1. her requests for reasonable accommodation in the form of telecommuting
were denied from May 2007 to the present;
2. in a May 2, 2007 letter, S1 advised her that she would be charged
Absent Without Leave (AWOL) retroactively for April 16 through May 2,
2007;
3. on or about May 21, 2007, S1 denied her leave under FMLA;
4. on or about May 21, 2007, S1 denied her the opportunity to participate
in the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program and the Voluntary Leave Bank
Program;
5. on or about July 19 and 26, 2007, the Agency scanned her confidential
medical information into the tax system and associated it with her 2006
tax return;
6. on July 30, 2007, S1 requested medical information previously provided
on two occasions;
7. on August 6 and 27, 2007, S1 shared her confidential medical
information with another employee without her consent;
8. in an August 17, 2007, letter, S1 made inappropriate comments about
her disability; and
9. S1 issued a "Not Ratable" rating on her annual performance appraisal
on January 7, 2008.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to
request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant
timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request.
Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove
that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.
The Agency dismissed claim 1 for untimely counselor contact, noting
that Complainant contacted an EEO counselor beyond the 45-day regulatory
limitation period. Final Agency Decision, at 2. Alternatively, the Agency
addressed claim 1 on the merits, noting that Complainant could not work at
home because the nature of her work involved on-site interactions. Id. at
20. As a result, the Agency noted that Complainant could not perform the
essential functions of her position. Id. The Agency further noted that
Complainant accepted reassignment to an equivalent G-13 position, which
allowed her to work from home. Id. As such, the Agency determined that
Complainant was reasonably accommodated for her disability. Id. The Agency
also dismissed claim 2 for untimely counselor contact. Id. at 21. As
for claims 3 and 4, the Agency noted that Complainant never established
that she submitted requests under any of the programs. Id. Therefore,
the Agency noted, Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination because there was no adverse action taken against
her. Id.
As for claim 5, the Agency noted that employees at its extraction
unit are only responsible for scanning mail and are not charged with
reading mail received. Id. at 21-22. The Agency further noted that
employees in the tax extraction unit were unable to indentify the
nature of Complainant's correspondence and treated it as ordinary
taxpayer documentation. Id. at 22. Therefore, the Agency found that
this circumstance could not be considered a disclosure of medical
information in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Regarding claim 6,
the Agency noted that S1 was only reminding Complainant of medical
documentation she had not yet received. Id. With respect to claim 7,
the Agency noted that the August 6, 2006, letter to the Human Resources
Specialist concerned the validity of Complainant's absences, which
required guidance on employee relations matters. Id. As such, the
Agency noted that the disclosure of Complainant's medical information
was job-related and necessary. Therefore, the Agency determined the
disclosure was not improper. Id. For claim 8, the Agency noted that its
August 17, 2007, letter could not be considered unwelcome, severe, or
hostile conduct. Id. at 22-23. As for claim 9, the Agency noted that the
"Not Ratable" rating was issued because there was insufficient work on
which to evaluate Complainant due to her absences. Id.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant did not submit a brief on appeal. The Agency requests that
its finding of no discrimination be affirmed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Standard of Review
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo
review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9,
� VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review
"requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the
factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and
that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record,
including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and
. . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of
the record and its interpretation of the law").
Procedural Dismissals (Claims 2-4)
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires complaints of
discrimination to be brought to the attention of the EEO Counselor
within 45 days of the date of the claimed discriminatory matter, or,
in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date
of the action. The Commission's regulations, however, provide that the
time limit will be extended when the complainant shows that he or she
was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them,
that he or she did not know and reasonably should not have known that
the discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred, that despite
due diligence he or she was prevented by circumstances beyond his or
her control from contacting the counselor within the time limits, or for
other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission. See
29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(2).
The record discloses that the alleged discriminatory events in claims 2
through 4 occurred in May 2007. We find that Complainant did not initiate
contact with an EEO Counselor until August 9, 2007, which is beyond
the forty-five (45) day limitation period. On appeal, Complainant has
presented no persuasive arguments or evidence warranting an extension
of the time limit for initiating EEO Counselor contact. Therefore,
we find that claims 2 though 4 are untimely and must be dismissed.2
Reasonable Accommodation (Claim 1)
Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make
reasonable accommodation of the known physical and mental limitations
of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can
show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. �
1630.9. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined in part by our regulations
as "[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to
the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired
is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a
disability to perform the essential functions of that position." 29
C.F.R. � 1630.2(o)(ii). We find that, assuming without finding so that
Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to
the Rehabilitation Act, the Agency has provided her with a reasonable
accommodation.
When an individual with a disability cannot be accommodated in their
current position, an Agency is then obligated to consider the availability
of a reassignment as an accommodation. When provided as a reasonable
accommodation, a reassignment must be to a vacant position equivalent in
terms of pay, status, and other related factors, including benefits, if
the employee is qualified for the position. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance
on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Guidance), Notice No. 915.002 (rev. Oct. 17, 2002). If
there are no vacant equivalent positions, then an agency may consider
reassigning the individual to a vacant lower level position. Id.
Complainant's specific request for accommodation for her disability was
that she be allowed to perform her Information Security Specialist job
duties at home on a full-time basis. However, the record reflects that
Complainant's job required customer interaction and service to develop
compliance security reviews, reports, and audits, which required her
physical presence at the office. ROI, S1 Decl., at 417; ROI, Complainant's
Position Description, at 552. Accordingly, we find that the Agency
properly took the next step and began to search for vacant positions
for Complainant. The record reflects that from October 2007 to April
2008 the Agency searched for a vacant position for Complainant. ROI,
Reasonable Accommodation Tracking Log, at 593-597. As a result, on
April 4, 2008, the Agency reassigned Complainant to the position of
Management and Program Analyst at the same grade level as her prior
position. Id. at 597. Thus, we concur with the Agency's finding that
it did not violate the Rehabilitation Act in this regard.
Medical Confidentiality (Claims 5 and 7)
We note that, generally, medical information must be kept
confidential. See Guidance (describing the limited exceptions to the
medical confidentiality requirements). Specifically, footnote 111 of
the Guidance states as follows: "The limited exceptions to the ADA
confidentiality requirements are: (1) supervisors and managers may be
told about necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee
and about necessary accommodations; (2) first aid and safety personnel
may be told if the disability might require emergency treatment; and
(3) government officials investigating compliance with the ADA must be
given relevant information on request."
In regards to claim 5, although it is undisputed that the Agency
scanned Complainant's medical information into the Agency's tax
system, Complainant has not persuaded the Commission that the
Agency is responsible for a breach of medical confidentiality. The
record reflects that the Agency was not aware that the correspondence
Complainant sent contained her confidential medical information. ROI,
IT Security Specialist Decl., at 530. The record reflects that the
tax office routinely scans incoming correspondence into the document
management system in order to track tax matters; as such, it assumed that
Complainant's correspondence pertained to her taxes. Id. Thereafter,
upon notification, management promptly removed her medical information
from the document management system. ROI, S1 Aff., at 427. The evidence
in the record does not substantiate that the scanning of Complainant's
information came at management's behest or that management was lax in
its efforts to maintain the confidentiality of Complainant's medical
records. Also, although Complainant's medical information may have
been in plain view of other Agency employees, there is no evidence
that her medical information was used inappropriately. See Cornelius
v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120073652 (June 4, 2009) (finding
that although complaint's medical information ended up in plain view
of agency employees, complainant failed to persuade the Commission that
the agency was responsible for a breach of medical confidentiality).
With respect to claim 7, Complainant contends that S1 improperly
disclosed her medical information to the Agency's Human Resources
Specialist. However, the evidence of record does not support Complainant's
contention here. Although the Agency's Human Resource Specialist had
access to Complainant's medical information, we find that the she had
implicit authorization to review this information by virtue of her
role as the point of contact in the Agency's reasonable accommodation
process. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.14(c). The record reflects that S1 contacted
the Human Resource Specialist seeking direction in providing Complainant
with a reasonable accommodation. ROI, Human Resource Specialist Decl.,
at 519. Therefore, we find no improper disclosure here.3
to the extent that Complainant alleges a violation of her privacy rights
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. � 552(g)(1), we find that this is outside
the Commission's jurisdiction. See Bucci v. Department of Education,
EEOC Request Nos. 05890289, 05890290, 05890291 (April 12, 1989).
Disparate Treatment
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant
must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must
generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would
support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed
with in this case with respect to Complainant's claims, however,
because the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Board of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately
prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, EEOC Request No. 05950842;
Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).
Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant has established a prima facie
case on the bases of race, disability, and reprisal, we determine that
the Agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
actions. Specifically, with respect to claim 1, the Agency noted that
it did not allow Complainant to work at home because her job duties
required her physical presence in the office. ROI, S1 Decl., at 417. As
for claim 5, the Agency noted that employees in the tax extraction unit
were unable to indentify Complainant's correspondence and treated it as
ordinary taxpayer documentation, requiring it to scan the documentation.4
Id. at 427. Regarding claim 6, the Agency noted that S1 was not aware that
the Agency had inadvertently scanned Complainant's medical information
into the Agency's tax system. Id. As a result, unaware that the Agency
received Complainant's documentation, S1 mistakenly reminded Complainant
that she needed to send the medical information. Id. Regarding claim 7,
the Agency noted that its August 6, 2006, letter to the Human Resources
Specialist concerned the validity of Complainant's absences, which was
an attempt to accommodate Complainant's disability. ROI, S1 Decl.,
at 422; ROI, S1 Decl., at 428. For claim 8, the Agency noted that
the August 17, 2007, letter was sent to Complainant because of her
excessive absences. ROI, S1 Decl., at 428. In that respect, the Agency
noted that this was a standard letter sent to all Agency employees who
have excessive absences. Id. As for claim 9, the Agency noted that the
"Not Ratable" rating was issued because there was insufficient work to
evaluate Complainant due to her absences. Id. at 431.
Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Agency's articulated reasons were a pretext
for discrimination. Complainant can do this by showing that the
Agency's preferred explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256. Upon review, we concur with the Agency's determination
that Complainant failed to provide any evidence of pretext in the
record. Further, we find that the record is devoid of any evidence that
the Agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus towards
Complainant's race, disability, or in reprisal for her prior protected
activity.
Specifically, with respect to claim 1, although Complainant contends
she could have performed her duties at home, the position description
for her position noted that she was required to "provide expert
consultation and support to customers and lower-graded information
security employees." ROI, Complainant's Position Description, at 552. As
such, we find the position description for Complainant's Information
Security Specialist position supports S1's testimony that Complainant's
position required on-site interactions with customers and employees. As
for claim 5, there is no dispute that the scanning of Complainant's
medical records into the tax system was accidental with no management
official involved. ROI, Complainant's Decl., at 141-142; ROI, IT Security
Specialist Decl., at 530. Regarding claim 6, it is undisputed that S1
only requested that Complainant provide the documentation for a second
time because she had not received the documentation the first time. ROI,
Complainant's Decl. 141-142. As for claim 7, the record reflects that the
disclosure pertained to Human Resources advice to provide Complainant with
an accommodation. ROI, Human Resource Specialist Decl., at 519. Regarding
claims 8 and 9, there is no dispute that Complainant was absent for
extended periods of time during her 2007 rating period. ROI, January 14,
2008, Letter to Complainant, at 456.
Harassment
Finally, to the extent that Complainant is alleging that she was subjected
to a hostile work environment, we find under the standards set forth in
Harris v. Fork-lift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) that complainant's
claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994).
A finding that Complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment is
precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that
any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory
animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923
(Sept. 21, 2000).
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's
Final Decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 17, 2011
Date
1 Complainant's prior protected activity pertains to a previous formal
complaint, Agency No. EEODFS-06-0909-F, which resulted in a final
Agency decision finding no discrimination. On appeal, we affirmed.
Boone v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073435 (Jan. 14,
2008).
2 Complainant's claim of harassment encompasses claims 2, 3, and 4. We
note that such untimely discrete acts may be used as background evidence
in support of a timely claim. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). As such, we will consider these incidents as
background evidence in support of Complainant's claim of harassment.
3 See Skarica v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073399
(Mar. 5, 2010) (disclosure of complainant's medical information to
a personnel official and an agency physician was not a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act because they were contacted by virtue of their
expertise in order provide complainant with a reasonable accommodation).
To the extent that Complainant alleges a violation of her privacy rights
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. � 552(g)(1), we find that this allegation
is outside the Commission's jurisdiction. See Bucci v. Dep't of Educ.,
EEOC Request Nos. 05890289, 05890290, 05890291 (Apr. 12, 1989).
4 As noted above, we dismissed claims 2, 3, and 4 as untimely brought
to the attention of an EEO counselor.
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0120101775
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120101775