KAPADIA, Jimmy et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 17, 2020

14932224 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/932,224 11/04/2015 Jimmy KAPADIA 83586962; 67186-212PUS1 5658
46442 7590 01/17/2020
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
THAPA, SAILESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JIMMY KAPADIA and KENNETH JAMES MILLER
Appeal 2019-002687
Application 14/932,224
Technology Center 2800
Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and
BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges.
RANGE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER2
Appellant describes the invention as relating to controlling charging
of an electric vehicle’s battery pack over a plurality of charging stations by
scheduling charging based on cost to charge at each location and amount of
charging time available at each station. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method to control charging of a battery pack of an
electrified vehicle over a plurality of charging locations of a
drive route, comprising:
scheduling charging of the vehicle, via a vehicle control
system, at each of the plurality of charging locations based at
least on a cost to charge at each of the plurality of charging
locations and an amount of charging time available at each of
the plurality of charging locations, wherein scheduling charging
includes estimating a confidence value that represents an
amount of time that the vehicle control system is confident that
the vehicle will be on charge at each of the plurality of charging
locations.

REJECTION
On appeal, the Examiner maintains (Ans. 3) the rejection of claims
1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 2–3.

OPINION
Claims 1, 16, and 21 are the three independent claims on appeal.
Appellant addresses claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 21 separately.
Appeal Br. 5. Below, we specifically address each of claims 1, 2, 12, 14, 16,

2 In this Decision, we refer to the Final Office Action dated December 27,
2017 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed July 30, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer dated December 14, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed February 14, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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18, 19, and 21 separately. All other claims on appeal stand or fall together
with the claim they depend from. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2013).
A. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)).
Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
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India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409
U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an abstract
idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
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requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). According to the Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
If a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, the Guidance looks to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also, e.g., Ex parte Kimizuka, Appeal
No. 2018-001081 (PTAB July 1, 2019) (informative).
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B. The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner determines that each claim on appeal is directed to an
abstract idea. Final Act. 2–4. In particular, the Examiner determines that
each claim is directed to the “abstract idea of data manipulation, organizing
information through mathematical correlations (Digitech).” Id. at 2–4
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner also determines that the claims do not
include any additional elements, taken individually or as a combination, that
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Id.
C. Guidance Step 1: Do independent claims 1, 16, and 21 fall within a
statutory category?
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and consistent with Step 1 of the
Guidance, we first consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within
the four statutory categories explicitly set forth in § 101: “[p]rocess,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
53–54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 1 recites a method including “scheduling
charging of the vehicle” and, thus, falls within the “method” category. Claim
16 recites “a battery pack” and other elements of “[a] vehicle system” and
therefore falls within the “machine” category. Claim 21 recites a method
including “controlling charging of a battery pack” and therefore falls within
the “method” category. Thus, each claim on appeal falls within a statutory
category.
D. Guidance Step 2A Prong 1: Do independent claims 1, 16, and 21
recite a judicial exception?
Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Mayo and Alice framework and
consistent with the next step of the Guidance, we consider whether the claim
recites a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The Guidance
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synthesizes the key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas into
three primary subject-matter groupings: mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity (e.g., a fundamental economic
practice), and mental processes. Id. at 52. For the reasons discussed below,
independent claims 1, 16, and 21 (and, thus, all claims on appeal) recite a
mental process.
Claim 1 recites, among other things, the following:
scheduling charging of the vehicle, via a vehicle control system,
at each of the plurality of charging locations based at least on a cost to
charge at each of the plurality of charging locations and an amount of
charging time available at each of the plurality of charging locations,
wherein scheduling charging includes estimating a confidence value
that represents an amount of time that the vehicle control system is
confident that the vehicle will be on charge at each of the plurality of
charging locations.
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). The claim requires scheduling vehicle
charging based upon the cost to chart at various locations and time available
to charge at each location. For example, the control system might avoid
charging a battery at a location where the charging is particularly expensive
(see Spec. ¶ 37 (“vehicle system 56 prioritizes charging at more cost
effective charging locations”)), but if future stops along the route will likely
be for a short enough of time such that charging time is not adequate, the
more expensive location might be used (see, e.g., id. ¶ 57 (describing
charging for additional time at a more expensive station if necessary to
obtain enough charge to reach the next station)).
The recited process of determining when to buy vehicle fuel (in
particular, battery charge) based on cost of the fuel and based on when there
will be enough time for fueling is a mental process that can be performed in
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the human mind. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“[M]ental processes[] and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work”) (internal quotes and citation omitted);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (holding that process claim
directed to binary conversion is unpatentable because “[t]he conversion of
BCD numerals to pure binary numerals can be done mentally”); Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that claims to process of “translating a functional description of a
logic circuit into a hardware component description” are directed to an
abstract idea because the claims “read on an individual performing the
claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper’). A human mind is capable
of mentally determining that a source of fuel (i.e., the battery charge) is too
expensive and the amount of time required to fuel up.
Claim 1 also requires estimating “a confidence value.” The confidence
value is an estimation of an amount of time that the vehicle will be on charge
at future locations. Spec. ¶ 50. This also is a mental process that can be
performed in the human mind. For example, if a human vehicle driver thinks
they may not have much time to charge the vehicle later (i.e., the
“confidence value” is low), the driver may be willing to buy more expensive
charging. Because claim 1 recites a mental process, the claim recites a
concept that falls within the Guidance and thus recites an abstract idea.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.15.
Independent claim 16 recites, among other things, the following:
a control system with instructions for creating a charging
schedule that prioritizes charging of the battery pack at a first
charging station along a drive route over charging at a second
charging station of the drive route, wherein the charging
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schedule includes a confidence value estimation of an amount
of time that the control system is confident that the vehicle will
be on charge at each of the first and second charging stations.
For the reasons explained above with regard to claim 1, this recitation reads
on a mental process. Recitation of a computer or “control system” to
perform the recited mental process does not change the eligibility analysis.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”). Claim 16,
therefore, also recites an abstract idea.
Independent claim 21 recites, among other things, the following:
“wherein controlling the charging includes estimating a confidence value
that represents an amount of time that the vehicle control system is confident
that the vehicle will be on charge at each of the plurality of charging
locations.” A human mind is capable of estimating how much time will be
available for charging at future locations. Thus, this recitation also reads on
a mental process, and claim 21 recites an abstract idea.
A. Guidance Step 2A Prong 2: Is the claim “directed to” the recited
judicial exception?
Because each independent claim (and thus all claims on appeal)
recites an abstract idea, we now determine, pursuant to the precedent of the
U.S. Supreme Court and our reviewing court and consistent with the
Guidance, whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. According to the Guidance, when
a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a
practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id.
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The claim may integrate the judicial exception when, for example, it reflects
an improvement to technology or a technical field. Id. at 55.
Here, Appellant argues that the claims at issue are “directed to
specific improvements to the way in which charging of an electrified vehicle
battery pack is scheduled/controlled at each of a plurality of charging
stations along a driver route.” Appeal Br. 4 (footnote omitted). Appellant
further contends that the claims are “replete with language signifying that
the charging of the vehicle is being controlled” and addresses claims 1, 2, 7,
8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 21 in this regard. Id. at 5. The Examiner, on the
other hand, contends that each of the claims on appeal are directed to an
abstract idea and “remain silent towards the controlling of charging of an
electrified vehicle.” Ans. 4. The Examiner maintains, for example, that the
claims “fail to mention the steps involved in the controlling of charging of
the electrified vehicle.” Id. at 5.
Resolution of the Appellant and Examiner’s contrary claim
interpretations requires careful consideration of the actual words of each
claim Appellant argues. As we explain below for individual claims, some of
the claims on appeal require charging and some do not. This difference in
claim construction impacts our analysis of whether the claim integrates the
recited judicial exception into a practical application. See ChargePoint, Inc.
v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[t]he § 101
inquiry must focus on the language of the Asserted Claims themselves”)
(citation omitted).
Claim 1. Claim 1 recites, in its preamble, “[A] method to control
charging of a battery pack of an electrified vehicle,” but it positively recites
only one step in its method. That one step is “scheduling charging of the
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vehicle.” Claim 1 does not recite that any actual charging must occur—only
the scheduling part of the “method to control charging” is required. Claim 1
performs the “scheduling” mental step but does not use the output of the
“scheduling” to improve any device. Cf. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Contrary to
Digitech’s argument, nothing in the claim language expressly ties the
method to an image processor.”). Appellant’s arguments to the contrary that
the claims improve electrified vehicle charging technology (see, e.g., Reply
Br. 4) are conclusory and, thus, unpersuasive.
Because claim 1 does not improve battery charging or otherwise
improve technology, claim 1 is distinguishable from technology-based
integrations previously addressed by our reviewing court. See, e.g., Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that
patent-eligible claim was directed to self-referential table to improve
computer databases); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., 837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that patent-eligible claim focused on
specific asserted improvement in computer animation); Thales Visionix, Inc.
v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
claim related to a tracking system was patent-eligible where claims were
directed to use of inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce
errors). Claim 1, instead, is more akin to claims our reviewing court has held
are not patent-eligible. See, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC, 758 F.3d at
1350 (holding that claims to a “process of organizing information through
mathematical correlations” are ineligible even though the patentee argued
that use of calculated profile would be useful for capturing, transforming, or
rendering a digital image); see also ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 773 (holding
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that claims “directed to the abstract idea of communicating over a network
for device interaction” were patent ineligible).
We thus determine that claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract
idea (as explained above, a mental process) into a practical application.
Claim 2. Appellant argues that “[c]laims 2, 7, and 8 specifically recite
‘controlling the charging.’” Appeal Br. 5. Claim 2 recites that “controlling
the charging includes determining a drive route expected to be traveled by
the electrified vehicle.” Claim 2’s reference to “controlling the charging” is
merely a reference back to the preamble of claim 1. Claim 2, read together
with claim 1, does not require that any charge be added to or removed from
the battery pack. Rather, claim 2 merely adds a mental “determining” step to
the “scheduling” step of claim 1. Like claim 1, claim 2 does not affect the
vehicle’s charging and, therefore, does not integrate the recited abstract idea
into a practical application.
Claim 7. Claim 7 recites, in part, “wherein controlling the charging
includes prioritizing charging at the first charging location.” As with claim
2, the claim further refines the claim’s recited mental processes, but the
claim does not require that charge be added to or removed from a battery
pack. Our analysis is, therefore, the same as with claim 2.
Claim 8. Claim 8 recites, in part, “wherein controlling the charging
includes executing a charge optimization sequence for determining an
amount of charging that is to occur.” Our analysis is the same as for claims 2
and 7.
Claim 12. Claim 12 recites “charging the battery pack to a target SOC
[state of charge (see Spec. ¶ 41)] that is sufficient to travel the distance to a
next cheapest charging location.” The Examiner states that this claim
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“includes scheduling of the charging of [the] battery pack of the electrified
vehicle.” Ans. 5. While the Examiner’s statement is strictly correct because
claim 12 depends from claim 1 (and claim 1 recites a “scheduling” step), the
Examiner does not address why claim 12 does not require charging of a
battery pack. See Ans. 5. Based on the plain language of claim 12 and
context provided by the Specification, we construe claim 12 as requiring
charging the battery pack.
Appellant argues that “at least some of the claimed subject matter in
this case” is similar to that of Diamond v. Diehr. Appeal Br. 8–9. We agree
that claim 12, properly construed, is analogous to the patent eligible claim of
Diamond v. Diehr. In Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue used a
mathematical equation for several steps of the recited process. Diehr, 450
U.S. 185. The claim also included, however, steps of “installing rubber in a
press, closing the mold, . . . and automatically opening the press at the
proper time.” Id. at 187. Similarly, claim 12 at issue here requires the step of
charging the battery pack based on the claim’s recited criteria. Claim 12
physically transforms a less charged battery pack into a more charged
battery pack. Claim 12, therefore, incorporates the abstract concepts of, for
example, claim 1 into a practical application.
Claim 12 is also distinguishable from the claims our reviewing court
found patent ineligible in Chargepoint. Chargepoint, 920 F.3d at 766. The
patent-ineligible Chargepoint claims recited, for example, a control device
to enable and disable charge transfer, a transceiver to communicate requests
for charge transfer with a remote server, and a controller coupled to the
transceiver that causes the control device to turn charging on and off. Id. The
court determined that the claims were patent-ineligible because the claim
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language was so broad that the invention of the patent was “nothing more
than the abstract idea of communication over a network for interacting with
a device, applied to the context of electric vehicle charging stations.” Id. at
769. Here, claim 12 is more narrow; claim 12 requires, for example, the
scheduling recited by claim 1 and determinations recited by claims 8–11.
Claim 12, unlike the claims of ChargePoint, does not “cover any mechanism
for implementing network communication on a charging station” or
otherwise preempt an entire industry’s ability to use a broad concept.
Because claim 12 incorporates recited abstract concepts into a
practical application, the process as a whole satisfies § 101 subject matter
eligibility.
Claim 14. Claim 14 recites “charging the battery pack to a target SOC
that is sufficient to travel the distance to a next cheapest charging location.”
Like claim 12, this claim requires charging the battery pack and requires
physically transforming a less charged battery pack into a more charged
battery pack. Claim 14, like claim 12, integrates any recited abstract
concepts into a practical application and, therefore, satisfies § 101 subject
matter eligibility.
Claim 16. Claim 16 recites a vehicle system with three recited
elements: “a battery pack,” “a charging system configured to selectively
charge the battery pack,” and “a control system configured with instructions
for creating a charging schedule that prioritizes charging of the battery
pack. . . .” While, as Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 5), claim 16 recites a
charging system for charging, the claim does not link the recited charging
system to the recited control system. Claim 16 requires that the control
system have instructions for creating charging schedule, but claim 16 does
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not require that the charging system charge based on the charging schedule.
Indeed, claim 16 does require that anything make use of the charging
schedule that claim 16 recites. Cf. Digitech Image Techs., LLC, 758 F.3d at
1350 (“nothing in the claim language expressly ties the method to an image
processor.”).
Appellant argues that claim 16 is more than a mental process because
it includes physical features such as the battery pack, charging system, and
control system. Appeal Br. 9. This argument does not persuade us that claim
16 transforms claim 16’s abstract idea recitations into a practical application.
Rather, the elements Appellant relies on are similar to those in the
ChargePoint claims that were not sufficient to make the claim patent-
eligible under § 101. See Chargepoint, 920 F.3d at 766 (holding claim
ineligible despite it reciting, among other things, “a control device to turn
electric supply on and off,” “a transceiver,” and “a controller”).
Unlike, for example, claim 12 that we address above, claim 16 does
not make use of the recited “creating a charging schedule” to improve
technology. Claim 16 is more similar to claim 1, also addressed above, in
this regard. As expressed in the Guidance, claim 16 does not “use[] a judicial
exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is
integral to the claim.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. We, thus, determine
that claim 16 does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application.
Claim 18. Claim 18 recites the system of claim 16 “wherein the
control system includes at least one control module configured to execute a
charge optimization sequence for charging the battery pack along the drive
route.” The recited “charge optimization sequence” serves to, as its name
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suggests, optimize the quantity of charge at various locations and determines
times to begin and end charging at each location. Spec. ¶ 54. The “charge
optimization sequence” may include the scheduling recited by claim 16.
Spec. ¶ 12. The recited “charge optimization sequence for charging the
battery pack along the drive route” is an abstract mental process because a
human mind is capable of, for example, assessing time available for
charging at locations along a route and making use of the charge time
accordingly.
Importantly, unlike claim 16, claim 18 requires an apparatus
configured to actually charge the battery pack according to the recited
charge optimization sequence (i.e., “a charging system configured to
selectively charge the battery pack” coupled with “at least one control
module configured to execute a charge optimization sequence for charging
the battery pack”). Claim 18, therefore, recites apparatus that (according to
Appellant’s Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 12, 54)) improves how the
recited battery pack is charged. Claim 18’s apparatus also is capable of
transforming a less charged battery pack into a more charged battery pack
according to the “charge optimization sequence.” We, thus, determine that
claim 18 integrates a recited judicial exception (the “charge optimization
sequence”) into a practical application,3 and, therefore, satisfies § 101
subject matter eligibility.

3 We note that claim 18, like claim 16, does not necessarily make use of the
“charging schedule” or integrate that particular abstract idea into a practical
application. The Guidelines and applicable law, however, do not require that
a claim integrate every abstract idea the claim recites into a practical
application.
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Claim 19. Claim 19 recites “[t]he vehicle system as recited in claim
16, wherein the charging system includes a switch selectively actuated to
shut-off charging of the battery pack.” Although the recited switch can
control charging, the recitation does not connect any abstract ideas to any
practical application. We, thus, determine that claim 19, much like claim 16,
does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application.
Claim 21. Claim 21 recites, for example, “controlling charging of a
battery pack of an electrified vehicle . . . wherein controlling the charging
includes estimating a confidence value.” The Examiner states that “[t]he
only positive[ly] recited step is ‘estimation’ which itself is directed to an
abstract idea.” Ans. 6–7. We disagree. Claim 21 explicitly requires
“controlling charging of a battery pack” and the controlling “includes” the
“estimating.” See also Appeal Br. 5 (arguing that claim 21 requires
controlling charging of the vehicle). Claim 21 makes use of its recited
“estimation” to improve charging of the battery pack and to physically
transform a less charged battery pack into a more charged battery pack.
Claim 21, therefore, is similar to claim 12 (discussed above) and the patent-
eligible claims of Diamond v. Diehr. Claim 21, thus, integrates the recited
judicial exception into a practical application and satisfies § 101 subject
matter eligibility.
B. Guidance Step 2B: Do the claims provide an inventive concept?4
Pursuant to the second step of the Mayo/Alice test and consistent with
the Guidance, we next determine whether a claim nonetheless provides an

4 Above, we determine that claims 12, 14, 18, and 21 (and claims depending
from those claims) are patent eligible. We, therefore, do not further address
those claims pursuant to Guidance Step 2B.
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inventive concept. In assessing this step, we consider whether additional
claim elements (claim recitations beyond the identified patent ineligible
subject matter), considered both individually and in combination with the
claim as a whole, (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (2) simply
append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate our
conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step. Id.
Here, the Examiner finds that the any additional elements are “recited
at a highly generic level without any specificity and significantly more.”
Final Act. 2–3. Appellant does not argue that any specific recited elements
beyond the abstract recitations addressed above are not well-understood,
routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 7. Rather, Appellant argues that the
claims are directed to specific improvements to the way charging occurs.
Appeal Br. 4, 7–8. This argument relates to whether or not the claims are
directed to an abstract idea rather than whether the claims include
significantly more, and, as explained above, this argument is unpersuasive as
to claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 16, and 19. Moreover, Appellant admits that, for
example, electric vehicles with battery packs that may be connected to
power sources are known in the art. Spec. ¶¶ 2–3. Appellant’s arguments,
therefore, do not identify error in the Examiner’s analysis pursuant to the
second step of the Mayo/Alice test.
Except where otherwise explained above, Appellant’s arguments do
not identify harmful error, and we, thus, sustain the Examiner’s rejection for
all claims except claims 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, and 22.
Appeal 2019-002687
Application 14/932,224

19
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22 101 Eligibility 1–11, 13,
16, 17, 19,
20
12, 14, 15,
18, 21, 22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART