Jurgensen

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 20, 2006

No. 78320557 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2006)

Mailed:
July 20, 2006

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Jurgensen
________

Serial No. 78320557
_______

Jeff Landes of Catalyst Law Group for Thomas E. Jurgensen.

Shaunia P. Wallace Carlyle, Trademark Examining Attorney,
Law Office 110 (Chris A. F. Pedersen, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Bucher, Grendel and Zervas, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Thomas E. Jurgensen has appealed from the final
refusal of the trademark examining attorney to register
CATALYST LAW GROUP (in standard character form) as a
trademark for “Legal Services in the Fields of
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 78320557
2
Biotechnology Law, namely Intellectual Property Law,
Business Law and Corporate Law”1 in International Class 42.
The examining attorney has refused registration
pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s mark so resembles
the previously registered marks THE CATALYST GROUP (in
standard character form) for “advisory services, namely,
business consultation services relating to business and
corporate development in the information technology
industry,”2 in International Class 35, and THE CATALYST
GROUP (in standard character form) for “publications,
namely, newsletters, circulars and reports, relating to
business and corporate development in the information
technology industry,”3 in International Class 16, that, as
used on applicant’s identified services, applicant's mark
is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
(Both registrations are owned by the same registrant.)
Additionally, the examining attorney has refused to
register applicant's mark in view of her requirement that
applicant disclaim the phrase LAW GROUP. (Applicant has

1 Application Serial No. 78320557, filed October 29, 2003,
asserting first use on May 1, 2002 and first use in commerce on
November 20, 2002.
2 Registration No. 2219977, issued January 26, 1999. Section 8
affidavit accepted, Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
3 Registration No. 2233289, issued March 23, 1999. Section 8
affidavit accepted, Section 15 affidavit acknowledged.
Serial No. 78320557
3
disclaimed GROUP only.) According to the examining
attorney, the term is merely descriptive of a feature of
applicant's services. 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a). See also
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
Applicant has appealed the final refusal of his
application. Both applicant and the examining attorney
have filed briefs. As discussed below, the refusals to
register are affirmed.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis,
however, two key, although not exclusive, considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods,
Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24
(CCPA 1976). See also, In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105
F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Serial No. 78320557
4
The Marks
We initially consider the first du Pont factor, i.e.,
the similarities or dissimilarities of the marks in their
entireties. We must consider whether the marks are similar
in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression.
Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir.
2005). We do not consider whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar that
confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the
respective marks is likely to result. The focus is on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains
a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.
See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB
1975). Also, we are guided by the well-established
principle that although the marks must be considered in
their entireties, there is nothing improper, under
appropriate circumstances, in giving more or less weight to
a particular portion of a mark. See In re National Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The examining attorney maintains that the dominant
portion of the marks is the term CATALYST and that the
significance of LAW GROUP is that “consumers will believe
Serial No. 78320557
5
that the applicant has a law group named CATLYST [sic].”
Brief at p. 3. Applicant maintains that the dominant
feature of the mark is CATALYST LAW rather than CATALYST
alone, because CATALYST LAW “is a double entendre … meant
to create the commercial impression to the consuming
public ….” Brief at p. 8. Applicant adds:
Applicant submits the wording “CATALYST LAW”
is meant to express the unification of science
and law. More specifically, the wording
“CATALYST LAW” will be understood to be a group
representing the legal services required in the
field of science, namely Intellectual Property
Law, Business Law, Corporate Law and
Biotechnology Law. The word CATALYST refers to a
substance or chemical that increases the rate of
a chemical reaction without itself undergoing any
change. The word LAW refers to the field of
business which is the practice of law. Thus,
“CATALYST LAW” is the significant feature of the
mark which is responsible to creating the
commercial impression upon the consuming public
meant to utilize Applicant's services. Rather
than focusing on the dominant wording of CATALYST
only, Applicant submits the proper focus should
be the wording CATALYST LAW as a double entendre
….” Id.

We find that the term CATALYST is the dominant term in
applicant's mark. CATALYST is the first term in
applicant's mark, and the first parts of marks are often
those most likely to be impressed on the minds of
prospective purchasers and remembered. Presto Products,
Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 1988).
In fact, applicant, who is the principal founder and sole
Serial No. 78320557
6
shareholder of Catalyst Law Group, APC, refers to Catalyst
Law Group, APC as “Catalyst” and the mark CATALYST LAW
GROUP as “the ‘Catalyst Mark’” in his declaration submitted
with applicant's September 3, 2004 response. Further, LAW
GROUP – taken as one phrase - has a readily identifiable
connotation, i.e., “a number of individuals engaged in the
practice of law.” See definition of GROUP from The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(Online Edition), i.e., “[a] number of individuals or
things considered together because of similarities,” of
which we take judicial notice.4 As such, LAW GROUP is
merely descriptive of a feature of applicant services,
i.e., the individuals or group that provides applicant's
legal services. It is completely appropriate to give less
weight to a portion of a mark that is merely descriptive of
the relevant goods or services in comparing marks in their
entireties. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224
USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“That a particular feature is
descriptive ... with respect to the relevant goods or
services is one commonly accepted rationale for giving less
weight to a portion of the mark.”).

4 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions.
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports
Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217
USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Serial No. 78320557
7
We disagree with applicant’s contention that there is
a double entendre in CATALYST LAW. While applicant
maintains that the phrase is “meant to express the
unification of science and law,” we find that the claimed
double entendre is simply one that would not be understood
without considerable thought and conjecture, even by those
in the biotechnology field, if at all. Also, given the
clear meaning of LAW GROUP and the highly descriptive
nature of LAW in the context of applicant's legal services,
we doubt that consumers of applicant's services would find
the double entendre which applicant ascribes to CATALAYST
LAW. Simply put, the definition of LAW GROUP would trump
any double entendre – if one exists - in applicant's mark.
Thus, we disagree with applicant that the dominant portion
of applicant's mark is CATALYST LAW but find that the
dominant term in applicant's mark is CATALYST.
We also find that CATALYST is the dominant term in
registrant’s mark. THE in registrant’s marks has no source
identifying capability. GROUP is merely descriptive of
registrant as the provider of the services set forth in the
registration. Registrant has disclaimed GROUP in both
registrations.
Further, because the term CATALYST is arbitrary in the
context of applicant's and registrant’s goods and services,
Serial No. 78320557
8
and there is no evidence of third-party use of this term in
the record for similar or related goods or services, we
find that registrant's marks are strong marks. See
definition of “catalyst,” made of record with applicant's
September 30, 2004 response, i.e., “1: a substance (as an
enzyme) that enables a chemical reaction to proceed at a
usually faster rate or under different conditions … than
otherwise possible[;] 2: an agent that provokes or speeds
significant change or action.”
Thus, both marks contain the arbitrary term CATALYST
and the descriptive term GROUP, with CATALYST as the
identical dominant term. While the marks have obvious
differences in their appearances and pronunciations due in
part to the inclusion of the descriptive term LAW in
applicant's mark, these differences are not as significant
as the similarities created by the identical common term.
Further, in view of the shared dominant term and the shared
term GROUP, we find that the meanings of the marks and
their commercial impressions are not dissimilar – the
addition of the highly descriptive term LAW between
CATALYST and GROUP does not alter the overall meaning and
commercial impression of the marks and the differences in
the meanings and commercial impressions of the marks are
not very significant. We conclude that, when we consider
Serial No. 78320557
9
these marks in their entireties, the differences in
appearance, pronunciation, meaning, and commercial
impression are eclipsed by the similarities of the marks.
We therefore resolve the first du Pont factor against
applicant.
The Services and Goods
We next consider the second du Pont factor involving
the similarities or dissimilarities of the goods and
services, first between applicant's services and
registrant’s services, and then between applicant's
services and registrant’s goods.
It is not necessary that the goods or services of the
parties be similar or competitive, or even that they move
in the same channels of trade to support a holding of
likelihood of confusion, as long as they are related in
some manner, and/or that the conditions and activities
surrounding the marketing of the services and goods are
such that they would or could be encountered by the same
persons under circumstances that could, because of the
similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief
that they originate from the same producer. See In re
Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223
USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d
1386 (TTAB 1991).
Serial No. 78320557
10
The examining attorney has submitted with her May 17,
2004 Office action several third-party use-based
registrations to show that the same entity has adopted a
common mark for both legal services and business
development services.5 See, e.g., the following:
Registration No. 2725795 for CONCISIS for
“business management consultation services,
namely, advising clients in all business fields
including electronics, telecommunications,
consumer industries, media, retail, energy,
banking, securities, healthcare, insurance and
transportation, in the areas of business
strategies, organization performance, business
related policy areas, marketing, manufacturing
and distribution of manpower, business
management, planning, control, management
information and information technology” in
International Class 35; and “providing legal
services” in International Class 42;

Registration No. 2736101 for ISOGUARD for
“Business consultation services and business
investigations” in International Class 35; and “…
legal services, namely, enforcement of
intellectual property rights of others” in
International Class 42; and

Registration No. 2738104 for ALCOS for
“… business consultation” in International Class
35; and “legal services” in International Class
42.6

5 The fact that the services (and goods) are classified in
different classes has no bearing on the likelihood of confusion
analysis. See Jean Patou Inc. v. Theon Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 29
USPQ2d 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
6 The examining attorney has also made of record several
registrations based on Section 44 of the Trademark Act or
registrations which do not recite legal services in International
Class 42 but rather provide for business consulting services that
include consultation on legal issues. Because these
registrations are not based on use in commerce or do not provide
Serial No. 78320557
11

These registrations suggest that the same source may
provide both business consultation services and legal
services. See In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467
(TTAB 1988) (although third-party registrations “are not
evidence that the marks shown therein are in use on a
commercial scale or that the public is familiar with them,
[they] may have some probative value to the extent that
they may serve to suggest that such goods or services are
the type which may emanate from a single source”). See
also In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB
1993).
Additionally, the examining attorney has submitted
with her final Office action Internet evidence showing that
the same entity offers both legal services and business
development services. See, e.g. the following:
www.hill-law-firm.com
Hill, Glowacki, Jaeger & Hughes, LLP is able to
provide a variety of services to business and
their owners. *** We provide legal services in
connection with the formation of corporations,
partnerships and limited liability companies. We
counsel on the liability, business and tax
aspects of business formation. *** BUSINESS
COUNSELING. … We provide ongoing consultation
with business owners and managers on a variety of
problems.

for legal services as a service in itself, such registrations
have no probative value.
Serial No. 78320557
12
www.e-magnify.com
Business Owners Legal Solutions Plan
The Business Owners Legal Solutions Plan provides
small businesses with comprehensive services such
as: Legal correspondence services[,] … executed
contract review … This plan also provides
business consultation services and other numerous
small business focused benefits ….

www.sicyou.com
Prepaid Legal Services designed the Home Based
Business Rider to provide small business owners
access to commonly needed legal services for a
low monthly cost. … Benefits of the Rider
include: … Trial defense at a 25% discount …
Business consultation services and other numerous
small business focused benefits.

www.prweb.com
Legal Services for Entrepreneurs Now Available
Business Owners Legal Solutions Plan provides
small businesses with comprehensive and
affordable services. This plan also provides
business consultation services.

Applicant maintains that “the services differ in two
categories: 1) the industry of trade and 2) the type of
service provided.” Brief at p. 5.
Regarding the “industry of trade” argument, applicant
maintains that applicant “provides [his] services to the
field of biotechnology including, biology, chemistry and
biochemistry, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, etc.
while Registrant provides services to the field of
information technology”; and that “the public would not be
confused because the services, including the industry of
the trade … are substantially different.” Brief at
Serial No. 78320557
13
pp. 5 - 6. However, the test is not whether purchasers
would confuse legal services in the biotechnology field
with business consultation services in the information
technology industry, but rather whether purchasers would be
confused as to the source of these services. Additionally,
although registrant limits its services to the information
technology industry, information technology is part of the
computer industry, which is ubiquitous and certainly has
application in the biotechnology field.
Regarding applicant's “type of services” argument,
applicant explains that “the business services provided by
a legal organization are substantially different from those
of a non-legal entity and would not cause a likelihood of
confusion.” Brief at p. 6. Applicant submits:
The business services provided by a legal
entity, including those by Applicant, are legally
related, including issues and problems regarding
securities formation and regulation, business
formation, contract formation, etc. However, a
non-legal entity provides such business services
such as marketing, corporate development, market
trend analysis, product marketing, etc. The two
examples provided by the examining attorney, Pre-
Paid Legal Services and Hill Law Firm, are legal
entities that offer legal related business
services. For example, the “business
consultation services” offered by Pre-Paid Legal
Services include contract review, document
review, legal correspondence services, trail
defense services, etc. while those of the Hill
Law Firm include business formation, contract
review, dispute resolution, etc. These business
services are legal business services such as
Serial No. 78320557
14
those provided by the Applicant and are not
business services provided by non-legal entities
such as those provided by the Registrant. Brief
at p. 6

Applicant, however, has not provided any support for his
contention that the business services provided by a “legal
entity” are limited to those that “are legally related,
including issues and problems regarding securities
formation and regulation, business formation, [and]
contract formation.” Id. Certainly, a law firm is not
restricted to providing only legal advice or legal
services. See third party registrations of record.
Additionally, there is no basis for applicant’s restrictive
interpretation of the scope of the business consulting
services provided by Pre-Paid Legal Services and the Hill
Law Firm. These firms do not only address “issues and
problems regarding securities formation and regulation,
business formation, [and] contract formation.” Id. The
printout describing “The Business Owners Legal Solutions
Plan” states that small businesses are provided with
business consultation services and identifies such
services, obtainable through GoSmallBiz.com as offering “a
panel of experts to provide direction and advisement on any
business issue” such as financing options, website
promotion, sales challenges, computers, time management,
Serial No. 78320557
15
motivating employees and management.” Further, the site
states, “[i]f your question leads our counselors to
conclude that you need hands-on business advice, then you
may be referred to a retired business executive in your
area who will provide free consulting and advice.”
We find that the examining attorney has made a prima
facie case that applicant's legal services in the
biotechnology field and registrant's business consulting
services in the information technology industry are
sufficiently related and that applicant's legal services
would likely be offered in the same channels of trade to
the same purchasers who would be interested in registrant's
business consulting services, and applicant has not
rebutted the examining attorney’s prima facie case. Thus,
the second du Pont factor is resolved against applicant in
connection with Registration No. 2219977 involving advisory
services.
We now consider the similarities and dissimilarities
between applicant's services and registrant’s goods. The
examining attorney relies on the following registrations to
show that consumers have come to view applicant's legal
services and registrant’s publications as being of a type
that emanates from a single source:
Serial No. 78320557
16
Registration No. 2827799 for RADER FISHMAN &
GRAUER for “Brochures and newsletters in the
fields of legal and technology services” in
International Class 16; and “Legal services,
intellectual property consultation, namely,
management of intellectual property portfolios
for domestic and foreign clients; computer
services, namely, offering U.S. and foreign
intellectual property data” in International
Class 42;

Registration No. 2859652 for JENNER & BLOCK
(stylized) for “Magazines, newsletters and
pamphlets in the field of legal services” in
International Class 16; and “Legal services in
the fields of general litigation, client
counseling, commercial law, employee benefits and
executive compensation, corporate and securities
law, corporate transactions, antitrust/unfair
competition, appellate litigation, financial
services/institutions law, tax,
labor/employment/human resources, environmental,
technology and intellectual property,
international law, government issues, estate
planning and probate, family law, and
media/communications/First Amendment law” in
International Class 42; and

Registration No. 2674481 for RFG for “Periodic
publications, namely, newsletters in the field of
intellectual property law” in International Class
16; and “Legal services in the field of
intellectual property law” in International Class
42.7

With the exception of the registration for RADER FISHMAN &
GRAUER, the above registrations are limited to legal
publications, and do not concern publications in the

7 The examining attorney has included several Section 44
registrations with her final Office action in support of her
contention that there is a relationship between applicant's
services and registrant’s goods. For the reasons set forth in
footnote 6, supra, these Section 44 registrations have no
probative value.
Serial No. 78320557
17
information technology industry. While the registration
for RADER FISHMAN & GRAUER includes brochures and
newsletters in the field of technology services, the term
“technology services” is ambiguous. Also, one registration
is insufficient to demonstrate prima facie that consumers
have come to view legal services and publications relating
to business and corporate development in the information
technology industry as coming from a common source. Thus,
the second du Pont factor is resolved in applicant's favor
in connection with Registration No. 2233289 involving
publications.
Trade Channels
Applicant maintains that applicant's marketing
activities are specifically calculated to reach only
individuals or companies engaging in some form of
scientific research; and that applicant typically markets
his services through industry-specific trade shows,
presentations and publications. In contrast, applicant
maintains that the typical consumers of registrant’s
services are telecommunications companies “looking for
better ways to market … products, follow market trends and
raise capital”; and that registrant markets its services
through trade shows, networking events and publications
Serial No. 78320557
18
specific to the telecommunications industry.8 Applicant
concludes that “[g]iven the entirely unrelated nature of
telecommunications and life sciences, it is highly unlikely
that consumers in the market for advertising, marketing and
financial services, such as offered by the Registrant, will
ever be exposed to the Applicant marketing its [sic]
intellectual property services.” Brief at pp. 9 – 10.
In so arguing, applicant unduly restricts the scope of
registrant’s identification of services, which is not
limited to the telecommunications industry. We must
consider registrant’s services as described in the
registration, and not as what applicant determines them to
be from registrant’s marketing materials. Thus,
applicant's arguments regarding trade channels are not well
taken.
Further, we have recognized that the information
technology industry is ubiquitous and would include
applications in the biotechnology field. Applicant

8 Applicant characterizes registrant's services based on
information applicant obtained from registrant’s promotional
material. It is well settled that in a proceeding such as this,
the question of likelihood of confusion must be determined based
on an analysis of the mark as applied to the goods and/or
services recited in applicant’s application vis-à-vis the goods
and/or services recited in the registrations, rather than what
the evidence shows the goods and/or services to be. See Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 811 F.2d
1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Serial No. 78320557
19
maintains that both applicant and registrant market their
services through trade shows. Brief at p. 9. Because
registrant’s identification of services does not limit the
field in which its business consulting services relating to
business and corporate development in the information
technology industry are provided, we conclude that
registrant’s services includes services directed to the
biotechnology field and may be marketed in the same trade
shows where applicant appears. Thus, we find that the
trade channels for applicant's and registrant’s services
overlap, and resolve the third du Pont factor against
applicant.
Conditions Under Which and Buyers to
Whom Sales are Made

Applicant maintains that applicant's customers are
well-educated and “highly sophisticated,” and are not
impulse-oriented purchasers, but careful, sophisticated
professionals interested in specific and clearly defined
services from a particular source.” Brief at p. 10.
However, even careful and sophisticated purchasers are not
immune from source confusion. In this case, because of the
similarities of the marks and the relatedness of the
services, we believe that even sophisticated purchasers are
likely to believe that applicant's and registrant's
Serial No. 78320557
20
services emanate from a single source. The fourth du Pont
factor is resolved against applicant.
No Actual Confusion
Applicant states in his declaration submitted with his
September 3, 2004 response that “there has not been a
single instance of actual confusion between Catalyst’s mark
and the mark THE CATALYST GROUP …. No customers have ever
contacted Catalyst and inquired about the goods and
services provided under THE CATALYST GROUP mark.”
There is no evidence in the record as to the
geographic locations where applicant and registrant have
been doing business. If distant from each other, the
geographic separation may account for this lack of actual
confusion. Also, there is no evidence in the record
regarding the level of sales or advertising by applicant.
The absence of any instances of actual confusion is a
meaningful factor only where the record indicates that, for
a significant period of time, an applicant's sales and
advertising activities have been so appreciable and
continuous that, if confusion were likely to happen, any
actual incidents thereof would be expected to have occurred
and would have come to the attention of one or both of
these trademark owners. Similarly, we have no information
concerning the nature and extent of registrant's use, and
Serial No. 78320557
21
thus we cannot tell whether there has been sufficient
opportunity for confusion to occur, as we have not heard
from the registrant on this point. All of these factors
materially reduce the probative value of applicant's
argument regarding a lack of actual confusion. Therefore,
applicant’s contention that no instances of actual
confusion have been brought to applicant's attention is not
indicative of an absence of a likelihood of confusion. See
In re Majestic Distilling Co., supra. Applicant's argument
regarding actual confusion therefore is unpersuasive, and
the seventh du Pont factor is neutral.
Conclusion
When we consider the record and the relevant
likelihood of confusion factors, and all of applicant's
arguments relating thereto, we conclude that, when
potential purchasers of applicant's legal services and
registrant’s business consultation services encounter the
marks CATALYST LAW GROUP and THE CATALYST GROUP for these
services, they are likely to believe that the sources of
these services are in some way related or associated. As a
result, there is a likelihood of confusion. We add that to
the extent that we have had doubts about the question of
likelihood of confusion, which we have in this case, we
have resolved them in favor of the registrant and against
Serial No. 78320557
22
the newcomer. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d
463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Pneumatiques,
Caoutchouc Manufacture et Plastiques Kleber-Colombes, 487
F.2d 918, 179 USPQ 729 (CCPA 1973).
Further, when we consider the record and the relevant
likelihood of confusion factors, we conclude that, when
potential purchasers of applicant's legal services and
registrant’s publications encounter the marks CATALYST LAW
GROUP and THE CATALYST GROUP for these services and goods,
they are not likely to believe that the sources of these
services and goods are in some way related or associated.
Disclaimer
As discussed above, we do not accept that there is a
double entendre in CATALYST LAW but rather find that LAW
GROUP is merely descriptive of a feature of applicant's
services. In view thereof, we affirm the examining
attorney’s requirement for a disclaimer of LAW GROUP. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1) and 1056(a).
DECISION: The refusal to register the mark under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act in view of Registration
No. 2219977 is affirmed. However, the refusal to register
the mark under Section 2(d) in view of Registration
Serial No. 78320557
23
No. 2233289 is reversed. The refusal to register
applicant's mark in the absence of a disclaimer of the
phrase LAW GROUP is affirmed.