01A20456
03-10-2003
June E. Briand, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.
June E. Briand v. United States Postal Service
01A20456
March 10, 2003
.
June E. Briand,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A20456
Agency Nos. 3A-2162-92, 3A-2196-92, 3A-2265-92, 3A-2659-92, 3A-2739-92,
3A-2747-92, 3A-2475-92, 4G-2064-93, 4G-2828-93
Hearing No. 360-99-8957X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final order.
The record reveals that, during the relevant period, complainant was
employed as a PS-5, Distribution Clerk, at the agency's San Angelo Post
Office facility in Texas. The record reflects that in November 1987,
complainant sustained an on-the-job injury as a result of her footrest
slipping while she was casing mail. Complainant filed several formal
EEO complaints with various filing dates. Complainant alleged that
the agency had created a hostile work environment by discriminating
against her on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (female), disability
(back injury, carpal tunnel), and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:
(1) on June 2, 1992, she was denied the right to file a claim under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (OWCP);
on June 4, 1992, she was told to bring medical documentation upon her
return to work;
on June 15, 1992, she was not allowed to return to work;
on July 23, 1992, she became aware that men and women who were injured
on the job were treated differently;
on August 22, 1992, her OWCP claim was controverted because she did
not file the proper claim;
on September 2, 1992, she learned that the agency neither had
authorization nor approval from the Department of Labor to force her
to work four hours a day;
on September 4, 1992, she was threatened with removal if she did not
provide medical documentation within a specific period of time;
on April 22 and June 30, 1993, the Postmaster (male, no known disability,
prior protected activity) and the Injury Compensation contact person
(S1: male, no known disability, no known prior protected activity)
delayed processing of her OWCP claims; S1 stated complainant faked
on-the-job injuries; and the District Injury Compensation Specialist
(female, no known disability, no know prior protected activity) stated
complainant's OWCP forms would not be submitted because the herniated
disk claim had already been accepted by OWCP; and
during an unspecified time, her medical restrictions were not followed
by the Postmaster and S1, resulting in a second ruptured disk.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the
investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no
discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of race, sex, disability and/or reprisal discrimination. The AJ found
that the evidence failed to support complainant's claim that her race,
sex, or prior protected activity was related to the adverse actions.
The AJ also found that complainant failed to establish that she was
a qualified individual with a disability. The AJ further found that
complainant did not have a condition that substantially limited a major
life activity.
The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,
complainant contends that the AJ failed to allow her adequate time to
present her case. In response, the agency restates the position it took
in its FAD, and requests that we affirm its final order.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
Although the initial inquiry of discrimination in a discrimination case
usually focuses on whether the complainant has established a prima facie
case, following this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.<1>
See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May
31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant
has established a prima facie case to whether she has demonstrated by
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and
that the AJ's decision referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. We note that complainant failed to present evidence that any
of the agency's actions were in retaliation for complainant's prior EEO
activity or were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's
race, sex, or disability.
In reaching this conclusion, we find that complainant failed to
present any evidence that she had been denied the right to file an
OWCP claim. Complainant also did not show that other employees,
outside of her protected class(es), were treated more favorably under
similar circumstances. In regard to the agency's request that she
submit documentation upon her return to work, the record establishes
that this was normal agency procedure whenever an employee returned to
work after absences in excess of three days. The comparative employee
produced by complainant was not on extended sick leave and thus, was
not required to submit medical documentation upon his return to work.
The record also establishes that complainant's OWCP claim was denied
because she filed the wrong form.
In regard to working beyond the limitations prescribed by her physician,
the record contains no evidence that complainant's duty hours and work
assignments failed to comply with the restrictions. The Commission also
finds that, other than complainant's assertions, there is no evidence
that agency management interfered with the processing of her OWCP claim.
In point of fact, the record reflects that complainant's OWCP claim was
delayed because further documentation was needed.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's
final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 10, 2003
__________________
Date
1 Because we find that the agency has articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, we do not reach the issue of
whether complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.