Juan C. Hernandez, Complainant,v.Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2007
0120073143 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2007)

0120073143

09-27-2007

Juan C. Hernandez, Complainant, v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection), Agency.


Juan C. Hernandez,

Complainant,

v.

Michael Chertoff,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

(Bureau of Customs and Border Protection),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120073143

Hearing No. 510-2007-00001X

Agency No. HS06-CBP-000182

DECISION

On July 3, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May 31,

2007, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

On December 26, 2005, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he

was harassed and discriminated against on the bases of race (Caucasian),

national origin (Hispanic), and color (White) when: (1) on or about May

25, 2005, a management official (S1; Jamaican) threatened him by shaking a

finger in his face; (2) on or about June 6, 2005, complainant was required

to switch positions with another Assistant Port Director for thirty (30)

days; (3) on or about June 8, 2005, a management official announced

at a meeting that complainant would be moving on to bigger and better

things until further notice; (4) on or about July 26, 2005, complainant

was required to move his office; (5) on or about October 12, 13, 26,

2005 and November 2, 2005, a management official told complainant's

colleagues that complainant did not walk around enough and he would

like to see another employee run passenger operations; (6) on or about

October 19, 2005, complainant's subordinates asked whether he would be

"pulled" from passenger operations; (7) on or about October 26, 2005,

a management official asked complainant to sign a blank performance

review; and (8) on or about October 26, 2005, complainant learned that

a management official did not recommend him for a monetary award.

The record indicates that in 2003, complainant transferred to the agency

from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), where he

had worked for over 20 years. Complainant was employed by the agency

as an Assistant Port Director, Passenger Operations at the Orlando,

Florida International Airport. The record reflects that the former INS

was being merged with the Customs Service and sections of the Department

of Agriculture in the new Department of Homeland Security. S1 stated

that the merger efforts were important to his supervisor (S2), and he

had been pressured to unify functions at the facility among the three (3)

organizations which comprised the new Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

The record reflects that one of the elements of complainant's performance

rating required management to ensure "one face at the border" unification

streamlining the merger of the three organizations comprising the CBP.

Complainant alleged that S1 harassed him on several occasions while the

merger efforts were taking place at the facility. S1 conceded that he

felt upset while the merger efforts were occurring and he acted upon

those feelings, although he denied pointing his finger at complainant.

Believing he was the victim of harassment and discrimination, complainant

sought EEO counseling and filed the aforementioned EEO complaint. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a copy of

the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested

a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case determined that the complaint

did not warrant a hearing and over the complainant's objections, issued

a decision without a hearing on April 26, 2007. The agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

The AJ addressed complainant's allegations separately and initially

found that there was no independent evidence to support complainant's

allegation that S1 pointed his finger at complainant. AJ's Decision at 6.

The AJ further found that the job switch of June 6, 2005 resulted from

the decisions of agency upper management. The AJ found that there was no

evidence which suggested that discriminatory animus was involved in the

decision to switch complainant's position. Further, the AJ noted that

complainant did not lose any pay, status or benefits of employment due

to the temporary detail; complainant further conceded that he did not

suffer any harm and learned from the experience of working in another

area of the facility. AJ's Decision at 7. The AJ also found that

there was no evidence to suggest that S1 announced complainant would

be "moving on to bigger and better things until further notice" due to

discriminatory animus. The AJ found that S1 described the job swap to

facility staff in Orlando to be temporary, and complainant conceded that

others in the agency underwent a job rotation at the direction of S2.

Id. Regarding complainant's other allegations, the AJ noted that S1

clearly was not satisfied with complainant's management style, and felt

complainant should be more visible and accessible to his subordinates.

Further, the AJ noted complainant's allegations that S1 favored a coworker

(W1; Jamaican), such that he required complainant to move his office and

did not recommend complainant for a performance award but recommended W1.

The AJ noted that complainant's claim centered on the fact that he

perceived S1 favored W1 over himself. The AJ noted that when complainant

raised concerns to S2 about the friendship between S1 and W1, she informed

S1 that he could not fraternize with his subordinates. The AJ found that

complainant failed to proffer evidence that the perceived favoritism

prompted S1 to act in a discriminatory manner toward complainant.

The AJ specifically found that with regard to the performance review

and monetary award allegations, the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which were not proven to be

pretextual in nature. AJ's Decision at 9. Finally, the AJ found that

none of the incidents which complainant alleged, either collectively

or individually, were sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute

harassment due to a hostile work environment. As such, the AJ found

that complainant was not subjected to discriminatory harassment on

his alleged bases. The agency's final order fully implemented the

AJ's decision. On appeal, complainant alleged that: (1) the AJ erred

in dismissing incidents based on the favoritism S1 showed to W1; (2)

the AJ did not consider complainant's allegations that S1 had a Jamaican

flag in his office or that a top secret clearance was given to W1 but

not to complainant; and (3) the AJ erred in failing to hold a hearing

in the instant case. The agency responded to complainant's appeal,

urging the Commission to affirm the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal

and factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on

an appeal from an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo

review . . ."); see also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9,

� VI.B. (November 9, 1999). (providing that an administrative judge's

"decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo"). This essentially means that we

should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free

to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's,

factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact

of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of

review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to

the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,"

and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of

record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate

where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and

evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

To establish a claim of harassment based on race, sex, disability,

age, or reprisal, complainant must show that: (1) he is a member of the

statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the

form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected

class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily

protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of

employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering

with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or

offensive work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11.

The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of

a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance

on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8,

1994). Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe and

pervasive to alter the conditions of complainant's employment and create

an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

23 U.S. 75 (1998). Finally, the fifth element that must be satisfied

in order to establish a claim of harassment is that complainant must

also show that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir 1982).

With respect to complainant's allegations, we find the AJ properly

issued his decision without a hearing. Specifically, drawing every

inference in complainant's favor, that is, that S1's actions at issue

were as complainant alleged, we find the incidents of which complainant

complained were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a claim

of harassment based on race, color or national origin. We concur with

the AJ's finding that the alleged events between May and November of

2005 were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and

conditions of complainant's employment. We further concur with the AJ's

finding that S1 articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his

actions regarding complainant's performance appraisal and monetary award.

In so finding, we note that S1 failed to complete the evaluations of the

three (3) GS-13 employees (including complainant) under his supervision;

when complainant noticed the evaluation was incomplete, he rated himself

as "Successful." In addition, S1 stated that complainant did not receive

a monetary award due to issues with his performance; other employees

did not receive awards and S1 nominated another employee who was not

Jamaican for an award.

We note that complainant alleged that he believed that W1 was treated

more favorably by S1 due to their shared Jamaican background; however,

this alone is insufficient to establish a pretext for discrimination. The

Commission notes that employment decisions based on favoritism are

not unlawful, as long as they are not premised on prohibited bases.

McClinton v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05921032

(May 6, 1993). Despite the fact that S1 and W1 were both of Jamaican

background and were social friends, we find the record supports the AJ's

finding that there was no basis to conclude that any of S1's decisions

regarding complainant were due to discriminatory animus.1 After careful

consideration of the entire record together with the arguments on appeal,

we find no reason to disturb the AJ's decision. Accordingly, we AFFIRM

the agency's final order finding that complainant was not harassed or

discriminated against as he alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____9/27/07______________

Date

1 Despite complainant's allegations on appeal, we note that his

allegations regarding S1's display of a Jamaican flag and other examples

of S1's favoritism towards W1 such as upgrading his security clearance

to top secret were not alleged in his formal complaint of discrimination

but were identified in other documents and were the subject of discovery.

While the AJ did not specifically address the issue of the items displayed

in S1's office, we find no evidence that the items were displayed due to

discriminatory animus. We further find the display of these items was

not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment by S1.

We also note that the record reflects that W1 was given top secret

clearance by S1 after he requested it, but complainant never requested

a top secret clearance.

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0120073143

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120073143