Joshua Ben. Sherman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 26, 2019

14203005 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/203,005 03/10/2014 Joshua Ben Sherman 110.0134 1350
136715 7590 08/26/2019
Athorus, PLLC
P.O. Box 579
Mount Vernon, WA 98273
EXAMINER
EGLOFF, PETER RICHARD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
athorus.docket@athorus.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JOSHUA BEN SHERMAN,
NATHAN BRENT GLISSMEYER, PETER A. LARSEN,
ROBERT ALEXANDER ROOSA, and
MATTHEW PATRICK ORME1
____________________

Appeal 2018-008080
Application 14/203,005
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, JAMES P. CALVE, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12–18, and 20–25. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Appellant), which is a subsidiary of
Amazon.com, Inc., is the applicant as provided in 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is
identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention is directed to an account management system
and method “that allows for the creation and management of primary and
secondary user accounts and user profiles” in order to, for example, help
“parents to control, among other things, the quantity and types of content
that their children are accessing.” Spec. ¶¶ 1, 19. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter.
1. A method for controlling access to content, the method
comprising:
under control of one or more computing devices configured with
executable instructions,
determining, at least in part by a server system, a first
amount of content that has been accessed by at least one
electronic device and is associated with a content category,
wherein the at least one electronic device is associated with an
account;
determining, based at least in part on a geographic location
associated with the at least one electronic device, a time
constraint that is indicative of a time during which access to
content is to be granted to the at least one electronic device;
receiving a request from the at least one electronic device
to access a first content item;
determining that the request to access the first content item
is within the time constraint and is associated with a first activity
type;
determining for the first activity type, a first access time
indicating a total time that access to content associated with the
first activity type is granted to the at least one electronic
device, wherein the first activity type is at least one of presenting
a book, displaying a video, or providing audio;
determining that the first access time has not been
exceeded by the at least one electronic device; and
in response to determining that the first access time has not
been exceeded, sending, by the server system via a network, at
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least a portion of the first content item to the at least
one electronic device.

THE REJECTION
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12–18, and 20–25 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.

CLAIM GROUPING
Appellant does not present any separate substantive arguments for the
dependent claims apart independent claims 1, 5, and 15. See Appeal Br. 7–
22. Appellant submits broadly that the Examiner has not adequately
addressed the limitations of the dependent claims and recites particular
elements of claims 8, 9, 18, and 23. Id. at 10. These vague statements do
not constitute separate arguments for patentability of the dependent claims
pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Cf. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Board had reasonably interpreted 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (the predecessor to § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)), in the
context of a prior art rejection, as requiring “more substantive arguments in
an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked
assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art”).
Thus, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), the dependent claims stand or
fall with the independent claim from which they depend.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding of rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
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In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citations omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
On January 7, 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance on the
application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (hereinafter “2019 Eligibility Guidance”). The
2019 Eligibility Guidance includes steps 2A and 2B. Under Step 2A, Prong
One, of the guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial
exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). See id. at 54.
If a claim recites a judicial exception, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong
Two, and determine whether the claim recites additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See id.; see also
MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Only if a claim both recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application, do we proceed to Step 2B
of the guidance. At this step, we determine whether the claim adds a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

DISCUSSION
Step 2A, Prong One — Recitation of Judicial Exception
The Examiner found that independent claims 1, 5, and 15 recite a
method for sending content to a user of an electronic device in response to
certain information about the user and/or the device, such as “a first amount
of content accessed by the user at the device, the geographic location of the
user and electronic device, a time constraint corresponding to the geographic
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location, and an access time.” Final Act. 2. The Examiner analogizes
Appellant’s claims to the claims in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), directed to a method of
tailoring electronic content based on a user’s personal characteristics, which
the court held to be directed to an abstract idea. Id. (noting that the court in
Intellectual Ventures stated that providing minimal tailoring of electronic
content based on the location of an individual is an abstract idea). The
Examiner also analogizes Appellant’s claims to the claims in Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which were
held to be directed to an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3 (stating that “[t]he
use of geographic location in determining and delivering content . . . is akin
to . . . ‘providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content’” as in
Affinity Labs).
Claim 1 recites “determining, based at least in part on a geographic
location associated with . . . at least one electronic device, a time constraint
that is indicative of a time during which access to content is to be granted to
the at least one electronic device”; “receiving a request from the electronic
device to access a first content item”; “determining that the request to access
the first content item is within the time constraint and is associated with a
first activity type; “determining for the first activity type, a first access time
indicating a total time that access to content associated with the first activity
type is granted to the at least one electronic device”; “determining that the
first access time has not been exceeded by the at least one electronic
device”; and “in response to determining that the first access time has not
been exceeded, sending . . . at least a portion of the first content item to the
at least one electronic device.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.).
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The first access time and the time constraint associated with the
geographical location, the at least one electronic device, and a first activity
type are rules established to manage the behavior of the user of the at least
one electronic device. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 22 (describing the account
management system permitting a primary account user to specify group
rights to users of secondary accounts associated with the primary account to
determine the types of digital items that are available to users of the
secondary accounts), ¶ 61 (describing the primary account user establishing
one or more time constraints during which digital items may be accessed).
According to the method of claim 1, the requested content (or at least a
portion thereof) is sent to the at least one electronic device only if the time
constraint is satisfied and the total access time has not been exceeded for the
at least one electronic device for the first activity type. In other words, the
aforementioned steps of claim 1 manage the personal behavior (i.e.,
accessing content associated with a first type of activity) of the user of the at
least one electronic device by following rules. This falls within one of the
groupings of abstract ideas (namely, certain methods of organizing human
activity) enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. See 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent
Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating, “we have applied the
‘abstract idea’ exception to encompass inventions pertaining to methods of
organizing human activity”) (citing Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at
1367).
Claim 1 also recites “determining . . . a first amount of content that
has been accessed by the at least one electronic device and is associated with
a content category.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.). According to
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Appellant’s Specification, “[d]igital items, or portions thereof, may be
considered accessed when the user interacts with, or otherwise accesses the
digital item.” Spec. ¶ 21. For example, if a user uses an electronic device to
read a book for 30 minutes, the portion of the book presented to the user via
the electronic device is considered accessed. Id. Thus, determining the
amount of content, associated with a content category, that has been
accessed by the at least one electronic device can be accomplished by
keeping track of how much content has been presented to the user via the
electronic device, which can be performed in the human mind, or with pen
and paper. Thus, the step of determining a first amount of content that has
been accessed by the at least one electronic device falls within the category
of mental processes, enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance as one of
the groupings of abstract ideas. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52; see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method that can be performed by human
thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under §
101.”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental
processes—or processes of human thinking-standing alone are not
patentable even if they have practical application.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67
(“Phenomena of nature, . . . , mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work” (emphasis added)). Thus, claim 1 also recites another
abstract idea, namely, a mental process.
Claim 5 recites “determining, based at least in part on a geographic
location associated with at least one electronic device, a time constraint,
wherein the at least one electronic device is associated with an account”;
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determining an amount of content, associated with a first content category,
that has been accessed by the at least one electronic device; “determining,
based at least in part on the amount, that the time constraint has not been
satisfied”; and “in response to determining that the time constraint has not
been satisfied, restricting the” sending of “a first content item associated
with a second content category via a network to the at least one electronic
device.” Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). The “time constraint” associated
with the account and the geographical location is a rule, and claim 5 recites
denying access to content associated with a second content category in
accordance with that rule (i.e., if the total access time permitted during a
time constraint has already been exceeded by accessing a content item
associated with a first content category). In other words, the aforementioned
steps of claim 5 manage the personal behavior (i.e., accessing or not
accessing content associated with a second content category) of the user of
the at least one electronic device by following rules. This falls within one of
the groupings of abstract ideas (namely, certain methods of organizing
human activity) enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. See 2019
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
As discussed above, Appellant’s Specification describes that
determining the amount of content that has been accessed by the at least one
electronic device can be accomplished by keeping track of how much
content, including the time spent by the user interacting with the content
(e.g., 30 minutes of reading or watching a movie), has been presented to the
user via the electronic device, and determining whether the time constraint
has been satisfied requires simply comparing the access time to the total
access time established for the time constraint, both of which can be
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performed in the human mind, or with pen and paper. See Spec. ¶¶ 21, 97.
Thus, the steps of determining the amount of content that has been accessed
by the at least one electronic device and determining, based at least in part
on the amount, that the time constraint has not been satisfied fall within the
category of mental processes, enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance
as one of the groupings of abstract ideas. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, claim 5 also recites other abstract ideas, namely,
mental processes.
Claim 15 recites determining an amount of content of a first content
category that has been accessed by a first electronic device. Appeal Br. 26
(Claims App.). For the reasons discussed above, this simply amounts to
keeping track of how much content has been presented to the user via the
electronic device, which can be performed in the human mind, or with pen
and paper. See Spec. ¶ 21. Thus, claim 15 recites a mental process, which,
as discussed above, is one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in
the 2019 Eligibility Guidance.
Claim 15 also recites determining, “based at least in part on a
geographic location associated with the . . . first electronic device, a goal that
is indicative of a second amount of the first content category to be accessed
by the . . . first electronic device”; determining, based at least in part on the
amount of content of the first category, “that the goal has been satisfied”;
and, in response to determining the goal has been satisfied, sending “at least
a portion of a second content item that is associated with a second content
category to the . . . first electronic device to allow . . . access to the second
content item.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.). The goal is a rule established
by the primary account user to manage the online activities of a secondary
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account user. See Spec. ¶ 20 (describing that a primary account user may
establish for a secondary account user a goal of reading at least 30 minutes
of educational content each day, which may be achieved when the secondary
account user accesses the educational content and reads it for at least 30
minutes, and that the primary account user may also specify that access to
non-educational content be denied until the goal is achieved). In other
words, claim 15 recites managing the personal behavior (i.e., accessing or
not accessing content associated with a second content category) of the user
of the at least one electronic device by following rules, namely, providing
access to the content if a goal has been satisfied. This falls within one of the
groupings of abstract ideas (namely, certain methods of organizing human
activity) enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. See 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Determining that the goal has been satisfied
involves keeping track of the amount of content of a first content category
that has been accessed by a first electronic device and comparing it to the
goal established by the primary account user, as discussed above, which can
be performed in the human mind, or with pen and paper. Thus, determining
the goal has been satisfied is a mental process, which, as discussed above, is
one of the groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the 2019 Eligibility
Guidance.
For the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner’s determination
that independent claims 1, 5, and 15 recite abstract ideas.

Step 2A, Prong Two — Practical Application
Following our Office guidance, having found that claims 1, 5, and 15
recite judicial exceptions, namely, certain methods of organizing human
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activity (i.e., managing personal behavior by following rules) and mental
processes, we are instructed next to determine whether each claim recites
“additional elements [that] integrate the exception into a practical
application” (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). See 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This evaluation requires us to determine
whether an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the
claim applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not “directed to” the judicial exception. Id.
The additional limitations in claims 1 and 5 are performing the
method under the control of one or more computing devices, determining the
amount of content accessed using a server system, and sending (or
restricting from sending) content by the server system via a network.
See Appeal Br. 23, 24 (Claims App.). The additional limitations in claim 15
are a computer system comprising one or more processors; a memory for
storing program instructions; and generating, and providing to a second
electronic device, an overview that indicates at least a progress toward the
goal and the amount of content accessed by the first electronic device. Id. at
26.
Generating and providing an overview indicating progress toward the
goal and the amount of content accessed by the first electronic device, as
recited in claim 15, amounts to simply presenting the results of the
determination steps, or insignificant post-solution activity, and, thus, does
not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Elec. Power
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Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (pointing
out “that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and
analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for
presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis”); see also 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55
(identifying “add[ing] insignificant extra-solution activity to the” abstract
idea as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a
practical application).
The nominal recitation of generic computer components, such as
computing devices, processors, a memory, a server system, and a network
does not integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to
any indication, that the operations recited in the claims invoke any assertedly
inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other
inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer and
network components to perform generic computer and network functions.
See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 28 (describing without specificity a computing
environment including a server system and a network, which may include
traditional wired or wireless networks or a combination thereof).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
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argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellant argues that “the claims of the present application provide a
specific technical solution to a problem inherent with digital content – i.e.,
controlling access.” Appeal Br. 14; see id. at 14–15 (analogizing
Appellant’s claims to those in DDR Holdings). However, as the Examiner
points out, Appellant’s claims “recite a business practice from the pre-
Internet world,” namely, “restricting the type and amount of data a user may
view, based on information about the user.” Ans. 9. According to the
Examiner, Appellant’s invention clearly “is directed to tailoring content to a
user of the electronic device.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 19).
Although Appellant’s claims refer to content delivered by a server
over a network, and granting or restricting access to such content using a
server, neither Appellant’s claims nor Appellant’s Specification provides
any technical details as to how access is either granted or restricted, only
establishing rules for when and under what conditions access is granted or
restricted. In this regard, Appellant’s claims are directed to establishing and
carrying out rules for when and how much access to content is to be
provided to a user, which is a fundamental practice that was long prevalent
in our system well before the advent of the Internet. The solution set forth in
the DDR claims “is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773
F.3d at 1257. By contrast, the practice of establishing and carrying out rules
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for when and how much content is to be provided to a user, as in Appellant’s
claims, is not unique to digital content or delivery of content over a
computer network. Rather, Appellant’s invention addresses the age-old
problem faced by parents of limiting cumulative access to non-educational,
entertainment-type media, such as books, television, movies, or playtime,
and withholding access to such media until after other goals, such as
completion of homework or reading of educational media, has been
accomplished. Limiting the claims to content delivered by a server via a
network in a computing environment does not integrate the abstract ideas
into a practical application but, rather, at most, limits the abstract idea to one
field of use (electronic content). See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (stating that
“limiting an abstract idea to one field of use . . . did not make the concept
patentable”). Our reviewing court has held similar claims to be patent-
ineligible in Ultramercial LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (stating that “[t]he process of receiving copyrighted media, selecting
an ad, offering the media in exchange for watching the selected ad,
displaying the ad, allowing the consumer access to the media, and receiving
payment from the sponsor of the ad all describe an abstract idea, devoid of a
concrete or tangible application”); see id. at 716 (stating, “The claims’
invocation of the Internet also adds no inventive concept. As we have held,
the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save otherwise abstract claims from
ineligibility under § 101.” (citing CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370)).
Appellant also argues that the claims before us in this appeal are like
the claims held to be patent eligible in BASCOM Global Internet Services,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 18.
According to Appellant, just as the BASCOM claims “were ‘directed to [a]
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more specific problem of providing Internet-content filtering in a manner
that can be customized for the person attempting to access such content
while avoiding the need for (potentially millions of) local servers or
computers to perform such filtering and while being less susceptible to
circumvention by the user,’” Appellant’s claims “are also directed to
address[ing] one or more of the challenges or inefficiencies associated with
prior art systems for controlling access to digital content.” Id. Appellant
contends that, “[t]raditionally, there was no way to effectively restrict what
content was accessible to a user” having a client device with access to a
system containing digital content; “[i]f the user had access, the user could
download or view any accessible content.” Id. According to Appellant, the
claimed invention solves “this problem by controlling access to content
based on a geographically based time constraint and an activity type (claims
1 and 5), or an amount of a content category accessed by the device at a
geographic location and progress toward a goal (claim 15).” Id. Appellant
submits that the claimed features “are unconventional steps that utilize
geographic location of the device, time, and/or goals to decide when and
what content is to be accessible through the electronic device.” Id.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. The inventive concept recited
in the claims in BASCOM was “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific
location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features
specific to each end user,” giving “the filtering tool both the benefits of a
filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.”
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. Further, the patent in BASCOM “describes
how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over
prior art ways of filtering such content,” which “were either susceptible to
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hacking and dependent on local hardware and software, or confined to an
inflexible one-size-fits-all scheme.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, “the
claims [in BASCOM] may be read to ‘improve[ ] an existing technological
process.’” Id. at 1351 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). By “providing
individualized filtering at the ISP server,” the invention recited in the
BASCOM claims “represents a ‘software-based invention[ ] that improve[s]
the performance of the computer system itself.’” Id. at 1351. Appellant’s
claims, on the other hand, do not recite, and the Specification does not
describe, technical details as to how access to some content is permitted,
while access to other content is denied or restricted. Rather, as discussed
above, the claim features cited by Appellant are the methods of managing
human behavior (permitting or denying access to content) according to rules,
which fall under one of the groupings of abstract ideas (certain methods of
organizing human activity) enumerated in the 2019 Revised Guidance. In
other words, the features cited by Appellant are the abstract idea itself, and
not additional limitations.
Appellant also asserts that, similar to the claims in Thales Visionix
Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Diehr, Appellant’s
claims “are directed to improvements in the technical field of controlling
access to digital content.” Appeal Br. 21–22. This argument is
unpersuasive, for the reasons discussed above.
For the above reasons, we determine that no additional element or
combination of additional elements in claim 1, claim 5, or claim 15 applies,
relies on, or uses the judicial exception (methods of organizing human
activity and mental processes) in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit
on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
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designed to monopolize the exception. In other words, claims 1, 5, and 15
are “directed to” an abstract idea.
Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Because we determine that claims 1, 5, and 15 fail to recite additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, in
accordance with the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, we next consider whether the
claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or instead “simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.” See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As mentioned above, the additional limitations in claims 1, 5, and 15
are performing the method under the control of one or more computing
devices; determining the amount of content accessed using a server system;
sending (or restricting from sending) content by the server system via a
network; a computer system comprising one or more processors and a
memory for storing program instructions; and generating and sending an
overview that indicates at least a progress toward the goal and an amount of
content accessed by the first electronic device. See Appeal Br. 23, 24, 26
(Claims App.). As for the hardware, Appellant cannot reasonably contend
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether operation of
these components is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as
here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations
recited in the claims require any specialized hardware or inventive computer
components or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than
generic components operating in their normal, routine, and ordinary
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capacity. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 28 (describing, without specificity, a server
system and a network including a conventional wired or wireless network),
¶ 80 (describing various well-known and conventional memory devices
suitable for the memory).
As for generating and sending an overview indicating progress toward
a goal, as discussed above, this amounts to merely analyzing information
(comparing the amount of content accessed to the goal to determine progress
toward achieving the goal) and then displaying the result. Such operations
are among the most basic of computer operations. See Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding ineligible claims reciting the
combination of processes of gathering and analyzing information of a
specified content and then displaying the results, without any particular
assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions).
For the reasons discussed above, we find no element or combination
of elements recited in claim 1, claim 5, or claim 15 beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
that contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more”
to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice,
573 U.S. at 221. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent
claims 1, 5, and 15, as well as dependent claims 2 and 3, which fall with
claim 1; claims 7–10, 12–14, and 21–24, which fall with claim 5; and claims
16–18, 20, and 25, which fall with claim 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12–18, and
20–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED