Joseph R. Colwell, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 21, 1999
01984025 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 21, 1999)

01984025

06-21-1999

Joseph R. Colwell, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Joseph R. Colwell v. United States Postal Service

01984025

June 21, 1999

Joseph R. Colwell, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01984025

) Agency No. 4B-010-0014-98

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision of

the agency concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination,

in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791

et seq. The final agency decision was received by appellant on March

22, 1998. The appeal was postmarked April 13, 1998. Accordingly,

the appeal is timely (see 29 C.F.R. �1614.402(a)), and is accepted in

accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed a portion

of appellant's complaint as untimely.

BACKGROUND

Appellant contacted an EEO counselor on November 6, 1997, regarding

allegations of discrimination. Specifically, appellant alleged that he

was discriminated against when the agency denied him the opportunity to

work overtime beginning February 3, 1994. Informal efforts to resolve

appellant's concerns were unsuccessful. Accordingly, on March 19, 1998,

appellant filed a formal complaint alleging that he was the victim of

unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of physical disability

(back injury).

On March 20, 1998, the agency issued a final decision dismissing a

portion of appellant's complaint as untimely. In defining appellant's

complaint the agency separated appellant's allegation into two separate

time frames, namely (1) that time period outside the forty-five day

time limitation, (February 3, 1994 through September 21, 1997); and

(2) that period of time within forty-five days of appellant's counselor

contact, (September 22, 1997 to the filing date of appellant's formal

complaint). Specifically, the agency determined that any allegation

regarding overtime which occurred prior to September 22, 1997 had not

been brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor within forty-five days.

The agency rejected the theory that appellant's allegations constituted

a recurring violation beginning in February 1994 and continuing to the

date appellant's formal complaint was filed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints

of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the EEO

Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter

alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action,

within 45 days of the effective date of the action. EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2) provides that "the agency shall extend the 45-day

time limit...when the individual shows...that he or she did not know and

should not have known that the discriminatory action occurred...." EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b) provides that an agency shall dismiss

a complaint or a portion of a complaint that fails to comply with the

applicable time limits contained in 29 C.F.R. �1614.105.

This Commission has held that where there is an issue of timeliness,

the agency always bears the burden of obtaining sufficient information to

support a reasoned determination as to timeliness. Williams v. Department

of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05920506 (August 25, 1992). Concerning

appellant's complaint, the agency has met its burden.

The Commission applies a "reasonable suspicion" standard to the triggering

date for determining the timeliness of the contact with an EEO Counselor.

Cochran v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05920399 (June

18, 1992). Under this standard, the time period for contacting an EEO

Counselor is triggered when the complainant should reasonably suspect

discrimination, but before all the facts that would support a charge

of discrimination may have become apparent. Id.; Paredes v. Nagle,

27 FEP Cases 1345 (D.D.C. 1982). The record indicates that appellant

has specifically acknowledged that discrimination began in 1994 when

appellant was placed on limited duty following an injury to his back.

Therefore, appellant admits and acknowledges that he had a suspicion

of discrimination based on disability as early as 1994. Nevertheless,

appellant did not bring his allegations of discrimination to the attention

of an EEO Counselor until November 6, 1997, more than three years after

he acknowledges the discrimination began.

The courts have held that in determining whether a claim for continuing

violation is stated, it is important to consider whether appellant had

prior knowledge or suspicion of discrimination. See Sabree v. United

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st

Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between an appellant

who believed he had been subject to discrimination, and therefore had

the obligation to file promptly or lose his claim, versus a plaintiff who

is unable to appreciate that he is being discriminated against until he

has lived through a series of acts and is thereby able to perceive the

overall discriminatory pattern. Hagan v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05920709 (January 7, 1993). The Commission finds

that he has not stated a claim for continuing violation regarding those

allegations regarding overtime occurring prior to September 22, 1997.

Therefore, appellant has not presented evidence sufficient to justify

equitably tolling or waiving the time limits and allow him to seek EEO

counseling concerning allegation (1), beyond the time limit provided by

EEOC Regulations for said contact.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we find that the agency's decision dismissing allegation

(1) as defined by the FAD was proper. The agency's decision is hereby

AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 21, 1999 ____________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations