Jorgensen, Eric

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 17, 2020

12569672 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/569,672 09/29/2009 Eric Jorgensen 327808.01 8698
69316 7590 04/17/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
QAYYUM, ZESHAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ERIC JORGENSEN

Appeal 2019-000293
Application 12/569,672
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, ULRIKE W. JENKS, and
RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
anticipated, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking a written
description, and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, as indefinite. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject the
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE and set forth a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft
Technology Licensing LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims stand finally rejected by the Examiner as follows:
Claims 1, 4–8, 10–12, 20, and 21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious in view of Bannwolf et al. (US 2008/0182232 A1, published July
31, 2008) (“Bannwolf”) and Kane-Esrig (US 2010/0115591 A1, published
May 6, 2010) (“Kane-Esrig”). Final Act. 7.
Claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. pre-AIA § 103(a) as obvious in view of
Bannwolf, Kane-Esrig, and Killian (US 6,163,316, issued Dec. 19, 2000)
(“Killian”). Final Act. 12.
Claims 1, 4–12, 20, and 21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 5.
Claims 1, 4–12, 20, and 21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly
claim the subject matter which Applicants regard as their invention. Final
Act. 6.
Independent claim 1 is representative and reproduced below (the
claim has been annotated with bracketed numbers to reference the
limitations in the claim).
1. A computing system, comprising:
a physical computing processor; and
a physical computing storage device, the physical
computing storage device holding instructions which, when
executed by the physical computing processor, cause the
physical computing processor to perform the following
operations:
[1] selectively lock use of one or more system resources
of the computing system;
[2] visually recognize a data-encoded tag, the data-
encoded tag identifying a usage allowance defining a limited
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time during which system resources of the computing system
can be unlocked;
[3] receive the usage allowance identified by the data-
encoded tag;
[4] unlock use of some to all of the one or more system
resources of the computing system in accordance with the usage
allowance;
[5] based on the one or more system resources being
unlocked for at least the limited time defined by the usage
allowance, lock the use of the one or more system resources;
[6] visually recognize a second data-encoded tag, the
second data-encoded tag identifying a second usage allowance
defining a second limited time during which system resources
of the computing system can be unlocked, the second usage
allowance being different from the first usage allowance; and
[7] unlock use of some to all of the one or more system
resources of the computing system in accordance with the
second usage allowance.

Independent claim 20 is directed to a method, reciting substantially
the same limitations as claim 1.

CLAIM INTERPRETATION
Claim 1 is directed to a computing system comprising a computing
processor and computing storage device. The computing storage device
comprises instructions that causes the processor to perform a method
comprising seven steps that we have numbered [1] to [7].
In the first step of the method, system resources of the system are
locked. In the second step [2], a data-encoded tag is visually recognized.
The tag identifies “a usage allowance defining a limited time during which
system resources of the computing system can be unlocked. The usage
allowance is received (step [3]) and “system resources” of the computing
system are unlocked in accordance with the “usage allowance” (step [4]).
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An example of a system resource is a computer game. Spec. ¶¶ 26, 35. The
usage allowance therefore can be the amount of time a game can be played.
The interpretation of step [5] is in dispute. The limitation reads:
based on the one or more system resources being unlocked for
at least the limited time defined by the usage allowance, lock
the use of the one or more system resources.
The Examiner interpreted the limitation as “conditional” or “optional”
and did not give it “patentable weight.” Final Act. 3–4 (¶ 13). The Examiner
explained that the second locking recited in limitation [5] is “conditional”
because it will only occur when the “usage allowance” expires. Ans. 5, 8.
Appellant argues that the limitation is “conditioned on one or more system
resources being unlocked for at least a limited time.” Appeal Br. 26.
Appellant states it “is important to note that this time is limited, meaning it
must eventually elapse.” Id.
During patent examination proceedings, claim terms are given “the
broadest reasonable meaning . . . in their ordinary usage as they would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant's specification.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As indicated by Morris, the
best place to begin when interpreting a claim is the Specification because the
Specification must contain a written description of the claimed invention in
compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Appeal Brief cites paragraphs 10 and element 72 of Figure 2 as
support for limitation [5].
Paragraph 10 of the Specification does not recite the literal language
of limitation [5]. Paragraph 10 is reproduced below:
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Access control computing device 12 can be used by an access
controller (e.g., parent, teacher, etc.) to generate a token that
can be used by a computer user (e.g., child, student, etc.) to
unlock the rationed computing device 14. The access controller
can define a usage allowance with virtually any number of
parameters that specify how the rationed computing device may
be used. As nonlimiting examples, the usage allowance may
specify which computer(s) can be unlocked; at what time(s) a
computer can be unlocked; for how long a computer can be
unlocked; when unlocked, which resources shall be made
accessible to the user; the interface that should be presented to
the user; the settings of the computer; etc.
This paragraph describes unlocking the computer as in step [5], and
implies it is locked when a usage allowance is expired because the computer
is “rationed” and therefore only available for the fixed amount of time of the
“usage allowance.”
Appellant also identifies Figure 2 as support for the disputed
limitation. Figure 2 is described in the Specification as an example of
“rationing computer access.” Spec. ¶ 43. The Specification explains that
“computer usage allowance can be specified to provide a user with a desired
level of computer access at a desired time and/or for a desired duration, for
example.” Id.
Element 72 of Figure 2 is titled “Selectively lock use of one or more
system resources.” Paragraph 47 of the Specification which describes this
element discloses that it is a reference to “selectively locking use of one or
more system resources of a rationed computing device.”
It is clear from these disclosures in the Specification that the “time
defined by the usage allowance” (step [5]) is a period of time in which the
computer is unlocked for use by a user. It does not require that the computer
be actually used by the user, but rather that it is the time in which the
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computer is “made accessible to the user” (Spec. ¶ 10) and that “access” to
the computer is available (Spec. ¶ 43). In light of this disclosure and the
plain language of the claim, we interpret step [5] to require that the system
resource be unlocked for the duration of usage allowance of step [2] and
then to lock again when that time has expired. It does not require a user to
engage the resources; the only requirement is that the resource is unlocked
for that time period and accessible to the user to access it.
Accordingly, we conclude that step [5] is not conditional as
interpreted by the Examiner, but rather it is a positive step of the claim that
requires the resources to be unlocked and locked for the defined time of step
[2] so that the resources are accessible to the user.

REJECTIONS BASED ON BANNWOLF AND KANE-ESRIG
The Examiner found that Bannwolf describes a computing system
comprising a computing processor and storage device as claimed. Final Act.
7–8. The Examiner further found that Bannwolf discloses all the steps of the
claimed method, but not step [2] of “visually recognize a data-encoded tag,
the data-encoded tag identifying a usage allowance defining a limited time
during which system resources of the computing system can be unlocked.”
Id. at 8 (quoted language is from the claim). Rather, the Examiner found
Bannwolf discloses recognizing a login identity and identifying a usage
allowance based on the login identity and then unlocking computer
resources. Id. To make up for this deficiency, the Examiner cited Kane-
Esrig which the Examiner found discloses recognizing visually a data-
encoded tag. Id. at 9.
Based on these teachings, Examiner concluded that it would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention:
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to have modified the system of Bannwolf so as to have included
visually recognize a first and second data-encoded tag with a
camera, in accordance with the teaching of Kane-Esrig, in order
to provide the ability to use scanned codes that can be used for
authentication because scanning a code is inexpensive and easy
for a user to use.
Final Act. 9.
Appellant argues that Kane-Esrig’s “optical tokens/tags do not
identify a usage allowance relating to rationed system resources of a
computing system.” Appeal Br. 18. Appellant further argues that “each
optical token/tag” of Kane-Esrig “identifies the specific user who owns that
optical token/tag. The optical token/tag has absolutely nothing to do with a
usage allowance that defines a limited time during which specific system
resources of a computing system may be used.” Id. Appellant contends that
there is no suggestion in either Bannwolf or Kane-Esrig of a mechanism of
how the optical token/tag would be used to retrieve a usage allowance. Id.
Furthermore, Appellant states that, using Kane-Esrig, “does not alleviate the
problem . . . [T]here is still no connection between the optical token/tag -
which validates the user’s identity – and a usage allowance that defines a
limited time during which specific system resources may be unlocked.” Id.
at 19. Appellant concludes that “the optical tokens/tags . . . used by Kane-
Esrig” are “not equivalent to Appellant’s claimed use of data-encoded tags”
because they are not associated with a usage allowance. Id. at 19–20.
The Examiner responds that “Bannwolf does not use data-encoded
tags but instead identifies the user through a login which automatically
identifies the usage profile for said user.” Ans. 6. The Examiner further cited
Kane-Esrig’s teaching of visually recognizing a data-encoded tag to
authenticate the user. Ans. 7.
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An examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case
of obviousness. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
2011). The Examiner did not meet the burden of establishing that claim 1 is
prima facie obvious in view of Bannwolf and Kane-Esrig.
Bannwolf discloses giving children access to a play device once they
have completed educational tasks “to form a balance between computer-
based leisure activities and computer-based educational activities.”
Bannwolf ¶ 11. Bannwolf teaches:
Embodiments of the present invention can also advantageously
include a system, program product, and methods which provide
professionally developed, centrally managed and stored, and
appropriately selected educational tasks, tailored to the child,
which the child must consummate in order to receive an
allotment of “play time” as a reward as set according to
parameters provided by the parent.
Bannwolf ¶ 11.
Bannwolf teaches that after completing the educational task, the child
can use, or continue to use, the computing device for play:
[E]mbodiments of the present invention advantageously can
present educational tasks to a child over the Internet within the
context of his or her ongoing leisure activity on a computer or
other digital processing and communication device, such as,
dedicated game boxes or hand held communication devices,
etc., to thereby enhance the educational benefit from the
educational tasks by rewarding the child with time and freedom
to continue with computing device play. . . Advantageously,
according to embodiments of the present invention, computer
leisure activities can be interrupted and the browser can be
directed to a website which presents one or more educational
tasks, upon completion of which, the child’s computer is
enabled to initiate or return to interrupted leisure activity.
Bannwolf ¶ 12.
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Bannwolf further discloses that a time limit can be imposed on the
child’s use of the computer resources, which when elapsed, data is provided
“through the communication network to the child client user computer to
thereby display an educational task required to be completed to allow
resumption of the interrupted computer-based leisure activity.” Bannwolf
¶ 17. The “amount of awarded permissive access time” is monitored and
determined when to interrupt the computer-based leisure activity. Id. Thus, a
child is given time to use a computer resource, such as a game. When the
time expires, the child is presented with an educational task, which must be
completed before the child can resume game or other leisure activity.
Bannwolf also teaches that “educational enhancement program
product 100 can also include an entry initiator 111 adapted to access the
child client user records in the database 51, 53, to thereby provide user login
access for, and authentication of, each child client user.” Bannwolf ¶ 49.
Thus, Bannwolf describes a method in which a child user logs on to
the system, is identified (¶ 48), and then given access to the computer for an
identified period of time as a reward for completing an education task. The
usage allowance is provided after the child is logged in and identified.
Kane-Esrig provides access to computer resources using a registered
cell phone and an optical token. Kane-Esrig teaches:
In one aspect of the presently described embodiments, the
method comprises receiving an image of the optical token from
the mobile device, verifying that the optical token and the
mobile device are associated with a user, allowing access to the
information if the optical token and the mobile device are
associated with the user,
Kane-Esrig ¶ 9.
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Kane-Esrig discloses that a user “may wear or possess a unique
optical token or code printed on a plastic tag (e.g. as a bracelet or glued to
his watch strap). The user or consumer can use the combination of the tag
and cell phone or other device to authenticate himself or herself in order to
access health or other data securely.” Kane-Esrig ¶ 28. Thus, as found by the
Examiner, Kane-Esrig uses the token to authenticate the user and gain access
to the data.
The Examiner did not provide a reason as to why one of ordinary skill
in the art would have used the optical token and phone of Kane-Esrig to
identify a usage allowance as required by step [2] of claim 1. The Examiner
states that it would be obvious to use the token of Kane-Esrig “for
authentication,” but makes no statement of why the optical token would be
used to obtain the data usage allowance, which is the express requirement of
step [2] of the claim. Ans. 9. The Examiner did not establish prima facie
obviousness of the claim. Consequently, we are compelled to reverse the
obviousness rejection of claim 1.
Independent claim 20 recites the same limitation, and therefore we
reverse the obviousness rejection of claim 20, as well. Dependent claims 4–
8, 10–12, and 21 are reversed because they incorporate all the limitations of
independent claims 1 and 20.
The obviousness rejection of dependent claim 9 is also reversed. The
Examiner cited Killian for its teaching of a rear-projector and thus does not
compensate for the deficiencies of Bannwolf and Kane-Esrig.

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WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1 and 20 for lack of written description
in the Specification. Specifically, the Examiner found that the Specification
does not describe step [5] of “based on the one or more system resources
being unlocked for at least the limited time defined by the usage allowance,
lock the use of the one or more system resources.” The Examiner stated that
the “specification discloses selectively locking and unlocking, but never
locking the use based on any condition, particularly not ‘based on the one or
more system resources being unlocked for at least the limited time defined
by the usage allowance’ as recited in the amended language.” Final Act. 5.
To satisfy the written description requirement, the inventor must
“convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In describing the
claimed invention, there is no requirement that the wording be identical to
that used in the specification as long as there is sufficient disclosure to show
one of skill in the art that the inventor “invented what is claimed.” Union Oil
Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The Specification has the following disclosure pertinent to the written
description of step [5]:
Other constraints, such as the times the token can be used to
unlock a rationed computing device and the duration for which
the rationed computing device may remain unlocked may also
be set when the computer usage allowance is defined.
Spec. ¶ 25.
Of course, different computer usage allowances may be created
in accordance with the preferences specified by an access
controller. In some instances, a usage profile and/or computer
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usage allowance can be designed so that the login module
unlocks use of some to all of the one or more system resources
up to a maximum duration specified by the usage profile. In
such cases, if a user exits an unlocked computing session before
the allocated duration has been used, the usage profile and/or
computer usage allowance may be automatically amended to
reflect the remaining duration that has not yet been used.
Spec ¶ 27.
As explained in paragraph 25, the “rationed computer device” can be
unlocked for the “duration” of the computer usage allowance. Spec. ¶ 25.
The ordinary skilled worker reading this disclosure would understand that to
have a “rationed” device unlocked for a defined “duration,” it must be
locked before the usage period begins, unlocked when the user allowance is
made available to the user, and then locked again when the “duration” has
expired. Paragraph 27 explains that “the login module unlocks use of some
to all of the one or more system resources up to a maximum duration.” That
is, when the “maximum duration” expires, the computer is necessarily
locked again to be consistent with the disclosure that computer must be
“unlocked” to allow the user to use the rationed computing device. Element
72 of Figure 2 of the Specification specifically shows a step of locking
computer resources of the rationed computer device. Spec. ¶ 47.
Accordingly, one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized
that the inventors had possession of the concept of unlocking a computer to
allow usage consumption during the usage allowance period and then
locking the rationed computer after the allocated usage allowance expires.
We therefore conclude that a preponderance of evidence weighs against the
Examiner’s determination that step [2] is not described in the Specification.
The written description rejection of claims 1, 4–12, 20, and 21 is reversed.
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INDEFINITENESS REJECTION
The Examiner rejected the claims as indefinite under § 112, second
paragraph, stating it is “unclear whether the resource is locked when the
second unlock step occurs” in step [7] of claim 1. Final Act. 7.
Step [5] of claim 1 recites that, based on the system being locked for
limited time defined by the usage allowance, it locked. We interpreted this
step to be a necessary step of the claim and to require that when the “usage
allowance” expires, the unlocked system is locked. In step [6], a second tag
is visually recognized with a second usage allowance. Step [7] recites:
“unlock use of some to all of the one or more system resources of the
computing system in accordance with the second usage allowance.” It is
clear that the system is locked in step [5] when the usage has expired and
therefore would require the unlocking in step [7] to use it again. Moreover,
because step [7] states that the resource is unlocked, the resource must be
locked in the first place for the “unlock” limitation to have any meaning. All
the terms in a claim must be considered when giving claims their broadest
reasonable interpretation.
In sum, we conclude that the claim is not indefinite in the recitation of
the unlocking step recited in limitation [7]. The indefiniteness rejection of
claim 1 is reversed. Independent claim 20 recites the same limitation, and
therefore we reverse the indefiniteness rejection of claim 20, as well.
Dependent claims 4–8, 10–12, and 21 are reversed because they incorporate
all the limitations of independent claims 1 and 20.

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NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we set forth the following new
ground of rejection of claims 1 and 20 as obvious in view of Bannwolf,
Durbin,2 and Spaceworld 2001.3 We leave it to the Examiner to address the
dependent claims.
Bannwolf teaches controlling a child’s access to a computer as
reward. Bannwolf ¶ 11. The access is given for a limited amount of time. Id.
at ¶ 14. The parent can set the parameters under which the child is allowed
to engage in “play time” using the computer and for what period of time. Id.
at ¶¶ 11, 40. Because access is controlled, one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that the computer resource, such as a game, is unlocked
and then locked again for the period of time awarded to the child4 as
required by claims 1 (steps [1], [4], [5]) and 20.
Bannwolf does not teach that computer usage is unlocked for the
period of time using an optical token as recited in steps [2] and [6] of claim
1 and the corresponding limitations of claim 20. However, the concept of

2 M. Durbin and L.A. Jason, “A token-actuated timer for line-voltage
devices,” Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 16(3):
294–296 (1984).
3 Spaceworld 2001: New Look at Pokemon E-Card Reader (Originally
Posted Aug. 22 2001).
4 Bannwolf ¶ 14 recites: providing data to the child client user computer to
display a first educational task required to be completed to allow access to at
least one application program adapted to provide the respective child client
user a computer-based leisure activity, providing data to direct the
educational enhancement agent to allow access to the at least one application
program responsive to child client user satisfaction of access criteria,
providing data to direct the educational enhancement agent to interrupt the
computer based leisure activity to define an interrupt order responsive to a
permissive access time limit.
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rationing time spent watching media using a token was known in the art at
the time of the invention. Specifically, Durbin teaches using a token-
activated timer for line-voltage devices to control how much television a
child watches. Durbin teaches that the token is detected when inserted into
the device and triggers a 30-min timer. Durbin 294 (under section titled
“Timer”). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention to use a token to control computer access as a
reward to a child in Bannwolf’s method for its established function in
rationing the time that media is viewed by a child. As held in KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007):
[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a
person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.
. . . [A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
Neither Bannwolf nor Durbin teach to “visually recognize a data-
encoded tag” identifying the usage allowance as in steps [2] and [6] and the
corresponding limitations of claim 20. However, Spaceworld 2001 describes
using an E-card reader to read barcodes on Pokémon cards to enable mini-
games on a Game Boy. While these cards are not associated with a usage
allowance as required by steps [2] and [6], Spaceworld 2001 teaches using
visually recognized tags, namely a barcode, to unlock a game. Durbin
teaches unlocking media using a token, but not one which is visually
recognized. However, the concepts are the same – giving limited access to a
media or a game using a type of coupon or voucher. It would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to have
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used the barcodes described by Spaceworld 2001 to unlock a game and
encoded usage allowance to automate rationing the time spent watching and
engaging with electronic media as described by Bannwolf and Durbin.
With respect to the requirement in claim 1 of first and second tags
with different usage allowances (step [6]), Bannwolf teaches that usages
times can be determined based on completed task (Bannwolf ¶¶ 15, 19, 21),
providing a reason to have used different times associated with different
barcodes as determined by a parent of the child.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)
/Basis
Affirmed Reversed New
Grounds
1, 4–8,
10–12,
20, 21
103 Bannwolf,
Kane-Esrig
1, 4–8,
10–12,
20, 21

9 103 Bannwolf,
Kane-Esrig,
Killian
9
1, 4–12,
20, 21
112, first
paragraph
Written
description
1, 4–12,
20, 21

1, 4–12,
20, 21
112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 1, 4–12,
20, 21

1, 20 Bannwolf,
Durbin,
Spaceworld
2001
1, 20
Overall
Outcome
1, 4–12,
20, 21
1, 20

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution
will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection
is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the
opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the
claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this
subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under §41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.

Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the MPEP § 1214.01.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b).

REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)