Johnnie K. Raymond, Complainant,v.Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 20, 2007
0120073185 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 20, 2007)

0120073185

09-20-2007

Johnnie K. Raymond, Complainant, v. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.


Johnnie K. Raymond,

Complainant,

v.

Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120073185

Hearing No. 451-2007-00046X

Agency No. 03-2009R

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's June 4, 2007 final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29

U.S.C. �621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Secretary GS-3618-05, at the agency's Internal Revenue Service

facility in San Antonio, Texas.

Previously, in Johnnie K. Raymond v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A31932 (July 29, 2006), the Commission affirmed the

dismissal of all but one claim of complainant's October 9, 2002 complaint.

We directed the agency to continue processing complainant's claim that she

was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American), sex

(female), color (black), age (over 40 years of age), and in retaliation

for prior EEO activity when:

On August 4, 2002, complainant received a written counseling

memorandum regarding a taxpayer's name left on a note pad,

which agency management addressed as a security violation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on May 8, 2007. In a decision

dated May 24, 2007, the AJ found that complainant failed to show that

she was treated any worse than other employees in her work group also

reporting to S1, a supervisor with a harsh or demanding management style.

The AJ observed that several witnesses indicated that S1 was a difficult

supervisor to work for and that many of them were outside of complainant's

protected classes. Accordingly, the AJ found that no discrimination

occurred as alleged.

The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding

of no discrimination.

On appeal, complainant argues that the record contains no evidence

whatsoever that complainant committed any breach of the agency's data

security policy that formed the basis of S1's counseling memorandum

and that the charges that complainant compromised taxpayer identifying

information were false. The evidence therefore does not support the

AJ's decision and complainant requests that the Commission reverse the

AJ's finding.

On appeal, the agency argues that the AJ properly found that complainant

produced no evidence to prove that S1 treated her more harshly than the

other employees in her group. Thus, the agency maintains that the AJ

properly determined that she failed to prove that S1's issuance of the

counseling memorandum was only a pretext for discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the AJ's finding or the

agency's final decision. We find that complainant has not identified

any similarly situated employees, not in her protected racial, color,

sex or age groups, that were treated any better than she was by S1 under

similar circumstances. We find that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination on any basis and the AJ properly

found that no discrimination occurred.

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

we AFFIRM the agency's final decision, finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 20, 2007

__________________

Date

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0120073185

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120073185