John S. Barnes Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 483 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

JOHN S. BARNES CORP.
John S. Barnes Corporation and Lodge
No. 1553, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Case 13-CA-7372 (formerly 38-CA-
187).
June 16,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On November 18, 1966, Trial Examiner David E.
Davis issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner' only to the extent consistent with
this Decision and Order.
For the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner in his
Decision, we find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by its distribution of photostatic
copies of employees' testimony and union
authorization cards. We disagree, however, with the
Trial Examiner's findings that Respondent violated
the Act by denying employment to, and eventually
terminating, employee Edwards because he engaged
in protected activity and gave testimony in a prior
formal Board proceeding. Briefly, the facts
regarding Edwards are as follows:
Edwards, who had virtually no vision in his left
eye, had been an employee of Respondent for 11
years. He became active in the Union and, following
the organizational campaign and subsequent unfair
labor practice charges filed by the Union, testified in
a Boarding proceeding. Shortly after testifying in
late November 1965, he broke a bone in his foot
which incapacitated him. In late December,
Edwards received permission from his own doctor to
return to work with a walking cast on his foot. On
' Although no exceptions were filed to the Trial Examiner's
reliance in part upon findings in an earlier Trial Examiner's
Decision, we do not adopt those portions of the Trial Examiner's
Decision here
Subsequent to the issuance of the Trial Examiner's Decision
herein, the Charging Party filed a motion to consolidate with the
instant case unfair labor practice allegations contained in
165 NLRB No. 58
483
Monday, January 3, 1966, Respondent permitted his
return. When Plant Manager Stenberg arrived at
work, he learned Edwards had returned wearing a
cast. Stenberg informed the company nurse that he
would not permit Edwards to work with a cast, and
the nurse then informed Edwards that he could not
work with a cast on his leg. Edwards personally got
in touch with Stenberg who again advised him that
he would not be permitted to work with a cast on his
foot. Stenberg, claiming he sought to avoid potential
liability, admitted that at one time another employee
had worked wearing a neck brace, but distinguished
this from Edwards' situation. As a result of
Stenberg's decision, Edwards went home and did
not return to work until January 17, 1966, after the
cast was removed and after receiving approval from
both the company doctor and his own doctor.
Toward the end of January, Respondent set up an
appointment for Edwards to have an eye
examination. Stenberg told Edwards that the
Company was enforcing its eye protection program,
that Edwards had not been complying although he
had but one good eye, and that the Company had
arranged for him to have an eye examination.
Thereafter, Edwards' eyes were reexamined and
new prescription glasses ordered. Later, Edwards
received his new glasses, which were fitted by the
company nurse. The same afternoon Edwards
received his glasses, Respondent's president,
Svenson, approached Edwards' bench and noticed
that Edwards did not have his glasses on. Svenson
asked Edwards if he had received his glasses and
Edwards replied that he had. Svenson asked why
they were not being worn and Edwards replied that
he did not need them for that particular operation.
Svenson urged Edwards to put his glasses on, but
Edwards repeated that he did not need them. When
Edwards became disrespectful, Svenson went to
Stenberg's desk, signed a memo previously prepared
by Stenberg requiring Edwards to wear his glasses at
all times, had Edwards sent down, handed him the
memo, and suspended Edwards for 1 week as a
reprimand because he did not wear his glasses.
There was more heated conversation, and Edwards
was accompanied to the exit by a guard. Later that
week, Edwards picked up his tool box from the plant
and refused to sign a resignation form. At that time,
the evidence shows, Edwards had found
employment with another company at 42 cents an
hour more than he received while with Respondent.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent's
reasons for not allowing Edwards to return to work
with a cast on his foot were a pretext and that the
true reasons were his known union sympathies and
consolidated Cases 13-CA-6407 et at and 13-RC-10159, in which
a Trial Examiner's Decision was issued on August 26, 1966 A
reply in opposition to this motion was filed by the Respondent As
it appears that the charges m'the instant case allege new unfair
labor practices which may properly be litigated separately, the
motion is denied
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his earlier testimony. For a number of reasons,
particularly Edwards' known affection for the Union,
the Trial Examiner concluded that the condition of
Edwards' eyes was "seized upon by Respondent as a
cloak for harassment " and that Edwards ' suspension
was actually discriminatory. Accordingly, the Trial
Examiner found Respondent discriminatorily
refused employment to Edwards from January 3 to
January 17, 1966, and constructively discharged
Edwards on February 7, 1966, in violation of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
We disagree with these conclusions. The record is
clear that Edwards returned to work on January 3
with a cast on his foot. Respondent's concern over
potential liability is readily understandable,
particularly in view of the fact that Edwards had only
one good eye. The fact that at one time Respondent
had allowed an employee to work while wearing a
neck brace is not analoguous to Edwards' situation
and is not a basis for finding disparate treatment. A
review of the record as a whole convinces us that
Respondent had good reason to refuse to permit
Edwards to work until he had the cast on his foot
removed and until he obtained a release from the
company doctor.
Similarly, in regard to Edwards' suspension and
alleged constructive discharge, we are also of the
opinion that Respondent did not act out of a
discriminatory motive. Respondent's exhibits show
that its insurance carrier , Midland , became
concerned with the high rate of eye injuries in June
1965. In August 1965, Midland suggested that all
plant personnel be required to wear eye protection
while on the premises. In reply to Midland's letter,
Respondent stated it was pursuing an active policy
of eye protection. During August, Respondent had
ordered eye safety signs pertaining to goggles, and,
as stated by the Trial Examiner, instituted plans for
an eye protection program because of the demands
of the insurance company. In early February 1966,
Respondent ordered more eye protection signs,
delivered later in the month , and also requested
prices for eye safety signs, warning of discharge if
safety glasses were not worn. Respondent presently
requires all personnel , as well as customers and
visitors, to wear safety glasses while in the
manufacturing area . It should be noted that
Respondent bears the cost of issuing regular safety
glasses to employees who do not wear glasses, and
provides examinations by the company doctor for
prescription ground safety glasses for those who do
wear prescription glasses. In addition, the company
nurse refers employees to the company doctor for
eye reexaminations periodically.
Consideration of the entire record has failed to
convince us that Edwards was suspended and
subsequently constructively discharged for the
reasons alleged in the complaint . Instead , we find
that Respondent had instituted an eye protection
program sometime in 1965 at the' insistence of its
insurance company. Thus, signs were posted and
Respondent began a campaign of urging its
employees to wear safety glasses. In conformity with
that campaign , Respondent urged Edwards to wear
his new prescription glasses, recommended and
prescribed by the company doctor and provided by
Respondent . Despite Respondent ' s urging, Edwards
insubordinately refused to wear the glasses and was
suspended. A review of the evidence indicates that
Respondent had ample reason to suspend Edwards.
Underlying the theory of constructive discharge is
the employer 's responsibility of creating a situation
so unbearable to any employee that he quits rather
than continue working in the face of harassment.
Even if the testimony in this case is assessed in a
light most favorable to the General Counsel's
position , it would not show that Respondent
precipitated a plan or created an atmosphere which
made it impossible for Edwards to work under
normal or reasonably normal conditions . We cannot
speculate that his suspension, resulting from his
insubordinate failure to wear his new glasses, was
part of a plan to harass him because of his earlier
testimony or his known union sympathies.
Accordingly, we conclude that the General Counsel
has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that Edwards was suspended or discharged
because of his union activities and earlier testimony.
To the contrary,we find that Edwards was suspended
because he insubordinately refused to wear his
safety glasses and subsequently quit his job because
he had found his present more lucrative position.
Under these circumstances, we therefore find,
contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Edwards was
not discriminatorily discharged in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, and shall
dismiss those portions of the complaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
John S. Barnes Corporation, Rockford, Illinois, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations , to join or assist Lodge No. 1553,
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , or to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose' of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
JOHN S. BARNES CORP.
(a) Post at its plant at Rockford, Illinois, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 13, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
Except to the extent found in this Decision and
Order, the National Labor Relations Board hereby
orders that the remaining portions of the complaint
herein be, and they hereby are, dismissed.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the
words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
such activities, except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
JOHN S. BARNES
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
485
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office
Building, 219 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois
60604, Telephone 828-7597.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID E. DAVIS, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed on
February 25, 1966, by Lodge No. 1553, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the
Board, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on
June 17, 1966, against John S. Barnes Corporation, herein
called Respondent , alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, herein called the Act.
Upon answer by Respondent on June 24, 1966, issue was
joined.'
The complaint, as amended, alleged that Respondent
distributed copies of union authorization cards signed by
various employees, which were introduced in a prior
formal Board proceeding and copies of the testimony of
employees who testified in that proceeding, thereby
threatening employees with reprisals for h, irrg engaged
in union activities and having given testimony under the
Act. It was further alleged that Respondent denied
employment to Clyde Edwards from January 3, 1966, to
January 17, 1966, and terminated Clyde Edwards on
February 7, 1966, because he engaged in protected activity
and gave testimony in the prior formal Board proceeding.
The Respondent denied each of the allegations and denied
that it had engaged in any unfair labor practices.
A hearing was conducted before me, the duly
designated Trial Examiner, on September 7 and $, 1966,
at Rockford, Illinois. At the hearing all parties were
represented and were afforded full opportunity to present
evidence, to examine witnesses , to argue orally, and to file
briefs. The General Counsel and counsel for the
Respondent waived oral argument but each of them
submitted excellent briefs.
Upon the entire record and after careful consideration of
the briefs," I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Delaware and has maintained its principal
office and place of business at Rockford, Illinois, where it
is engaged in the manufacture and sale of hydraulic
pumps, components, and limited machine tools. During
' The complaint was amended during the course of the hearing
by GC Exh 9. The reporter, in setting up the GC Exh. file,
erroneously designated this exhibit as merely marked for
identification Page 254 of the record of this hearing shows that
the amendment was allowed and received in evidence by the Trial
Examiner.
8 In a motion dated November 8, 1966, Respondent 's counsel
moved to strike certain portions of the brief filed on behalf of the
General Counsel. The motion is herewith denied.
299-352 0-70-32
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the last calendar year Respondent manufactured, sold,
and distributed products valued in excess of $500,000, of
which more than $50,000 worth were shipped directly from
its plant in Rockford, Illinois. to other States of the United
States. The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I
find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I also find that it
would effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleged that the Union was a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The answer stated that Respondent is without knowledge
of this and that it is not required to answer this conclusion
of law. On August 26, 1966, Trial Examiner Eugene E.
Dixon issued his decision, TXD-494-66,3 in which he
found, inter alta, that the Union herein was a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
I have taken official notice of this decision. Moreover, the
evidence in the instant case clearly establishes that the
Union acted in behalf of the Respondent's employees and
was designated by numerous employees as their
collective-bargaining representative. Accordingly, I find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues litigated in this proceeding are as follows:
1. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
distributing copies of the testimony of employees and
copies of their signed union authorization cards?
2. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of
the Act by refusing to permit Clyde Edwards to work from
Janudry 3, 1966, to January 17, 1966?
3. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of
the Act by suspending Clyde Edwards on February 7,
1966?
4. Did Respondent unlawfully cause Clyde Edwards to
quit Respondent's employment and in effect discharge
Edwards in violation of Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the
Act?
B. Background
As stated above, I have taken official notice of Trial
Examiner Dixon's decision in the prior formal proceedings
before the Board. I note the following:
1. The hearing in the consolidated cases was held on
various dates from November 3, 1965, to January 13, 1966.
2. Clyde Edwards, Alice Swift, Samuel LaSala, E. J.
Svenson, and William Stenberg testified in that
proceeding as well as in the instant case.
3. The Union's organizational campaign among
Respondent's employees commenced in the spring of
1964, several months after Respondent moved into its
present plant.
4. Respondent was found by the Trial Examiner to have
3 The case was officially designated as John S Barnes
Corporation and Lodge No 1553, International Association of
Machinists , AFL-CIO, Cases 13-CA-6407, 13-CA-6637,
13-CA-7049, 13-CA-7027, and 13-RC-10159 (consolidated for
hearing)
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)
of the Act.
5. The Tual Examiner found that Clyde Edwards was
discriminated against in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
because of his union adherence and activities.
C. Refusal to Permit Edwards to Work From January .3,
1966, to January 17,1966
The record evidence in the hearing established that
Edwards, an employee of Respondent for 11 years, has
almost no vision in his left eye as a result of a childhood
accident, and wears prescription glasses which corrects
vision in his right eye to the accepted standard of 20/20.
Respondent, when it hired Edwards in 1956, and at all
times since, has been fully aware of Edwards' condition
Edwards' duties during the last 3 years of employment at
Respondent's plant were primarily hand bench assembly
of hydraulic units , pumps and valves, mostly on special
orders. On occasion, in connection with his work, Edwards
operated a drill press, a grinder, and a reamer.
Edwards, about November 28, 1965, broke a small bone
in his right foot which incapacitated him. On
December 29. 1965, Edwards received written approval to
return to work from his doctor. Dr. B. C. Snell. He called
the Respondent's industrial nurse, Mrs.-Edna M.
Lindberg, and informed her that his doctor had released
him to go to work, that he had a walking cast on his foot,
and that it was permissible for him to work with this cast
on his foot. Lindberg acquiesced in Edwards' return to
work on Monday, January 3, 1966. On Monday Edwards
reported, punched the timeclock, and gave the note from
Dr. Snell to Eric Johnson, his foreman. Foreman Johnson
shook hands with him and said he was happy to have him
back. After Edwards had been working about 2 hours,
Johnson told Edwards that Nurse Lindberg wanted to see
him. Edwards went to the office where Lindberg told him
that Stenberg4 had ruled that he could not work with a cast
on his foot. Edwards again told her that his doctor said he
was able to work Lindberg replied that she realized that
but Stenberg had overruled her. As Stenberg was not
in his office, Edwards reached Stenberg on the plant
telephone and asked Stenberg why he was being sent
home when he had clearance from his doctor and was able
to work. According to Edwards' credited testimony'
Stenberg said that he did not care if he had a release from
the "Jolly Green Giant," that Edwards was not going to
work with a cast on his foot. Edwards asked Stenberg how
the "Jolly Green Giant" was involved, as it was quite
serious to him. Stenberg replied that it was quite serious to
him too, but that Edwards was not going to work with a
cast on his foot. As a result Edwards went home and did
not return to work until January 17, 1966.
After the cast was removed, Edwards received another
written statement from Dr. Snell and called Lindberg on
January 14, 1966. Lindberg informed Edwards that he was
required to go to the Respondent's doctor to receive
verification in writing that he was in fit condition to return
to work and to bring it with him when he reported for work
on Monday, January 17, 1966. Edwards thereupon visited
Respondent's doctor and received a written memorandum
William J Stenberg , plant manager.
Edwards' testimony up to this point is uncontradicted on the
record
JOHN S. BARNES CORP. 487
from him which stated that he was capable of returning to
work
Lindberg, a registered nurse with many years of
experience in hospitals and industrial plants, testified that
her chief duties consisted of taking care of accidents,
maintenance of medical records, and processing group in-
surance. On occasion she would make home visits to sick
employees. No testimony was elicited from her concerning
the foregoing.
Stenberg testified that he learned of Edwards' return to
work with a cast shortly after he came into the plant on
January 3. 1966, and decided that he did not want Edwards
working under circumstances where "having one eye" and
wearing a cast, he was required to use the stairs to go to
the washroom. To avoid potential liability, Stenberg
thereupon instructed the nurse to send Edwards home
until the cast was removed and the company doctor
okayed him for work. Stenberg said that when he talked to
Edwards on the telephone he told him that he could not
come back to work until the cast was off his foot and he
had an okay from the company doctor. He denied that he
told Edwards that he said even if he got a release from the
"Jolly Green Giant" he could not work with a cast on his
foot.' Stenberg further testified that he told Edwards that
anyone who was off 3 days for illness or accident needed
an okay by the company doctor before he could return to
work.
On cross-examination Stenberg was asked (p. 366):
Q. Why didn't you send him to your doctor to see if
he might give him a release at that time?
Stenberg replied:
A. First of all, I don't want him in the plant with a
cast on I don't want anybody in the plant with a cast
on their leg
The latter statement is contrary to evidence adduced
that a former employee, Henry Gillette, was permitted to
work for several months while wearing a neck brace which
restricted movement of his head. Stenberg was asked on
cross-examination why he had not sent Gillette home when
he had that cast or brace around his neck. Stenberg
replied:
Well, he didn't have a cast on. He just had one of
these leather things around his neck for a whiplash.
This wouldn't cause him to trip and fall down the
steps.
The distinction drawn by Stenberg between the walking
cast and the neck brace is difficult to understand.
Stenberg did not see Edwards on January 3. 1966. when he
sent him home because he was wearing a cast. Lindberg
and Johnson did. Neither one raised any objection or saw
any difficulties which would present a danger to Edwards
or would prevent performance of his duties. Yet Stenberg
concluded without seeing Edwards that he could not work
in the plant with a cast on his foot. He did not even
consider receiving an opinion from the company doctor
prior to removal of the cast. Henry Gillette, who was
wearing a brace which severely restricted head
movements, surely was more handicapped in performing
work requiring use of machines and in far greater danger
of falling down stairs than Edwards who was wearing a
walking cast. This disparate treatment, the flimsy reasons
given by Stenberg, the fact that Edwards had testified in
the prior case which did not close until January 13, 1966,
and in which Edwards was alleged as a discriminatee, and
the record evidence in the instant case, detailing further
discriminatory treatment of Edwards by Respondent, to
which Stenberg contributed, convince me that Stenberg's
refusal to permit Edwards to work while he was wearing a
cast stemmed from Edwards' known union sympathies
and activities, and because he gave testimony in the
formal Board proceeding concluded on January 13, 1966. 1
find that to be the true reason, and the reasons advanced
by Stenberg constitute a pretext to disguise the true
reasons. Accordingly, I find that Edwards was
discriminately refused employment from January 3 to
January 17, 1966, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4)
of the Act.
D. The Distribution of Copies of Testimony and
Authorization Cards
Commencing on or about January 23, 1966, and
continuing for about 3 weeks, Ernest Svenson, president of
Respondent, and Stenberg distributed photostatic copies
of the testimony to those employees of Respondent who
testified. Additionally, employees who had signed
authorization cards designating the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative received photostatic
copies of their signed cards which had been introduced in
evidence in the formal Board hearing concluded on
January 13, 1966.
The record evidence discloses that Edwards, Samuel
LaSala, and Benny Hagen were among the first recipients
of their testimony and cards. Svenson accompanied by
Stenberg came to LaSala's working area and Svenson
said, "Mr. LaSala?" When LaSala replied in the
affirmative, Svenson then said, "Here is your testimony
that you gave at the recent hearing." Whereupon LaSala
was handed a folder containing the photostatic copy of his
testimony and his signed union card. The folder had
LaSala's name typed on its index tab. Edwards testified
that when he was approached by Svenson and Stenberg,
Svenson opened the folder bearing Edwards' name and
said, "You are Clyde Edwards." Edwards replied, "Yes,
Sir." And Svenson then asked him if that was his card and
his signature . Edwards recognized it and said, "Yes, I
signed that." Svenson then said, "This is the testimony
that you gave against me at the National Labor Relations
Board hearing in November."7
Benny Hagen, who did not testify," received a folder"
containing a photostat of a single sheet of paper which is
reproduced as Appendix A, attached hereto. [Omitted
from publication.]
Hagen on this particular day was the first to receive his
folder, Edwards second, and then LaSala. LaSala and
Hagen turned their folders over to Edwards and Edwards
turned all the folders over to the Union.
LaSala's and Edwards' photostatic copies of their
testimony contained numerous markings , names, and
comments on various pages. Edwards' copy in particular
was copiously marked with handwritten comments, such
as:
s I credit Edwards As will appear , infra, I do not consider
Stenberg a credible witness
' On cross-examination Edwards displayed some uncertainty as
to whether Svenson used the phrase , " testimony you gave against
me." Svenson and Stenberg denied that this phrase was used at
any time As LaSala and Alice Swift also received copies of their
testimony and did not testify that this phrase was used when they
were addressed, I credit Svenson in this regard.
' Hagen was deceased at the time of the hearing
See GC Exh. 5
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This man has only one eye. I discussed him with Dr.
Duchon 12-6-65. His vision in one eye only 20/80. Dr.
Duchon corrected right eye lens, per memo from
nurse 11-4-63.
I have not and would not shake hands with Edwards.
It will be important to analyze the poor eye of
Edwards by using medical opinion.
Numerous other remarks emanating from Svenson,
although written by Mrs. Svenson, disparage certain
aspects of Edwards' testimony, or term certain statements
a "plain lie," many printed remarks like "Hit" are spread
over the pages. Svenson testified that these remarks were
added at a conference in his home when Stenberg, Mrs.
Svenson, and other supervisors were going over the
recorded testimony to assist Respondent's counsel in the
preparation of a brief to the Trial Examiner. Svenson
stated that this annotated copy of the evidence was from
such a "working" copy of the transcript and was
accidentally duplicated and distributed. The evidence
shows that only about five or six copies so marked were
actually distributed. I credit the testimony that the marked
copies were distributed by accident or error and that only
five or six such copies were distributed. It is readily
apparent that this was a "working" transcript intended to
assist Respondent's counsel. In my view, however,
whether such copies were distributed through accident or
error, as I have concluded, or through deliberate intention,
does not affect the ultimate decision. I find that the
distribution of all such material whether marked up or not,
including the copies of the authorization cards, constituted
a not too subtle form of coercion, designed to warn the
employees that their testimony was known, to apprise the
employees that when they signed a union card it became
known, and that Respondent had a complete record of the
foregoing. It therefore tends to deter employees from
union activity or adherence and to desist from giving
testimony under the Act. The elaborate, formalized
ceremony engaged in by the two top executives of
Respondent when they distributed the folders in person
over a 2- or 3-week period clearly was designed to impress
the employees with the seriousness with which
Respondent viewed such employee activity. The evidence
further shows that a formalized ritual and a solemn
manner of distribution was observed when union
adherents received their folders and a casual and friendly
attitude was displayed by Svenson and Stenberg when
they delivered the folders to supervisors and nonadherents
of the Union. This difference in approach served notice to
the employees that the Respondent looked with disfavor
upon those who gave testimony unfavorable to Respondent
and upon those employees who signed union authorization
cards. I cannot conceive a legitimate purpose in the
distribution, so soon after the close of the former hearing
and under the accompanying circumstances. Svenson's
testimony that he wanted all his employees to have a copy
of their testimony, the testimony that Svenson habitually
distributed by mail certain books and pamphlets to his
employees, and the fact that a similar distribution was
made in 1949 after the conclusion of an earlier NLRB
unfair labor practice hearing, I regard as weak,
unconvincing excuses that do not justify or mitigate the
deterrent effect of this conduct upon the employees. I find
that the distribution of photostatic copies of the
employees' testimony and the union authorization cards
were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I find that this
conduct tended to inhibit the employees from fully
exercising their rights under Section 7 of the Act and
tended to inhibit them from giving testimony under the
Act.' °
E. The Alleged Discharge of Edwards
Stenberg testified that on January 27 or 28, 1966, after
Lindberg had set up an appointment for Edwards to have
an eye examination, he called down to the assembly
department and had Edwards sent up to his office. He told
Edwards that he wanted him to have an eye examination,
that it was quite a while since he had one; that there was a
new program of 100 percent enforcement of safety glass
wearing in the plant; that, as Edwards only had one eye,
Stenberg wanted to make sure that he had proper glasses
and that Edwards had not been wearing glasses in the
plant prior to that time. Stenberg quotes Edwards as
saying, "I'll go down and have my eyes examined and I'll
get the glasses, but I won't wear them because I don't
need new glasses." Stenberg told him that the Respondent
would provide him with transportation to the doctor for the
eye examination and that he wanted Edwards to have new
glasses and that when he got the new glasses he was going
to wear them or else he would be subject to discipline,
possibly even discharge.
Edwards testified that the conversation with Stenberg
took place on the morning of January 31, 1966. Edwards
quotes Stenberg as saying, "Clyde, I don't want you to
think that you are being picked on but we are starting a
new procedure in the shop. Everyone who wears glasses
must have an eye examination and be fitted for
prescription glasses if so needed. We are doing this
alphabetically and as your name is an E that puts you on
the top of the list." Stenberg then, according to Edwards,
told Edwards that an appointment had been set up with
Dr. DuShane" for that morning and that someone from the
Company would take him to the doctor's office. Edwards
said that a short time later he received a call from
Lindberg that Dr. DuShane had broken his leg over the
weekend in a skiing accident and that the appointment
had been canceled. Later that day, he again received a call
informing him that an appointment for shortly after lunch
had been made with Dr. Roe and that Henry Stuttgart, an
employee of Respondent, would drive him to Dr. Roe's
Office. 12
Subsequently on February 7, 1966, Edwards was called
to Lindberg's office and given the new safety glasses
which had been ground to the specifications of the
prescription furnished by Dr. Roe as a result of his
"' The Welch Scientific Co. Inc. v N L.R B , 340 F 2d 199
(C.A. 2), rehearing denied February 3, 1965, in which the court
said at 203, "The cases clearly demonstrate that it is the tendency
of an employer 's conduct to interfere with the rights of his
employees protected by Section 8(a)(1), rather than his motives,
that is controlling." Citing Burnup & Sims . Inc, v. N.L.R B,
379 U.S 21; Erie Resistor Corp v. N L.R B, 373 U.S. 221.
" Undoubtedly the same "Dr Juchon" referred to in one of
Svenson's notes on Edwards ' copy of t'ie transi°ipt of his
testimony
'i I credit Edwards' version rather than Stenberg's As will
appear, Infra, Stenberg testified that he pla..ned to warn Edwards
that failure to wear the glasses would be penalized, when Edwards
received his glasses.
JOHN S. BARNES CORP. 489
examination of Edwards' eyes on January 31, 1966. Before
discussing the events of February 7, 1966, it is necessary
to set forth a summary of the considerable testimony with
regard to the Respondent's eye protection program.
Edwards testified that there was no requirement that
employees wear safety glasses or any glasses at any time.
He said there was a sign on the grinder which said that
glasses should be worn by the operator of the machine but
that there was no enforcement of this requirement and he
frequently observed foremen and other employees
operating the grinder and other machines without glasses.
He stated that he, himself, wore glasses whenever he
operated any machine as he wished to guard his good eye.
I credit Edwards' testimony as summarized above. Sam
LaSala, Alice Swift, and Dorothy F. DeGarmo in their
testimony likewise corroborated Edwards' testimony with
regard to the absence and/or lack of enforcement of rules
regarding the wearing of safety glasses. Indeed, all of
these witnesses credibly testified that when an insurance
safety inspection was about to make a survey of conditions
various foremen would circulate among the employees
and, for the period of the inspection only, would require
them to put on safety glasses and safety caps.'"
Lindberg and Stenberg testified that in August or
September 1965 an eye safety program was inaugurated.
The evidence does not support their testimony. I find, in
accordance with the testimony of Gilbert M. Laurence, the
master mechanic who had the responsibility for safety in
the plant, that a definitive and enforced program was not
instituted in the Respondent's plant until sometime in
March 1966. At that time it was made mandatory for
employees to wear safety glasses in the plant under
penalty of discipline. Prior to March 1966, 1 find that
while there were a limited number of signs urging the
wearing of safety glasses, there was no genuine
requirement nor enforcement except when an insurance
inspection was due.
I do not credit Lindberg's conclusionary testimony by
which she attempted to have me believe that a new policy
or compulsory eye protection was inaugurated in August
1965. This testimony was completely demolished on cross-
examination when she admitted that safety prescription
glasses continued to be subscribed only when requested
by an employee. Moreover, her total credibility was
seriously impugned by numerous contradictory
statements . Thus, she testified that Svenson asked her to
have Edwards' eyes checked again14 and subsequently,
when she was asked concerning her conversation with
Svenson, she denied that she had ever discussed Edwards'
eyes with Svenson or that she had testified to that effect. 1-5
Moreover, Svenson's notations on Edwards' copy of his
testimony in the prior Board proceeding stated that
Svenson was going to have Edwards' eyes reexamined.
This was delivered to Edwards on January 23, 1966. I
conclude therefore that Svenson did speak to Lindberg
and Stenberg about having Edwards' eyes reexamined.
Stenberg likewise attempted to create the impression
that a definitive eye protection program was inaugurated
by the Respondent in August or September 1965 and that
employees, particularly Edwards, were cautioned that
penalties would be incurred if employees failed to wear
safety glasses in the plant. When pressed by the Trial
Examiner, Stenberg was evasive and equivocal. It was
apparent to me that he was attempting to place the
Respondent in a more favorable light regardless of the true
facts. Accordingly, because of Stenberg's demeanor and
apparent lack of candor, I have discredited him wherever
his testimony is in conflict with other witnesses or contrary
to the facts as I find them. My conclusion that the actual
institution of a comprehensive eye protection program
coupled with strict enforcement occurred in March 1966 is
fully supported by LaSala's testimony, which I fully credit,
Laurence's testimony and that of Edwards, Swift, and
DeGarmo. Undoubtedly, because of the insistent demands
of the insurance company, the Respondent made plans for
an eye protection program in August and September 1965,
but the evidence is plain that whatever plans were made,
they did not develop into action until March 1966.
On February 7, 1966, after Edwards received his new
safety glasses from Lindberg, Edwards returned to his
bench. A little later, he was engaged in a hand operation,
reaming a small part. Svenson approached Edwards'
bench and saw him performing the operation. At that time
Edwards was not wearing glasses. Svenson asked him if he
had received his glasses that day and Edwards replied that
he had. Svenson then asked why they were not being worn
and Edwards replied that he did not need them for the
particular operation. Svenson asked where the glasses
were and Edwards stated they were in his toolbox. Again
Svenson urged that Edwards put them on and Edwards
again repeated that he did not need them. I credit
Svenson's testimony that Edwards was disrespectful and
in fact insubordinate in this conversation. Svenson then
went to Stenberg's desk in the office upstairs and had a
secretary type a memorandum in Stenberg's handwriting
which he knew was in Stenberg's desk. Svenson signed
this memorandum and brought it with him when he went
downstairs to Foreman Johnson's desk about 25 feet from
Edwards' bench. Svenson instructed Johnson to bring
Edwards there. When Edwards arrived, an argument
ensued between Edwards and Svenson. Svenson
thereupon handed Edwards the memorandum which he
had just signed.16 Edwards stated that he had never seen
the memorandum before and Svenson agreed. Svenson
then said "I'm going to send you home for the week as a
reprimand because you do not wear your glasses."
[Emphasis supplied.] Svenson further testified that
because of the abuse he had taken he refused to permit
Edwards to use the company telephone to call home for
transportation. Apparently there was some further heated
discussion and Svenson called a guard to accompany
Edwards to the exit. Svenson in summarizing the reasons
for his action testified:
I'm the chief executive. I have created every
structure we make. I also own the premises where we
manufacture, and I also furnish the working capital. I
got to have some respect. I cannot have a mess in the
13 This testimony is uncontradicted in this record None of the
foremen identified as giving such instructions was called as a
witness by Respondent.
14 Transcript, p 292, 1. 16, 17
15 Transcript, p. 303, 11 2-10.
1e GC Exh 6 It is dated February 7, 1966, and signed by
Svenson although it is headed as an interdepartmental
memorandum from Stenberg to Edwards It reads as follows-
After receipt of your new prescription safety glasses you will
be required to wear said safety glasses at all times when
inside the plant. Failure to comply can lead to a penalty
which would include dismissal.
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plant. I have to have some discipline and I am entitled
to that."
On cross-examination Svenson testified that shortly
after the move to the new plant in 1964 Edwards started to
be obnoxious by disagreeing with the foremen and with
other men in the plant.
Edwards, on February 8, 1966, the day after his
suspension, successfully applied for employment in
another plant. On the morning of February 11, 1966, he
called Johnson and asked permission to get his tools.
Johnson told him to come to the plant about 5 p.m. When
Edwards arrived, Stenberg requested Edwards to sign a
document which Stenberg had previously prepared. The
document in fact was a resignation from the Company.
Edwards refused to sign the resignation even though
repeatedly requested to do so by Stenberg. Stenberg
defended his insistence by stating that when an employee
removes his tools from the plant it is a sign that he is
quitting his employment there.
The General Counsel argues that under the
circumstances described above, Edwards' suspension for
1 week was discriminatory and that Edwards' employment
in another plant resulted from a constructive discharge by
the Respondent and did not constitute a voluntary quitting
by Edwards. Respondent contends that Edwards'
suspension was fully justified and that he voluntarily
relinquished his employment with the Respondent. The
evidence disclosed that Edwards currently is receiving 30
cents to 40 cents per hour more than he was earning while
he was in the employ of the Respondent. Under these
circumstances it is fair to assume that Edwards would not
return to Respondent's plant even if offered
reinstatement. However, the latter consideration is
completely irrelevant. The question presented to the Trial
Examiner is whether the entire episode, or series of
episodes, constitute unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. If so
proper effectuation of the Act calls for the issuance of an
order that requires an offer of reinstatement be made to
Edwards.
As I have indicated above, I am convinced that Edwards
was insubordinate when Svenson asked him to wear his
glasses. The evidence indicates that Svenson felt that his
authority was being challenged and that he felt hurt
because his position was being demeaned. I find that to be
true. I have serious doubts, however, that these ostensible
reasons were the only ones that motivated Svenson to
suspend Edwards or in fact were controlling.'" It is
difficult to minimize the background events which
establish that Edwards was a known protagonist of the
Union,''' that Respondent was well aware of Edwards'
union sympathies and displayed marked resentment
towards Edwards (a) by the discrimination found by me in
the prior case, (b) by the discrimination I have found above
from January 3, 1966, to January 17, 1966, when Stenberg
refused to let Edwards work with a walking cast on his
foot, (c) By the tenor of the remarks on the marked copy of
Edwards' testimony which Svenson handed him, (d) by the
fact that among those remarks was a direction that
Edwards' eyes be examined by Dr. DuShane, (e) by the
singling out of Edwards for a special eye examination,
(f) by the memorandum prepared by Stenberg and given to
Edwards by Svenson on February 7, 1966, indicating that
Edwards was singled out for special attention and a special
rule which was not at that time applicable to other
employees, (g) by Svenson's statement, emphasized above,
in which he said he was suspending Edwards for not
wearing his glasses-rather than his insubordination,
(h) by imposing the requirements of the February 7, 1966,
memorandum on a retroactive basis. It is somewhat of an
understatement to merely state that Svenson was resentful
of Edwards' known union sympathies and desires.
Svenson's own testimony indicates his attitude toward
Edwards when he related Edwards' alleged obnoxious
behavior to the time when union organization activity
commenced in the plant, i.e., after Respondent moved to
the new premises in January 1964.
While I am convinced that Edwards' insubordination
and lack of respect for Svenson were contnbuting factors
to Edwards' suspension, I conclude that the primary
causes were Svenson's animosity to Edwards stemming
from Edwards' union activity and his testimony in the prior
Board proceeding. It is my conclusion, therefore, that
Edwards' suspension for 1 week was discriminatory and in
violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.L' I
further conclude that the entire course of events was a
compelling reason for Edwards to seek employment
elsewhere and but for the pressure arising from the
developments detailed above, Edwards would not have
sought employment elsewhere. As these pressures and
incidents were discriminatory in nature , I can only
conclude that Edwards was in fact discharged even though
Respondent did not do so in so many words. Moreover,
Stenberg's adamant insistence that Edwards sign a
it Stenberg testified that after his conversation with Edwards in
which he notified him of the new eye examination, "1 made up my
mind that lie , above all others, was going to wear the glasses in the
plant, because he only had one eye " Stenberg then wrote a
memorandum in his own handwriting to the effect that "when he
got his new glasses he would get this memo, and it would require
him to wear his safety glasses at all times when he was in the
manufacturing plant, subject to disciplinary actions which could
lead to his discharge " [Emphasis supplied.] After Stenberg
prepared this memo, he placed it in a drawer of his desk and
mentioned it to his secretary and to Svenson He did not give the
memo to Edwards because he took a short vacation from
February 4 to February 9, 1966 It is established, therefore, that
Edwards knew nothing about the special memo directed to him
until Svenson handed it to him after Svenson suspended him for
not wearing glasses As Svenson was far from an indecisive person
it seems to me that , if Svenson was solely motivated by Edwards'
insubordination and disrespect, he would have immediately
suspended Edwards and stated that as the reason However
Svenson did not follow this course but instead had Stenberg's
memorandum typed and then. told Edwards that he was being
suspended for not wearing his glasses and because of Stenberg's
memorandum , the contents of which Svenson conceded had not
been hitherto disclosed to Edwards
IN "Without question an employer may lawfully discharge an
employee for any reason provided the reason is not conduct
protected by the Act " Interboro Contractors, Inc , 157 NLRB
1295, 1301 On the other hand, "the fact that a lawful cause for
discharge is available is no defense where the employee is
actually discharged because of his union activities." Ace Comb
Co v N L R B, 342 F 2d 841, 847 (C A 8), Symons Mfg Co v.
N L.R.B , 328 F 2d 835, 837 (C A 7), Portable Electric Tools, Inc
v NLRB,309F2d423,426(CA 7)IN
His prominence is further indicated by the fact that LaSala
and Hagen turned over the folders of their testimony and
authorization cards, which Svenson gave them, to Edwards for
transmission to the Union
m That other and legitimate reasons for a discharge may exist
does not constitute a defense , if discrimination or other illegal
considerations are substantial and motivating , Whitin Machine
Worksv NL R.B.,204F2d883,885(CA 1)
JOHN S. BARNES CORP.
resignation demonstrates that he, himself, was quite
conscious of the fact that Respondent's treatment of
Edwards could be construed as a discharge in fact.
In arriving at the above appraisal of the events leading
to Edwards' employment elsewhere, I am not unmindful of
Dr. Roe's testimony. Dr. Roe testified that his examination
of Edwards' eyes revealed that Edwards' left eye had a
retinal detachment which added up to industrial blindness
in that eye; that the left eye corrected produced 20/20
vision; that his prescription was slightly stronger than the
glasses Edwards was wearing and that the new
prescription was a slight change "pulling in his near point
of vision perhaps five inches or so." He stated he did not
remember whether he talked to plant nurse, Lindberg,
prior to examining Edwards' eyes but that Lindberg called
him after the examination because she was interested in
his findings. Dr. Roe stated that Lindberg was interested
whether Edwards was a source of hazard because of the
condition of his left eye. Dr. Roe further testified that after
Edwards' eye examination he sent the following letter,
dated January 31. 1966, to Respondent.
Mr. Clyde Edwards came to my office on
January 31st, and upon examination was found to
have an essentially blind left eye from a childhood
accident. The vision in the right eye is 20/20 with good
peripheral field when wearing the proper glasses.
There is no sign of detachment nor other pathology in
the right eye.
That thereafter he received a call from Lindberg that the
letter was not complete enough. He testified that he got
the "impression that there was a little more interest." As a
result he sent another letter to Respondent on February 4,
1966, which read as follows:
Mr. Edwards came to my office on January 31,
1966. On examination he was found to have an
essentially blind left eye from a childhood accident.
The vision in the right eye is 20/20 with good
peripheral field when wearing the proper glasses.
There is no sign of detachment nor other pathology in
the right eye. The uncorrected vision in the right eye,
at distance, is 20/50.
Thereafter, additional phone calls were made by Lindberg
to Dr. Roe's office apparently with a view that Dr. Roe
discuss Edwards as a potential hazard because of the
condition of his left eye. As a result Dr. Roe, on
February 10. 1966, sent the following letter to the
Respondent:
Mr. Clyde Edwards came to my office on
January 31, 1966. He has a blind left eye. The right
eye is 20/50 vision when not wearing glasses and is
corrected to 20/20 when wearing glasses. Safety
glasses are recommended for plant wear at all times.
Some work around machinery might be contra-
indicated entirely due to his being one-eyed.
I note also that when Dr. Roe conducted his examination
of Edwards' eyes, Edwards told him that Respondent was
unhappy with him and that perhaps they were trying to get
rid of him.
I believe that the above recital indicates that
Respondent in fact was engaged in an inordinate search
for medical justification of Edwards' discharge and that
Edwards' state of mind was such that he correctly
surmised that Respondent was trying to get rid of him.
Accordingly, after the February 7 suspension, it was
logical for Edwards to conclude that his prospects for
future employment with Respondent were precarious and
that, under the circumstances. it was rather compelling for
491
him to seek other employment. In view of the above, I
conclude. contrary to the contentions of the Respondent,
that the Respondent by the acts and conduct described
herein created an atmosphere which rendered it
impossible for Edwards to continue his employment with
Respondent under reasonably normal conditions.2' On the
record in the instant case, I conclude that the condition of
Edwards' left eye was seized upon by the Respondent as a
cloak for harassment because of his prominence in union
organization , his adherence to the Union, and because he
gave testimony under the Act in the prior Board
proceeding. Accordingly, I find that Edwards was
constructively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(1),
(3), and (4) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, distributed copies of its employees'
testimony given by them in a prior Board unfair labor
practice hearing and that Respondent also distributed
photostatic copies of their signed union authorization
cards for the purpose of inhibiting them from exercising
their right under Section 7, I shall recommend an order
that it cease and desist therefrom
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act by denying employment to
Clyde F. Edwards from January 3, 1966, to January 17,
1966, and that Respondent, by unlawfully discharging
Clyde F. Edwards on February 7, 1966, further violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, I will recommend
that the Respondent shall offer Edwards immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that
which he normally would have earned as wages from
January 3, 1966, to January 17, 1966, and from the date of
his discharge to the date of the Respondent's offer of
reinstatement , less his net earnings during such period,
with backpay and interest thereon in the manner
proscribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716.
The unfair labor practices found herein indicate a
purpose to coerce Respondent's employees from engaging
in lawful concerted activities and to deter them from
giving testimony under the Act. It is therefore concluded
" BeiserAviation Corporation , 135 NLRB 450,451, Springfield
Garment Manufacturing Company, 152 NLRB 1043, 1062
492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that these unfair labor practices are of such a character
and scope that they strike at the basic purposes the Act
was designed to achieve. It will therefore be recommended
that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
their guaranteed rights.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the record as a whole I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is and , during all times material herein,
was an employer engaged in commerce and a business
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is and, during all times material herein,
was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By denying employment to Clyde F. Edwards from
January 3, 1966, to January 17, 1966, and by discharging
him on February 7, 1966, because of his membership in
the Union, his protected concerted activities, and because
he gave testimony under the Act, Respondent has
discouraged membership in a labor organization and has
discriminated against said Edwards in violation of Section
8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]