John Robert. Van Wiemeersch et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 20, 2020

13670525 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/670,525 11/07/2012 John Robert Van Wiemeersch 83231503 1098
28395 7590 02/20/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
MANLEY, SHERMAN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3747
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT VAN WIEMEERSCH and
ROBERT BRUCE KLEVE

Appeal 2018-004168
Application 13/670,525
Technology Center 3700

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford
Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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According to Appellant, the invention “relates to a method and system
for monitoring a vehicle rental micro-business.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1, 8,
and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Below, we reproduce claim 1
as representative of the appealed claims:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive input defining one or more vehicle parameters to
monitor using a vehicle computing system;
monitor the vehicle parameters, via the vehicle
computing system, during a vehicle rental period, wherein the
rental period begins when an authorized user keylessly activates
a vehicle during a defined start time and ends when the vehicle
is powered down following either a predetermined end time or
when the vehicle is returned to a predetermined geographic
area; and
initiate communication of the vehicle parameters from
the vehicle computing system to a vehicle rental administrative
system through a cellular telephone, located in proximity to the
vehicle and in wireless communication with the processor.
REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART
The Examiner rejects the claims as follows:
I. Claims 1–7 and 14–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
by Clark et al. (US 2011/0213629 A1, pub. Sept. 1, 2011)
(“Clark”);
II. Claims 14, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
by Zaid et al. (US 2011/0112969 A1, pub. May 12, 2011)
(“Zaid”); and
III. Claims 8–13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Kustosch et al. (US 2004/0049333 A1, pub. Mar. 11, 2004)
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(“Kustosch”) and Reichow et al. (US 7,113,081 B1, iss. Sept.
26, 2006) (“Reichow”).
ANALYSIS
Rejection I—Anticipation rejection of claims 1–7 and 14–18 based on
Clark
Independent claim 1, and its dependent claims 2–7
As set forth above, independent claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a
processor configured to . . . initiate communication of the vehicle
parameters from the vehicle computing system to a vehicle rental
administrative system through a cellular telephone, located in proximity to
the vehicle and in wireless communication with the processor.” Appeal Br.,
Claims App. (emphasis added). A relevant, ordinary, and customary
dictionary definition of “initiate” is “[t]o begin, set going, or originate.”
From https://www.dictionary.com/browse/initiate, last accessed February 12,
2020. This definition is consistent with Appellant’s Specification and
Appellant’s figures, which show and describe the vehicle computing system
sending information to the rental administration system without reference to
any request from the system (i.e., it appears that it is the vehicle computing
system that begins, sets going, and originates the communication of the
vehicle parameters to the vehicle rental administrative system). See
Spec. 52; see Fig. 3B. The Examiner does not proffer any alternative
definition or understanding of the claim term “initiate.” See, e.g., generally
Answer.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is in error
because Clark does not disclose initiating communication of the vehicle
parameters by a vehicle computing system (that is, having the vehicle
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computing system communicate the vehicle parameters without being
requested to do so), as claimed. Appeal Br. 6–7. Based on our review of the
record, the Examiner does not support adequately that Clark discloses a
processor that initiates communication as claim 1 recites. Accordingly, we
do not sustain this rejection.
Specifically, Appellant argues that, in Clark, the request for GPS
information “is quite plainly initiated by the requesting user [from a system
that is outside of the vehicle]. The fact that [in Clark] the vehicle computing
system responds, at some point, with GPS coordinates is not ‘initiating
communication,’” as claimed. Id. at 7. Appellant’s summary of Clark is
consistent with Clark’s paragraphs 126 and 127, which state that
“[b]eginning at the time when the car is supposed to have been returned (that
is, at the end of the reservation period . . . ), the following process is
executed . . .: 1) The system requests the car’s location.” Clark ¶¶ 126, 127.
It appears that “the system” Clark references is “system 104,” which is a
server outside of the vehicle. See, e.g., id. ¶ 62, Fig. 1. Although the
Examiner relies on Clark’s paragraph 136 (see, e.g., Answer 3) to disclose a
vehicle computing system initiating communication, this paragraph of Clark
does not appear to disclose anything of the sort. Instead, this portion of
Clark discusses the transmission of GPS information from the in-car device
to the server without explanation as to whether the device or the server
initiates communication. See Clark ¶ 136. Thus, based on the foregoing, the
Examiner does not support adequately that Clark discloses a processor that
initiates communication, as claimed.
Notwithstanding the above discussion, the following provides a
separate reason that we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection
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of independent claim 1 based on Clark. Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a
processor configured to . . . receive input defining one or more vehicle
parameters to monitor using a vehicle computing system.” Appeal Br.,
Claims App. Based on our review of the record, a broadest reasonable
interpretation of receiving an input defining one or more vehicle parameters
to monitor using a vehicle computing system is receiving options set by a
vehicle owner. See Spec. ¶ 51 (“At 326, the VCS [(vehicle computing
system)] may implement assigned vehicle control limitations during the use
of the rental term by mitigating vehicle performance while preventing the
Temporary User to exceed a limitation set by the Owner. The Owner may
have the options to set rental restrictions based on, but not limited to, speed,
destination location, or load weight limitations. Controlling usage to enforce
compliance with the rental agreement terms may be of more importance to a
vehicle rental micro-business owner as this may be the only vehicle the
Owner possesses. These restrictions can be input using the vehicle rental
website, a smart phone application or the Owner’s nomadic device
interacting with the VCS.”).
Conversely, the Examiner does not support adequately, such as by
citation to either anything in any of the references, Appellant’s
Specification, or any other evidence, that any “initial programming” of the
processor discloses receiving input defining one or more vehicle parameters
as claimed. See Answer 6–7. And, the Examiner does not show that, in
Clark, something other than perhaps initial programming of the in-car device
enables the device to send GPS information. See id. at 3–4. Consequently,
the Examiner does not support adequately that in Clark there is receiving of
input by the processor, as claimed. Thus, as we state above, the preceding
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provides a separate reason that we do not sustain independent claim 1’s
anticipation rejection based on Clark.
The Examiner rejects, with independent claim 1, claims 2–7 that
depend from claim 1. Because we do not sustain claim 1’s anticipation
rejection based on Clark, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of dependent claims 2–7.

Independent claim 14, and its dependent claims 15–18
Independent claim 14 recites, in relevant part, “receiving an input
defining a vehicle parameter to monitor,” and “initiating communication of
the vehicle parameters from the vehicle computer to a vehicle rental
administrative system through a cellular telephone, located in proximity to
the vehicle and in wireless communication with the vehicle computer.”
Appeal Br., Claims App. Because this is an anticipation rejection based on
Clark, the Examiner relies on Clark to disclose each of these claim
recitations. For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1, however,
Clark does not disclose either claim recitation. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 14 based
on Clark. Further, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 15–18 that depend from, and the Examiner rejects with, claim 14.

Rejection II—Anticipation rejection of claims 14, 19, and 20
As set forth above, independent claim 14 recites, in relevant part,
“receiving an input defining a vehicle parameter to monitor.” Appeal Br.,
Claims App. Similar to the above discussion regarding Clark under the
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heading Rejection I, the Examiner relies on Zaid’s “initial programming” of
its processor to disclose the claimed receiving an input. See, e.g., Answer 6.
Based on our review of the record, a broadest reasonable
interpretation of receiving an input defining a vehicle parameter to monitor
is receiving options that are set by the vehicle owner. See Spec. ¶ 51.
Conversely, the Examiner does not support adequately, such as by citation to
either anything in any of the references, Appellant’s Specification, or any
other evidence, that the “initial programming” of the processor discloses
receiving input defining one or more vehicle parameters as claimed. See
Answer 6–7. The Examiner does not show that in Zaid, something other
than its initial programming enables Zaid’s vehicle computer to send
location and speed information. See id. Consequently, the Examiner does
not support adequately that in Zaid there is receiving input by the processor,
as claimed.
Based on the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of independent claim 14 based on Zaid. Further, we do not sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 20 that depend from claim 14, and
which the Examiner rejects with the independent claim.

Rejection III—Obviousness rejection of claims 8–13
Independent claim 8 recite, in relevant part, “a processor configured
to . . . receive input defining a vehicle parameter to monitor, via a vehicle
computing system (VCS).” Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 8 appears to rely on Kustosch to disclose a
processor configured to receive an input defining a vehicle parameter to
monitor (in the case of Kustosch, vehicle weight), and to rely on Reichow to
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disclose changing a value of the monitored vehicle parameter. See, e.g.,
Answer 8–9. Regardless, the Examiner’s rejection cites Kustosch’s
paragraph 34, and column 8, lines 30–45 of Reichow. See, e.g., id. at 9.
Neither the cited portion of Kustosch nor the cited portion of Reichow
discloses receiving any input defining a vehicle parameter to monitor. See
Kustosch ¶ 34; see Reichow col. 8, ll. 30–45.
In response to Appellant’s argument that “the prior art, again, never
discloses [an] input defining a parameter to be monitored” (Appeal Br. 10
(emphasis omitted)), the Examiner appears to rely on unreferenced
“programming” in the prior art to disclose the claimed receiving an input
(Answer 12). As discussed above, a broadest reasonable interpretation of
receiving an input defining a vehicle parameter to monitor is receiving an
option set by the vehicle owner. See Spec. ¶ 51. Conversely, the Examiner
does not support adequately, such as by citation to either anything in any of
the references, Appellant’s Specification, or any other evidence, that the
claimed receiving input by the processor encompasses any “initial
programming” of the processor. And, the Examiner does not show that in
either Kustosch or Reichow, something other than the initial programming
starts any system monitoring vehicle weight.
Consequently, the Examiner does not support adequately that in either
Kustosch or Reichow there is any receiving of input by the processor, as
claimed. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of independent claim 8. Further, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 9–13 that depend from, and which the Examiner rejects with,
claim 8.

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CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness
rejections of claims 1–20.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 14–18 102(b) Clark 1–7, 14–18
14, 19, 20 102(b) Zaid 14, 19, 20
8–13 103(a) Kustosch, Reichow 8–13
Overall
Outcome
1–20
REVERSED