John R. Checkett Complainant,v.Elaine Chao, Secretary, Department of Labor, (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 5, 2001
01991201 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 5, 2001)

01991201

10-05-2001

John R. Checkett Complainant, v. Elaine Chao, Secretary, Department of Labor, (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs) Agency.


John R. Checkett v. Department of Labor

01991201

10/5/01

.

John R. Checkett

Complainant,

v.

Elaine Chao,

Secretary,

Department of Labor,

(Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01991201

Agency No. 7-10-078

DECISION

John R. Checkett (complainant) timely initiated an appeal of a final

agency decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination on the bases of race (white), sex (male) and age (DOB:

5/30/40), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1>

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.405. For the following

reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether complainant has proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that he was subject to unlawful employment discrimination

on the above-cited bases when he was not selected for the SES position of

Regional Director for the Dallas Office of Federal Contract Compliance

Programs (OFCCP) which was announced in Notice of Executive Vacancy,

No. ESA 96-02 dated March 20, 1996.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant was employed as a Senior Liaison

Officer (Ombudsperson), GM-15, in Seattle, Washington, at the time he

filed the instant complaint. Prior to that, complainant served as a

Regional Director, GM-0360-15 at the agency's offices in Chicago, Illinois

and in Seattle, Washington. In his statement to the EEO Investigator,

complainant argued that in filling the Dallas Regional Director (hereafter

RD) position, the agency's diversity objective took precedence over

Title VII protections. Consequently, complainant argues that a number of

qualified females, non-minorities and minorities were not given serious

consideration for the RD position. In his affidavit, complainant also

argues that his experience at the GM-15 level gave him the knowledge,

skills and technical experience to discharge the responsibilities of RD

and also made him better qualified for the position than the Selectee

who happened to be a GM-14 Hispanic male who was 57 years of age at the

time of his selection to the RD position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency informed complainant

of his right to request a hearing or a FAD. By letter dated April 20,

1998, complainant requested that the designated agency official issue a

decision without a hearing. In a final agency decision dated October 26,

1998, the agency found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of sex discrimination because both he and the Selectee were males.

Further, the agency determined that complainant failed to show that the

reasons it articulated for his non-selection, which are set forth below,

were a pretext for discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that the investigation ignored key

areas of his complaint. Specifically, complainant asserts that the

Investigator neglected to look into a statement published in a Newsletter

that the agency was particularly interested in Hispanic candidates for

the RD position. Further, complainant contends that the agency failed

to provide him with necessary information to prosecute his complaint,

such as how many agency managers had been promoted from the GS-14 to

the SES level. Similarly, complainant states that the agency improperly

processed his complaint, because it did not afford him the opportunity

to mediate his complaint. Complainant also argues that although a white

male had served as RD in Dallas in the mid-1980's all of the recent RD's

for Dallas were Hispanics. In conclusion, complainant stated that the

reasons articulated by the agency for its actions were not persuasive

and he requested that the Commission review the circumstances surrounding

his non-selection for the RD position.

In responding to complainant's appeal, the agency basically reiterates

the arguments it made in its FAD. In effect, the agency argues that

its FAD is proper and should not be disturbed on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation

of burdens and order of presentation of proof in Title VII cases is a

three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Complainant has the initial burden of establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination. A prima facie case of discrimination

based on sex or race is established where complainant has produced

sufficient evidence to show that he is a member of a protected class

and he was accorded treatment less favorable than that given to persons

otherwise similarly situated who are not members of his protected class.

Potter v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland, 518 F. 2d 864 (6th Cir. 1975);

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).

If complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden

of production shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252

(1981). If the agency articulates a reason for its action, the burden

of production then shifts back to complainant to establish that the

agency's proffered explanation is pretextual, and that the real reason

is discrimination or retaliation. Throughout the complaint process,

complainant retains the burden of proof to establish discrimination by

a preponderance of the evidence. It is not sufficient �to disbelieve

the employer; the fact finder must believe the plaintiff's explanation

of intentional discrimination.� St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (emphasis in original).

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has

established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Specifically,

the agency's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Contract Compliance,

ES-5 (hereafter DAS) stated that she selected the Selectee for the RD

position because:

he was one of the few candidates who received a �very good� rating in

every category of the Ranking Panel's qualification evaluation sheet

for SES positions; <2>

he had served as the Director of both the San Diego and the San Jose

District Offices;

he had consistently demonstrated expert knowledge of all the OFCCP

program areas;

he had represented OFCCP on several National Task forces;

he had served on regional management teams;

he had participated in training the regional staff;

he had demonstrated ability to manage human resources and had few if

any grievances;

he interviewed well and was able to articulate the mission and objectives

of the OFCCP when he met with the Ranking Panel;

he received a strong endorsement for the position from members of his

community;

he led the region in obtaining settlements;

his accomplishments in the District Office exceeded those of some of

the smaller regions including Boston, Seattle and Denver; and

he had an exemplary record of hiring a diverse staff.

In summary, the DAS averred that she chose the Selectee not because of his

Hispanic origin, but because he was clearly the best qualified person for

the position. The DAS also averred that complainant's stated objection

to the selection of the Selectee was without foundation. In this regard,

she noted that no one who happens to be a GM-15 is deemed to be preferred

or better qualified over a GM-14 who also made the selection certificate.

As such, the DAS noted that in a past recruitment action for an SES

position, she selected a GS-14 Caucasian male, over Hispanic and other

racial and ethnic candidates who were at the GM-15 level. As with the

Selectee, the DAS stated that she selected the Caucasian employee in that

recruitment action because of his competence, creativity, leadership,

and successful management skills

Based on the above discussion, we find that the agency has articulated

legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting complainant

for the RD position. Because the agency articulated a legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged personnel action,

complainant must demonstrate that the reasons are pretextual and/or that

the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus in not selecting him

for the RD position.

Except for his bare assertion that the RD position in the Dallas area

has traditionally gone to a Hispanic candidate, complainant presented

no substantive evidence to rebut the reasons articulated by the DAS for

choosing the Selectee for the RD position. The evidence of record supports

the DAS testimony that the Selectee was a highly qualified candidate for

the RD position. In prior judicial decisions, courts have held that in

order for there to be a finding of discrimination in a non-selection case,

the qualifications of the complainant must be clearly superior to that of

the Selectee. See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (4th Cir. 1981).

Although it is apparent that complainant was a capable manager and highly

regarded by his co-workers and customers, the Commission is unable to find

that his qualifications were clearly superior to that of the Selectee.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the agency's finding of no sex, race or age discrimination in

relation to complainant's non-selection for the RD position is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

10/5/01

__________________

Date

1 In his formal complaint dated April 11,

1997, complainant cited age as a basis. However, in his request for

a formal agency decision dated April 20, 1998, complainant noted that

after reviewing the agency's comments on the age of the selectee (DOB:

2/5/39) in the investigative file, he decided to drop age as a basis of

his complaint. Accordingly, this decision will only address complainant's

allegation of race and sex discrimination.

2 The ranking Panel consisted of the DAS, the Regional Director of

OFCCP's Atlanta, Georgia region, and the Deputy Director of OFCCP's

national office in Washington D.C.