John I. Chapman, Appellant,v.Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 14, 1999
01983391 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 14, 1999)

01983391

06-14-1999

John I. Chapman, Appellant, v. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Agency.


John I. Chapman v. Securities and Exchange Commission

01983391

June 14, 1999

John I. Chapman, )

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01983391

Arthur Levitt, Jr., ) Agency No. SEC 52-97

Chairman, )

Securities and Exchange )

Commission )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

The appellant timely filed an appeal with this Commission from a final

agency decision (FAD), dated February 26, 1998, which the agency issued

pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a). The Commission

accepts the appellant's appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960,

as amended.

Appellant alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases of race

(African-American), gender (male), and color (black) when a GS-12 employee

(the same grade as appellant) was assigned to supervise appellant.

Appellant also alleged harassment when his supervisor called appellant

when he was at home on sick leave.<1>

The agency dismissed the appellant's complaint for failure to state

a claim. Specifically, the agency determined that it is common for

employees to report to supervisors of the same grade and it did not affect

a term, condition, or privilege of appellant's employment. The agency

also found that the alleged phone call did not constitute a hostile or

abusive work environment. Thereafter appellant filed this appeal.<2>

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

In the instant case, the Commission finds that appellant has not

alleged facts sufficient to suggest he suffered a present harm or loss.

Therefore, appellant is not an "aggrieved employee" under �1614.103.

The Commission also observes that the alleged incidents are not sufficient

to state a claim of harassment. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment

is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the complainant's employment. The Court explained that

an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment" is created when "a

reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive: and the complainant

subjectively perceives it as such." Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus,

not all claims of harassment are actionable. Where a complaint does

not challenge an agency action or inaction regarding a specific term,

condition or privilege of employment, a claim of harassment is actionable

only if, allegedly, the harassment to which the complainant has been

subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the complainant's employment. In the present case, appellant has not

alleged facts sufficient to establish a claim of unlawful harassment.

See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March

13, 1997).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision dismissing appellant's complaint is

hereby AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 14, 1999

__________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1In the attachment to appellant's complaint, appellant describes his

work environment as "ongoing stressful and hostile". According to the

FAD, appellant advised the EEO counselor that his supervisor harassed

appellant when he called appellant at home. The agency treats this

incident as the second of appellant's allegations.

2On appeal, appellant also raises for the first time several new

allegations including:"glass ceiling" at agency bars his promotion,

called in for another interview after he thought he had already been

hired, and when he took problems to management he was blamed for them.

Appellant is advised that if he wishes to pursue these allegations

through the EEO process, he must initiate contact with an EEO Counselor.

The Commission advises the agency that the date appellant filed the

appeal statement in which he raised these allegations with the agency

shall be deemed to be the date of the initial EEO contact, unless he

previously contacted a counselor regarding these matters, in which case

the earlier date would serve as the EEO Counselor contact date.