John F. Thompson, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 22, 1999
01986250_r (E.E.O.C. Jun. 22, 1999)

01986250_r

06-22-1999

John F. Thompson, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


John F. Thompson, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01986250

v. ) Agency No. 4-K-220-0056-98

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

The agency issued a final decision which dismissed one of three

allegations of appellant's complaint. A receipt for certified mail

reveals that appellant received the final agency decision on April

13, 1998. At the time, appellant was not represented by counsel.

Appellant apparently retained counsel on April 17, 1998.

The record contains a final agency decision. Within the body of the final

agency decision, appellant was informed in detail of his appeal rights to

the Commission regarding the dismissed allegation. Appellant was informed

that he had to file an appeal with the Commission within 30 calendar days

of his receipt of the final agency decision. The Commission's address

was provided. Appellant was also informed that if he failed to file

an appeal with the Commission within 30 calendar days, his untimeliness

could result in the dismissal of his appeal. The final agency decision

also informed appellant that the accepted issues would be investigated

and if he did not agree with the definition of the issues, he had to

provide a response to the agency within seven days. The final agency

decision also informed appellant in detail about the investigatory and

hearing processes regarding the accepted issues, timetables for those

processes and, also, what procedures he would have to follow if he were

dissatisfied with the agency's final decision on the accepted issues.

The record reveals that appellant's counsel submitted to the agency's

Office of EEO Complaints Processing, a document entitled "Complainant's

Response to Defined Issues," wherein appellant contended that the agency

had improperly dismissed allegation 1 of his complaint. The document

was date stamped as having been received by the EEO Office on April

20, 1998. In an April 30, 1998 letter to the Senior EEO Complaints

Processing Specialist, appellant's counsel stated, in relevant part, as

follows: "[w]ith respect to the dismissed issue, [appellant] desires

to appeal the dismissal of issue no. 1... Please consider this letter

[appellant's] notice of appeal as to that issue." In the April 30, 1998

letter, appellant also requested the appropriate forms so that he could

"pursue" his appeal. The record does not reveal when the April 30,

1998 letter was received by the EEO office.

The record also contains a May 7, 1998 letter from the Senior EEO

Complaints Processing Specialist to appellant's counsel, which the

record discloses was received by appellant's counsel on May 8, 1998.

The letter states that per "previous correspondence," a copy of the final

agency decision was enclosed and it informed counsel that the letter

did "not toll time limits." The May 7, 1998 letter also reflects that

copies thereof were also sent to appellant and the EEO investigator.

In a June 1, 1998 letter to the EEO investigator, counsel stated that

he was "concerned about the dismissal of issue #1 in [appellant's] case

which deals with the �relation back' theory. Counsel also referenced his

April 30, 1998 letter to the Senior EEO Complaints Processing Specialist.

He also stated therein that "[t]he notification of dismissal of issue

#1 indicates appellate rights to the EEOC but it does not give precise

instructions for the procedures to be used in order to pursue that appeal.

Those precise instructions are what I am seeking now."

Appellant's appeal was postmarked August 5, 1998. On appeal, appellant's

counsel asserts that his April 30, 1998 letter to the Senior EEO

Complaints Processing Specialist constitutes a valid appeal of the

dismissed allegation and that the agency had a duty to forward the April

30, 1998 letter to the Commission, if the agency considered the appeal

improperly filed. Appellant's counsel further asserts that he relied

on misleading statements from the EEO investigator regarding appellate

actions and that, therefore, the agency should be estopped from denying

the validity of the appeal. Counsel also states that on April 22, 1998,

he received a letter from the Senior EEO Complaints Processing Specialist

which ignored appellant's arguments<1> and which stated that "no appeal

has been taken" and, also, on May 4, 1998, he received a letter from the

EEO investigator which made no mention of the appeal.<2> Counsel also

states that on May 7, 1998, he received another letter from the Senior EEO

Complaints Processing Specialist which did not address the appeal issue

but which contained a copy of the final agency decision.<3> Appellant

further asserts that after concluding that written correspondence to the

agency was "fruitless," he telephoned the EEO investigator on May 22,

1998, regarding the appeal. Counsel asserts that he was informed by the

EEO investigator that the clock would not begin to run until completion

of the investigation and that upon completion of the investigation,

the dismissed allegation could be addressed at a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge. Counsel further asserts that in his June 1,

1998 letter to the EEO investigator, he reiterated his concerns about

the appeal. Counsel also contends that he never received appropriate

appeal forms despite his requests to the agency.

In response to appellant's arguments on appeal, the agency contends that

appellant's appeal on August 5, 1998, occurred 114 days after appellant

received the final agency decision on April 13, 1998. The agency

further contends that counsel was provided with a copy of the final

agency decision on May 8, 1998, and that even if that date were used to

calculate the time for filing a timely appeal, the August 1998 appeal

was still untimely.

By regulation, appeals to the Commission must be filed within 30 calendar

days after an appellant receives notice of the final agency decision.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.402(a). The time limits are subject to waiver,

estoppel and equitable tolling. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

Upon review, we find that the appeal is untimely. The Commission finds

that appellant received the final agency decision on April 13, 1998,

and that in the final decision, the agency properly advised appellant

of his appeal rights and provided the Commission's address. Appellant,

therefore, had 30 days from April 13, 1998, to file an appeal with the

Commission. Appellant did not file his appeal until August 5, 1998.

Accordingly, his appeal is untimely and appellant has not provided

justification sufficient to extend the filing period.

The record reflects, and the Commission finds, that the April 30, 1998

letter from counsel evidenced appellant's attempt to file an appeal.

However, as a general rule, the Commission will dismiss an appeal as

untimely when it is mailed to the agency rather than to the Commission,

even if it would have been timely filed if it had been mailed directly

to the Commission. Henry v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05901116 (November 30, 1990)(mailed to the agency's Office of General

Counsel); Ramirez v. Department of Education, EEOC Request No. 05880901

(February 2, 1989) (mailed to the agency's EEO office). At times, the

Commission has exercised its discretion to extend the applicable filing

period for an appeal where: (1) there was no dispute that the appeal would

have been timely if sent to the correct destination; (2) the document

was sent to a Commission District Office; (3) the wrong office did not

forward the document promptly to the correct office, absent fault by

appellant; or (4) the agency was not prejudiced. Hyland v. Department

of Education, EEOC Request No. 05930037 (May 27, 1993). See, also,

Jones v. Department of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05950052 (January 19,

1996) (appeal found timely where agency did not act expeditiously to

advise appellant of her error or forward her appeal to the Commission);

Orr v. Tennessee Valley Authority, EEOC Request No. 05930311 (March 11,

1994)(appeal found timely where agency failed to expeditiously forward

the appeal to the Commission or to expeditiously inform appellant of

the filing error).

The Commission does not find that the present case qualifies as an

exception to our general rule. Appellant was provided appropriate

notice of his appeal rights which informed him at length when, where,

and how he was to file an appeal. In addition, on May 8, 1998, counsel

received a copy of the final agency decision from the EEO Complaints

Processing Specialist with the same detailed appeal rights previously

received by appellant. Counsel was also specifically put on notice in

the May 7, 1998 letter that time limits were not tolled. Counsel should

therefore have recognized that his attempt to file his appeal with

the agency through his April 30, 1998 letter was improper and taken

immediate action to file an appeal with the Commission. Based on the

May 7, 1998 letter and the appeal rights information contained in the

final agency decision, the Commission is not persuaded by counsel's

unsupported assertion that he was misled by the EEO investigator into

believing that his appeal was properly and timely filed when he talked

with the EEO investigator on May 22, 1998. The Commission also notes

that despite his having received the appeal rights and procedures and

despite the misgivings counsel asserts he had developed at least by late

May 1998, counsel still did not submit an appeal to the Commission until

August 1998. Counsel does not explain why if he believed the appeal was

properly filed with the EEO office by his letter of April 30, 1998, what

circumstances prompted him to file with the Commission in August 1998.

Finally, regarding appellant's contention on appeal that despite his

requests, the agency never provided him with EEOC Form 573 (Notice of

Appeal/Petition), the Commission has held that an appellant does not need

to have a Form 573 to file an appeal as long as appellant was advised of

appeal rights in the agency's final decision. Richardson v. Department of

the Army, EEOC Request No. 05960587 (April 22, 1996); Cole v. U.S. Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05950009 (May 25, 1995).

Accordingly, consistent with our discussion herein, the appeal is hereby

DISMISSED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 22, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

1Presumably, counsel is referring to his Response to Defined Issues.

2Counsel did not provide copies of the letters received by him on April

22, 1998 or May 4, 1998.

3The only evidence in the record reveals that the May 7, 1998 letter

was received, not on May 7, 1998, but on May 8, 1998.