01982686
06-18-2001
John F. Saroli, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
John F. Saroli v. United States Postal Service
01982686
June 18, 2001
.
John F. Saroli,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01982686
Agency No. 4J-481-0010-97
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision
(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases
of disability (job related injuries to left shoulder, back, and right
knee, Depression with Paranoid Schizophrenic Tendencies which resulted
in substance abuse-alcohol) and retaliation (prior EEO activity) when
he was issued a Notice of Charges - Removal dated September 4, 1996,
effective October 4, 1996, for unacceptable conduct and safety violations.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed
as a Full-Time Distribution Window Clerk, PS-05, at the agency's Wyandotte
Post Office, Wyandotte, Michigan facility. Believing he was a victim
of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently
filed a formal complaint on December 2, 1996. At the conclusion of the
investigation, complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing
before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final
decision by the agency. When complainant failed to respond within the
time period specified in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a
final decision.
In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to support
a prima facie case of both disability discrimination and reprisal.
With respect to complainant's disability claim, the agency concluded
that complainant failed to provide any evidence which could support
the finding that complainant had a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity. In addition, the agency
found no evidence that could support the finding that agency officials
regarded complainant as disabled. The agency also found that the
responsible management officials who initiated the removal and who
were directly involved in complainant's removal had no knowledge of
complainant's alleged disabilities. Lastly, the agency found the record
devoid of evidence which would support the finding that complainant
was treated more harshly than similarly situated individuals outside of
complainant's protected class.
With respect to the reprisal claim, the agency concluded that complainant
failed to present a prima facie case of reprisal because he could not show
that the responsible management officials were aware of complainant's
prior EEO activity and because complainant could not establish a
causal connection between the prior EEO activity which took place two
years earlier and the removal. In addition, the agency noted that the
responsible management officials involved in the removal action were
not named in the prior EEO complaint.
Lastly, the agency concluded that complainant did not show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its employment action were pretexts
to mask employment discrimination or reprisal. The record revealed
that complainant was issued a Notice of Removal for unacceptable
conduct and safety violations. Specifically, the Notice of Removal
set out the following incidents which resulted in the notice: On
August 5, 1996, complainant notified his supervisor of an injury he
sustained while at work approximately one hour earlier in the shift.
Complainant explained that he strained his back while lifting parcels
and bags. Complainant was reprimanded for not notifying management of
his injury immediately after it occurred. On August 6, 1996, complainant
rammed the All Purpose Container (APC) into the Distribution Case being
worked by another clerk. Complainant backed the APC up and rammed the
Distribution Case one more time. The carrier warned complainant to
stop and was afraid of being injured by complainant. Complainant then
took the APC over to the Carrier Case 9557 and rammed it into that
case as well. On August 12, 1996, complainant was heard yelling and
screaming profanity on the workroom floor and was seen banging containers.
Complainant stated to management that another employee rammed an APC into
his knee. According to the other employee, the APC container that he
was pushing slightly rolled and �tapped� the container that complainant
was working at. According to the employee, as complainant walked away,
complainant grabbed the container in front of the employee and �bashed�
it into an empty container while screaming and yelling profanity.
Complainant also threw his safety equipment on the ground. On August
24, 1996, complainant was instructed to distribute the marriage mail.
The supervisor observed that the carrier case area that complainant had
been working in had been drastically altered, as if �a tornado had come
through.� The employee assigned to the area stated that prior to his
discovery of the mess, complainant approached him and loudly belched
into his ear from a distance of approximately three inches.
On August 27, 1996, complainant was interviewed by a supervisor with
regard to his conduct on the above dates. Complainant stated that
he did not believe any of his actions were unsafe and gave no other
explanation or justification for his behavior. Complainant provided
no evidence of pretext. Complainant provides no statement on appeal.
Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d
292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981); and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for
Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal
cases), the Commission agrees with the agency that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and reprisal
because complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the responsible management officials knew of his prior EEO activity
or his alleged disabilities.<1> In reaching this conclusion, we note that
while the Postmaster affirmed that he was aware of complainant's prior
EEO activity and had some knowledge of complainant's medical conditions,
there is no evidence in the record which supports the finding that his
supervisors were also aware of such information. The Postmaster affirmed
that he was not involved in the decision to terminate complainant and the
responsible management officials both testify that they had no knowledge
of complainant's alleged disability or prior EEO activity.
The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present evidence
that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its
actions were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion,
we note that the undisputed record shows that complainant had a history
of discipline for similar failures. We also note that complainant failed
to articulate any reason for disbelieving the agency.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 18, 2001
__________________
Date
1Since we find that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the responsible management officials where aware
of his prior EEO activity and alleged disability, it is unnecessary to
determine whether complainant was in fact a qualified individual with
a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.