John Bodrozic

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 4, 2020

2020001879 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/212,040 08/17/2011 John Bodrozic 374741-991101 5462
26379 7590 08/04/2020
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
EXAMINER
LINDSEY III, JOHNATHAN J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketingUS-PaloAlto@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN BODROZIC
Appeal 2020-001879
Application 13/212,040
Technology Center 3600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES R. HUGHES,
and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 are pending,
stand rejected, are appealed by Appellant,1 and are the subject of our
decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). See Final Act. 1–2; Appeal Br. 1.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2015). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Homezada, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Throughout our decision we refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”)
filed Aug. 17, 2011 (claiming benefit of US 61/374,543, filed Aug. 17,
2010); and Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed July 16, 2019. We also refer to
the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed June 15, 2018; and
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Prior Appeal
The instant application was the subject of an earlier Appeal, Ex Parte
John Bodrozic, Appeal No. 2016–005887. The previous Decision on Appeal
was mailed on September 5, 2017 (the “Prior Decision”). In that Prior
Decision we affirmed the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–10, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) over Angel, Baird, Bove, and additional prior art references.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention generally relates to home inventory systems and home
maintenance systems, in particular, property asset management systems and
methods for compiling information concerning assets associated with spaces
of a property. The system includes a store (database) containing fixed item
assets and/or possession assets associated with spaces (locations) of a
property, an asset managing unit for assigning a maintenance checklist to the
property, a space within the property, a fixed item asset and/or a possession
asset, a project system that one of tracks property projects in one or more
spaces of the property, and an administrative system that automatically
generates items (items to be accomplished or “todo” items) for each
maintenance checklist and displays the property, the spaces of the property,
the fixed item assets within the spaces, and a maintenance plan for the
property (which includes the maintenance checklists). The administrative
system also transfers the information about the property to a buyer of the
property, but does not transfer the information about the possession assets

Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Oct. 1, 2019. Additionally we refer to our previous
Decision on Appeal (“Prior Decision”) mailed Sept. 5, 2017.
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for the property. Spec. 1:7–2:16; 6:2–9:30; Abstract. Claims 1 (reciting a
system and 28 (reciting a method) are independent. Claim 28, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:3
28. A[] property asset management method, the method
comprising:
[A] storing in a data store, for a plurality of assets
associated with a property and a plurality of spaces of the
property and each space is a physical location in one of on a piece
of land and within a house, an asset record for each asset and
each asset being one of a fixed item asset and a possession asset
and the plurality of assets are contained within spaces of the
property, the fixed item asset is a property asset that is embedded
into the property and the possession asset is an asset that is
removable from the property;
[B] executing, on a computer system, an asset managing
unit;
[C] assigning, using the asset managing unit, a
maintenance checklist to at least one of the property, the fixed
item asset and the possession asset and the maintenance plan has
a plurality of checklists;

3 Claim 28 (and claim 1) were modified by Appellant in an Amendment
(filed with a Request for Continued Examination (RCE)) on Nov. 6, 2017.
An additional Amendment was filed on May 15, 2018. Both Amendments
included Limitation D (below)—“automatically generating a plurality of
todo items for each maintenance checklist for at least one of the property, a
space, the fixed item asset and the possession asset.” There is no indication
that Appellant filed additional Amendments to the claims. The amended
claim language is also discussed by the Examiner in the rejection. See, e.g.,
Final Act. 3 (“Furthermore, the ‘automatically generating . . .”), Final Act.
10 (“an administrative system that automatically generates a plurality of
todo items . . .”). Appellant’s Claim Appendix includes claim 28 (and claim
1), but neither claim delineated in the Claim Appendix includes the amended
claim language. We have added the amended claim language to illustrative
claim 28 (below) to accurately reflect the current claims (as amended).
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[D] automatically generating a plurality of todo items for
each maintenance checklist for at least one of the property, a
space, the fixed item asset and the possession asset;
[E] tracking, using a project system of the asset managing
unit, one or more property projects in one or more spaces of the
property, wherein each property project includes a fixed asset
and is linked to one of a space in the property and a new space in
the property created by the property project, wherein the space
linked to the property project contains one of an existing asset
and a new asset created during the property project;
[F] displaying the spaces of the property, the fixed item
assets within the spaces, the maintenance plan, and the
completed property projects of the property to a public visitor
during a sale of the property; and
[G] transferring, using an administrative system of the
asset managing unit, information about the spaces of the
property, fixed item assets in the spaces of the property, the
maintenance plan for the property and a property project in the
property that has been completed to a buyer that buys the
property and does not transfer the information about the
possession assets for the property from a seller to the [] buyer
during the sale of the property.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (bracketed claim limitation designations
added).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Bove et al.
(“Bove”)
US 2003/0023610 A1 Jan. 30, 2003
Baird US 2008/0172393 A1 July 17, 2008
Angel et al.
(“Angel”)
US 2009/0024628 A1 Jan. 22, 2009
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Hwang et al., An Integration Platform For Developing Digital Life
Applications, Abstract, IEEE (2007) (“Hwang”).
REJECTIONS4
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38,
39, and 43–50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible
subject matter. See Final Act. 2–7.
2. The Examiner rejects claims 1–9, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–25, 28–32,
38, 39, and 43–48 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Angel, Baird, and Bove . See Final Act. 7–20.
3. The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 33 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Angel, Baird, Bove, and Hwang. See
Final Act. 20–21.
4. The Examiner rejects claims 26, 27, 49, and 50 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Angel, Baird, Bove, and Official Notice.
See Final Act. 21–23.
ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Eligibility—35 U.S.C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,

4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, e.g., to rename 35 U.S.C.
§ 103’s subsections. Because the present application has an effective filing
date prior to the AIA’s effective date for applications, this decision refers to
the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
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natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012). “[F]or distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The
framework requires us first to consider “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
If so, we then examine “the elements of [the] claim both individually and ‘as
an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). That is, we examine the
claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of elements
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–
73).
The Patent Office has published revised guidance concerning this
framework and the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(hereinafter “2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
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fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people) (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(hereinafter “Step 2A, prong 2”).5
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54. When the judicial exception is so
integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
54.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

5 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08-2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.6
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56. With these principles in
mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101 rejection.
The Examiner rejects Appellant’s claims 1–10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33,
38, 39, and 43–50 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See
Final Act. 2–7; Ans. 4–19. Appellant does not separately argue the claims
with specificity and, instead, argues the claims together for this rejection.
See Appeal Br. 5–7. Accordingly, we address the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 28 (and independent claim 1) and the claims not
separately argued by Appellant as a group based on claim 28, as permitted
by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Statutory Subject Matter
Claim 28 recites a “method” (supra). Appellant’s “method” uses a
computer system including an asset management unit and a data store to
perform a process comprising a number of functions or steps. Appeal Br. 17
(Claims App.) (claim 28). Accordingly, we analyze Appellant’s method as a
process, which is a statutory category of invention (subject matter)
(USPTO’s Step 1).
Abstract Idea
The Examiner rejects Appellant’s claim 1 and 28 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2–7; Ans. 4–9. Specifically,
the Examiner concludes claim 28 (and the other pending claims) recite an

6 Items (3) and (4) are collectively referred to as “Step 2B” hereinafter and
in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing the collected information,
and displaying the results similar to Electric Power Group (Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), or collecting and
processing information similar to Dealertrack (Dealertrack v. Huber, 674
F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). See Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant makes no specific arguments with respect to the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions concerning the abstract idea (USPTO’s Step 2A,
prong 1) analysis. See Appeal Br. 5. Instead Appellant generally contends,
with respect to claim 28 (and claim 1), that “any of the elements in the
claims that contain an abstract idea cannot be performed in the human mind
due to the types of data that are maintained and manipulated by the system
and method.” Appeal Br. 5. Otherwise, Appellant’s arguments are
specifically confined to the purported practical application of the abstract
ideas. See Appeal Br. 5–6. We address these arguments separately and in
detail below.
We conclude Appellant’s claim 28 and the other pending claims recite
abstract ideas, these abstract ideas are not integrated into a practical
application, nor do they include an inventive concept. In view of the 2019
Revised Guidance, we clarify and expand the Examiner’s reasoning as
follows.
We begin our analysis by broadly but reasonably construing
Appellant’s claim 28. See Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). Omitting the
portions of the claim invoking use of generic technology (which are
discussed separately below), claim 28 focuses on (as stated in the preamble)
“[a] property asset management method” that performs a process comprising
several functions or steps. See Spec. 1:7–8. These steps (functions)
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elaborate on the functionality of the asset management process (that is, a
process of managing assets associated with a property (e.g., real estate or
real property)) using “an online hosted software system that provides . . . the
ability to manage [and] organize . . . property with a centralized system for
all the electronic records of their property and all the associated inventory
items” (Spec. 6:7–9). The functions comprise “storing” or collecting
information—specifically, an “asset record for each asset” “for a plurality of
assets” that are “associated with a property,” “and each asset being one of a
fixed item asset and a possession asset” (limitation A). The asset
management process also comprises “executing . . . an asset managing unit”
(i.e., software) (limitation B) and “assigning” by the asset managing unit “a
maintenance checklist” to one (or more) of the “property, the fixed item
asset and the possession asset” (limitation C). See Spec. 10:1–11:24. In
other words, associating additional information (e.g., maintenance
checklists) with the stored data.
The asset management process further comprises “generating a
plurality of todo items for each maintenance checklist” (limitation D) (see
footnote 3) and “tracking” “one or more property projects in one or more
spaces of the property” where “each property project includes a fixed asset .
. . linked to . . . a space in the property” (limitation E). See Spec. 6:24–26,
28–29; 14:6–15:29. That is, processing or analyzing the collected and
associated information to generate a list of items to be completed and track
property projects.
The asset management process additionally comprises “displaying”
information— “the spaces of the property, the fixed item assets within the
spaces, the maintenance plan” (which consists of the checklists) and
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“property projects” (limitation F). In other words, displaying the resulting
collected, associated, and generated information. See Spec. 22:4–25:16.
Also, the asset management process comprises “transferring” (i.e.,
sending) “information” about the property to a purchaser—“transferring . . .
information about the spaces of the property, fixed item assets in the spaces
of the property, the maintenance plan for the property and a property project
in the property that has been completed to a buyer that buys the property”
(limitation G). See Spec. 22:4–25:16.
Apart from the use of generic technology (discussed further below),
each of the limitations of claim 1 describes “‘collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,’
where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such
that they could practically be performed in the human mind.” October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (hereinafter
“October 2019 Update”). The claim documentation process amounts to a
mental process that is very similar to Electric Power Group. See Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351–54; Final Act. 2–3.
A person can practically perform the function of limitations A–E (the
“storing,” “assigning,” “generating,” and “tracking” steps) mentally, or by
using pen and paper. Nowhere does Appellant point to specific claim
limitations that could not be performed alternatively as a mental process.
We emphasize that the 2019 Revised Guidance explains that “mental
processes” include acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen
and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic computer component
performs the acts. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52 n.14 (“If a
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claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in
the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be
performed in the mind.”). Because each of the limitations discussed above
encompasses an act that people can perform in their minds or using pen and
paper, claim 1 recites mental processes. Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us otherwise. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of
collecting, displaying, and manipulating data); Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Finding the “claims generally recite . . . extracting
data [and] recognizing specific information from the extracted data” and that
the “claims are drawn to the basic concept of data recognition.”). Even
where the analysis requires one to access and gather data, or utilize a pen
and paper in the analysis, such analysis may still be an abstract mental
process. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain
information from the database . . ., such data-gathering steps cannot alone
confer patentability.”). Additionally, the steps of displaying information
(limitation F) and transferring information (limitation G) amount to extra-
solution activity to the mental process.
Also, apart from the use of generic technology (discussed further
below), each of the limitations of claim 28 describes activities that would
normally be performed in managing property or assets associated with
property. Limitations A–E describe analyzing the collected information to
manage assets or property by collecting information about a property and
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assets associated with the property, preparing checklists for maintaining the
property and assets, tracking the status of the various maintenance projects,
and determining items that need to be accomplished to maintain the property
and assets. See Spec. 6:7–11 (the method “provides property owners with
the ability to manage, organize and protect their property” using “a home
inventory” and lists or check lists (“home maintenance, home to dos, home
spending, home improvement projects”).
We also agree with the Examiner that the asset management process
of claim 28 is “akin to methods of managing human activity” (Final Act. 4),
which is a certain method of organizing human activity, one of the
categories of judicial exceptions enumerated in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Ans. 4–5.
In summary, we conclude Appellant’s claim 28 recites a judicial
exception (USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1; see 2019 Revised Guidance).
Specifically, claim 1 recites a process of managing property and assets
associated with property—the asset management process—by collecting
information concerning a property and assets associated therewith, preparing
checklists for maintaining the property and assets, tracking the status of the
maintenance projects associated with the property and assets, determining
“to do” items that need to be accomplished to maintain the property and
assets, displaying the resulting information, and transferring some of the
information to a purchaser, as discussed supra. The asset management
process consists of methods of organizing human activity and mental
processes that can be practically performed in the human mind (or utilizing
pen and paper) including observation, evaluation, or judgment. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, 53 (listing “[c]ertain methods of
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organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices”
and “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as some of the “enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)).
Practical Application
Having determined that claim 28 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, whether
the claims are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims integrate
the abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract idea. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54. In doing so, we evaluate the claim as a
whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s] the [abstract idea] into a
practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 55; see also October 2019 Update 12 (discussing the practical
application analysis). That is, we consider any additional elements recited in
the claim along with the limitations that recite an abstract idea to determine
whether the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application.
See October 2019 Update 12.
Claim 28 recites additional elements beyond the abstract asset
management process (the judicial exception). The additional elements in
claim 28 include a data store, a computer system, and an asset management
unit. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (claim 28).
Appellant’s Specification describes “a data store . . . implemented as
one or more databases hosted on one or more database servers.” Spec.
27:25–26. Appellant’s Specification does not explicitly describe “a
computer system,” or “an asset management unit” (claim 28), but describes
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the method including the asset management unit as “a web-based property
asset system and method” (Spec. 6:2–3) that “combines multiple features
into one application” (Spec. 6:9–10). See Spec. 25:19–20 (“These mobile
applications work in unison with the Web Application to provide home
owners the ability to manage their home from a mobile smartphone.”).
Further, Appellant’s Specification describes an implementation of the “asset
system” including “a property asset unit” (Spec. 26:19–22) that “may be
implemented as one or more well known server computers (with the typical
well known server computer components) that execute one or more pieces of
software” (Spec. 27:12–14).
In summary, Appellant’s written description describes the “asset
management unit” implemented as part of the web-based software
application (in other words, a module or sub-application) executed by (on) a
standard server computer. Similarly, Appellant’s written description
describes the data store as a standard database (operating on a standard
database server). Appellant’s written description does not portray the data
store, computer system, and asset management unit as anything but standard
computer components. Nor does Appellant’s written description portray
these components as operating in a new way. Instead, the written
description depicts these components as generic components operating in
their accustomed manner. See Ans. 5–8.
Accordingly, Appellant’s written description shows that additional
elements are generic. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent need not teach, and
preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”); Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The
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claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it
amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware)
that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-
specific resources.”).
Appellant contends claim 28 and the other pending claims “recite
additional elements that improve a technical process (a property asset
system),” i.e., provide improvements to the technology field of property
asset management by “generat[ing] to do items” and “transferring the
property information upon the sale of the property.” Appeal Br. 5. In other
words, Appellant contends the claims recite a technological improvement
that amounts to more than simply utilizing a computer as a tool to
accomplish the asset management process. Appellant also contends claim
28 and the other pending claims “are directed to an improvement in the user
interface of a computing device” (Appeal Br. 5) in that the limitations of the
claims “disclose a specific manner of summarizing and displaying the
property asset information” (Appeal Br. 6) similar to Core Wireless (Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2018)). See Appeal Br. 5–6.
Appellant’s contentions correspond to the reasoning in MPEP
§ 2106.05(a), where additional elements integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application. We, however, disagree with Appellant’s contentions.
Appellant’s additional elements do not apply or use the asset management
process (the judicial exception) in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit
on the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–24 (citing Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78–85). Rather, Appellant’s claim recites generic computer
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elements (e.g., the computer system and database) that are utilized as tools to
carry out the collection of information and information analysis for storing,
assigning, generating, and tracking property and asset data in order to
display the data and transfer a portion of the data as discussed supra.
Utilizing computers as tools to perform common data information analysis
and data collection functions that can be mental processes (an abstract idea)
does not impose a meaningful limit on the abstract idea. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(f); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (Finding “if [the] recitation of a
computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a
computer, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”) (internal quotation
marks, alteration, and citations omitted).
Additionally, Core Wireless is inapplicable to the instant claims. In
Core Wireless, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing device
that could display a limited list of selectable functions. Core Wireless, 880
F.3d at 1360–63. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that
the claimed invention was directed to an improved user interface for
computing devices that used a particular manner of summarizing and
presenting a limited set of information to the user, unlike conventional user
interface methods that displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–
63. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (see Appeal Br. 5–6), the
claims are not “directed to a particular manner of summarizing and
presenting the property assets” in a display. Appeal Br. 6. Rather, the
claims recite the abstract concept of summarizing property asset information
(supra) that is then displayed. Appellant’s claims do not describe how the
information is actually formatted or displayed in the unclaimed display
(interface). Appellant’s displaying limitation differs substantially from the
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particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of
information to the user, including a limited list of selectable functions in
Core Wireless. See Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63.
None of the additional elements in claim 28, whether taken alone or in
the context of the claims as a whole, integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. In particular, the recited limitations including the
additional elements may improve the abstract idea—the mental processes or
method of organizing human activity—of managing property and assets, but
do not describe an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field. See Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 55.
Appellant’s claim 28 (and the other pending claims) can be
distinguished from patent-eligible claims such as those in McRO, Enfish,
BASCOM, and DDR Holdings that are directed to “a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology” (McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), or “a
specific improvement to the way computers operate” (Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), solving a
technology-based problem (BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), or a method
“rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer [technology]” (DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Contrary to
Appellant’s arguments, claim 28 is not a technological improvement or an
improvement in a technology. Appellant’s claim 1 does not “improve the
functioning of the computer itself” or “any other technology or technical
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field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Nor does it provide a technological solution
to a technological problem. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257; MPEP
§ 2106.05(a). Appellant fails to explain sufficiently and persuasively how
the instant claim(s) is/are directed to an improvement in the way computers
operate, nor has Appellant identified any technical advance or improvement
or specialized computer components. See Appeal Br. 5–6.
In summary, “the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement
in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
computers as tools.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(f) (instructing Examiners to consider “[w]hether the claim
invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an
existing process” in determining whether the claim recites mere instructions
to apply the exception) (cited in 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,
n.30) (emphasis omitted). Thus, we conclude the claims are directed to an
abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application.
Inventive Concept
Having concluded Appellant’s claims are directed to an abstract idea
under the 2019 Revised Guidance (Step 2A analysis), we consider whether
claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is, whether the claim has additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). As
discussed above, this requires us to evaluate whether the additional claim
elements add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply
append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” 2019 Revised
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56. If the Examiner or the Board determines under
Step 2B that the additional elements (or combination of additional elements)
amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the claim is eligible,
thereby concluding the eligibility analysis.
Here, the Examiner determined that Appellant’s claim 28 (and the
other pending claims) “do not include . . . elements that qualify as
significantly more than the abstract idea” (Final Act. 4) because the
“limitations recite the conventional computer functions of ‘storing and
retrieving information in memory’ and ‘receiving or transmitting data over a
network’” that are ‘recited in a merely generic manner’” (Ans. 8, footnotes
omitted). See Final Act. 4–7; Ans. 5–9.
Appellant does not address explicitly which additional elements
allegedly are not well-known, routine, or conventional, or how the additional
elements allegedly perform functions that are not well-known, routine, and
conventional with respect to the second step of the Alice analysis. Instead,
Appellant’s arguments are specifically confined to the purported practical
application of the abstract ideas. See Appeal Br. 5–6 (discussed supra).
Appellant fails to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection
with respect to the second Alice step (Step 2B). We agree with the Examiner
that Appellant’s claim 28 (as well as the other pending claims) does not
evince an “inventive concept” that is significantly more than the abstract
idea itself. In particular, Appellant fails to explain how the additional
elements (supra) add specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that
are not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field.
As previously discussed, claim 28 merely recites additional non-
abstract elements (a data store (database) and a computer system (servers)
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including an asset management unit) that perform the asset management
process. The record supports the Examiner’s findings (see Final Act. 5–6;
Ans. 5–6) that the additional elements, individually and as an ordered
combination, are generic computer components that carry out common
information collection and analysis functions recited in the asset
management process (the abstract idea), and that the additional elements are
well-understood, routine, and conventional, specified at a high level of
generality. See, e.g., Spec. 6:2–3, 6:9–10, 25:19–20, 26:19–22, 27:12–14,
27:25–26; see also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Such conventional computer processes operating on conventional
computer hardware “do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at
1256). Further, generically claimed elements of server(s), database(s), and
program instructions (asset management unit) have been found to be no
more than well-understood, routine, and conventional in the context of
gathering, assembling, and analyzing information. See, e.g., Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“These conventional
limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of analyzing and
comparing data and reconciling differences between the data . . . . amount to
no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data
with conventional computer components.”).
To the extent that Appellant argues that the purported technical
improvements and benefits of the recited property asset management system
as a whole (the abstract asset management process in conjunction with the
additional elements) provide significantly more than the abstract idea, we are
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not persuaded. See Appeal Br. 5–6. The purported benefits and
improvements flow from the abstract idea and not the additional elements.
That is, other than using generic technology, the purported benefits and
improvements are elaborations on the basic abstract idea itself. “It is clear
from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself.”
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
For at least the reasons above, Appellant has not persuasively shown
the additional elements amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
when considered either individually or as a combination, and we are not
persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of
independent claim 28, independent claims 1, and dependent claims 2–10, 15,
16, 20, 21, 23–27, 29–33, 38, 39, and 43–50, which depend from claims 1
and 28, respectively, and which were not argued separately with specificity.
Obviousness Rejections of Claims 1–9, 15, 16, 20, 21,
23–25, 28–32, 38, 39, and 43–48
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 28 and dependent claims
2–9, 15, 20, 21, 23–25, 28–32, 38, and 43–48 together as a group with
respect to the § 103(a) rejection. See Appeal Br. 7–12. Appellant provides
nominal separate arguments with respect to claims 16 and 39. See Appeal
Br. 12. We select independent claim 1 and dependent claim 16 as
representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–9, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–25, 28–32, 38, 39, and 43–48. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious in view of
Angel, Baird, and Bove. See Final Act. 8–12; Ans. 21–24. Appellant
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contends Angel, Baird, and Bove do not teach the disputed features of claim
1. See Appeal Br. 7–12. Specifically, Appellant contends Angel, Baird, and
Bove do not teach (1) an administrative system that displays the property
information and transfers the property information as recited in claim 1 (see
limitations F and G of claim 28 supra) (see Appeal Br. 8–9); (2) a store or
storing inventory information as recited in claim 1 (see limitations A of
claim 28 supra) (see Appeal Br. 9–11); and (3) a maintenance checklist as
recited in claim 1 (see limitation C of claim 28 supra) (see Appeal Br. 11–
12).
We note that Appellant’s arguments are essentially identical to the
arguments previously presented in prior Appeal No. 2016–005887. We
adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 8–12) and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 21–24) in
response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and
conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the following analysis
for emphasis.
With respect to Appellant’s first contention of error (that the prior art
does not teach an administrative system that displays and transfers
information), Appellant contends Bove merely “discloses a system in which
data records are transferred between a first and second owner when a sale
occurs” (Appeal Br. 9), Angel merely describes “home projects and ToDo
item lists” (Appeal Br. 9), and Baird merely describes an MLS (multiple
listing service) system (see Appeal Br. 9). Appellant, however, does not
specifically address the Examiner’s findings and improperly attacks the
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references individually. Appellant does not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection with respect to the disputed limitation.
Baird describes an MLS system that displays information about a
property for sale, including descriptions of the property, a dwelling (having
rooms or spaces), and additional information. See Final Act. 10–12; Ans.
20–21 (citing Baird ¶¶ 14, 16, 39, 40, 48–50; Figs. 1, 2, 6–9). Angel
describes a home/property management system including a user interface
displaying home improvement projects and “to do” lists. See Final Act. 8–9;
(citing Angel ¶¶ 38–40, 46–48, 50; Figs. 4–6, 12–14, 16). Bove describes a
property management system including a database storing inventory and
service information (maintenance and improvement projects) where access
to data may be restricted. Data may be accessed and/or transferred to a
second owner from a first owner and other data may be retained for access
by the first owner. See Final Act. 10–12; Ans. 20–21 (citing Bove Abstract;
¶¶ 10–12, 14, 15, 34, 35, 38, 39; Figs. 2–3).
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s finding that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove together
teaches or at least suggests a property asset management system (an
administrative system) that displays information concerning the property,
spaces therein, fixed item assets within the spaces, to do lists and
improvement projects and the status of projects (i.e., maintenance plans, and
completed projects) when selling a property (to a public visitor during the
marketing for a sale of the property). The combination also describes
providing and/or restricting data access to a second owner (buyer) of the
property with respect to the property information (assets and
maintenance/projects) (i.e., copying and transferring the information about
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the property, the maintenance plan and property projects, but does not
transfer information about possession assets).
With respect to Appellant’s second contention of error, Appellant
contends Bove does not disclose or teach a store that stores and manages
information about both fixed item assets and possession assets in
conjunction with a property as delineated in claims 1 and 28. See Appeal
Br. 9–11. Appellant, again however, does not specifically address the
Examiner’s findings and improperly attacks the references individually.
Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection with respect to the disputed limitation—“a store containing data
about a plurality of assets associated with a property and a plurality of
spaces of the property” “each asset being one of a fixed item asset and a
possession asset” (Appeal Br. 14 (claim 1) (Claim App.)).
Bove describes a property management system including a database
storing inventory information—assets associated with real property (fixed
item assets) (see Abstract), as well a personal property (possession assets)
(see ¶ 56). See Final Act. 10–12; Ans. 20–21 (citing Bove Abstract; ¶¶ 10–
12, 14, 15, 34, 35, 38, 39, 56). Baird describes an MLS system that displays
information about a property for sale, including descriptions of the property,
a dwelling (having rooms or spaces), and additional information. See Final
Act. 10–12; Ans. 21–22 (citing Baird ¶¶ 14, 16, 39, 40, 48–50; Figs. 1, 2, 6–
9). Angel describes a home/property management system including a user
interface storing inventory information including appliances (fixed assets or
personal property (possession assets) and fixtures (fixed item assets) and
their location in/on the property. See Final Act. 8–9 (citing Angel ¶¶ 38–40,
46–48, 50; Figs. 4–6, 12–14, 16). In particular Angel explicitly describes a
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user interface that stores and displays asset inventory information associated
with locations in a home. See Angel ¶¶ 50, 51; Fig. 16. Angel describes
various assets including personal property (removable/possession assets)
(e.g., lawn mower (¶ 51), snow blower (¶ 51), microwave (Fig. 16)),
appliances that may be removed (but may also remain when sold) (e.g.,
oven, refrigerator, washing machine, and dryer (Fig. 16)), and fixtures that
are part of the property (e.g., furnace, dishwasher, and garbage disposal (Fig.
16)). See Angel ¶ 51; Fig. 16.
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s finding that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove together
teaches or at least suggests a property asset management system having a
store containing data about assets associated with a property and spaces of
the property, where the assets include fixed item assets and possession assets
(where the fixed item assets are embedded into the property and the
possession assets are removable from the property).
With respect to Appellant’s third contention of error, Appellant
contends Bove merely describes “a calendaring system” (Appeal Br. 12) and
concedes “Angel does disclose a ToDo list and displaying information about
appliances, etc. in the house,” but “Angel still does not disclose ‘asset
managing unit that assigns a maintenance checklist to at least one of the
property, a space, the fixed item asset and the possession asset and the
maintenance plan for the property has a plurality of these maintenance
checklists’” (Appeal Br. 12). Appellant, however, does not persuasively
explain why the combination of references (Angel in combination with Bove
and Baird) does not teach or at least suggest the disputed limitation. See
Appeal Br. 11–12.
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Bove describes (supra) a database storing information about assets
(see Final Act. 10–12; Ans. 20–21 (citing Bove Abstract; ¶¶ 10–12, 14, 15,
34, 35, 38, 39, 56)) and Bove “generate[s] task notifications using stored
maintenance schedules” (see Ans. 23 (citing Bove ¶¶ 34, 35). Angel
describes a home/property management system including a user interface
displaying home improvement projects and “to do” lists, automatically
generating projects from an inspection report, and a user interacting with the
interface to create and edit “to do” lists. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 23–24
(citing Angel ¶¶ 38–40, 46–48, 50; Figs. 4–6, 12–14, 16). In view of
Angel’s disclosure, we broadly but reasonable construe assigning a
maintenance list to read on creating and editing improvement projects and
task (to do) lists as described in Angel. Bove further describes maintenance
calendars (¶¶ 4, 22) and creating/storing/maintaining/editing maintenance
schedules for assets associated with a property. See Ans. 23 (citing Bove ¶¶
34, 35).
Further, Appellant’s disputed limitation recites assigning (associating)
data (a maintenance checklist, assets) with other data (property, space,
assets, maintenance lists). Appellant attempts to distinguish the claim based
strictly on the informational content of stored and displayed data — the
various assets and maintenance lists—and an association with other
information (data)—the various maintenance lists and assets. The content of
the data, however, does not change the functionality of the recited
management system (storing, assigning, and displaying). The recited
functionality remains the same regardless of what the data constitutes, how
the data may be named, or the relationship among the data and such data do
not further limit the claimed invention either functionally or structurally.
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The informational content of the data thus represents non-functional
descriptive material, which “does not lend patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable computer-implemented product or process.” Ex parte Nehls,
88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See Ex parte Curry, 84
USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (Fed. Cir. Appeal No.
2006-1003), aff’d, (Rule 36) (June 12, 2006) (“wellness-related” data in
databases and communicated on distributed network did not functionally
change either the data storage system or the communication system used in
the claimed method). See also In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at 1887–90 (discussing non-functional descriptive
material).
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s finding that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove together
teaches or at least suggests a property asset management system including
asset managing functionality that assigns improvement projects or
maintenance tasks (to do lists) (i.e., a maintenance checklists) to one of the
property, a space therein, or an asset associated therewith.
Generally, we note that Appellant does not persuasively rebut the
Examiner’s findings with respect to the combination of references and
improperly attacks the references individually instead of addressing the
combination as a whole. The cited references must be read, not in isolation,
but for what each fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.
See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (one cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the
rejections are based on combinations of references). Appellant’s arguments
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do not take into account what the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove
would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art —
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; . . . Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner and find that it would have
been well within the skill of one skilled in the art to combine such known
techniques of storing, managing, and creating asset inventories and
maintenance lists as taught by Angel, storing and displaying data in an MLS
system as taught by Baird, and storing and editing asset inventories and
maintenance lists in a property management system as taught by Bove. See
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way,
using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or
her skill”). We are not persuaded that combining the respective familiar
elements of the cited references in the manner proffered by the Examiner
would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill
in the art” at the time of Appellant’s invention. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
With respect to claim 16, Appellant contends Angel and Baird do not
disclose or teach the disputed features of the claim and Bove merely
describe “that owners may share information about a plumber,” but does not
describe “‘sharing a community property checklist, creating a virtual
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neighborhood watch, showing a map with other users of the asset managing
unit and generating incident reports’” as recited in claim 16. Appeal Br. 12.
Claim 16 requires that only one of the information items be shared between
users in a “community system to share information between users” “wherein
sharing information further comprises one of sharing a community
maintenance plan[,] creating a virtual neighborhood watch, showing a map
with other users of the asset managing unit and generating incident reports.”
Claim 16.
As explained with respect to claim 1, Appellant’s recited non-
functional descriptive material (the shared information) does not change the
functionality (sharing information). The recited functionality remains the
same regardless of what the data constitutes, how the data may be labeled
and such data do not further limit the claimed invention either functionally
or structurally. Further, as explained by the Examiner, Bove describes
allowing access to certain data and sharing of information (the contact
information of a service provider) between a first and second owner (e.g.,
information for a plumbing service provider). See Final Act. 16 (citing Bove
¶¶ 14, 38). We find Bove’s disclosure of maintenance schedules (see supra
claim 1) and sharing maintenance service information would have at least
suggested sharing information between users such as sharing a community
maintenance plan. See Bove ¶¶ 35, 38.
Thus, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claims 1 and 16. Accordingly, we
affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of independent claim 1 and
dependent claim 16, as well as independent claim 28 and dependent claims
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2–9, 15, 20, 21, 23–25, 28–32, 38, 39, and 43–48, not separately argued with
particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 10, 26, 27, 33, 49, and 50
The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 33 over Angel, Baird, Bove, and
Hwang. See Final Act. 20–21. The Examiner rejects claims 26, 27, 49, and
50 over Angel, Baird, Bove, and Official Notice. Appellant does not
separately argue with specificity the rejections of claims 10, 26, 27, 33, 49,
and 50. See Appeal Br. 12–13. Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 10, 26, 27, 33, 49, and 50
for the same reasons set forth with respect to claim 1 (supra).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that claims 1–10, 15,
16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 are directed to an abstract idea and do
not demonstrate an inventive concept. We also conclude that claims 1–10,
15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 are obvious in view of the cited
prior art.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant has also not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We therefore affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–10, 15, 16, 20,
21, 23–33, 38, 39, and 43–50.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–33,
38, 39, 43–50
101 Patent-Eligible
Subject Matter
1–10, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–33,
38, 39, 43–50

1–9, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–25,
28–32, 38, 39,
43–48
103(a) Angel, Baird,
Bove
1–9, 15, 16, 20,
21, 23–25, 28–
32, 38, 39, 43–
48

10, 33 103(a) Angel, Baird,
Bove, Hwang
10, 33
26, 27, 49, 50 103(a) Angel, Baird,
Bove, Official
Notice
26, 27, 49, 50
Overall
Outcome
1–10, 15, 16,
20, 21, 23–33,
38, 39, 43–50

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED