Johannes Antonius. Van Vliet et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 1, 2019

13375824 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/375,824 12/02/2011 Johannes Antonius Van Vliet 2009P00959WOUS 3971
24737 7590 08/01/2019
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
GAMI, TEJAL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2118
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JOHANNES ANTONIUS VAN VLIET,
ROBERT PAUL KLEIHORST, BERNHARD WAGNER,
MARINUS JOHANNES ADRIANUS MARIA VAN
HELVOORT, PETER-CHRISTIAN ERICH HEINRICH
HAN-JOACH LEYMANN, and ARNO OSTENDORF
____________________

Appeal 2018-008718
Application 13/375,8241
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and
IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.

AHMED, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 6, 16, and 37–64, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is is Koninklijke Philips
N.V. App. Br. 2.
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SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The application relates to “an electrical power distribution apparatus
connectible to one or more loads” and “a method of electrical power
distribution to one or more loads.” Spec. 1:5–8.
Claims 6 and 16 are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and
reproduced below with certain limitations at issue emphasized:
6. An electrical power distribution apparatus connectable to one or
more loads, the apparatus comprising:
a mains transformer having a mains input for receiving
electrical power distributable to one or more loads that are
electrical devices requiring, as their respective power
requirements, respective amounts of power for operation;
one or more taps for supplying the loads with the electrical
power so received;
one or more circuit breakers operative to switch off the
power supply at the one or more loads, if at least one of voltage,
and amperage, associated with the power supplied at the one or
more loads exceeds a predetermined critical threshold value,
thereby protecting the loads against damage, wherein one or
more of said taps are arranged in groups, each one of the groups
of taps being supplied with a group specific amount of electrical
power, the specific amount of power corresponding to the power
requirements of the loads connectable to the taps within any one
of the groups of taps;
a monitoring module arranged to monitor said at least one
of voltage, and amperage, at the one or more loads;
a programmable control module arranged to issue control
commands in response to and in dependence on correspondingly
the monitored voltage or amperage, wherein the control module
has a distributed architecture comprising both a master module
arranged to control the group specific supply of the electric
power from the main transformer to the groups of taps and one
or more slave control modules each associated with one of the
groups of the taps, the slave control modules arranged to switch
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on or off the fuses of the taps within the associated group of taps;
and
one or2 more programmable fuses arranged to switch on
or off in response to the issued control commands the supplied
power at the one or more taps, the switching on or off the fuses
occurring at correspondingly voltages or amperages lower than
the critical threshold value, thereby controlling the distribution
of the electrical power throughout the one or more loads.

16. A non-transitory computer readable medium having stored
thereon computer readable instructions suitable to cause a
computer to perform the following steps in relation to
distributing electrical power to one or more loads:
switching off power supplied at the one or more loads, if
voltage or amperage associated with the power supplied at the
one or more loads exceeds a predetermined critical threshold
value, thereby protecting the loads against damage, said one or
more loads being respective end-user devices, taps being
associated correspondingly with said devices;
monitoring, via a monitoring module, a voltage or
amperage at said one or more loads individually by device;
issuing control commands in response to and in
dependence on the monitored voltage or amperage; and
switching on or off in response to the issued control
commands the supplied power at the one or more taps, said
monitoring occurring at said taps so as to effect the individual
monitoring, the switching on or off occurring at voltages or
amperages lower than the critical threshold value, thereby
controlling the distribution of the electrical power throughout the
one or more loads, among said instructions there being further
included an instruction for monitoring, at a mains input to a
mains transformer, an electrical characteristic of the power being
supplied to said one or more loads, both the monitoring at said

2 We note that when claim 6 was amended on March 1, 2017, it included an
“or.” However, the Appeal Brief and the claims dated January 3, 2018,
appear to erroneously omit the “or” without indicating any amendment.
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one or more loads and the monitoring at said mains input being
performed in real time.
REJECTIONS
§ 112 Rejection
Claim 50 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for
failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of the
claimed invention. Final Act. 2.
§ 103 Rejections
Claims 6, 37, 51, and 64 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Ying (US 7,324,876 B2; issued Jan. 29,
2008), Jones (US 2006/0072271 A1; publ. Apr. 6, 2006), and DeBenedetti
(US 2008/0140565 A1; publ. June 12, 2008). Final Act. 3.
Claims 38, 39, 41, 42, 49, 52, and 62 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, and
Robinson (US 2011/0006603 A1; publ. Jan. 13, 2011). Final Act. 14.
Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, and Gozun (US 2009/0002909 A1; publ. Jan. 1,
2009). Final Act. 19.
Claims 40, 53, 54, and 55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, and
Winger (US 2009/0278506 A1; publ. Nov. 12, 2009). Final Act. 24.
Claim 43 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, and Langer (US
5,381,554; issued Jan. 10, 1995). Final Act. 27.
Claim 47 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, and Gordon (US
5,808,376; issued Sept. 15, 1998). Final Act. 28–29.
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Claim 44 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, Toy (US 6,191,500 B1;
issued Feb. 20, 2001), and Fujita (US 2010/0292856 A1; publ. Nov. 18,
2010). Final Act. 29–30.
Claim 45 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, Toy, Fujita, and
Gordon. Final Act. 31–32.
Claim 46 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, and Kong (US
6,886,152 B1; issued Apr. 26, 2005). Final Act. 33.
Claims 48 and 61 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over the combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, and Kikinis
(US 5,920,727; issued July 6, 1999). Final Act. 34.
Claims 50 and 63 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over the combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, and Faulkner (US
2011/0087383 A1; publ. Apr. 14, 2011). Final Act. 36.
Claims 56–58 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
the combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, Langer, and
Winger. Final Act. 39.
Claim 60 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Ying, Jones, DeBenedetti, Robinson, Winger, and Gordon.
Final Act. 40–41.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in concluding that the combination of Jones
and Ying teaches or suggests “one or more programmable fuses
arranged to switch on or off in response to the issued control
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commands the supplied power at the one or more taps, the
switching on or off the fuses occurring at correspondingly voltages
or currents lower than the critical threshold value,” as recited in
claim 6?
2. Did the Examiner err in concluding that Gozun teaches or suggests
“monitoring, at a mains input to a mains transformer,” as recited in
claim 16?
3. Did the Examiner err in concluding that claim 50 fails to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of the
claimed invention?

ANALYSIS
§ 103 Rejection of Claims 6 and 51
Independent claim 6 recites “one or more programmable fuses
arranged to switch on or off . . . at correspondingly voltages or amperages
lower than the critical threshold value.” App. Br. 24 (emphasis added).
Independent claim 51 recites an identical limitation. The Examiner finds
that the combination of Jones and Ying teaches or suggests this limitation.
The Examiner finds that Ying discloses that when “customer power demand
level exceeds [a] . . . first threshold level i.e., LEVEL1, the power
management system 100 enters a first stage alert state 1106, whereupon the
central station 102 broadcasts a wireless message to the local wireless
communication units 115 indicating that a first stage power alert has been
declared,” and “[i]n response, the power control circuits 112 at the local sites
109 selectively disengage various local electrical loads 120, thus reducing
the overall customer power demand to keep the total energy usage within a
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tolerable level.” Ans. 7–8 (citing Ying 13:44–14:7). Referring to Figure 2
of Ying, the Examiner determines that “soft switches 262 [are] controlled to
disconnect from loads lower than defined threshold level where breakers 251
trips.” Final Act. 4 (citing Ying 13:48–57, Fig. 2) (emphasis omitted).
With regard to Jones, the Examiner finds that it discloses a “control
circuit 127 removes the drive signals to the power switch devices 123 to
disconnect AC line power supplied to devices” “as soon as it detects the line
voltage dropping below a low level threshold or going above a high level
threshold.” Ans. 8 (citing Jones ¶ 149); see also Final Act. 7 (citing Jones
¶ 117). The Examiner therefore concludes that Ying and Jones teach the
limitation at issue.
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s findings arguing that “Jones, et al.
teaches the opposite [of the claimed invention]: turning off switches when a
load rating is exceeded.” App. Br. 12 (citing Jones ¶¶ 41–43); see also
Reply Br. 9 (citing Jones ¶ 21). According to Appellants, a disconnect
signal to the switch device in Jones is provided upon the “actual load
consumed by each electrical device respectively exceeding the respective
electrical device load rating for each electrical device.” App. Br. 12
(quoting Jones ¶ 42).
To the extent Jones suggests that the load rating has upper and lower
limits, Appellants argue, Jones still does not teach the claimed
programmable fuses. Reply Br. 9. According to Appellants, “claim 6
effectively provides for a two-tier system, where circuit breakers provide a
range of safe operation (i.e., below the predetermined critical threshold
value) and the programmable fuses provide control within the range
provided by the circuit breakers,” and Jones “merely teaches disconnecting
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the electrical device when it is outside the load limits, similar to the
functionality of the one or more circuit breakers of claim 6, but not the one
or more programmable fuses.” Id. Ying, Appellants argue, “is directed to a
central station changing power alert stage levels using wireless
communication units at the various local sites,” with “no teaching of
switching on or off fuses occurring at voltages or currents lower than a
critical threshold value.” App. Br. 13 (citing Ying 13:12–15). Moreover,
Appellants contend, Ying is directed to monitoring total customer power
demand (as opposed to monitoring at least one of voltage, and amperage, at
the one or more loads), and alerting local sites 109 when different threshold
levels are exceeded (and thus not lower than the critical threshold value), at
which point the power control circuits 112 at the local sites 109 receive
control commands to selectively disengage various local electrical loads 120
to reduce the total customer power. Reply Br. 8 (citing Ying 13:44–14:7).
We are not persuaded of error. Appellants’ argument fails to address
the Examiner’s rationale to combine the references to yield the
programmable fuses limitation. By arguing that neither Jones nor Ying
alone teaches all aspects of the limitation at issue, Appellants do not address
the rejection as articulated, in which the Examiner relies on the combined
teachings of Ying and Jones. See Final Act. 7; see also In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“[T]he test [for obviousness] is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”).
Appellants agree that Jones discloses an “electrical power distribution
system [that] . . . disconnects the electrical device when the actual load
differs from the load rating obtained by the PCD reader.” Reply. Br. 9
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(emphasis added). In fact, Jones discloses switching on or off the switch
devices in response to a variety of “power quality faults such as surges, low
line voltage and high line voltage,” i.e., as soon as the control circuit
“detects the line voltage dropping below a low level threshold or going
above a high level threshold.” Jones ¶ 149. Thus, contrary to Appellants’
contentions (see App. Br. 12), Jones’s disclosure is not limited to “turning
off switches when a load rating is exceeded.” Further, Jones discloses
performing such monitoring at one or more receptacles, thereby controlling
the distribution of the electrical power throughout the one or more loads, in
the manner recited in claim 6. Jones ¶ 116.
The Examiner relies on Ying for its disclosure of multiple threshold
levels that Ying’s power management system monitors. Ans. 7–8 (citing
Ying 13:44–14:7). Ying discloses different alert states at different demand
thresholds, and discloses taking various actions, e.g., “disengag[ing] local
electrical loads” when the power demand goes above or falls below each of
these thresholds. See Ying 14:8–15:5, Fig. 11. Appellants’ argument that
“Ying is directed to monitoring total customer power demand (as opposed
to monitoring at least one of voltage, and amperage, at the one or more
loads)” (Reply Br. 8) not only fails to explain why a person of skill in the art
would have distinguished between the two, but also ignores that the
Examiner relies on Jones for disclosure of monitoring performed at
individual loads. We agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood that replacing the total customer power
demand teaching of Ying with an individual load monitoring and switching
approach of Jones would have resulted in “one or more programmable fuses
arranged to switch on or off in response to the issued control commands the
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supplied power at the one or more taps, the switching on or off the fuses
occurring at correspondingly voltages or amperages lower than the critical
threshold value, thereby controlling the distribution of the electrical power
throughout the one or more loads,” as recited in claim 6.
With regard to Appellants’ argument that claim 6 effectively claims a
“two-tiered system” utilizing circuit breakers and programmable fuses in a
manner not taught by the cited prior art (Reply Br. 9), that is a new argument
presented in the Reply Brief. In the absence of a showing of good cause by
Appellants, we need not consider an argument raised for the first time in the
Reply Brief, as the Examiner has not been provided a chance to respond.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2012); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (noting that an argument not first raised in the brief to the Board
is waived on appeal). Appellants have provided no showing of good cause
as to why Appellants’ argument could not have been presented in the Appeal
Brief.
Even if considered, that argument is not persuasive. Ying discloses a
multi-tiered monitoring system and discloses that “electrical components
e.g., fuses, may be present instead of or in addition to the circuit breakers
251.” Ans. 8 (quoting Ying 9:15–18) (emphasis added). Similarly, Jones
discloses the use of circuit breakers to protect the feed wire and connections.
See, e.g., Jones ¶¶ 3, 8. We are therefore not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s findings regarding the cited prior art combination to teach or
suggest the programmable fuses limitation of claims 6 and 51.
§ 103 Rejection of Claim 16
Independent claim 16 recites “monitoring, at a mains input to a mains
transformer” (App. Br. 24–25), which the Examiner finds is taught by
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Gozun. Final Act. 23; see also Ans. 9–10. The Examiner finds that, in
Gozun, “AC signals are received at line 117 and transmitted to a transformer
210 and a turn-off switch 250,” such that the “turn-off switch 250 should
stay open based on the detected power surges in the AC signals.” Final Act.
23 (citing Gozun ¶¶ 14, 16, Fig. 2); see also Ans. 10.
Appellants argue that monitoring in Gozun “takes place after the
mains transformer 210, and therefore [Gozun] does not monitor at a mains
input to the mains transformer 210.” App. Br. 16 (citing Gozun ¶ 15).
Appellants explain that “it is the surge voltage detector 230, clearly
connected to the output of the transformer 210, that detects (e.g., thus
arguably monitors) surges in the transformed AC signals, and controls
operation of the turn-off switch 250 in response.” Reply Br. 12 (citing
Gozun ¶ 15). Thus, Appellants argue, “the AC signals in which power
surges are detected are the transformed AC signals received and detected by
the surge voltage detector 230.” Id.
We are persuaded of Examiner error. Claim 16 requires “monitoring,
at a mains input to a mains transformer.” Emphasis added. The Examiner
relies on Gozun as disclosing the “mains transformer” as well as the location
of the monitoring, i.e., “at a mains input to a mains transformer.” Final Act.
23 (citing Gozun ¶ 14 and transformer 210 as teaching the “mains
transformer”). The monitoring in Gozun that the Examiner relies on
(detecting power surges), however, takes place at the surge voltage detector
230. Id. (citing Gozun ¶ 16, Fig. 2). Although we agree with the Examiner
that the input to the switch 250, which stays open when a power surge is
detected, and the input to the transformer is at a “common point,” that is not
where the monitoring occurs. Gozun Fig. 2. Instead, the surge voltage
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detector 230 detects surges in the transformed AC signals at the output side
of the transformer. Gozun ¶ 15, Fig. 2. The Examiner does not find that
switch 250 performs the recited monitoring. Given that the Examiner finds
that transformer 210 teaches the “mains transformer” recited in claim 16, the
Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Gozun discloses monitoring “at
a mains input” to that transformer.
Thus, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not shown that
Gozun teaches or suggests “monitoring, at a mains input to a mains
transformer,” as recited in claim 16. The Examiner also does not rely on
Ying as teaching the specific monitoring location aspect of this limitation.
Final Act. 20. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 16.
§ 103 Rejections of Claims 37–50 and 52–64
Appellants do not separately present argument regarding the § 103
rejections of claims 37–50 and 52–64. Rather, Appellants assert that each of
these claims is patentable “at least because it ultimately depends from [an]
independent claim . . . , which has been shown to be allowable.” App. Br.
15, 17–21. Thus, the rejections of these claims turn on our decision as to
claims 6 and 51, and are sustained.
§ 112 Rejection
Claim 50 depends from independent claim 6 and recites a slave
control module that “establishes, via the monitoring, that quality of a power
signal supplied by said master module is sufficient.” App. Br. 27 (emphasis
added). In rejecting claim 50 as indefinite under § 112, second paragraph,
the Examiner concludes that “it is not clear how to determine sufficient
amount since [Appellants did not] . . . disclose the measure of sufficiency in
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submitted claims or in specification, therefore scope of the claim is not
bounded by the limitation.” Final Act. 2.
Appellants argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would readily
appreciate the scope of claim 50, at least because of the Specification’s
description of “imaging equipment [that] is adversely effected by ‘rippled’
power signals having peaks, surges, dips, incidents etc. or other such ‘signal
singularities,’” and that “[h]igh power signal quality is ensured by only
switching back on the soft fuses 110 if the signal singularities in the supplied
power signal are bounded by the configurable control threshold values or
ranges.” App. Br. 9 (citing Spec. 11:21–24). In light of that disclosure,
Appellants argue, “various signal singularities should be low in order to
provide a signal that is of sufficient quality to foster good imaging.” Id.
(emphasis added).
In the Answer, the Examiner maintains that it is unclear “what makes
the signal singularities ‘insufficiently low’ vs. ‘sufficiently low,’” or “what
makes the quality ‘sufficient’ vs. ‘insufficient’”? Ans. 6.
We agree. Although the Specification may describe some specific
types of signal singularities that may degrade the quality of a power signal to
an insufficient degree, the degree of degradation is a relative factor, which
neither the Specification nor Appellants quantify as to what would be
“sufficient.” Accordingly, it is unclear what level of peaks, surges, dips,
incidents, or other conditions not specifically identified by Appellants would
degrade the power signal quality below the threshold of acceptability.
The claims, when read in light of the Specification and the
prosecution history, and under the broadest reasonable interpretation, must
provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art. See In re Packard,
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751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ex parte McAward, Appeal
No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017)
(precedential) (reaffirming that “we apply the approach for assessing
indefiniteness approved by the Federal Circuit in Packard , i.e., a claim is
indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.”)
(internal quotations omitted). Because the claim language here does not set
out the metes and bounds of Appellants’ claimed invention with sufficient
precision and particularity to determine which conditions, other than those
cursorily mentioned in Appellants’ Specification, would degrade power
signal quality to an unacceptable degree, the disputed phrase of claim 50 is
indefinite in scope.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections of
independent claims 6 and 51 as well as dependent claims 37–50 and 52–64
and the § 112, second paragraph, rejection of claim 50. We reverse the
Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 16.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 6 and 37–64, and reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 16.
No time for taking subsequent action in connection with this appeal
may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART