01980528
11-24-2000
Joe T. Thompson, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Joe T. Thompson v. United States Postal Service
01980528
November 24, 2000
.
Joe T. Thompson,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01980528
Agency No. 1-C-451-1158-95
Hearing No. 220-96-5331X
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed the agency's final decision concerning his
equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. In his July 18, 1995 complaint, complainant
alleged discrimination on the bases of sex (male) and disability
(stress/adjustment disorder with depressive moods) when on June 5, 1995,
complainant was required to continue working near a machine emitting an
extremely loud noise.
On August 1, 1995, the agency dismissed his claim; but the Commission
reversed the dismissal and remanded the claim for investigation.
See Thompson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956240
(Apr. 16, 1996). At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant
invoked his right to a hearing with an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
The AJ conducted the hearing on January 27, 1997, and issued a finding
of no discrimination on August 14, 1997. Specifically, the AJ found
that although complainant was a qualified individual with a disability,
he was not improperly denied an accommodation. The AJ also concluded
that complainant suffered no disparate treatment on the bases of sex
or disability. By decision dated October 8, 1997, the agency adopted
the AJ's findings.
Complainant, a mail handler at the Cincinnati Bulk Mail Center, requested
to leave his work area and sit in the locker room for the final hour
of his shift on June 5, 1995. A �loop� machine close to complainant's
work station was making an unusually loud noise. Complainant explained
that he had a stress-related Office of Workers' Compensation Program
(OWCP) claim, and that the noise was causing him head and neck pain.
The supervisor denied complainant's request to cease working and
leave the work floor entirely, but offered to move complainant to
another section of the bulk mail center away from the loud machine.
Complainant declined, and immediately requested his union steward.
On a prior occasion, the supervisor allowed a female employee with an
ear condition to leave the work room floor to avoid excessive noise.
That employee was instructed to report to her �Quality of Work Life�
group to carry out other duties/assignments.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). The Commission notes, however, that the AJ's
conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
9-16 (Nov. 9, 1999).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's decision summarized the relevant facts and generally referenced
the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We discern no basis
to disturb the AJ's ultimate decision.
The agency is obligated to make reasonable accommodations for the known
physical and mental limitations of an individual with a disability.
See Sellers v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01964003
(Oct. 3, 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o) - (p)).<1> Assuming that
complainant was an individual with a disability, the record indicates that
complainant's supervisor offered complainant a reasonable accommodation --
the supervisor offered to move complainant to a different location on the
work floor, away from the noise. The agency is not obligated to provide
complainant with his chosen accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, EEOC Order No. 915.002, q. 9 at 17 - 18 (Mar. 1, 1999).
It must provide only a reasonable accommodation that allows complainant
to perform the essential functions of his job. Id.
With regard to the disparate treatment claims, the AJ properly found
that complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination.
The supervisor allowed a female coworker with an ear condition to
leave the work room floor to avoid excessive noise. However, the AJ
erred by concluding that the agency failed to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
In cases involving indirect evidence, the Commission applies the same
analysis for cases brought under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, or
the ADEA. See Brown v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01970189
(February 25, 2000) (citing Prewitt v. United States Postal Service,
662 F.2d 292, 305 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1981) and Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981)). This analysis first requires
complainant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000) (affirming
the analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804
(1973)). If complainant succeeds, the burden of production shifts for the
agency to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
Id.
To meet its burden of production, the agency need only articulate
a legally sufficient reason to justify its decision. See Thompson
v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01971189 (Aug. 31, 2000)
(citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1981)). It must present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether it discriminated against complainant.
Rodriguez v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01983390
(June 11, 1999) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If successful, the burden reverts to complainant
to demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence that the agency's
reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Hammons v. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, EEOC Request No. 05971093 (Mar. 5, 1999).
If a claimant establishes his prima facie case, and the agency fails
to articulate any legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions,
a finding of discrimination normally is appropriate. See Rodriguez
v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01983390 (June 11, 1999)
(finding discrimination �given the woeful inadequacy of the agency's
proffered explanation�); see also Johnson v. Department of the Navy,
EEOC Appeal No. 01986468 (June 31, 2000); Randolph v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01973491 (May 18, 2000).
In the present complaint, the agency met its burden to provide a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, the
supervisor offered to move complainant to a less noisy work area elsewhere
in the building. Complainant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agency's articulated reasoning was pretext, or that
the agency engaged in discriminatory disparate treatment. The female
coworker was allowed to leave the work room floor entirely, but continued
to work and attend to other duties. Similarly, complainant was offered
a move to a quieter area where he could continue to perform his duties.
The agency's refusal of complainant's request to allow him to rest in
the locker room rather than to continue working in a different location
does not indicate pretext. Therefore, the Commission finds that the
AJ's ultimate finding of no discrimination was proper.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 24, 2000
__________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment.