Joe Sedillo, et al., Complainant,v.Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 7, 2002
07A20071 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 7, 2002)

07A20071

08-07-2002

Joe Sedillo, et al., Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Joe Sedillo, et al. v. Department of Agriculture

07A20071

August 7, 2002

.

Joe Sedillo, et al.,

Complainant,

v.

Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 07A20071

Agency No. 990031

Hearing No. 100-99-7226P

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Concurrent with the issuance of its February 20, 2002 final order

regarding the assigned Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(Commission) Administrative Judge's (AJ) decision to certify the

above-captioned matter as a class action, the agency filed this timely

appeal of the AJ's decision to the Commission. The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the reasons discussed below,

it is the decision of the Commission to MODIFY the AJ's decision,

VACATE the agency's final order, and REMAND the matter to the agency

for continued processing of the class complaint.

BACKGROUND

In the class complaint underlying the instant appeal, the class agents

allege that the agency discriminated against the class of Hispanic Forest

Service employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The complaint

alleges that the class members have been subjected to discrimination on

the basis of their national origin (Hispanic) in selections, promotions,

appraisals, awards, training programs, and by failing to remedy a

working environment hostile to Hispanic employees.<1> On January 7,

2002, after reviewing the briefs and other submissions of the parties,

including information presented in discovery ordered by the AJ against

the agency, the AJ issued a decision certifying the class.

In his decision, the AJ addressed how the class agent had satisfied

the requirements for class certification, as established at 29 C.F.R. �

1614.204(a)(2). The AJ found that the class agents had satisfied the

typicality requirement as to some but not all of their allegations, as

they had sufficiently shown that they shared the same interests and are

alleged to have suffered the same injury as the other members of the class

regarding their allegations of discriminatory selections, promotions,

and the presence of a hostile work environment. The AJ also found

that the class agents, who sought to represent a class of all Hispanic

employees of the Forest Service at all grade levels, were primarily

higher-graded employees (GS-13 through GS-15 levels), but included

one employee graded at the GS-6 level, and that this distribution was

sufficient to satisfy the typicality requirement as to these allegations.

The AJ further found, however, that the class agents had not satisfied

the typicality requirement as to the allegations of discriminatory

appraisals, awards, and training programs, as the class agents had not

raised these claims in their individual complaints of discrimination.

The AJ then narrowed the issue presented by the class complaint to be

�[w]hether the Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (agency),

discriminated against the class agents and other members of the class

on the basis of national origin (Hispanic) in selections, promotions,

and the existence of a hostile work environment.�

The AJ then turned to the requirement that the class complaint contain

questions of fact common to the class, and found that this requirement had

been met as well. The AJ found that the parties had agreed that there

was a nationwide total of over 1,600 Hispanic employees in the Forest

Service. The AJ further found that, based upon employee demographic

information provided by the agency for the years 1995 through 2000,

there was a statistical under-representation of Hispanic employees in

the Senior Executive Service (SES) and higher GS grade levels which was

significant enough to indicate a common policy or practice regarding

promotions and/or selections of Hispanic employees. The AJ also found

that the claim of the lead class agent sufficiently described a common

policy or practice of hostility to Hispanics in the workplace, and that

this claim was supported by the claims of the other class agents.

The AJ also found that, for reasons of class size and geographical

dispersion, the numerosity requirement had been satisfied. The AJ found

that, in addition to identifying the pool of over 1,600 potentially-harmed

Hispanic Forest Service employees, the lead class agent averred that

seventy-two named Hispanic Forest Service employees had previously filed

formal, or presented informal, complaints of hostile work environment

discrimination based upon their national origin.<2>

The AJ also found that the class agents had satisfied the adequacy of

representation requirement. In support of this finding, the AJ noted that

there was no indication in the record that the lead class agent has any

interest antagonistic to those of the class, and that his performance

thus far indicated that he would fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class. The AJ made similar findings regarding the

class representative, but did not address the adequacy of the three

other designated class agents.

In its February 20, 2002 final order, the agency declined to implement

the AJ's certification decision. The agency first noted the filing

on October 30, 2001 of a similar class complaint as a civil action in

United States District Court. The agency provided that the civil action

addressed issues of discriminatory hiring, promotion, and harassment

against Hispanic employees of Region 5 of the Forest Service (which

includes the states of California and Hawaii, as well as Guam and the

Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands), and that, therefore, the

certified class action should be dismissed as it pertains to employees

of Region 5 of the Forest Service.

The agency also asserted that, as a result of removing Region 5 employees

from the class complaint, the class may not meet the certification

prerequisites of commonality, typicality, and numerosity. The agency

further noted that during the pendency of the AJ's class certification

determination, one of the four class agents requested an administrative

hearing in her individual EEO complaint, and another filed a civil

action in United States District Court on her individual EEO complaint.

The agency concluded that these events negatively affected the commonality

and typicality requirements.

Concurrent with the issuance of the agency's final order, the agency

filed with the Commission this appeal of the AJ's certification decision.

On appeal, the agency raises numerous challenges to the AJ's decision.

The class agents and representative similarly present several arguments

in favor of certification of the class complaint. We address these

arguments below.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

As an initial matter we note that, as this is an agency appeal from an

AJ's class complaint certification decision entered without a hearing,

see 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(d)(7), we apply a de novo standard of review

and base our decision upon a preponderance of the evidence. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(a).

Class Certification

An individual seeking to gain certification of a class action is required

to sign and file a class complaint which identifies the policy or practice

adversely affecting the class as well as the specific action or matter

affecting the class agent. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(c)(1). The class

complaint must present allegations that the class is so numerous that

a consolidated complaint of the members of the class is impractical;

that there are questions of fact common to the class; that the claims of

the agent of the class are typical of the claims of the class; and that

the agent of the class, or, if represented, the representative, will

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.204(a)(2)(i)-(iv). The Commission's regulatory requirements for

class certification are patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and allow for an AJ to dismiss the complaint in its

entirety, or any portion thereof, should it fail to meet the certification

prerequisites provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2). Furthermore,

while the party seeking certification bears the burden of proof as to

each prerequisite, the Commission is mindful that class agents have

limited access to precertification discovery during the administrative

process, as opposed to the rules applicable to private sector employees,

Mastren v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05930253 (Oct. 27,

1993), and that it would be unjust to hold the class agents to the same

standard of proof in the administrative process as would be required of

a litigant proceeding under Rule 23 in federal district court.

As the agency has challenged the AJ's findings in favor of class

certification on each of the four prerequisites, we will address each

prerequisite in turn below.

Class Agents

As an initial matter, we note that, as recognized by the agency,

the composition of the group of class agents has diminished during

the pendency of the AJ's certification decision and this appeal.

The AJ recognized four named class members as class agents for the

certified class complaint. However, on appeal the agency has produced

unrebutted evidence that one class agent filed a civil action on her

individual discrimination claims in United States District Court,

depriving the Commission of jurisdiction over her complaint, see 29

C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(3) (requiring agency to dismiss EEO complaint when,

prior to a hearing request, the complaint becomes the basis for a pending

action filed in United States District Court in which the complainant is

a party), and that another class agent requested a hearing before an EEOC

AJ and subsequently received a decision on the merits of her individual

discrimination complaint. Both of these class agents' actions, and

the subsequent effects of those actions, took place prior to the AJ's

issuance of his class certification decision. Accordingly, as it is a

requirement for all class agents that they be members of the class, 29

C.F.R. � 204(a)(3), they are no longer eligible to serve as class agents.

The remaining class agents argue on appeal that the loss of these class

agents is not fatal to certification of the class, as they have presented

the names of five additional class members who have claims which are

�entirely typical� of the class to serve as additional class agents.

However, the remaining class agents have not provided any detailed

information on the nature of these individuals' complaints, such as

copies of the EEO complaints filed by these individuals, affidavits

describing the allegations these individuals raised with the agency,

or any other evidence which would provide information as to the nature

of the individuals' claims. The only such information offered is the

lead class agent's statement that these class members each have �active

EEO complaints pending against the USDA Forest Service, having raised

one or more issues of non-selection, non-promotion, and/or hostile work

environment in his or her EEO complaint(s).� We find this proffer

insufficient to make the necessary showing that these individuals

are eligible to serve as class agents in this action�namely, that the

named individuals will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class. See 29 C.F.R. � 204(a)(2)(iv). Therefore, the two remaining

class agents from the AJ's initial class certification are at this time

the only class agents in this class action.

Commonality and Typicality

In addressing whether a class complaint warrants certification, it

is important to first resolve the requirements of commonality and

typicality in order to �determine the appropriate parameters and the

size of the membership of the resulting class.� Fusilier v. Department

of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01A14312 (Feb. 22, 2002) (citing Moten

v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, EEOC Request No. 05960233 (Apr. 8,

1997)). The purpose of the commonality and typicality requirements is to

ensure that class agents possess the same interests and suffer the same

injury as the members of the proposed class. General Tel. Co. of the

Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1982). Factors the Commission

considers in determining whether commonality is present include whether

the practices at issue affect the whole class or only a few employees,

the degree of local autonomy or centralized administration involved,

and the uniformity of the membership of the class, in terms of the

likelihood that the members' treatment will involve common questions

of fact. Harris v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01994220

(Mar. 14, 2002) (quoting Mastren v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC

Request No. 05930253 (Oct. 27, 1993)). Typicality exists where the

class agent demonstrates some �nexus� with the claims of the class,

such as similarity in the conditions of employment and similarity in

the alleged discrimination affecting the agent and the class. Thompson

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A03195 (Mar. 22, 2001).

Furthermore, we note that the commonality and typicality requirements

might be satisfied if there was a showing of �significant proof that an

employer operated under a general policy of discrimination� and �the

discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion in the same

general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking

processes.� Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.

Our review of the record reveals that the class agents have not met their

burden of sufficiently establishing commonality as to the hostile work

environment claim. Of the two remaining class agents for purposes of

this class action, only the lead class agent has presented a hostile work

environment claim. The lead class agent alleges in his complaint that

the agency created a hostile work environment based upon his race, sex,

age, and national origin, but he does not provide any information as to

the nature of the hostile work environment to which he has allegedly

been subjected�he simply claims that the agency has discriminated

against him by the �creation of a hostile work environment,� without

further explanation.

The AJ found that the lead class agent's affidavit in support of

certification sufficiently described a common policy or practice of

hostility in the workplace as to Hispanic employees. Our review of this

affidavit, however, reveals that while the lead class agent alleges that

the �abysmal system of mismanagement of discrimination complaints� at

the agency, as well as an �overall atmosphere of retaliation/reprisal,�

has produced a �chilling effect� on the civil rights of Forest Service

employees, he has not presented these concerns in any of his several EEO

complaints which serve as the basis for his membership in the class and as

the basis for the class complaint. Nor does the record contain any detail

or explanation as to how the identified class members have been subjected

to a hostile work environment�the only information present is the lead

class agent's claim that fifty-four Hispanic Forest Service employees

have presented hostile work environment complaints to the agency between

1993 and 1999, and that another eleven Hispanic employees attempted

to present such claims after 1996, but were rejected by the agency.

The record lacks any factual description of the nature of any of these

complaints or claims, beyond the bare assertion that they are claims of

a �hostile work environment.�

Accordingly, it is impossible to determine whether or to what extent the

complained-of hostile work environment affects the class in terms of the

likelihood that the class members' treatment involves common questions

of fact. Therefore, as to the class claim of hostile work environment,

we conclude that the AJ incorrectly found that the commonality requirement

had been satisfied, and that certification of the class as to that claim

was unsupported by the record. We note, however, that the lead class

agent has stated on appeal that the specific information provided by

the agency regarding each named class member's hostile work environment

claim is available upon request. As information which may be sufficient

to establish commonality as to the hostile work environment claims of the

class agent and the class members is purportedly in the possession of the

lead class agent, it is the decision of the Commission to provisionally

certify the class as to the hostile work environment claim, and allow

the class agents a reasonable period of time to present any more detailed

information they may possess to the presiding AJ for a determination as

to whether the hostile work environment claim of the lead class agent

is typical of the hostile work environment claims of the class members

and whether there are factual issues common to these claims.

We do agree with the AJ that commonality has been sufficiently established

with regard to the claims of discriminatory selections and promotions.

In his determination that the commonality requirement had been met as to

these claims, the AJ noted that the parties had agreed that there were a

total of over 1,600 Hispanic employees nationwide, out of 29,500 permanent

Forest Service employees. The AJ also noted that information provided by

the agency for the years 1995 through 2000 showed that Hispanic employees

were represented in the following levels: three in the Senior Executive

Service (SES); nine at the GS-15 level; twenty-five at the GS-14 level,

forty-two at the GS-13 level; thirty at the GS-12 level; and fifty-six

at the GS-11 level. The AJ further noted that approximately one-fourth

of Forest Service employees with GS-level positions are in these higher

grade levels, but only ten percent of the agency's Hispanic employees

occupy such positions. From this evidence, the AJ found that the

statistical underrepresentation of Hispanics in the SES and higher GS

levels was sufficient to indicate a common policy or practice regarding

promotions and selections of Hispanic employees in the Forest Service.

In addition to this statistical evidence, the lead class agent asserts

in his affidavit that seventy-five to eighty percent of the fifty-four

claimants identified as alleging hostile work environment clams also

alleged they had suffered discriminatory nonselection and nonpromotion

based upon �being Hispanic.� The record also contains evidence of fifteen

additional nonselection claims, and twenty-two additional nonpromotion

claims. Despite the agency's contention that a finding of commonality is

precluded because the claims of the class agents and the class members

involve different regions and offices, different management officials,

and different geographic locations, we find that the class agents'

evidentiary showing in support of their contention that there exists

an overarching agency discriminatory policy or practice is sufficient

to establish questions of fact common to the class as to the claims

of discriminatory selections and promotions. See Moten v. Federal

Energy Regulatory Comm'n, EEOC Request No.05910504 (Dec. 30, 1991)

(allegation of discrimination manifest through excessively subjective

agencywide promotion and selection policies sufficient to support finding

of commonality).

The agency argues on appeal that the composition of the group of

class members will �necessarily� include a mixture of supervisory and

non-supervisory employees, as well as bargaining unit and management

employees, and therefore creates a class with members whose interests

conflict with each other to a level sufficient to preclude certification.

However, the agency has failed to present any evidence which would

indicate that such a conflict exists in the certified class. Accordingly,

we will not disturb the certified class on these grounds.<3>

As for the typicality requirement, the AJ found that the distribution

of grade levels among the class agents was sufficient to protect the

interests of the class, and that the class agents had therefore satisfied

typicality as to all grade levels represented in the class. However,

as discussed above, the composition of the group of class agents has

diminished, leaving only two class agents�one of whom occupies a position

at the GS-13 level, and another who recently retired from a GS-13 level

position. The agency contends that, as the remaining class agents seek

to represent a class composed of all Hispanic Forest Service employees

of all grade levels, including Hispanic SES level employees, the class

agents' claims are atypical of the class. The agency further argues

that the existence of �at least three different selection/promotion

procedures for different-graded positions� further militates against a

finding of typicality.

We disagree, however, that the class agents have failed to make a

showing of typicality sufficient to support certification of the class.

A class agent's different grade level does not necessarily render his or

her claims atypical of the class. Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 591

(D.C. Cir. 1987). In applying the typicality requirement to a class

claim involving nonpromotion allegations which swept across several

grade levels, the court in Wagner held that:

[T]he court must consider whether [the class agent] suffered injury

from a specific discriminatory promotional practice of the employer in

the same manner that the members of the proposed class did, and whether

[the class agent] and the class members were injured in the same fashion

by a general policy of employment discrimination.

Wagner, 836 F.2d at 591.

The record in the instant appeal indicates that the class agents have

raised claims which allege being subjected to, and injured by, a general,

agencywide policy of unlawful discrimination against Hispanics in the

Forest Service's selection and promotion decisionmaking processes.

Furthermore, the class agents have provided demographic evidence

regarding the level of representation of Hispanic employees in higher

level positions to indicate that the harm alleged was not confined to a

single position, grade level, or geographic region of the Forest Service.

Accordingly, we find that the class agents have demonstrated a �nexus�

with the claims of the class sufficient to satisfy the typicality

requirement.

Numerosity

In addressing the numerosity requirement, the Commission has recognized

that there is no set minimum number of required class members, and that

each case must be evaluated based upon the particular circumstances

involved. Woods, et al. v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev.,

EEOC Appeal No. 01961033 (Feb. 13, 1998). The focus in determining

whether a proposed class is sufficiently numerous for certification

purposes is on the number of persons affected by the agency's alleged

unlawful discriminatory practices and who, therefore, may assert claims.

Moten v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, EEOC Appeal No. 05910504

(Dec. 30, 1991).

We agree with the AJ that the record contains sufficient evidence

to establish that the numerosity requirement has been satisfied.

As discussed previously, the lead class agent's evidentiary presentation

to the AJ included a table displaying the names of fifty-four Hispanic

Forest Service employees who, based upon documentation provided to

the class agents by the agency, allegedly filed formal, or presented

informal, discrimination complaints against the Forest Service between

1993 and 1999. The lead class agent indicated that at least seventy-five

to eighty percent of these complaints also alleged being subjected to

discrimination in selection and promotion decisions based upon �being

Hispanic.� The class agent also presented a list of Hispanic Forest

Service employees who had allegedly previously presented the agency with

discrimination claims based upon their national origin, but which the

agency refused to address. The agency has not disputed this assertion.

These claims included fifteen additional discrimination in selection

claimants, twenty-two additional discrimination in promotion claimants,

and eleven additional hostile work environment claimants.<4> Furthermore,

the parties agreed that there are over 1,600 Hispanic employees of

the Forest Service, all of which the class agents allege are potential

members of the class. We find this evidence sufficient in this case to

satisfy the numerosity requirement for class certification.

The agency contends that the existence of a nearly-identical class

action filed as a civil action in United States District Court on behalf

of Hispanic Region 5 Forest Service employees deprives the purported

class of sufficient numerosity. The agency argues that there are 507

Hispanic Region 5 Forest Service employees, and that the filing of the

civil action accordingly reduces the number of potential class members

in the instant class to roughly 1,100. We are unpersuaded that, even

if the agency's claim was proven to be true, the resultant reduction

of the number of potentially-affected class members to a total of

approximately 1,100 would deprive the class of sufficient numerosity.

We note that the agency has made no showing of how this civil action

actually, rather than speculatively, impacts the number of named class

members in the instant class action. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded

by the agency's argument.<5>

Adequacy of Representation

The final requirement for class certification is a showing by the class

agent or agents that the agent of the class, or, if represented, the

representative, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2)(iv). The class representative

should have no conflicts with the class and should either have sufficient

legal training and experience to pursue the claim or designate an

attorney with the requisite skills and experience. Kennedy v. National

Aeronautics & Space Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01993626 (Apr. 26, 2001).

In the instant matter, the class agents have presented evidence that they

do not possess any interests which conflict with those of the class,

and that the class is to be represented in this action by an attorney

with extensive experience in employment discrimination law.

There has been no showing, however, that either the class agents or the

class representative have any experience in litigating a class action.

The Commission has previously held on numerous occasions that a lack

of experience in class action litigation can be fatal to meeting

the adequacy of representation requirement for class certification.

See Belser v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A05565 (Dec. 6,

2001) (noting �the complex nature of EEO class litigation,� and holding

the proffer of attorneys who lack experience in class litigation

or EEO law insufficient to establish adequacy of representation);

Kennedy v. National Aeronautics & Space Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01993626

(Apr. 26, 2001) (adequacy of representation not established when class

agents failed to demonstrate that they had any experience in actually

prosecuting class complaints, and stating that �[m]ost important, there

has been no showing that [the class agent] ever identified an attorney

with the necessary experience in class actions�); Woods v. Department of

Housing & Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal No. 01961033 (Feb. 13, 1998) (adequacy

of representation not established when there has been �no showing that

[the class agent/representative] has the necessary skills and experience,

nor the time and resources at his disposal, to conduct class litigation�).

The Commission has also recognized that where a class agent has

satisfied the commonality, typicality, and numerosity requirements for

class certification, the class may be conditionally certified for a

reasonable period of time, in order to permit the class agent time to

obtain qualified counsel. EEOC Management Directive 110, chapter 8, p.5

(Nov. 9, 1999). As the class agents have either fully or provisionally

satisfied these three certification requirements, we provisionally

certify the class to allow a reasonable time for either (1) the class

agents to secure additional representation qualified to conduct class

action litigation, or (2) the class representative to associate himself

with other counsel sufficiently experienced in class action litigation.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is the decision of the Commission to

provisionally certify the class, with the class complaint defined

as follows:

Whether the Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture,

discriminated against the class agents and other members of the class

on the basis of national origin (Hispanic) in selections, promotions,

and the existence of a hostile work environment.

Accordingly, the AJ's decision on class certification is MODIFIED, the

agency's final order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the agency

for continued processing of the provisionally certified class complaint,

as ordered below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to comply with the above decision as follows:

The agency shall process the remanded class complaint in accordance with

29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(e) et seq. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall notify all class

members of the acceptance of the class complaint in accordance with the

requirements of 1614.204(e). Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, the agency shall provide the Washington,

D.C. Field Office with a copy of the notice sent to the class members,

and shall request the appointment of an AJ, who shall undertake the

continued processing of the complaint pursuant to 1614.204(f) et seq.

The agency shall provide a copy of the notice of certification and request

for appointment of an AJ to the Compliance Officer, as referenced below.

Within 30 days of the assignment of an AJ by the Washington, D.C. Field

Office, the assigned AJ shall make any further determinations necessary

for full certification of the class on the issues of whether the class

agents have presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the commonality

and numerosity requirements contained in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2)

as to the class claim of the existence of a hostile work environment,

and on the adequacy of additional counsel retained by the class agents

to represent the class in this action. The parties shall submit evidence

in support of their position to the Washington, D.C. Field Office within

thirty (30) days of the date this decision becomes final. The parties

may not make an interlocutory appeal to the Commission on the decision

of the AJ as to these issues.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to

file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the

paragraph below entitled �Right to File A Civil Action.� 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.407, 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on

the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil

action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any

petition for enforcement, will be terminated. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

�Agency� or �department� means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (�Right

to File A Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 7, 2002

Date

1 These are the allegations as defined by the AJ in his March 10,

1999 order identifying the issues presented in the class complaint.

2 This evidence was presented in a table which referred to seventy-two

specific hostile work environment complaints filed by Hispanic employees

of the Forest Service between 1993 and 1999. However, the document only

lists fifty-four different-named complainants, and it appears from the

table that several of the complainants have filed more than one hostile

work environment complaint against the agency during the period covered

in the table. Accordingly, we disagree with the AJ that this evidence

established that seventy-two employees had filed formal, or presented

informal, hostile work environment complaints.

3 We note that, even after a class is certified, the AJ remains free to

modify the certification order or dismiss the class complaint in light

of subsequent developments. EEOC Management Directive 110, chapter 8,

p. 5 (Nov. 9, 1999). Therefore, should evidence come to light in support

of the agency's contentions, such evidence and argument may be presented

to the AJ during the processing of the class action.

4 The document contained information from a total of thirty-six

individuals, but several of these individuals' claims had already been

accounted for in the table of hostile work environment claims presented

by the lead class agent.

5 During the pendency of this appeal, the parties submitted a joint

motion requesting that the Commission hold its decision in this appeal

in abeyance, in order to allow for a redefinition of the instant class

should the Hispanic Region 5 Forest Service employees settle their

discrimination claims with the agency. The Commission declines to stay

the issuance of its decision in this matter, and reminds the parties

that they may present to the assigned AJ any new information impacting

the formulation of the class and request that the class be appropriately

redefined, as discussed in footnote 3 above.