Joanne L. Burnett, Petitioner,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 23, 2005
04a50022 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 23, 2005)

04a50022

11-23-2005

Joanne L. Burnett, Petitioner, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.


Joanne L. Burnett v. United States Postal Service

04A50022

November 23, 2005

.

Joanne L. Burnett,

Petitioner,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(New York Metro Area),

Agency.

Petition No. 04A50022

Appeal No. 01981618

Agency Nos. 1A-071-102-94; 1A-071-1010-95

Hearing Nos. 170-95-8498X; 170-95-8499X

DECISION ON A PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

On June 1, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC

or Commission) docketed a petition for enforcement to examine the

enforcement of an order set forth in Joanne L. Burnett v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01981618 (September 26, 2002). Petitioner

alleged that the agency failed to fully comply with the Commission's order

dated September 26, 2002. The petition for enforcement is accepted by

the Commission pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503.

As background, petitioner filed a complaint in which she alleged

that the agency discriminated against her on the bases of her race

(African-American), disability (asthma and allergic rhinitis), and

in reprisal for prior EEO activity. In EEOC Appeal No. 01981618, the

Commission found that the agency discriminated against complainant because

of her disability by failing to provide complainant with a reasonable

accommodation. More specifically, the Commission found that the agency

should have reassigned complainant to a position away from the workroom

floor and that its Collective Bargaining Agreement was not a bar to such

a reassignment. The Commission also found that the agency's termination

of her employment violated the Rehabilitation Act.

The Commission's order for relief directed the agency to reinstate

complainant to a vacant position which accommodated her disability at an

equivalent pay and status as her previous bid position as a Letter Sorting

Machine Operator. If such a position was not available, the Commission

required the agency to assign complainant to a lower level position which

complied with her medical limitations. The Commission also required the

agency to compute back pay.<0> The matter was assigned to a Compliance

Officer and docketed as Compliance No. 06A30021 on May 3, 2005.

On May 31, 2005, petitioner submitted this petition for enforcement

through her attorney.<0> The petition contends that the agency failed

to pay any back pay or to reinstate complainant to her employment in a

position which would accommodate her disability. Her petition claims she

is owed back pay from December 17, 1994, the date the agency's termination

of her employment was effective, to the date of her death on October

28, 2004. Complainant contends that any partial wage payment made in

response to an arbitration decision was not the full amount of back pay

owed and that her calculations of back pay are more accurate in that

they accounted for any disability retirement benefits she received.

The agency opposed complainant's petition stating that it fully

complied with the Commission's order and that complainant is not owed any

additional back pay. The agency's position is that it offered complainant

her original bid position as a Letter Sorting clerk but rather than report

to work, she applied for disability retirement. The agency argues that

complainant indicated in her application for disability retirement that

she was unable to work as of May 14, 1994 which implied that she was

unable to report for duty because of her disability. The Office of

Personnel Management granted complainant's application for disability

retirement on February 8, 1999 retroactive to March 15, 1996.

According to the record before us, the agency submitted computer

documentation that it paid complainant the sum of $40,198.82 in gross

wages in 1997. The agency reported that this payment occurred in June

1996 and represented back pay for the time period December 17, 1994 to

March 11, 1996. This time period encompassed the date of the agency's

termination of complainant's employment to the date the agency offered

complainant reinstatement to her position in the Manual Distribution

unit.

In her petition, complainant acknowledged receipt of a �wage settlement�

in 1997 in the amount of $43,161.00 as set forth in the �Back Pay Award

Report� submitted by her accountant. She argued however, that this was

not the correct amount of back pay the agency should have paid to her.

We turn first to the Commission's Order entered in September 2002.

There, we required the agency to restore complainant to her employment

retroactive to the date her termination became effective and to pay

complainant back pay as recovery of her lost wages. Although the

agency issued a letter dated March 11, 1996 ostensibly reinstating

complainant to her employment, it did not offer complainant a position

which accommodated her disability as the Commission ordered. Instead,

the agency informed complainant that her original bid position had been

abolished and she was provided �an opportunity to bid on assignments.�

As we stated in our previous decision, complainant is not required to

bid for positions which are available in order to receive a reassignment

as a reasonable accommodation. EEOC Revised Enforcement Guidance on

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (October 2002).

Moreover, the Commission required the agency to reassign complainant to

a position which would accommodate her pulmonary dysfunctions in a place

away from the letter sorting area. Instead, according to the agency's

correspondence reinstating her, it placed complainant as an Unassigned

Regular in the Manual Distribution unit. The agency's letter stated

that it would accommodate complainant's disability by permitting her to

wear a Nuisance Dust Mask and by washing down a special distribution

case twice a day. As noted in our previous decision, this was not an

acceptable approach by the agency. There being no indication that the

agency attempted to identify other positions as we directed, we conclude

that the agency's offer of reinstatement to the letter sorting area was

deficient and did not comply with our Order.

Responding to the agency's contention that complainant admitted she

was unable to work in her application for disability retirement

benefits, the Commission has clearly expressed the policy that

representations made in an application for disability benefits are

not necessarily determinative or an absolute bar to a claim for a

reasonable accommodation. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of

Representations Made in an Application for Benefits on a Determination of

whether a Person is a Qualified Individual with A Disability under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (Compliance Manual Notice No. 915.002

2/12/97). The Commission further stated that an individual should not

be forced to choose between his/her rights under the ADA and the right

to claim disability benefits under other statutes. Id. A relevant

inquiry, which we believe is present in the instant case, is whether an

individual applied for disability benefits because her employer denied

her a reasonable accommodation. Id. Thus, the fact that complainant

applied for and was granted disability retirement status did not excuse

the agency from complying with our order for a reassignment.

Nevertheless, the record accompanying this petition supports that

complainant eventually became unable to work due to her declining health.

Specifically, medical records indicate that complainant suffered a stroke

in February 1997 and another stroke in September 1997. Significantly,

complainant's physician gave her a neurological evaluation in January

1998, and reported that complainant was incapable of working and was

permanently disabled due to the effects of the two strokes she suffered

in 1997.

Based on this evidence, the Commission concludes that the appropriate

time period for purposes of calculating back pay should begin December 17,

1994 and end at the time of complainant's first stroke in February 1997.

We note that there was no evidence provided that complainant was unable

to work prior to February 1997.

As it appears from the record that complainant received disability

retirement benefits during the applicable back pay period, the agency is

advised that any back pay amount computed is not offset by the receipt

of such benefits. Savage v. United States Postal Service EEOC Appeal

No. 04990044 (March 28, 2000) citing EEOC Policy Guidance: Cases Involving

the Deduction of Pension Payments from Back Pay Awards, No. N-915-054

(May 11, 1990). However, other payments the agency made as back pay will

offset any re-computation of amounts owed pursuant to this decision.

Accordingly, the agency is directed to comply with the Commission's Order

as set forth below. The Commission's order will only address back pay

since reinstatement of complainant is moot due to her intervening death.

As stated before, the issue of compensatory damages and attorney's fees

will be addressed in a separate decision.

ORDER (D0403)

1. Within 30 days, the complainant's counsel will submit appropriate

proof that he represents the complainant's estate in this matter.

2. Within 60 days of the date this Order becomes final, the agency will

re-compute back pay for the period December 17, 1994 to February 23,

1997, with interest, and other benefits due complainant, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501. The complainant's estate's representative shall

cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and

benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the

agency. If necessary, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant's

estate for additional amounts due as a result of the new computation.

Complainant's estate may petition for enforcement or clarification of

the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement

must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in

the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 23, 2005

Date

0 1The Commission also remanded the case to

an EEOC Administrative Judge for a determination of whether compensatory

damages and attorney's fees should be awarded. Complainant has appealed

that determination which is the subject of a separate appeal and will

not be addressed in this decision.

0 2Petitioner was deceased on October 28, 2004.