Jesus Cardoso

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 17, 2020

13495841 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/495,841 06/13/2012 Jesus Cardoso 83228152 8250
28395 7590 01/17/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
ZENG, LINGWEN R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1723
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JESUS CARDOSO

Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, and
JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Primary
Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–3, 6–13, 15–17, and 19–23.2
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42—i.e., the Inventor, as indicated in the Application Data
Sheet filed June 13, 2012. The Appellant identifies “Ford Global
Technologies, LLC” as the real party in interest (Appeal Brief filed July 20,
2018 (“Appeal Br.”) at 1).
2 See Appeal Br. 6–12; Final Office Action entered December 20, 2017
(“Final Act.”) at 2–17; Examiner’s Answer entered October 31, 2018
(“Ans.”) at 3–20.
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

2
I. BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates generally to a cooling system for
a vehicle traction battery, a vehicle comprising such a cooling system, and a
method of cooling a vehicle traction battery (Specification filed June 13,
2012 (“Spec.”) ¶¶ 1, 5–13; Drawings filed June 13, 2012, Fig. 1). Claims 1
and 15 are reproduced from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief, as
follows:
1. A vehicle traction battery cooling system
comprising:
a cabin climate control duct system connected to the
battery cooling system and having a blend door movable between
at least an open position and a closed position to select a source
of incoming air for cooling a plurality of battery cells, wherein
the climate control duct system includes an air supply duct
arranged to direct the incoming air to a battery chamber
surrounding the battery cells;
a controller programmed to:
receive a signal indicative of a presence of gases
vented by the battery cells;
command the blend door to the open position in
response to the signal; and
a vent tube in fluid communication with the battery
chamber and extending from the battery chamber to outside
the vehicle, thereby venting the gases outside the vehicle.
15. A method for cooling a traction battery in a vehicle,
the method comprising:
receiving, by a controller, a signal indicative of a
presence of gases vented by the battery;
commanding, by the controller, a cabin climate control
system parameter to change in response to the signal.
(Claims App. 1, 3 (emphases added)).

Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

3
II. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
The claims on appeal stand rejected, as follows:
A. Claims 15–17 and 19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more;
B. Claims 15 and 16 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Zhu et al.3 (“Zhu”);
C. Claims 1–3, 6–13, 22, and 23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhu in view of Matsumoto et al.4
(“Matsumoto”) and further in view of Yoneda;5
D. Claim 176 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhu in
view of Kato et al.7 (“Kato”); and
E. Claims 19–21 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhu
in view of Kato and further in view of Yoneda.
(Ans. 3–20; Final Act. 2–17).

3 US 2008/0236181 A1, published October 2, 2008.
4 US 2011/0059341 A1, published March 10, 2011.
5 US 2005/0285563 A1, published December 29, 2005.
6 Claim 17 depends from claim 16, which depends from claim 15 (Claims
App. 3). Although claims 15 and 16 were not included in the statement of
the rejection, these claims necessarily stand rejected on the same basis as
claim 17. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“A broader independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a
dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is invalid for
obviousness.”).
7 US 6,377,880 B1, issued April 23, 2002.
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

4
III. DISCUSSION
Rejection A (Patent Eligibility). Without specifically identifying the
judicial exception in claims 15–17 and 19–21, the Examiner states that these
claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception (Ans. 3). According to the
Examiner, “the limitations[ in claim 15] ‘receiving[, by a controller,] a
signal indicative of a presence of gases vented by the battery[;]
commanding[, by the controller,] a cabin climate control system parameter
to change in response to the signal’ could be interpreted as a person
notic[ing] some smoke c[oming] out from the battery, then the person just
press[ing] a button to vent the smoke out of the vehicle” (id.). In the
Examiner’s view, “[t]here is no specific structural component for
prosecuting all of the command, in other words, all of the command could be
done manually” (id. at 3–4). The Examiner posits that the recitation “by [a]
controller” in claim 15 “could be interpreted as a technician who operates
the battery cooling system” and that the “controller” limitation does not
significantly add to the judicial exception (id. at 4). As to whether the
method improves computer functionality, the Examiner states that “a claim
whose entire scope can be performed mentally . . . cannot be said to improve
computer technology” (id. at 18).
The Appellant contends that the Examiner’s interpretation of the
disputed claim limitations is unreasonable because it is inconsistent with the
Specification and Drawings (Appeal Br. 6). According to the Appellant, the
Specification (¶¶ 25–27, 37) and Figure 1 would have informed a person of
ordinary skill in the art that the claimed method requires a “controller” that
is in electrical communication with the climate control system (id.).
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

5
Regarding the Examiner’s position that the claim limitations at issue could
be performed manually, the Appellant argues that the Examiner’s position is
flawed and that “a ‘vehicle controller’ that commands changes in the climate
control system’s parameters in response to receiving signals from sensors
amounts to significantly more than manual control of the climate control
system under the ‘abstract-idea’ two-step analysis” (id. at 7).
We concur with the Appellant that the Examiner’s rejection is not
well-founded. Our reasons follow.
1. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 216.
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the
claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

6
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

7
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citations omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 with regard to the first step of the Alice/Mayo test (i.e., Step 2A of the
USPTO’s Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance as incorporated into MPEP
§ 2106 and as updated in October 2019). USPTO’s January 7, 2019, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Revised Guidance”).
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). Thus, under Step 1 of the Guidance, as
revised, we determine whether the claimed subject matter falls within the
four statutory categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. Step 2A of the Guidance is two-pronged, under which we look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

8
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then, under Step
2B, look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
2. Claim Interpretation
Before applying the two-step framework described in Alice/Mayo, we
construe the claim limitations that are at issue. MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC,
934 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Determining patent eligibility
requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject
matter.”).
Claim 15, the sole independent claim subject to this rejection, recites
the steps of “receiving, by a controller, a signal indicative of a presence of
gases vented by the battery” and “commanding, by the controller, a cabin
climate control system parameter to change in response to the signal”
(Claims App. 3). The only description of a “controller” in the Appellant’s
disclosure is a controller that is configured to receive a signal from a battery
system (e.g., by a sensor) and to command a climate control system (e.g., to
vent the gases outside the vehicle) by communicating with such a battery
system and a climate control system (Spec. ¶¶ 25–27, 30–32; Fig. 1). The
Appellant’s disclosure provides no other indication that the “controller” can
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

9
be anything other than what is meant by a “controller” in the traditional
sense—i.e., a control module 64, such as that shown in Fig. 1, which
electronically communicates with a battery system by receiving a signal (as
distinguished from noticing smoke) and commanding a climate control
system to perform a specified operation (as distinguished from pressing a
button). Therefore, the Examiner’s proffered claim construction (Ans. 4)
that the “controller” may be interpreted as “a person [who] notices some
smoke” or “a technician who operates the battery cooling system”—i.e., by
just pressing a button—is unreasonable. In re Baker Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d
1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that interpreting “hydrocarbon” to read
on gaseous hydrocarbons constituted reversible error in the proper context of
the written description). See also In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375,
1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1261
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
3. Analysis
Having construed claim 15, we turn to the PTO guidance on patent
eligibility. Under Step 1 of the revised Guidance, claim 1 falls within the
four statutory categories of patent subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Specifically, claim 15 recites a “method for cooling a traction battery
in a vehicle”—i.e., a method that includes two positively-recited steps.
That, however, does not end our inquiry. Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (“[M]any
computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible
subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant
could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a
computer system configured to implement the relevant concept.”).
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

10
The Examiner appears to find that, under Step 2A, Prong 1, claim 15
recites judicial exceptions in the form of mental processes (Ans. 18 (“a claim
whose entire scope can be performed mentally, cannot be said to improve
computer technology”)). Specifically, the Examiner alleges that the
presence of vented gases could be detected by “a nose or eyes of [a] person”
and that “all of the command[ing] could be done by the person, for example,
pressing a button to open a blend door” (id. at 3). Although Matsumoto
shows that gases vented from a battery system may include smoke generated
from a short circuit, which presumably could be detected by smell or sight,
these gases also include hydrogen and carbon monoxide (Matsumoto ¶¶ 4,
22; Fig. 2(b)). Furthermore, the correct construction of “controller” requires
a controller that is configured electronically to not only receive a signal from
a battery system but also command a climate control system to carry out a
specified function (Spec. ¶ 27; Fig. 1). Mechanically pressing a button has
not reasonably been shown to be considered by one skilled in the relevant art
as “commanding” as that term is used in the present context. Nor does the
Examiner establish that a human mind per se can practically perform such a
step and function. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 7
(“Claims do not recite a mental process when they do not contain limitations
that can practically be performed in the human mind, for instance when the
human mind is not equipped to perform the claim limitations.”); Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n. 14.
Therefore, we conclude that claim 15 is not directed to a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea). Because
we find that claim 15 is not directed to a judicial exception, we need not
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

11
address Step 2A, Prong 2, or Step 2B. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection.
Rejections B (Anticipation), D (Obviousness), and E
(Obviousness). The Examiner finds that Zhu describes every limitation
recited in claims 15 and 16 (Ans. 4 (citing Zhu ¶¶ 26–33; Fig. 2C)).
Specifically, the Examiner finds that Zhu teaches commanding a climate
control system to be in an open position such that a battery system receives
outside air in response to an air temperature measurement (Ans. 4).
According to the Examiner, “[t]he air temperature could be measured only if
a presence of gases inside the battery system [sic]” (id.).
The Appellant contends that Zhu does not disclose any signals
indicating a presence of vented gases from the battery, as required by claim
15 (Appeal Br. 12). According to the Appellant, “the presence of [vented]
gas is not necessary or inherent for detecting temperature” (id.).
We agree with the Appellant. Claims 15 and 16 require “receiving, by
a controller, a signal indicative of a presence of gases vented by the battery”
(Claims App. 3). The Examiner does not explain how a signal that is a mere
temperature measurement would inherently or necessarily indicate the
presence of vented gases.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection on this ground.
Rejections D and E are not sustained for the same reason because
neither Kato nor Yoneda has been cited to cure the deficiency in the
Examiner’s anticipation finding as to claim 15’s subject matter over Zhu.
Rejections C (Obviousness). Except for independent claim 9 and
claims 6–8 and 12 as a group, the Appellant’s arguments focus primarily on
claim 1 (Appeal Br. 7–11). Therefore, we decide the appeal as to these
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

12
rejections on the basis of claims 1 and 9, which we select as representative.
All other claims subject to Rejection C stand or fall with either claim 1 or
claim 9. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
2. Claim 1
Zhu’s Figure 1 (annotated) is reproduced, as follows:

Zhu’s Figure 1 above depicts a battery cooling system 10 for a vehicle 16
comprising an entry duct 18 for drawing outside air, a fan 20 directing the
air to a heat exchanger 22 to cool the air, a multi-port duct 24 that channels
the cooled air to cabin air registers 30 to cool vehicle cabin 19 and/or a
battery 12 via channels 26 and 28, respectively, and a fan 32 that draws air
from a battery chamber 14 into vehicle trunk 34 (Zhu ¶¶ 10, 32–33).
The Examiner correctly finds that, in contrast to claim 1, Zhu does not
disclose: (1) a controller that is programmed to receive a signal indicative of
a presence of gases vented by the battery cells and to command a blend door
to an open position in response to such a signal; and (2) a vent tube for
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

13
venting the gases from the battery chamber to outside the vehicle (Ans. 5–6).
For the reasons given by the Examiner and below, however, these
differences do not confer patentability to claim 1 over the combined
teachings of the applied prior art references.
Specifically, Matsumoto teaches an electrically-driven vehicle in
which a controller 50 obtains a gas temperature, carbon monoxide
concentration, and hydrogen concentration from sensors 36–38 in a gas
discharge passage 28 connected to a chamber 27 for collecting gas discharge
from a cell 21 of a lithium ion battery pack 20 and determines whether an
abnormality has occurred in the battery pack 20 (Matsumoto ¶¶ 20, 25; Fig.
3). Matsumoto teaches that, in the normal state, the battery pack 20 is
provided with an air intake duct 23 for introducing air from the vehicle
interior 11 for cooling and an air discharge duct 25 for discharging warmed
air into the vehicle interior 11 (id. ¶ 20). Matsumoto teaches that when an
internal pressure inside the cell 21 is increased due to generated gas in an
abnormal state, rupture disk 26a is ruptured to discharge the gas from inside
the cell 21 to the outside, whereby gas from the gas discharge passage 28
connected to chamber 27 is discharged into vehicle interior 11 (id.).
Specifically, when an abnormality is detected—i.e., “[w]hen smoke is
confirmed to be emitted from the battery pack 20, the controller 50 outputs
an outside air introduction command to [a] fan damper interface 54 by [an]
outside air introduction mechanism starting means 51” and “also outputs a
command to open a window to [a] window glass drive mechanism interface
55 by [a] window opening starting means 52” (id. ¶ 31). Thus, Matsumoto
would have reasonably suggested that any harmful gases such as carbon
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

14
monoxide and hydrogen are vented outside the vehicle through an open
window.
Yoneda teaches the known concept of cooling a battery pack using
cooling air from a vehicle’s interior and then exhausting the cooling wind
directly out of the vehicle through an exhaust port (Yoneda ¶¶ 7, 102; Fig.
5). Yoneda shows that an exhaust duct 12 can be used for this purpose (id.
Fig. 5).
Given the collective teachings found in Zhu, Matsumoto, and Yoneda,
we agree with the Examiner that a person having ordinary skill in the art
would have been prompted to modify Zhu’s battery cooling system to
include Matsumoto’s controller and sensors to determine an abnormal state
(i.e., the presence of carbon monoxide and hydrogen) and, when such an
abnormal state exists, to vent harmful gases directly outside the vehicle
without passage through the vehicle’s passenger cabin in order to avoid the
presence of harmful gases within the cabin. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”); id. at 420
(“Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses
beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill
will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle.”).
The Appellant argues that “Matsumoto is dealing with a very different
system where the air conditioning system is not connected to the battery
pack for cooling the battery, as in claim 1” and “[i]nstead of venting to the
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

15
battery system outside the vehicle, as required by the claims, Matsumoto
discloses that the battery system vents to the interior cabin so that ‘air which
was warmed after cooling the battery pack’ is used to warm the vehicle
compartment” (Appeal Br. 8). This argument fails because the Examiner is
relying on the collective teachings found in all three references. Zhu teaches
using air cooled by a heat exchanger to cool the battery system and Yoneda
teaches the concept of venting gases directly outside the vehicle. In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[O]ne cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.”).
The Appellant’s related argument that “Matsumoto teaches away from
venting the air outside the vehicle since Matsumoto teaches venting to inside
the vehicle to warm the cabin” is also without persuasive merit. Merely
pointing out differences between a claimed device and a prior art device
does not suffice to establish a teaching away. Here, the Appellant does not
explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been
dissuaded from combining the references in the manner as proposed by the
Examiner. In re Urbanski, 809 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing
in the prior art teaches that the proposed modification would have resulted in
an ‘inoperable’ process.”).
For these reasons, we uphold the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
3. Claim 9
With respect to claim 9, the Appellant argues that Zhu teaches a fan
32 for pulling air from within the battery chamber 14 an directing the air into
a vehicle trunk 34, and not outside the vehicle as required by the claim
(Appeal Br. 10 (citing Zhu ¶ 33)). For the same reasons discussed above for
Appeal 2019-001958
Application 13/495,841

16
claim 1, we agree with the Examiner that the collective teachings found in
not only Zhu, but also Matsumoto and Yoneda, would have suggested the
subject matter recited in claim 9.

IV. CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed
15–17, 19–
21
101  Eligibility 15–17, 19–
21
15, 16 102(b) Zhu 15, 16
1–3, 6–13,
22, 23
103(a) Zhu, Matsumoto,
Yoneda
1–3, 6–13,
22, 23

15–17 103(a) Zhu, Kato 15–17
19–21 103(a) Zhu, Kato, Yoneda 19–21
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 6–13,
22, 23
15–17, 19–
21

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED