Jessica Lynn Greenhalgh

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 25, 2019

87422458 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2019)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: January 25, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Jessica Lynn Greenhalgh
_____

Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
_____

Jessica Lynn Greenhalgh, pro se.

Leslee Friedman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 120,
David Miller, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Cataldo, Kuczma and Heasley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Jessica Lynn Greenhalgh, seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the standard character marks CAMDEN GROUP and CAMDEN REALTY
(GROUP and REALTY respectively disclaimed), both identifying “real estate
brokerage” in International Class 36.1

1 Application Serial No. 87422458 was filed on April 24, 2017 and Application Serial No.
87448613 was filed on May 13, 2017. Both applications were filed under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based upon Applicant’s claim of a bona fide intent to use
the marks in commerce. Applicant subsequently filed an amendment to allege use in both
applications, asserting June 13, 2017 as the date of first use of the mark anywhere and in
commerce.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 2 -

The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s
marks on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), in view of the following registered marks, all issued to the
same entity:
CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST (typed drawing,2 PROPERTY TRUST
disclaimed);3
;4 and
,5
all identifying “apartment and property management and leasing services,” in
International Class 36.6

2 Effective November 2, 2003, Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. §2.52, was amended to replace
the term “typed” drawing with “standard character” drawing. A mark depicted as a typed
drawing is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark.
3 Registration No. 2136835 issued on February 17, 1998. Second Renewal.
4 Registration No. 2618939 issued on September 10, 2002. First Renewal. The mark is
described as follows: “The mark consists of the stylized word ‘CAMDEN’ with a design of a
bird in flight appearing separately above the upper right of the word element.”
5 Registration No. 2522502 issued on December 25, 2001. First Renewal. The mark is
described as follows: “The mark consists of the stylized word elements ‘CAMDEN’ and
‘LIVING EXCELLENCE’ with a design of a bird in flight appearing separately above the
upper right of the ‘CAMDEN’ word element.”
6 Reg. No. 2136835 recites “apartment and real property management and leasing services,”
while the other cited registrations omit the term “real” from the recitation of services. We
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 3 -

The refusal has been fully briefed by Applicant and the Examining Attorney,
including a reply brief from Applicant.
Based upon the record and the arguments made, we affirm the likelihood of
confusion refusal.
I. Appeals Consolidated
The ex parte appeals before the Board in these co-pending applications involve
common issues of law and fact, and are presented on nearly identical records and
briefs. The Board, upon request by the applicant or examining attorney or upon our
own initiative, may order the consolidation of the appeals for purposes of briefing,
oral hearing, or final decision. See e.g., In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1915
(TTAB 2012) (Board sua sponte consolidated two appeals); In re Country Music
Association, Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1824, 1827 (TTAB 2011) (same); In re Bacardi & Co.
Ltd., 48 USPQ2d 1031, 1033 (TTAB 1997) (Board sua sponte considered appeals in
five applications together and rendered single opinion). See also TRADEMARK TRIAL
AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 1214 (June 2018).
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby consolidate these appeals for purposes of
final decision. References to the record and briefs refer to Application Serial No.
87422458 unless otherwise indicated.

find that the slight variation in the wording of the recitations of services represents a minor
distinction rather than a significant difference.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 4 -

II. Evidentiary Issue
Applicant attached copies of her evidentiary record to her appeal briefs.7 To the
extent this evidence is duplicative of the evidence previously submitted during
prosecution of the involved applications, we need not and do not give this redundant
evidence any consideration. See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1734-
5 (TTAB 2018). Furthermore, any of the evidence submitted with Applicant’s appeal
briefs that was not previously submitted during prosecution is untimely and will not
be considered.8 See Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d); TBMP
§§ 1203.02(e) and § 1207.01 and authorities cited therein.
We turn now to the merits of these consolidated appeals.
III. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis
of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In
re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods or services.
See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24

7 Applicant’s brief; 4 TTABVUE 27-40.
8 The proper procedure for an applicant or examining attorney to introduce evidence after an
appeal has been filed is to submit a written request with the Board to suspend the appeal
and remand the application for further examination. See Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.142(d). See also TBMP § 1207.02 and authorities cited therein.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 5 -

(CCPA 1976). See also In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
1. Cited Registration No. 2618939
For purposes of the du Pont factors that are relevant to these appeals we will
consider Applicant’s involved marks and identified services and the mark shown
below that is the subject of cited Registration No. 2618939, identifying “apartment
and property management and leasing services” (“registered mark”).

If likelihood of confusion is found as to the mark and services in this registration,
it is unnecessary to consider the other cited registrations. Conversely, if likelihood of
confusion is not found as to the mark and services in this registration, we would not
find likelihood of confusion as to the mark and services in the other cited
registrations. See Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010).
Strength of the Term “Camden” in the Cited Registration
We consider the conceptual strength of “Camden” in relation to “apartment and
property management and leasing services.” In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d
1670, 1673 (TTAB 2018). Applicant submitted with her January 19, 2018 Response
to the Examining Attorney’s first Office Action the following definitions and
references for “Camden:”
“city and port on the Delaware River in southwestern New Jersey opposite
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,”

Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 6 -

“borough of northern Greater London, England…;”9

William Camden 1551-1623 English antiquarian and historian;10

Camden, New Jersey is a city in Camden County, New Jersey. … The city
derives its name from Charles Pratt, 1st Earl Camden.11

In the context of property management and leasing, we find these definitions
indicate that “Camden” signifies at least one, or more, geographic locations as well as
a surname. There is no evidence that either Applicant or Registrant is named
Camden or located in one of the geographic locations known as Camden or provides
services specific to any location named Camden. Given these meanings, none of which
possess significance in relation to the identified services, the term appears to be
conceptually strong.
We next consider Applicant’s argument concerning the number and nature of
third-party registrations of “Camden” formative marks. Applicant argues that “these
marks are all owned by different owners and provide various services, but have a
connotation and impression with a closely similar meaning to the Registrant[’s]
marks….”12 In support of this contention, Applicant introduced into the record with
her January 19, 2018 Response to Office Action a list of 50 registrations and
applications retrieved from a search of the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search
System (“TESS”) database of applications and registrations which consist of or

9 At .pdf 19. Definition from merriam-webster.com.
10 At .pdf 20. Definition from merriam-webster.com.
11 At .pdf 18. Reference from Wikipedia.org.
12 4 TTABVUE 6.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 7 -

include the word “Camden.”13 In the Final Office Action, the Examining Attorney
advised Applicant that the mere submission of a list of registrations does not make
them of record and, further, instructed Applicant how to introduce the third-party
registrations into the record.14 As the Examining Attorney made clear, to make a
third-party registration of record, a copy of the registration, either a copy of the paper
USPTO record, or a copy taken from the electronic records of the Office, should be
submitted. See, e.g., In re Compania de Licores Internacionales S.A., 102 USPQ2d
1841, 1843 (TTAB 2012) (mere listing of third-party registrations in brief insufficient
to make them of record); In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1372-73 (TTAB
2006). See also TBMP § 1208.02 (June 2018) and authorities cited therein.
Applicant did not provide copies of the listed registrations as instructed. We
exercise our discretion to consider the proffered TESS listing. However, a mere listing
of third-party marks, without any accompanying indication of the goods and/or
services associated therewith, has little, if any, probative value.15 See TBMP §
1208.02. In addition, the listed applications show only that they have been filed.
Interpayment Services Ltd. v. Docters & Thiede, 66 USPQ2d 1463, 1468 n. 6 (TTAB
2003).

13 At .pdf 16-17.
14 Jan. 22, 2018 Office Action at .pdf 4.
15 The TESS printout merely lists Serial Number, Registration Number where applicable,
Word Mark, Check Status and Live/Dead status.
Additionally, the cancelled registrations possess little, if any, probative value. Cancelled
registrations are evidence only that the registrations issued. See, e.g., In re Inn at St. John’s,
LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1745 (TTAB 2018); Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, 126 USPQ2d
1601, 1606 (TTAB 2018).
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 8 -

While the Federal Circuit has held that “extensive evidence of third-party use and
registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific extent and impact of the
usage has not been established,” see Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH
& Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129,
1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), none of the third-party registrations
introduced into the record by Applicant list the goods or services identified. Because
we cannot ascertain whether any of the third-party registrations recite goods or
services that are related to those identified in the challenged application and cited
registration, this evidence has little, if any, probative value with regard to the
asserted weakness of the cited mark as to “apartment and property management and
leasing services.” See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Evidence
of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is relevant to show that a mark
is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.”) (emphasis
added; citation omitted); In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744,
1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for goods in other classes
where the proffering party “has neither introduced evidence, nor provided adequate
explanation to support a determination that the existence of I AM marks for goods in
other classes, … support a finding that registrants’ marks are weak with respect to
the goods identified in their registrations”); accord Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v.
Gerson Stewart Corp., 367 F.2d 431, 151 USPQ 350, 353 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 9 -

Based on the totality of the evidence, we find that the shared term CAMDEN has
not been shown to be either particularly strong or particularly weak. On balance, we
do not believe that, on this record, the relative strength of the cited mark in its
entirety weighs significantly one way or the other.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We next compare the marks in their entireties and, in so doing, look to their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., 73
USPQ2d at 1692. “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but
instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components; that is, the decision must be based on the entire
marks, not just part of the marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ
749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d
1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be
dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in
determining likelihood of confusion.”). On the other hand, there is nothing improper
in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 10 -

marks in their entireties. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751. Although we place the marks
alongside each other in the following paragraph for purposes of this decision,
consumers may not have the luxury of viewing the marks in such a manner.
Here, upon evaluating the marks CAMDEN GROUP and CAMDEN REALTY, and
the registered mark , we agree with the Examining Attorney
that the dominant feature of each mark is the term “Camden.” Because this term
appears first in each mark, it is most likely to be impressed in purchasers’ memories.
Presto Products, Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988)
(“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the
mind of a purchaser and remembered”). Moreover, for source-identifying purposes,
consumers will likely focus on the CAMDEN element in Applicant’s marks in view of
the fact that the additional literal portions thereof are descriptive of the recited
services and thus disclaimed. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 752
(“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the descriptive component of
a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on the likelihood of
confusion”); In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34
(Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Code Consultants, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1699, 1702 (TTAB 2001)
(disclaimed matter is often “less significant in creating the mark’s commercial
impression”).
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 11 -

The word “Camden” in the registered mark similarly has more source-identifying
significance than the design of a bird in flight. It is settled that where, as here, marks
comprise both words and a design, the words are normally accorded greater weight,
in part because consumers are likely to remember and use the word(s) to request the
goods. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the
verbal portion of a word and design mark likely will be the dominant portion”); In re
Appetito Provisions Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987) (holding that “if one
of the marks comprises both a word and a design, then the word is normally accorded
greater weight because it would be used by purchasers to request the goods or
services” and “because applicant’s mark shares with registrant’s mark that element
responsible for creating its overall commercial impression, the marks are confusingly
similar”). As a result, while there are obvious differences between Applicant’s marks
and the registered mark, viewed as a whole, they are more similar than dissimilar in
appearance and sound.
With regard to meaning, “Group” is defined as “any collection or assemblage of
persons or things; cluster; aggregation;”16 and “Realty” is defined as “property in the
form of land or buildings.”17 As discussed above, “Camden” identifies one or more

16 We hereby exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of this definition from
Dictionary.com, based upon Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2019). The Board may
take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet
Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir.
1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have regular fixed editions.
In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014).
17 Applicant’s January 19, 2018 Response to Office Action at .pdf 37. Definition retrieved from
dictionary.cambridge.org.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 12 -

geographic locations as well as a surname. Applicant further introduced evidence that
the term “Camden” in the registered mark is an amalgam of the surnames of the
company’s owners, Ric Campo and Keith Oden.18 Applicant also argues, without
evidentiary support,
Applicant’s mark was named using the street as a specific geographical
term, and the Applicant provides goods and services that are within the
region of Beverly Hills, which is the region where the street is location
[sic]. While the mark [sic] applicant’s goods and services are provided in
the region where the street is located, a street name is not like a city or
state name that can mislead a consumer into believing the services are
only at that specific street geographical location.19

However, it is not clear on this record to what extent consumers will perceive
“Camden” as one or another geographic location, surname or portmanteau of two
surnames or other terms. Further, there is no evidence that consumers would
perceive “Camden” as possessing a different meaning in Applicant’s marks than in
the registered mark. The term “Group” merely describes a collection of persons
working together. In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016).
“Realty” at best is highly descriptive of real property. As a result, we find the addition
of these terms to the term “Camden” in the registered mark does little to distinguish
the marks in meaning. There similarly is no evidence that the design of a bird in
flight in the registered mark creates a separate meaning therein.
In sum, we view the marks in their entireties and find them to be more similar
than dissimilar in appearance, sound and meaning and, overall, to convey similar

18 January 19, 2018 Response to Office Action at .pdf 28-29.
19 Applicant’s brief, 4 TTABVUE 7.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 13 -

commercial impressions. The fact that each mark is dominated by the same term
“Camden” simply outweighs the points of dissimilarity. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751.
Thus, this du Pont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
Similarity of the Services and Trade Channels
We turn now to the du Pont factors involving the relatedness of Applicant’s
services and the services identified by the registered mark, as well as the trade
channels in which they are encountered. It is settled that in making our
determination, we must look to the services as identified in the application vis-à-vis
those recited in the cited registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion
Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Midwest
Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1165 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re La
Peregrina Ltd., 86 USPQ2d 1645, 1647 (TTAB 2008)); In re Giovanni Food Co., 97
USPQ2d 1990, 1991 (TTAB 2011). It is also not necessary that the respective services
be competitive, or even that they move in the same channels of trade to support a
holding of likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient that the respective services are
related in some manner, or that the conditions and activities surrounding the
marketing of the services are such that they would or could be encountered by the
same persons under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks,
give rise to the mistaken belief that they originated from the same producer. In re
Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991).
Based on the plain meaning of the recitations of the services in the respective
applications and registration, it is evident that Applicant’s “real estate brokerage”
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 14 -

services are related to Registrant’s “apartment and property management and
leasing services.” Simply put, Registrant’s services include leasing of real estate,
namely, apartments, and Applicant provides real estate brokerage of properties that
must be presumed to include apartments due to the lack of any restrictions in the
identified services. Cf. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162; In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90
USPQ2d 1634, 1638 (TTAB 2009).
The evidence of record confirms the relatedness of the services. The Examining
Attorney submitted pages from eight third-party websites for companies providing
apartment or other property management, real estate leasing and real estate
brokerage services.20 This evidence clearly demonstrates that real estate brokers may
also provide apartment and property management and leasing services to real estate
purchasers, sellers and tenants.
The Examining Attorney also submitted printouts of ten use-based, third-party
registrations that include both real estate brokerage and apartment and property
management and leasing services.21 These registrations have probative value to the
extent that they suggest that such services are the type of services that could be
marketed by a single source under a single mark. See In re Assn. of the United States
Army, 85 USPQ2d 1264, 1270 (TTAB 2007); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29
USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d

20 July 20, 2017 first Office Action at .pdf 19-27; January 22, 2018 final Office Action at .pdf
33-42. These companies include: Hanford - Freund & Co., Ebby Halliday Realtors, Elan
Realty Group, Millennium Properties, MDL Group, CEM Properties, INCO Commercial and
Candor Realty.
21 January 22, 2018 final Office Action at .pdf 7-32.
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 15 -

1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).We are not persuaded by Applicant’s argument that the
services identified by the registered mark are limited to real estate investment trusts,
or REITs, and that the evidence adduced by the Examining Attorney does not specify
that the third-party uses or registrations pertain to REITs and, as a result, does not
support a finding that the services are related. Applicant attempts to distinguish its
services based upon distinctions that are not present in the recitation of services. As
noted above, we may not limit the scope of services in the subject applications or in
the cited registration by resort to such evidence. It is the identification of services
that controls, not what extrinsic evidence may show about the specific nature of the
services. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162; Midwest Gaming, 106 USPQ2d at 1165;
In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764-65 (TTAB 1986).
In sum, the Examining Attorney has shown that Applicant’s services and
Registrant’s services are clearly related and may emanate from a common source.
The evidence of third-party use discussed above demonstrates that the services are
not only complementary, but will be targeting the same class of consumers, including
real estate buyers, sellers and brokers, lessors and lessees, tenants and landlords,
and will be encountered in at least one common trade channel, namely, the websites
of real estate brokers who also provide apartment and property management and
leasing services.
Conclusion
Because the marks are similar, the services are related, and target the same
consumers in at least one common trade channel, we find that Applicant’s marks, if
Serial Nos. 87422458 and 87448613
- 16 -

used in association with the services identified in the applications, are likely to cause
confusion with the registered mark in connection with the services recited in the
registration.
Decision: The likelihood of confusion refusal to register Applicant’s marks is
affirmed as to each application.