Jesse McKinley, Sr., Complainant,v.Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 9, 2003
01A25033_r (E.E.O.C. Sep. 9, 2003)

01A25033_r

09-09-2003

Jesse McKinley, Sr., Complainant, v. Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.


Jesse F. McKinley, Sr. v. General Services Administration

01A25033

September 9, 2003

.

Jesse McKinley, Sr.,

Complainant,

v.

Stephen A. Perry,

Administrator,

General Services Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A25033

Agency No. GSA01NCRWPJFM25

DECISION

On August 23, 2001, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint wherein he

claimed that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability

(prosthesis below the right knee) when the agency denied his request

for a waiver of a GSA Certification Card Form 3257, thus prohibiting him

from working as a security guard under any agency, Nation Capital Region,

security guard contract. Complainant had worked as a contract guard at

the Ronald Reagan Building in Washington, D.C.

In its decision dated August 15, 2002, the agency dismissed the complaint

on the grounds that it failed to state a claim. The agency determined

that complainant was not an employee of the agency, but rather an employee

of Coastal International Security, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as CIS).

The agency stated that CIS had entered into a contract with the agency to

provide security guard services. The agency determined that complainant

was hired as a security guard by CIS and assigned by CIS to work at

the agency building. According to the agency, complainant was not

supervised by agency staff or paid by the agency for work performed.

The agency stated that complainant's supervisors were CIS employees and

that CIS invoiced the agency for work performed by CIS employees under

the contract. The agency noted that the contract between the agency and

CIS provided that CIS was responsible for job assignments, scheduling,

performance, and discipline of contract guards.

On appeal, complainant states that he had been employed as a security

guard at the agency's Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade

Center since 1997. Complainant states that since 1998, he has been

directly employed by CIS pursuant to a contractual agreement between the

agency and CIS. Complainant notes that officials from CIS attempted to

persuade the agency that his work performance warranted an opportunity

to continue his employment under the contract. Complainant argues

that he had a joint employment relationship with the agency and CIS.

Complainant maintains that the agency had a greater right to control

the relevant terms and conditions of his employment. Complainant notes

that complainant works at the agency's building, follows extraordinarily

specific employment duties set forth by the agency, and is assigned

specific work hours by the agency. Complainant argues that in light

of the glowing commendations sent by CIS officials to the agency, it is

clear that the agency, and not CIS, terminated his position.

In response, the agency asserts that it is evident that complainant

is not an employee of the agency based on the intent of the parties,

the lack of agency control over complainant's manner and means of job

performance, the method of payment, the lack of employee benefits from

the agency, and the method of termination. The agency maintains that

no agency official observed, directed, or supervised complainant's work

on a daily basis. The agency states that CIS supervised complainant

directly, set his work hours, and determined how he could best perform his

work on a daily basis. The agency notes that CIS paid complainant his

wages and deducted all social security, state taxes, and federal taxes.

Additionally, the agency states that CIS was responsible for providing

complainant with insurance, worker's compensation benefits, and other

employee benefits. The agency asserts that complainant did not accrue

any employee benefits from the agency, such as annual leave, sick leave,

or retirement. According to the agency, complainant did not receive

any performance appraisals from the agency. The agency notes that

complainant was required to schedule and request leave through CIS.

The agency asserts that CIS hired complainant and placed him at the

Ronald Reagan Building under its contract with the agency. According to

the agency, CIS was responsible for ensuring that complainant met the

medical requirements set forth in the contract. The agency states that

a physician hired by CIS determined that complainant did not meet the

requirements of the contract, thereby leading to his non-certification.

With regard to termination capability, the agency states that although

it refused to certify complainant's suitability for performance on its

contract with CIS, the authority to terminate complainant rested at all

times with CIS. The agency notes that complainant remained employed

with CIS and was offered an assignment at another location pursuant to

another contract.

The Commission has applied the common law of agency test to determine

whether complainants are agency employees under Title VII. See Ma

v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 01962390 (June

1, 1998) (citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,

323-24 (1992)). Specifically, the Commission will look to the following

non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) the extent of the employer's right to

control the means and manner of the worker's performance; (2) the kind of

occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done under the

direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision,

(3) the skill required in the particular occupation; (4)whether the

�employer� or the individual furnishes the equipment used and the place

of work; (5) the length of time the individual has worked; (6) the method

of payment, whether by time or by the job; (7) the manner in which the

work relationship is terminated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or

without notice and explanation; (8) whether annual leave is afforded; (9)

whether the work is an integral part of the business of the �employer�;

(10) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11) whether

the �employer� pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of

the parties. See Ma v. Department of Health and Human Services, supra.

In Ma, the Commission noted that the common law test contains, �no

shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the

answer... [A] ll of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed

and weighed with no one factor being decisive.� Id. The Commission

in Ma also noted that prior applications of the test established in

Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979), using many of the

same elements considered under the common law test, was not appreciably

different from the common law of agency test. See Id.

Upon review, we observe that it is the agency's position that complainant

was employed by the contractor CIS. The agency stated that it had no

control over complainant's leave or pay and that CIS set complainant's

work hours and directly supervised his work on a daily basis. The agency

also stated that complainant's social security and all other insurance

and taxes were handled by CIS. The agency asserted that it does not

provide complainant with a performance appraisal and that complainant was

hired by CIS and placed by CIS at the Ronald Reagan Building pursuant

to the contract between CIS and the agency. The agency also stated

that it although it refused to certify complainant's suitability for

performance, the authority to terminate complainant's employment resided

with CIS, and complainant remained employed by CIS after he was denied

agency certification. We observe that complainant has not submitted

sufficient argument or evidence to refute the agency's position that

he was an employee of CIS rather than the agency. Based on the record,

we find that complainant was not an agency employee.

Accordingly, the agency's decision dismissing the complaint on the

grounds of failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1)

was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 9, 2003

__________________

Date