Jesse H. Davis

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2020

14523355 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/523,355 10/24/2014 Jesse H. Davis CMT01-011-US 5788
86067 7590 01/31/2020
Klintworth & Rozenblat IP LLP
19 North Green Street
Chicago, IL 60607
EXAMINER
MACASIANO, MARILYN G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3688
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kandrip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JESSE H. DAVIS

Appeal 2018-006482
Application 14/523,355
Technology Center 3600

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CAROLYN D. THOMAS, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23. Appeal Br. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We refer to the Specification, filed Oct. 24, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed July 24, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed Oct. 13,
2017 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed Apr. 18, 2018 (“Ans.”),
and Reply Brief, filed June 11, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Creative Mobile Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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II. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter relates to in-
vehicle equipment (203) including passenger information monitor (PIM-
220) containing display (225) for presenting targeted content (227) and for
interacting with a passenger. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 22, 223, Figure 2. In-vehicle
equipment (203) further includes wireless communication device (241) for
communicating with remote server (240), which may access general
advertising content from a database library for presentation to the passenger.
Id. ¶¶ 29, 67. Once PIM (220) is paired with mobile device (200) via mobile
device’s paring module (202), mobile device (200) transmits passenger
information (204) to PIM (220), which in turn, communicates passenger
information (204) along with vehicle information (205) to remote server
(240). Id. ¶¶ 21, 28. In return, remote server (240) uses passenger
information (204) to retrieve targeted content from the database library, and
forwards the targeted content to PIM (220), which presents the content on
display (225) to the passenger. Id. ¶ 28.
Claims 1, 15, 19, and 22 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for interacting with a passenger within a
vehicle comprising:
a passenger information monitor having a first display for
presenting targeted primary content to the passenger;
a wireless communication device which communicates
information between a remote server outside of the vehicle and the
passenger information monitor;
a database library containing general advertising content
accessible by the remote server;
a mobile device having a second display, and a pairing module
operatively coupled to the mobile device, configured to enable
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communication between the mobile device and the passenger
information monitor,
wherein once paired, the mobile device communicates
with the passenger information monitor and transmits passenger
information to the passenger information monitor,
wherein the passenger information monitor transmits the
passenger information along with vehicle information to the
remote server via the wireless communication device, and
wherein the passenger information monitor receives
targeted primary content from the remote server, the remote
server deriving the targeted primary content based on the
database library of general content and the received
passenger information, the passenger information
monitor displaying the targeted primary content on the
first display to the passenger.

Figure 2, discussed above and reproduced below, is useful for
understanding the claimed invention:

Figure 2 depicts an illustration of a mobile device interacting with and
communicating with in-vehicle equipment within a vehicle. Id. ¶ 9.

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III. REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following references 3
Name Number Filed Published
Meunier US 2002/0186144 A1 May 1, 2002 Dec. 12, 2002
Farley US 2003/0130769 A1 Nov. 14, 2002 July 10, 2003
Lee US 2008/0106376 A1 Mar. 7, 2007 May 8, 2008
Lopes US 8,369,848 B1 Mar. 29, 2012 Feb. 5, 2013

IV. REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–23 as follows:
1. Claims 1–23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as not directed to patent
eligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.
2. Claim(s) 1−4, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 19−21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Lee. Id. at 6–12.
3. Claims 5–7, 13 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Lee and Lopes. Id. at 13–15.
4. Claims 10, 22 and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Lee and Meunier. Id. at 15–18.
5. Claims 11 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Lee, Farley and Meunier. Id. at
18–19.

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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V. ANALYSIS
1. Prior Art Rejections
Appellant requests that the prior art rejections 2 through 5 of claims
1–23 as set forth above be held in abeyance.4 Appeal Br. 12–13. Because
Appellant has not presented any substantive arguments to rebut or challenge
the correctness of the Examiner’s prima facie cases of anticipation and
obviousness rejections, Appellant has waived such arguments.5 Therefore,
we summarily affirm the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections
of claims 1–23.
2. Patent Eligibility Rejection
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.

4 Appellants may not reserve arguments for some later time. Arguments not
made are considered waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
5 See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir 2008) (“When the
appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, section
1.192(c)(7) [(now section 41.37(c)(1)(iv))] imposes no burden on the Board
to consider the merits of that ground of rejection. . . . [T]he Board may treat
any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived.”). See also
In re Guess, 2009 WL 1598475 at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2009) (“Appellants
failed to argue that any limitations unique to [the claims] survive [the
rejection]. Appellants have therefore waived any such arguments on
appeal.”) (citing In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does
not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
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abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook), id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
The Office published revised guidance on the application of
Section 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 PEG”). Recently, the Office
published an update to that guidance. October 2019 Patent Eligibility
Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (hereinafter “PEG Update”). Under
the 2019 PEG and PEG Update, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and

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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)).6

See 2019 PEG, 52, and 55–56. Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception; and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, does the office then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 PEG 56.
We analyze the patent-eligibility rejection with the principles
identified above in mind.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
In the first part of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines that
claims 1–23 are directed to the abstract idea of “interacting with a passenger
within a vehicle.” Final Act. 3. According to the Examiner, the underlying
steps in the cited claims, when viewed individually and in combination, have
been identified by the courts to describe the abstract concepts of collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying results of the collected/analyzed
information (Electric Power Group), and delivering user selected media
content to portable devices (Affinity Labs v. Amazon.com). Id. at 4.
In particular, the Examiner determines the following:
[T]he concept in Electric Power Group, is not meaningfully
different from claim 1. The claims in Electric Power Group recite

6 All references to the MPEP are to 9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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steps that receive a plurality of data streams and sources, detect and
analyze events in real-time by deriving dynamic metrics from the data
streams, display visualization of measurements from the data streams
and the dynamic metrics, accumulate and update the measurements
and dynamic metrics, and derive an indicator from a combination of
measurements and dynamic metrics. The present invention is
analogous in that it too receives data such as the server receiving
passenger information and vehicle information, and generating data
(certain results), such as targeted primary content according to the
passenger and vehicle information received. The claims in the present
invention do not improve the functioning of the computer. Rather, the
claimed invention in this case uses a computer in routine and
conventional ways to produce information (targeted primary content)
without particular inventive technology-an abstract idea, as did the
claims in Electric Power Group. . . . There is no further specification
of particular technology for performing the steps. See Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir.
2016).

Ans. 5.
In the second part of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines the
claims do not recite additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5. In particular, the Examiner
determines the following:
The claim recites the additional limitations of a “wireless
communication device” configured for communicating information
between a remote server outside of the vehicle and the passenger
information monitor, a “passenger information monitor” for
presenting primary control to the passenger, a “mobile device” for
interacting with in-vehicle equipment and a remote server, a “remote
server” for receiving, storing, processing and transmitting
information to another computer and a “in-vehicle equipment” for
generating passenger information. Claims 1, 15, 19 and 22 also
indicates that the content is served by a “wireless communication
device”, a “passenger information monitor”, a “mobile device”, a
“remote server” and a “in-vehicle equipment” are recited at a high
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level of generality and are recited as performing generic computer
functions routinely used in computer applications. Generic
computer components recited as performing generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities
amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a
computerized system. Next, “wireless communication device” is
stated at a high level of generality and its broadest reasonable
interpretation comprises only the serving content using a particular
style of architecture through the use of some unspecified generic
computers and interface. The use of generic computer components to
transmit information through an unspecified interface does not impose
any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract
idea. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than a judicial exception. Looking at the limitations
as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present
when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning
of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective
functions merely provide conventional computer implementation.
The use of generic computer components to transmit
information through an unspecified interface does not impose any
meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract idea.

Id.

The Examiner further finds that the additional elements of the claims,
taken alone and as an ordered combination, do not transform the
abstract idea into a patent eligible invention, because they “each
execute in a manner routinely and conventionally expected of these
elements,” and are “merely the combined and coordinated execution
of generic computer functionalities which are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.”

Ans. 6.

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Appellant’s Contentions
In the first part of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues that the
Examiner has failed to make a prima facie case of ineligibility because the
Examiner has not identified one of the categories of abstract ideas, as set
forth by the courts, to which the claims are allegedly directed. Appeal Br.
5–9. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s identification of the claims as
directed to the abstract idea of “interacting with a passenger in a vehicle” is
not a recognized classification of abstract ideas as set forth in Alice. Id.
Instead, Appellant asserts the following:
Applicant’s claimed invention, although including some aspects
of interaction with a passenger, involves far more complex processes,
such as providing a database library containing general advertising
content, pairing a passenger information monitor with a mobile
device, wirelessly communicating information between a remote
server and the passenger information monitor, transmitting passenger
information along with vehicle information to the remote server,
deriving, by the remote server, targeted primary content based on the
database library of general content and the received passenger
information, and then displaying the derived or targeted content on the
passenger's mobile display. At the very least, deriving the targeted
content transforms the data in the database library to a different state,
namely targeted content. This is not abstract at all, does not represent
an “idea of itself,” and is not similar to any of the cited examples of
abstract ideas provided by the court in various decisions.

Id. at 9.
In the second part of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues that the
claims, taken as a whole and in an ordered combination amount to
significantly more than the purported abstract idea. Id. at 10. According to
Appellant, claim 1 provides a framework that concretely ties together
tangible hardware elements (e.g., passenger information monitor, wireless
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communication device, database library, remote server, multiple displays) in
a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement that transforms an
arguably abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id. at 10. Therefore,
Appellant argues that by failing to consider the cited claim elements
individually, and as an ordered combination, the Examiner has failed to meet
his burden under the second prong of Alice. Id. at 11–12. In particular,
Appellant states the following:
The Examiner certainly fails to mention or address at least
several significant elements. First, the Examiner utterly fails to
address the element of a remote server that derives the targeted
primary content based on the database library of general content and
the received passenger information and displays such targeted primary
content on the first display to the passenger. Deriving the targeted
primary content essentially transforms the general content in the
database library into targeted content. The two forms of content are
very different and one form is transformed into another form by the
derivation step, as required by the claims. Such transformation is
certainly not well known nor routine in the contact of applicant's
system, yet the Examiner completely ignores this important element in
his analysis.
Second, the Examiner completely ignores the element directed
to the pairing module coupled to the mobile device that operatively
pairs mobile device with the passenger information monitor. This is a
critical element because without this claimed element, the derived
targeted information could not reach the passenger. This element, in
combination with the element of deriving the targeted content, and
taken as a whole with the remaining elements of the claims, provides
significantly more than the purported abstract idea of merely
“interacting with a passenger in a vehicle,” as set forth by the
Examiner.

Id. at 12.
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Our Review
Applying the guidance set forth in the 2019 PEG, we determine
whether the Examiner has erred in rejecting the claims as directed to patent
ineligible subject matter.
In revised step 1 of 2019 PEG, we consider whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patent-eligible
subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter. Because independent claims 1, 15, 19, and 22
recite a “system” including a processor for performing various functions,
claims 1, 15, 19, and 22 fall within a machine category of patent-eligible
subject matter.
In prong 1 of revised step 2A of the 2019 PEG, we determine whether
any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claims. The
guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, such as fundamental economic practices; and (3) mental processes.
Independent claim 1 recites, inter alia, the following claim elements that
interact with a passenger as follows:
(1) a mobile device, upon being paired with a PIM,
transmits passenger information to the PIM;
(2) the PIM transmits passenger information along with
vehicle information to a remote server via a wireless
communication device;
(3) the remote server uses received information to derive
targeted information from general advertising content
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in the database library, and returns the targeted content
to the PIM ;
(4) the PIM displays the targeted content on a first display
to the passenger.
As an initial matter, we note that the preamble of claim 1 recites “a
system for interacting with a passenger within a vehicle.” Further, as set
forth in items 1 through 4 above, such interaction with the passenger merely
consists in a remote server using passenger information and vehicle
information received from the PIM to derive targeted content from general
advertising content in a database library, and to return targeted content to the
PIM for subsequent display to the passenger. Spec. ¶ 20. Therefore, claim 1
recites displaying targeted content (e.g., advertisement) specifically tailored
for the passenger within the vehicle based on the passenger’s profile
information and location. Such manipulation of customer data to provide
targeted advertisement to customers has been identified by our reviewing
court as a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in commerce. See
e.g., Cyberfone. Consequently, the claim recites a method of organizing
human activity, a judicial exception involving commercial interaction in an
ecommerce environment wherein a business owner markets targeted
advertisements to a customer based on customer’s profile and location.
Additionally, we determine these limitations are steps of “managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions),” which the
2019 PEG provides are “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.”
84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, independent claims 1, 15, 19, and 22 recite
the judicial exception of certain methods of organizing human activity.
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Having determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, our
analysis under the 2019 PEG turns now to determining whether there are
“additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.” See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).7 “Integration into a
practical application” requires an additional element or a combination of
additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial
exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
Appellant’s claims 1, 15, 19, and 22 recite computer-related
limitations (e.g., PIM, remote server, mobile device). Appellant argues that
“[a]t the very least, deriving the targeted content transforms the data in the
database library to a different state, namely targeted content.” Appeal Br. 9.

We do not find the recited computer-related limitations are sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The
Specification does not provide additional details about the PIM, remote

7 Specifically, we determine whether the claims recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer [(or a
mobile device)];
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
Id.
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server, and mobile device that would distinguish them from any generic
processing devices that communicate with one another in a computer
network environment. Spec. ¶¶ 16–20. Although we do not dispute that
these processing and communications devices include specific instructions
for performing the recited functions, Appellant has not explained
persuasively how the derived targeted content transforms the data in the
database library. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, the claims merely adapt
the certain methods of organizing the human activity through processing and
communication devices to retrieve from the database library targeted
advertisement that may be of interest to a passenger based on the passenger
profile and location. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859
F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that
mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”); see also
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687
F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (A computer “employed only for its most
basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those
claims.”).
Further, Appellant’s identified improvements are to the abstract idea
itself, not improvements to a technology or computer functionality. That is,
the cited claim limitations do not improve the functionality of the processing
devices by performing operations to provide targeted advertisements to a
passenger in a vehicle based on the passenger’s profile and location, nor do
they achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry
practice. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, the claims do not recite an additional element
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reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Nor do the claims recite an additional element that implements the
abstract idea with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the
claim. Instead, the claim limitations only recite additional elements that add
insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011). Our reviewing court has consistently held that mere characterizations
of human activities within the stream of commerce are not patent eligible.
See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (claims directed to collection, manipulation, and display of data);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (customizing information and presenting it to users
based on particular characteristics). Prior to the Internet, such activities
were widely practiced, and became computerized to facilitate the
distribution of targeted advertisements to passengers in a vehicle. See OIP
Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
Because claim steps 1–4, outlined above, do not (1) provide any
technical solution to a technical problem as required by DDR Holdings;8

8 See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014). The Federal Circuit found DDR’s claims are patent-eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because DDR’s claims: (1) do not merely recite “the
performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world”
previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical
solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . .
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
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(2) provide any particular practical application as required by BASCOM;9 or
(3) entail an unconventional technological solution to a technological
problem as required by Amdocs,10 we agree with the Examiner’s
determination that Appellant’s claims 1, 15, 19 and 22 are directed to an
abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2B (Inventive Concept)
Turning to step 2B of the 2019 PEG, we look to whether the claim:
(a) recites a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b) simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 84 Fed. Reg. 56; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“[W]e consider the
elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether the claim includes “significantly more” than the
ineligible concept); see also BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (“[A]n inventive
concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pieces.”).
We discern no additional element or combination of elements recited
in Appellant’s independent claims 1, 15, 19, and 22 that contain any
“inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to transform the
abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.

specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257.
9 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
10 See Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s remarks, noted above, alleging the
claims are directed to a non-routine and unconventional system because
deriving the targeted primary content essentially transforms the general
content in the database library into targeted content. Appellant has failed to
establish on this record how the alleged transformation is distinguished from
routine querying of the database library to retrieve relevant advertisements
based on criteria specified in the query including passenger profile info and
location. We agree with the Examiner that using a generic processing and
communication devices to collect, analyze, process data and displaying the
result in the manner suggested is a routine and conventional approach to data
management. Final Act. 4–5.
As noted above, Appellant does not direct our attention to any portion
of the Specification indicating that the claimed processing and
communication devices perform anything other than well-understood,
routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving, analyzing,
processing, and displaying data. See Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims,
understood in light of the [S]pecification, requires anything other than off-
the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for
gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.”); see also
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That
a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at
224–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks insufficient
to add an inventive concept). Instead, Appellant’s claimed subject matter
simply uses generic computer components (computer system) to perform the
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abstract idea of providing targeted advertisements to a passenger in a vehicle
based on the passenger’s profile information and location. Spec. ¶¶ 16–20.
As noted above, the use of a generic computer does not alone transform an
otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As our reviewing
court has observed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of
generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223).
Because the discussed claim elements only recite generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional, individually
and in combination, the claim is devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 217. Appellant is reminded that “the ‘inventive concept’ [under
the second part of the Mayo/Alice test] cannot be the abstract idea itself” and
“Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court
which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive
concept’ is the abstract idea.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). “It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner
that the computer functions recited in the claims were, in fact, generic, and
are met by numerous precedent establishing that using a generic computer to
expedite and automate processes traditionally performed manually, or that
are otherwise abstract, is a well-understood, routine, and conventional use of
such computers. Final Act. 4–5; see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an
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intermediary computer to forward information); Bancorp Services,
L.L.C., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s
claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the
scope of those claims.”).
Therefore, we conclude that claim 1’s elements, both individually and
as an ordered combination, do not provide an inventive concept. See 84 Fed.
Reg. 56; Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370 (“The limitations amount to no more
than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with
conventional computer components.”); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he
use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than
its most basic function—making calculations or computations—fails to
circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental
processes.”).
To the extent Appellant argues the claims necessarily contain an
“inventive concept” based on their alleged novelty or non-obviousness over
the cited references, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent.
Although the second part in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search
for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for “an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–218 (quoting Mayo 566 U.S. 72–73). A novel and
nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-
ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
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Appellant is further reminded that, in many cases, “relying on a
computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is
insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice,
573 U.S. at 224) (“[U]se of a computer to create electronic records, track
multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an
inventive concept.); see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370 (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to
increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent
eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”). Therefore, the functions recited
in independent claims 1, 15, 19 and 22 do not add meaningful limitations
beyond generally linking the abstract idea to the particular technological
environment. See Final Act 4–6.
Because Appellant’s claims 1, 15, 19 and 22 are directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something “significantly more”
under the second part of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 1, 15, 19 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant does not present additional arguments for dependent claims
2–14, 16–18, and 20, and 21. Accordingly, for the same reasons as set forth
for independent claims 1 and 11, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101
rejection of dependent claims 2–14, 16–18, and 20, and 21.
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1−4, 8, 9,
12, 14, 15, 17, 19−21 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. We affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections of claims 5−7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 22, and 23, under
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35 U.S.C. § 103. We affirm the Examiner’s patent eligibility rejection of
claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23 101 Eligibility 1–23
1−4, 8, 9, 12, 14,
15, 17, 19−21 102 Lee
1−4, 8, 9, 12,
14, 15, 17,
19−21

5−7, 13, 18 103 Lee, Lopes 5−7, 13, 18
10, 22, 23 103 Lee, Meunier 10, 22, 23
11, 16 103 Lee, Farley, Meunier 11, 16
Overall Outcome 1–23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED