Jerry DePalmo, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 26, 2003
01A30382 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 26, 2003)

01A30382

06-26-2003

Jerry DePalmo, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Jerry DePalmo v. United States Postal Service

01A30382

06-26-03

.

Jerry DePalmo,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A30382

Agency No. 4C442012801

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts the complainant's

appeal from the agency's final decision in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant alleged he has been subject to disparate treatment in regard

to his duty hours, job assignments, and attendance on the job because

of his gender (male) and his age (D.O.B. 7/11/59).

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Part Time Flexible (PTF) Carrier at Louisville Post Office in Ohio.

He filed a formal complaint of discrimination on June 15, 2001. In his

claim of gender discrimination, complainant alleged that his supervisor

did not provide him with a forty (40) hour week, while a female employee

received assignments he could have received. Complainant stated that this

female employee was also treated differently with regard to attendance

policies. In his claim of age discrimination, complainant stated that

he should have been working the duties and assignments of his supervisor.

The agency reached a final decision of no discrimination on September 9,

2002, and complainant timely filed this appeal on October 8, 2002.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses on whether

the complainant has established a prima facie case. To prevail in

a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must satisfy

the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The complainant

has the burden to demonstrate that he was subjected to an adverse

employment action under circumstances that would support an inference

of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

576 (1978). Where gender and age discrimination are at issue, as

they are here, complainant may establish a prima facie case by first

demonstrating that he belongs to a statutorily protected class, and that

similarly situated employees not within his protected group were treated

more favorably. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261 (D.C. Cir.1999);

Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1977).

In the instant case, complainant has shown that he is a member of two

protected classes: gender and age (43).

Based on the gender and discrimination claims, complainant has not shown

that similarly situated employees not in his protected group were treated

more favorably. In order for two or more employees to be considered

similarly situated, all relevant aspects of the employees' work situation

must be identical or nearly identical. Smith v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,

770 F.2d 719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985). For example, where employees work in

different departments, have different supervisors, perform different jobs,

and have different functions, they are not similarly situated. O'Neal

v. USPS, EEOC Request No. 05910490 (July 23, 1991); Allen v. Department

of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05900539 (June 15, 1990).

Complainant used a female Casual Carrier (CC) as his basis of comparison

for his claim of gender discrimination. The record shows that during the

relevant time period, CC was appointed a Rural Carrier Associate/Carrier

and later a Rural Carrier Associate/Clerk, while complainant was a PTF

City Carrier. Personnel exhibits also show that complainant and CC had

different rate schedules, positions types, allowance codes and pay types.

Most relevant to complainant's complaint are the time schedules on

which employees work. PTF workers and casuals, in general, are defined

by different time limits. For these reasons, CC is not a similarly

situated employee as her job is based on different terms. Complainant,

therefore, did not meet his burden to establish a prima facie case of

gender discrimination.

Complainant used his Acting Supervisor (AS) as the comparison employee

in regard to age discrimination. Complainant said that AS was working

assignment and job duties which he should have been given. Complainant's

date of birth was July 11, 1959, and AS's date of birth was May 27,

1957. Thus, AS is not a valid comparison, as he is two years older

than complainant and part of the same protected class as complainant.

Complainant, therefore, did not meet his burden to establish a prima

facie case of age discrimination.

Complainant also named three other employees in his affidavit as

individuals not being subject to the same alleged discriminatory conduct:

a female PTF Distribution Clerk, a male Full Time Carrier, and a female

casual employee. The male Carrier is in complainant's protected class

(D.O.B. 4/13/1945), and therefore not a valid comparison. None of the

female employees are in similarly situated positions hence no appropriate

inference of discrimination can be made.

Assuming arguendo, that complainant had satisfied the first prong of the

McDonnell analysis, the burden would shift to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Pavelka v. Department of the

Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Reasons proffered by the agency regarding job assignments among employees

include that it only assigns Sunday work to casuals and transitionals, as

it did with CC. Complainant's supervisor stated that he carried mail for

CC one day because the mail volume was too heavy for her. In a specific

instance, complainant stated that he should have received overtime because

CC received a job he should have been assigned. Complainant asserted

that he was entitled to 40 hours a week according to Article 7, Section

1, Part B (2) of the National Agreement of Letter Carriers. The agency

said complainant was not entitled to 40 hours a week. Complainant's

statement is misplaced. The section complainant references states

that the employer will �make every effort to insure that qualified and

available part-time flexible employees are utilized at the straight time

rate prior to assigning such work to casuals.� This section does not,

in fact, deal with the hours assignable to part-time flexible employees.

It is Article 7 Section 1, Part A (2) of the National Agreement of Letter

Carriers that discusses part time employees. This section states that

part time employees �shall be assigned to regular schedules of less than

40 hours in a service a week, or shall be available to work flexible

hours as assigned by the Employer.� In a separate grievance filed by

complainant about this matter, management agreed in good faith to schedule

PTF's for work so that they take priority over casuals when appropriate.

Regarding attendance policies and duty hours, the agency states that CC's

late rings were within her 8 unit allowance. The agency also stated that

it did not allow complainant paid leave because PTF employees cannot use

leave to get additional hours. On appeal, complainant does not show by a

preponderance of the evidence that there was a pretext of discrimination

for any of these actions.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final

decision because complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____06-26-03_____________

Date