Jens M¿hlsteff et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 18, 2020

13703704 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/703,704 12/12/2012 Jens Mühlsteff 2010P00641WOUS 2033
24737 7590 02/18/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
MESSERSMITH, ERIC J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3791
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JENS MÜHLSTEFF, GEERT GUY GEORGES MORREN, and
CHRISTIAN MEYER
____________

Appeal 2018-001110
Application 13/703,704
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4, 6, 8–11, 14, and 15. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
“Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., the assignee of record.” Appeal
Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Subject Matter
The Appellant’s invention relates to a graphical representation of a
measured set of physiological values as a vector representing the risk of an
occurrence of a critical hemodynamic event. See Spec., Abstract, Figs. 1–2.
The critical hemodynamic event may be an impending syncope (id. at 7:30–
8:1, 6–9), i.e., a temporary loss of consciousness caused by a fall in blood
pressure.
Claims 1 and 10 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below (with added bracketing for reference), is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for facilitating detection of a potential critical
hemodynamic event of a patient, the potential critical
hemodynamic event being a syncope, the method comprising the
steps of:
[(a)] continuously measuring, via one or more sensors
attached to the patient, a set of values of physiological
parameters, said physiological parameters including heart rate
(HR) and pulse arrival time (PAT), wherein said set of values
includes a heart rate (HR) value and a pulse arrival time (PAT)
value;
[(b)] generating, by a processing device based on the
measured set of values of physiological parameters, a
representation of the heart rate (HR) and pulse arrival time (PAT)
values as a two-dimensional vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) in a two-dimensional
vector space indicative of risk levels of the occurrence of the
critical hemodynamic event,
wherein a first dimension of the two-dimensional
vector represents the heart rate (HR) value and a second
dimension of the two-dimensional vector represents the pulse
arrival time (PAT) value, and
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wherein the risk levels are represented by
predetermined regions of the two dimensional vector space
delimited by a threshold value PATThres for the pulse arrival time;
[(c)] performing, by the processing device, a trend analysis
comprising determining a direction and/or a length of a vector
𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref denotes a time dependent adaptive
reference point, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref is changed responsive to variation
in 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) within a predetermined time interval;
[(d)] effectuating, by the processing device, presentation
of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) within the two dimensional vector space,
wherein a position of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) in relation to PATThres
indicates one of the risk levels; and
[(e)] effectuating, by the processing device, presentation
of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref within a second two dimensional vector
space, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref indicates a trend in the physiological
status of the patient.

REJECTION
Claims 1, 4, 6, 8–11, 14, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 Framework
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
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products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
After the Appellant’s briefs were filed and the Examiner’s Answer
mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT
MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination
procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by
(1) providing groupings of subject matter that are considered an abstract
idea; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception
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if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019. Id.2
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, 56.

2 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related
guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, the
Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s
rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on
now superseded USPTO guidance.
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Independent Claims 1 and 10 and Dependent Claim 15
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that claim 1 is “directed to the abstract ideas of mathematical
correlations and mathematical relations and formulas and comparing
information.” Final Act. 2. More specifically, the Examiner determines that
claim 1 is directed to “a mathematical algorithm for calculating . . . the
relationship between a person’s risk of syncope and relative changes in that
person’s heart rate (HR) and pulse arrival time (PAT)” and “the relationship
between PAT-HR vector trends and risk of syncope.” Ans. 3; Final Act. 2.
When viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner
characterizes the claimed subject matter as “Mathematical concepts—
mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations” under Prong One of Revised Step 2A. 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Appellant characterizes the concept of the claim as “relat[ing]
generally to detecting a syncope and other critical hemodynamic events.”
Reply Br. 3; see Appeal Br. 6–15.
An examination of claim 1 shows that the claim recites “[a] method
for facilitating detection of a potential critical hemodynamic event of a
patient, the potential critical hemodynamic event being a syncope, the
method comprising”: (a) continuously measuring, via one or more sensors,
heart rate (HR) and pulse arrival time (PAT) values; (b) generating, by a
processing device, a representation the HR and PAT values as a vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t)
in a two-dimensional vector space indicative of risk levels of the occurrence
of the critical hemodynamic event; (c) “performing, by the processing
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device, a trend analysis comprising determining a direction and/or a length
of a vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref denotes a time dependent adaptive
reference point, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref is changed responsive to variation in 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t)
within a predetermined time interval”; (d) “effectuating, by the processing
device, presentation of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) within the two dimensional vector
space, wherein a position of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) in relation to PATThres indicates
one of the risk levels”; and (e) “effectuating, by the processing device,
presentation of the vector 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref within a second two dimensional vector
space, wherein 𝑅𝑅�⃗ (t) – 𝑅𝑅�⃗ ref indicates a trend in the physiological status of the
patient.” The sensors in step (a) that are used to measure HR and PAT may
include an electrocardiogram (ECG), and a photoplethysmogram (PPG) or a
piezo-electric sensor. See Spec. 2:15–24, 6:26–32, 10:17–21; Fig. 3
(showing sensors 102, 104 of body worn system 106). The processing
device in steps (b)–(e) is described as a calculating device of a monitoring
station, wherein the monitoring station includes a display. See id. at 5:5–19,
10:10–14, 19–23; Figs. 1–3.
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim’s limitations, claim 1 recites a method for
predicting risk of a potential critical hemodynamic event by continuously
measuring values of physiological data, generating a representation that is
indicative of risk levels and performing a trend analysis based on the
collected data, and effectuating a display(s) of data.3 In this case, measuring

3 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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to obtain data is an extra-solution activity. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
(2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution
activity). Generating a representation indicative of risk levels and
performing a trend analysis based on the obtained data are steps that are
functional and lack any technical or technological details associated
therewith. These steps can be done mentally with the aid of a pen and paper,
which also is a mental process. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes”). Effectuating a
presentation of data is an insignificant post-solution activity. See Bilski, 561
U.S. at 610–11 (“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding
‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92);
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354.
Predicting risk of a potential critical hemodynamic event by
continuously measuring values of physiological data (i.e., collecting data),
generating a representation that is indicative of risk levels and performing a
trend analysis based on the collected data (i.e., analyzing data), and
effectuating a display(s) of data (i.e., bringing about a display of data) is
similar to the concepts of “selecting certain information, analyzing it using
mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of the
analysis” in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). See also Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
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916 F.3d 1363, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (claim for standardizing data to be
conveyed to a bedside device for graphical display was directed to the
abstract idea of “collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and displaying data”).
Accordingly, we conclude the claim recites a way of observing and
evaluating, which are concepts that can be performed in the human mind,
i.e., mental processes identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed. Reg.
at 52), as well as a “series of mathematical calculations based on selected
information” (id. at n.12 (citing SAP America, 898 F.3d at 1163)) —
mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations, which is one of the “[m]athematical concepts”
identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance (id.), and thus recites an abstract
idea. Therefore, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is
not similar to claims courts have held ineligible. See Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply
Br. 4.
Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed.
Reg. at 54), we look to whether claim 1 “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e., “integrates a judicial exception
into a practical application.”
The Appellant contends that the Examiner’s determination is
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), because it fails to consider each
claim as a whole by “overgeneraliz[ing] the claims to identify the abstract
idea(s), merely asserting that the recited operations performed by only the
one or more processors recited in the claims (ignoring the other claim
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elements).” Appeal Br. 12; see id. at 8, 9–11. When viewed through the
lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Appellant’s contention concerns the
use of“[a]n additional element [that] reflects an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or
technical field” (2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55) such that the
additional element integrates the abstract idea into a practical application.
In Enfish, the court held that the focus of the claims was to “a specific
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential
table.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Specifically, “the claims [were] not
simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead [were]
specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.” Id.
at 1337. The Specification provided that “the self-referential table
function[ed] differently than conventional database structures” (id.) and
improved “the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory” (id. at
1339).
Claim 1, unlike the claims in Enfish, calls for obtaining data by “one
or more sensors” that are generic to the medical arts, e.g., an
electrocardiogram (ECG), and a photoplethysmogram (PPG) or a piezo-
electric sensor. See Spec. 2:15–24, 6:6–8; 10:17–21; Fig. 3 (showing
sensors 102, 104 of body worn system 106); Final Act. 2. Additionally, the
“processing device,” which performs steps (b)–(e), is described in the
Specification as a “calculating device” of a “monitoring station,” which is
also generic. See id. at 5:5–19, 6:6–8; 10:10–14, 19–23; Fig. 3 (showing
calculating device 110 and display 112 of monitoring station 108). The
“focus” of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336), but rather on using the
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processor as a tool to generate a representation that is indicative of risk
levels of the occurrence of a potential critical hemodynamic event of a
patient and performing a trend analysis based on obtained data. See Affinity
Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“The Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit] have repeatedly made clear
that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular
existing technological environment does not render the claims any less
abstract.”). Further, the way the “one or more sensors” and “processing
device” perform the functions referenced in steps (b)–(e) is part of the
abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results, and thus cannot provide the inventive concept. See BSG Tech LLC v
Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
The Appellant contends that the method of claim 1 is like the claims
in Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir.
2017). Appeal Br. 8–9. The Appellant asserts:
in Thales, the Federal Circuit found the claims at issue to be
patent-eligible because those claims’ recitation of (1) the use of
two inertial sensors, (2) the receipt of signals from the two
inertial sensors, and (3) a determination of an orientation of an
object based on the received sensor signals provided an
improvement to another technology or technical field (e.g., by
potentially increasing accuracy in object position/orientation
determination systems).
Id. at 8. The Appellant asserts that claim 1 is similar to the claims at issue in
Thales because:
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(1) recite[s] the use of physical sensors, and (2) use information
in signals from the sensors to (3) detect critical hemodynamic
events in a patient, which provides an improvement to another
technology or technical field (e.g., early and accurate detection
of critical physiological states of a patient and alerting medical
personnel to these critical physiological states).
Id. at 9. We disagree.
In Thales, the Federal Circuit analogized the claims, which were
found not to be directed to an abstract idea, to those found patent-eligible in
Diehr. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the claims in Thales were directed
to using sensors and algorithms (the application of physics to create an
improved technique) “in a non-conventional manner” to improve measuring
and orienting moving objects, as in Diehr where an algorithm and sensor
were used to improve a rubber-making process. Thales, 850 F.3d at 1348–
49; see Ans. 8–9.
Here, on the other hand, claim 1 is directed to data manipulation and
analysis to create more data and uses one or more sensors and a processor in
generic ways, as discussed above. See also Final Act. 2–3. In Thales, the
improvement was in a physical tracking system, which in SAP America, 898
F.3d 1168, the Federal Circuit explained was contrasted with “the selection
and mathematical analysis of information, followed by reporting or display
of the results,” which the Federal Circuit held to be “not a physical-realm
improvement but an improvement in wholly abstract ideas.” Here, the
claims are like those of SAP America rather than Thales, because the
improvement achieved is in the abstract idea itself. Stated differently,
claim 1 does not recite and the Specification does not describe a particular
unconventional configuration of the one or more sensors or a particular
method of using the raw data from the one or more sensors in order to more
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accurately calculate the detection of a potential critical hemodynamic event
(i.e., syncope) of a patient. See Ans. 8–9.
The Appellant cites to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and argues that “a patent examiner cannot
properly reject a claim under Section 101 if the examiner does not provide
any evidence that at least a non-computer-implemented version of a
computer-implemented process required by the claims exists in the prior
art.” Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 6; see Appeal Br. 15–17. However, an
abstract idea does not transform into an inventive concept just because the
prior art does not disclose or suggest it. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78.
“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–
89; see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 91 (rejecting “the Government’s invitation to
substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry
under § 101”).
Further, in McRO, the claims were directed to a specific improvement
in computer animation and used rules to automate a subjective task of
humans to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. See
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–15. Unlike Flook, Bilski, and Alice, it was not the
use of the computer but the incorporation of the rules that improved an
existing technological process. Id. at 1314. Here, as discussed above, there
is no such improvement to technology or a technological process. The
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Appellant also does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
to indicate that the invention provides a technical improvement in generating
a representation that is indicative of risk levels and performing a trend
analysis based on the obtained data, and effectuating a display of data or that
claim 1 incorporates rules to automate a subjective task of humans, as in
McRO.
Based on the forgoing, we determine that claim 1’s recitation of “one
or more sensors” and the “processing device” does not impose “a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. We find no indication in the
Specification, nor does the Appellant direct us to any indication, that the
operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any inventive
programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive
computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed
invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to
perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there
can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not
make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
The Appellant also suggests that preemption is not a concern for
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 12–13 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313–14). “The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the second step in the Alice framework (corresponding to Step
2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance), we find supported the Examiner’s
determination that the claim 1’s limitations, taken individually or as an
ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. See Final Act. 2–4.
The Appellant argues that the Examiner “fails to meet the
requirements set forth in Bascom by failing to support a conclusion that, as a
matter of law, the claim elements and the arrangement thereof are
conventional or generic.” Appeal Br. 17; see id. at 15–16; Reply Br. 7–8.
We disagree.
Taking the claim’s elements separately, the Examiner determines that
“one or more sensors” that measure heart rate (HR) and pulse arrival time
(PAT) and the processing device for performing steps (b)–(e) are
conventional; and the steps performed by the processing device are purely
conventional and/or are part of the abstract idea. See Final Act. 2–4; supra.
For example, as the Examiner explains:
indicating risk levels of the occurrence of the critical
hemodynamic even[t], wherein the risk levels are represented
by predetermined regions of the vector space is not seen as
significantly more by the Office because it amounts to labeling
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regions of data in a two-dimensional space, which is well-
known and conventional [(citing Simons (US 5,522,387, pub.
June 4, 1996))] and further that there is a PAT threshold which
may indicate risk levels [(citing Ben-Oren et al. (WO
2009/074985 A2, pub. June 18, 2009); and] . . . a trend analysis
comprising the determination [of the direction and/or length] of
a vector with a time dependent adaptive reference point is
considered by the office [as] merely the abstract idea of
organizing information through mathematical correlations and
mathematical formulas as well as comparing new and stored
information using rules to identify options performed by a
generic computer performing well-understood and routine and
conventional activities previously known in the industry.
Final Act. 3.
When considered collectively, the recitations of claim 1 describe
predicting risk of a potential critical hemodynamic event by measuring to
obtain data, generating a representation that is indicative of risk levels and
performing a trend analysis based on the obtained data, and effectuating a
display of data. Considered individually and in combination, the sequence
of accessing, organizing, receiving, and matching/analyzing data and
sending the results of the match/analysis is generic and conventional or
otherwise held to be abstract. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354–56
(holding that the functions and sequence of receiving, detecting, analyzing,
displaying, accumulating, updating, and deriving data was abstract); BSG
Tech, 899 F.3d at 1284, 1290–91 (the functions and combination of
providing a database with a specific structure, guiding a user to select an
item, storing the item on the database, and displaying usage information and
values lacked an inventive concept). Additionally, this concept is part of the
abstract idea, and the inventive concept under step two of the Mayo/Alice
test cannot be the abstract idea itself:
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It is clear from Mayo that the “inventive concept” cannot be the
abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the
numerous cases from this court which have held claims
ineligible because the only alleged “inventive concept” is the
abstract idea.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring).
The Appellant also argues that the Examiner does not provide
“rational underpinning to support this conclusion” that the elements are
well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 16. However, the
Examiner cites to patent literature (Final Act. 5) and judicial decisions
(Ans. 15–16). In doing so, the Examiner followed “Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018)],” USPTO Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for
Patent Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)).
And, we have provided additional support above.
The Appellant contends that the additional elements in the claim
include subject matter that is not well-understood, routine, conventional, or
previously known to the pertinent industry because “the Office Action does
not make any rejections under§ 102 or§ 103”. Appeal Br. 16. We disagree.
An abstract idea is not transformed into an inventive concept just because
the prior art does not disclose or suggest it. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591. Indeed,
“[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim
falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”
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Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 91 (rejecting “the
Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the
better established inquiry under § 101”). “It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1290.
Therefore, analysis of claim 1, as a whole, with its limitations
considered both individually and as ordered combination, confirms the
Examiner’s conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea without
significantly more.

Conclusion
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1.
Independent claim 10 is effectively a system for performing the method of
claim 1. Claim 10 does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea of claim 1 by a system, and thus does not
transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 226–227. Therefore, claim 10 falls for substantially similar reasons
as claim 1. The Appellant fails to separately argue claim 15, which depends
from claim 10. Claim 15 falls with claim 10.

Dependent Claims 4 and 11
The Appellant argues claims 4 and 11 as a group. See Appeal Br. 17–
18. We select claim 4 as representative. Claim 11 stands or falls with
claim 4. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Claim 4 recites, “[t]he method according to claim 1, wherein the
origin of said vector space is defined by a set of reference values (HR0,
PAT0) of the heart rate (HR) and the pulse arrival time (PAT) measured at a
point of time t0 or calculated as an average of heart rate (HR) values and
pulse arrival time (PAT) values measured over a certain basal period of time
respectively.” Appeal Br., Claims App.
The Appellant argues that the additional recitation of claim 4
concerning “an origin of the vector space . . . is determined in a specific
manner” and “is (1) not an abstract idea, and (2) is an inventive element.”
Appeal Br. 17. The Appellant argues that the specific origin of the vector
space: “does not preempt determination of other origins in other systems,
nor would this particular origin even be helpful in some generalized system
that displays an origin”; is not well-understood, routine, or conventional; and
is not known in the industry (i.e., prior art under §§ 102 and 103). Appeal
Br. 18. We disagree.
Claim 4 recites further detail as to the abstract idea. Therefore, for
similar reasons as discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claims 4 and 11.

Dependent Claim 6
Claim 6 recites, “[t]he method according to claim 4, wherein for
values of the heart rate (HR) lower than HR0, said predetermined regions are
further delimited by a threshold formed by a slope ascending to higher
values of the pulse arrival time (PAT) with decreasing values of the heart
rate (HR).” Appeal Br., Claims App.
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The Appellant’s argument for claim 6 is substantially similar in kind
to the argument presented for claim 4, supra. See Appeal Br. 18–19. And,
similar to our analysis for claim 4, claim 6 recites further detail as to the
abstract idea. Therefore, for similar reasons as discussed above, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 6.

Dependent Claims 8 and 14
The Appellant argues claims 8 and 14 as a group. See Appeal Br. 19.
We select claim 8 as representative. Claim 14 stands or falls with claim 8.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 8 recites, “[t]he method according to claim 1, further
comprising effectuating, by the processing device, presentation of the
measured set of values on a display.” Appeal Br., Claims App.
The Examiner determines that claim 8 is “directed to displaying
values/vectors which is insignificant post-solution activity and is not
significantly more.” Final Act. 7. The Appellant argues that “[a] physical
display is not an abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 19. The Appellant also
disagrees with the Examiner’s determination that displaying data “is not
insignificant post solution activity” and “adds significantly to” the method of
claim 1 “because the display provides a convenient view of the information
measured by the instant system so that a user can quickly digest the
presented information in medical and/or other settings and take action to
help a patient based on the displayed information.” Appeal Br. 19. We
disagree.
First, similar to effectuating a display of data as a set forth in claim 1,
displaying obtained data is part of the abstract idea. See supra (SAP
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America, 898 F.3d at 1167). Stated otherwise, claim 8 recites further detail
as to the abstract idea. Alternatively, displaying results of the obtained data
(i.e., measured set of values) is insignificant postsolution activity. See
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (“Flook stands for the proposition that the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. Second, claim 8
does not provide any details as to the “display,” and the Specification
describes a display as a generic component of a monitoring station. See
Spec. 5:10–11, 6:6–8; 10:13–14; Fig. 3 (showing calculating device 110 and
display 112 of monitoring station 108). Third, for reasons similar to those
discussed with regard to claim 1, the further recitation of claim 8, taken
individually or as an ordered combination, does not amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception. Supra.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 8 and
14.

Dependent Claim 9
Claim 9 recites, “[t]he method according to claim 1, further
comprising effectuating, by the processing device, presentation of the two
dimensional vector space and the second two dimensional vector space on a
display.” Appeal Br., Claims App.
The Appellant’s argument for claim 6 is substantially similar in kind
to the argument presented for claims 4, 6, and 8, supra. See Appeal Br. 19–
20. And, similar to our analysis for claims 4 and 6, claim 9 recites further
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detail as to the abstract idea and is directed to ineligible subject matter.
Supra. Therefore, for similar reasons as discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 9.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 6, 8–
11, 14, 15
101 Eligibility 1, 4, 6, 8–
11, 14, 15

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED