Jeld-Wen, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 11, 2008

No. 78772837 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2008)

Mailed: 3/11/08

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Jeld-Wen, Inc.
________

Serial No. 78772837
_______

David A. Harlow, Charles G. Zug and Lucas V. Haugh of
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough for Jeld-Wen, Inc.

Susan Leslie DuBois, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 111 (Craig D. Taylor, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Quinn, Hairston and Ritchie de Larena,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Quinn, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Jeld-Wen, Inc. filed an application to register the
mark LANGFORD for “decorative glass panels sold as an
integral component of metal doors.”1
The trademark examining attorney refused registration
under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1052(e)(4), on the ground that the matter sought to be

1 Application Serial No. 78772837, filed December 14, 2005,
alleging a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.
THIS OPINION
IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF
THE T.T.A.B.
Ser No. 78772837
2
registered is primarily merely a surname.
When the refusal was made final, applicant appealed.
Applicant and the examining attorney filed briefs.2
Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act precludes
registration of a mark that is “primarily merely a surname”
on the Principal Register without a showing of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f), 15 U.S.C. §1052(f). We
must decide on the specific facts of each case whether the
public would perceive the mark at issue as “primarily
merely a surname.” In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759
F.2d 15, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The examining
attorney bears the initial burden to make a prima facie
showing of surname significance. Id. If the examining
attorney makes that showing, then we must weigh all of the
evidence to determine ultimately whether the mark is
primarily merely a surname. In re Sava Research Corp., 32
USPQ2d 1380, 1381 (TTAB 1994).
In the case of In re Benthin Management GmbH, 37
USPQ2d 1332 (TTAB 1995), the Board identified five factors,
four of which are relevant here, to consider in determining
whether a mark is primarily merely a surname: (1) the
degree of the surname’s “rareness”; (2) whether anyone

2 Applicant’s request for an oral hearing subsequently was
withdrawn.
Ser No. 78772837
3
associated with applicant has the mark as a surname; (3)
whether the mark has any recognized meaning other than as a
surname; and (4) whether the mark has the “look and feel”
of a surname. Id. at 1332-33. Because applicant’s mark is
in standard characters, we need not consider the fifth
factor, that is, whether, because of the display of the
mark, it will not be perceived as a surname.
With respect to the rareness of “Langford” as a
surname, the examining attorney submitted the results of a
search of the Phonedisc database. The search revealed
8,995 hits for the surname “Langford.” The examining
attorney also provided the results of a search for
“Langford” at rhymezone.com stating, “name: A surname
(common: 1 in 12500 families; popularity rank in the U.S.:
#1659).” Also of record is a search of the NEXIS database
showing 2,697 hits for “Langford” as a surname in a recent
six-month period.
Applicant responds by arguing, “[t]his data is simply
not relevant since it is not in a format which can be used
to determine if the purchasing [public] would primarily
view the mark as a surname.” (Brief, p. 6). Applicant
goes on to indicate that two major metropolitan areas,
namely New York City and Los Angeles, have only nine and
ten listings, respectively, of individuals with the surname
Ser No. 78772837
4
“Langford.” Applicant contends that “[a] more useful and
relevant technique is to look at the data in the context of
a city, as opposed to the whole country at once,” and that
“[b]y looking at the data on a micro level instead of a
macro level, the impression of the purchasing public is
more easily determined.” (Brief, p. 8).
We find that the examining attorney’s evidence
establishes that “Langford” is a surname, and one that is
not rare. Although applicant cites to the case of In re
Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 184 USPQ
421 (CCPA 1975) in support of its novel arguments, we do
not share applicant’s view. The examining attorney
followed long settled practice and procedure in determining
the number of individuals with the surname “Langford”
throughout the United States, including major cities. The
fact that few surnames were listed in two metropolitan
areas does not diminish the probative value of the
examining attorney’s evidence.
With regard to the second factor, applicant states
that “no person connected with Applicant bears ‘Langford”
as a surname.” While we have considered this fact, it is
not determinative of whether “Langford” is a surname within
the meaning of Section 2(e)(4).
Ser No. 78772837
5
As to the third factor, the examining attorney
contends that “Langford” has no meaning other than as a
surname. In support of this position, the examining
attorney relies upon dictionary excerpts showing no entry
for “Langford.” To the contrary, applicant argues that
“Langford” “has roots dating back to the early English
vernacular. Looking at its components, LANG means ‘long’
in Old English and FORD refers to a pass or a river
crossing. The combination of the two terms would have been
used to describe a long river crossing.” (Brief, p. 2).
Applicant points out, “as evidence of this heritage,” that
“Langford” is the name of multiple foreign cities across
the world (primarily in England and none in the United
States), thereby taking “Langford” out of the category of
“primarily merely a surname.” Applicant also contends that
due to its English etymology, the use of LANGFORD in
connection with the goods may be suggestive of an English
style or feel of the goods.
Even assuming arguendo the accuracy of applicant’s
factual statements, it is likely that most individuals in
the United States are not aware of early English vernacular
or the existence of obscure geographical locations named
“Langford” overseas. See In re Hamilton Pharmaceuticals
Ltd., 27 USPQ2d 1939, 1943 (TTAB 1993). We do not view
Ser No. 78772837
6
“Langford” as being in the category of geographical
significance discussed in In re Colt Industries Operating
Corp., 195 USPQ 75 (TTAB 1977) [geographical significance
of Fairbanks as a well-known city in Alaska overcame a
finding of primary surname significance]. There is no
indication in the record that the locations highlighted by
applicant are well known or even slightly known to
potential customers in this country. Accordingly, we find
that in the United States, the term “Langford” has no
meaning to individuals other than as a surname.
Insofar as the fourth factor is concerned, we consider
whether “Langford” has the “look and feel” of a surname.
The examining attorney contends that the mark “has the
structure and sound of a surname,” but has submitted no
evidence in support of this proposition. To the contrary,
applicant argues that the mark “has the meaning, as well as
the appearance, of the compound word which combines the
word ‘lang’ with the word ‘ford;’ words with reference to a
long river crossing.”
This fourth factor is highly subjective. Given the
absence of any evidence in support of the examining
attorney’s claim, we decline to speculate on the point. We
reiterate, however, that individuals in this country likely
will not be familiar with any Old English meaning or that
Ser No. 78772837
7
the mark is the name of certain cities in foreign
countries.
We have considered all of applicant’s arguments
against the refusal, including those not specifically
mentioned in this opinion. Notwithstanding applicant’s
arguments, we conclude, based on the evidence of record,
that LANGFORD is primarily merely a surname within the
meaning of Section 2(e)(4).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.