Jeffrey Stambaugh, Complainant,v.Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (U.S. Mint), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 15, 2010
0120092641 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 15, 2010)

0120092641

12-15-2010

Jeffrey Stambaugh, Complainant, v. Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (U.S. Mint), Agency.


Jeffrey Stambaugh,

Complainant,

v.

Timothy F. Geithner,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

(U.S. Mint),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092641

Hearing No. 541-2008-00283X

Agency No. MINT-08-0002-F

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's April 20, 2009, final

order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES

the Agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Toolmaker at the Agency's U.S. Mint facility in Denver, Colorado.

On October 25, 2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the

Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex

(male), color (white), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:

On September 6, 2007, Complainant was not selected for a 120-day detail

to the position of Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist, because

his name had not been included on a list of interested candidates that

was forwarded to the selecting official.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to

the case issued a decision without a hearing on April 7, 2009. In his

decision, the AJ found that Complainant had worked for the Agency since

1999 and that at the time of the investigation, Complainant was serving as

a Tool Supervisor. Administrative Judge's April 7, 2009 Decision, at 3.

The AJ observed that in July 2007, the Agency announced an opening

for a 120-day detail to the position of Supervisor, Die Manufacturing

Specialist. The AJ noted that Complainant applied for the detail.

On September 6, 2007, the selecting official (Selecting Official),

informed Complainant that he was not selected for the position and that

his name was not on the list of interested employees forwarded to him

for selection. The AJ noted that the Selecting Official stated that two

names appeared on the list of interested candidates forwarded to him by

the Plant Manager: Employee 1 and Employee 2. The Selecting Official

stated that he selected Employee 2 because Employee 1 had recently served

a similar detail to the position of Supervisory, Manufacturing Specialist.

The Plant Manager, the AJ found, admitted that she had made a mistake

when she failed to forward Complainant's name to the Selecting Official

for consideration. The Plant Manager received the list of names of

interested employees from the Agency's Human Resources Specialist. Id.

The AJ found that Complainant did not establish that his qualifications

were plainly superior to the qualifications of Employee 2 and that if the

Plant Manager had forwarded Complainant's name to the Selecting Official

for consideration for the detail, Complainant would not have for certain

been selected. Accordingly, the AJ found that the material facts were

not in dispute and that a decision without a hearing was proper under

the circumstances. The AJ found that Complainant did not establish that

discrimination on any basis occurred as alleged. Id. at 5.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding

that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to

discrimination as alleged. Agency Final Order, April 20, 2009.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary

to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing.

Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge

could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to

a motion for a decision without a hearing).

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February 24,

1995).

We find that the AJ erred when he concluded that there was no genuine

issue of material fact in this case. In finding no discrimination,

the AJ relied on the statements of the Selecting Official and the Plant

Manager for the Agency's explanation of its decision to select Employee 2.

Specifically, the AJ relied on the Selecting Official's statement that

he selected Employee 2, because Employee 1 had previously been awarded a

detail. See Affidavit of the Plant Manager, March 13, 2008, page 1 (Report

of Investigation (ROI) at 101). The Selecting Official's recollection

of the selection is, however, at odds with the evidence provided by the

Plant Manager that the selection decision considered Employee 2 and other

interested employees. In her statement, the Plant Manager states that

she received three names for consideration: Complainant, Employee 2 (the

selectee), and Employee 3. Affidavit of the Plant Manager, February 28,

2008, page 6 (ROI at 111). This differs from the Selecting Official's

statement that the Selecting Official considered only Employee 2 and

Employee 1 for the position. Affidavit of the Selecting Official,

March 13, 2008, page 1 (ROI at 101).

In addition, notwithstanding the Plant Manager's admission that she

initially failed to accurately recollect the list of names she received

for consideration of the detail, see Affidavit of the Plant Manager,

February 28, 2008, page 6 (ROI at 111), we find the statements of the

Plant Manager and the Selecting Official are inconsistent with respect

to whether Complainant was considered by the Selecting Official for

selection. The Plant Manager states that Complainant was considered along

with Employee 2 and Employee 3, see id., while the Selecting Official

states that he only considered Employee 1 and Employee 2, see Affidavit

of the Selecting Official March 13, 2008, page 2 (ROI at 101).

We find that based on the statements of the Selecting Official and

the Plant Manager, the Agency has presented different reasons for the

selection decision. If the Selecting Official is correct, then Employee

2 was selected because Employee 1 had already served in a detail. If the

Plant Manager is correct, then Employee 2 was selected over Employee

3 and Complainant apparently for some other reason than because of

Employee 1's recent detail. We find that the basis for the Selecting

Official's selection of Employee 2 is a question of fact, material to

the disposition of Complainant's complaint.

We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the

investigative process, designed to ensure that the parties have "a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and, in

appropriate instances, to examine and cross-examine witnesses." See Equal

Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614

(EEO MD-110), 7-1 (November 9, 1999); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e).

"Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute

and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly

deprives Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims."

Bang v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998).

See also Peavley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October

31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578

(April 25, 1995). In summary, there are simply too many unresolved

issues which require an assessment as to the credibility of the various

management officials and Complainant. Therefore, judgment as a matter of

law for the Agency should not have been granted as to whether Complainant

was denied the opportunity to serve a 120-day detail to the position of

Supervisory Die Manufacturing Specialist based on his race, color, sex,

or reprisal.

CONCLUSION

The Commission VACATES the Agency's final order and remands the complaint

to the Agency in accordance with this decision and the Order herein.

ORDER

The Agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC

field office the request for a hearing within 15 calendar days of the

date this decision becomes final. The Agency is directed to submit a

copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within 15 calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall provide

written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth

below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings

Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the

complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the Agency shall

issue a final order in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as

stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 15, 2010

__________________

Date

2

0120092641

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120092641