Jeanne F. Lane, Complainant,v.Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Contract Management Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 7, 2008
0120063372 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 7, 2008)

0120063372

03-07-2008

Jeanne F. Lane, Complainant, v. Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Contract Management Agency), Agency.


Jeanne F. Lane,

Complainant,

v.

Robert M. Gates,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Contract Management Agency),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200633721

Agency No. YT-05-1050

Hearing No. 370-2006-00098X

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's final action dated

May 2, 2006, finding no discrimination with regard to her complaint.

The record indicates that complainant, a Quality Assurance (QA) Specialist

(Aerospace), GS-11, filed her complaint alleging discrimination based

on age (DOB: 4/2/1942), disability (physical), and in reprisal for

prior EEO activity when she was not selected for: (1) Supply Chain

Integration Specialist (DCMAW-04-2262); (2) Lead Acquisition Technical

Specialist (DCMAW-04-2933); and (3) Supply Chain Integration Specialist

(DCMAW-04-3583).

Upon completion of the investigation of the complaint, complainant

requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On April

24, 2006, the AJ issued a decision without holding a hearing, finding no

discrimination. The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

The Commission finds that grant of summary judgment was appropriate,

as no genuine dispute of material fact exists. In this case, the AJ

determined that, assuming arguendo that complainant had established a

prima facie case of discrimination, the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged nonselections.

With regard to claim (1), the AJ stated that the agency made the

alleged selections based on the candidates' resumes and no interviews

were conducted. A selecting official (SO1) stated that he selected a

selectee (SE1) based on her prior experience in the military dealing with

the supply chain and because he had first-hand knowledge of her exemplary

work performance at the agency. Another selecting official (SO2) selected

another selectee (SE2) because of his background experience in the

Fleet Ballistic Missile, his ability to resolve issues with other agency

offices, and his outstanding job performance in Supply Chain Management.

The SE1 and SE2's resumes reflect that they had extensive specialized

training and awards. Furthermore, complainant did not demonstrate that

her qualifications for the positions at issue were plainly superior to

the qualifications of SE1 or SE2.

With regard to claim (2), the AJ indicated that SO1 selected a selectee

(SE3) because she had the skills and experience dealing with a variety

of different contracts which he was looking for in the position.

Complainant did not demonstrate that her qualifications were plainly

supervisor to the qualifications of SE3.

With regard to claim (3), the AJ indicated that a recommending official

(SO3) recommended a selectee (SE4) for the position over complainant

because she had a good understanding of subcontract management,

strong business background, was DAWIA qualified as a Level II Contract

Administrator, and had dynamic personal skills. The agency Operations

Group Chief concurred with SO3's recommendation and selected SE4

for the position. The SE4's resume indicates that she had extensive

special training and awards. Despite complaint's claim, SO3 stated that

DAWIA Level II certification was not required; rather candidates had 18

months to get such certification once they were selected. The record

contains the position announcement at issue supporting that argument.

The position announcement also indicates that candidates could further

obtain a waiver to extend this 18-month period to get the certification.

It appears, however, that the SE4's resume indicates that she was DAWIA

Level II certified.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that complainant failed to

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting her for the positions at issue

were pretext for discrimination. Specifically, she failed to show that

her qualifications were plainly superior to the qualifications of the

selectees. See Bauer v. Bailor, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981);

Williams v. Department of Education, EEOC Request No. 05970561 (August

6, 1998). It has been held that an agency has broad discretion to carry

out personnel decisions and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing

authority absent evidence of an unlawful motivation. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). The Commission

does not address in this decision whether complainant is a qualified

individual with a disability. Furthermore, complainant clearly has not

claimed in her complaint that she was denied a reasonable accommodation;

nor has she claimed or shown that she was required to work beyond her

medical restrictions.

Accordingly, the agency's final action is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does

not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

3/7/08

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above-referenced appeal number.

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0120063372

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036