J.C. Gills, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 19, 1999
05970971 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 19, 1999)

05970971

08-19-1999

J.C. Gills, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


J.C. Gills v. United States Postal Service

05970971

August 19, 1999

J.C. Gills, )

Appellant, )

) Request No. 05970971

v. ) Appeal No. 01966742

) Agency No. 4F-913-1085-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

__________________________________)

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On August 16, 1997, J.C. Gills (hereinafter referred to as the appellant)

timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(the Commission) to reconsider the decision in J.C. Gills v. Marvin

T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01966742 (July 16, 1997), received on July 18, 1997.

EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may, in their discretion,

reconsider any previous Commission decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a).

The party requesting reconsideration must submit written argument

or evidence which tends to establish one or more of the following

three criteria: new and material evidence is available that was

not readily available when the previous decision was issued, 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved an erroneous

interpretation of law, regulation, or material fact, or a misapplication

of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); and the decision is of

such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons that follow, appellant's

request is denied. The Commission, however, has decided to reconsider

the previous decision on its own motion.

The issues on appeal are whether appellant's request for reconsideration

meets the criteria for reconsideration that is set forth at 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c); and whether the previous decision failed to address

appellant's allegation concerning prior nonselections.

Appellant filed a complaint that alleged discrimination based on age

(DOB: 10/2/28) when, on March 20, 1996, he made a written request for

a detail assignment to a 204-B position, but never received a response

from management (allegation (1)). Appellant also alleged that he applied

for positions in the past, but was never selected. The agency dismissed

appellant's complaint on the grounds that he failed to state a claim.

According to the agency, appellant did not suffer a personal loss or harm

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there was a remedy, because, at the time he submitted his request, there

were no detail assignments for 204-B positions available. The agency

did not address appellant's contention concerning past nonselections.

On appeal, appellant argued that he was aggrieved because the agency's

failure to respond to his request was a denial of a promotional

opportunity. Furthermore, he maintained that he suffered an economic and

emotional harm, and a loss of reputation because of the agency's actions.

The agency, according to appellant, engaged in a pattern of denying his

promotion applications and opportunities over a two year period.

The previous decision affirmed the dismissal of appellant's complaint.

According to the decision, appellant failed to show how he was harmed

with regard to allegation (1), since there was no evidence that a 204-B

detail assignment was either available or made. The previous decision,

concluding that appellant "[d]id not challenge the agency's framing of

the allegation," did not address appellant's contention that he had also

been nonselected over the prior two year period.

In his reconsideration request (request), appellant, in large part, raised

considerations that went to the merits of his complaint. For example,

he questioned the sufficiency of the agency's investigation because

there was no information regarding the ages and qualifications of the

selectees for the detail assignments he sought. Appellant also maintained

that "[h]is repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain a 204-B detail

assignment or to be selected for another promotional position raise[d]

a strong inference of age discrimination." Finally, appellant argued

that the previous decision erred in finding that he was not aggrieved,

and that the previous decision was of such an exceptional nature as to

have substantial precedential implications. The agency opposed the

request on the grounds that appellant did not meet any criteria set

forth at 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c).

In order to merit the reconsideration of a prior Commission decision, the

requesting party must submit written argument or evidence which tends to

establish that at least one of the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c) is

met. The Commission's scope of review on a request for reconsideration is

narrow. Lopez v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05890749

(September 28, 1989). A reconsideration request is not merely a form of a

second appeal. Regensberg v. USPS, EEOC Request No. 05900850 (September

7, 1990). Instead, it is an opportunity to submit newly discovered

evidence, not previously available; to establish substantive error in

a previous decision; or to explain why the previous decision will have

effects beyond the case at hand. Lyke v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05900769 (September 27, 1990).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that

appellant's request does not meet the regulatory criteria of 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c). We concur with the previous decision's determination

that appellant was not aggrieved with respect to the agency's failure

to respond to his unsolicited March 20, 1996 request. There is no

persuasive evidence that, at the time he submitted his request, a 204-B

assignment existed. As noted by the previous decision, a complainant is

not aggrieved when he submits an unsolicited application for a position

for which no vacancy exists. See Pletten v. Department of the Army, EEOC

Request No. 05940706 (February 24, 1995). We also find no persuasive

evidence that the previous decision is of such an exceptional nature as

to have substantial precedential implications.<1>

Notwithstanding the above, the Commission has decided to reconsider this

matter on its own motion. We find that both the agency and the previous

decision erred by not addressing appellant's contention that he was

denied promotional opportunities in the past. Although appellant did not

specifically challenge the agency's framing of his allegation, the fact

remains that a major portion of his appeal was devoted to this issue.

According to appellant, he applied for various promotional positions,

commencing in 1994, but never received any definitive explanation

as to why his applications were rejected. According to appellant, he

received a letter dated November 10, 1994, signed by an agency official,

and entitled "Notice of Non-Selection." The letter concerned appellant's

nonselection for the position of Supervisor, Customer Service at the Santa

Clarita Post Office (allegation (2)). Appellant also noted his receipt

of a letter dated September 29, 1995, signed by the Manager, Operations

Programs Support, concerning appellant's request that he be considered

for a 204-B position (allegation (3)). Appellant, in the letter, was

told that he needed to make his request to his immediate supervisor.

Finally, on appeal, appellant indicated that on May 7, 1996, the EEO

counselor advised him to contact the Labor Relations office in order to

request a detail assignment in that department. According to appellant,

he did so, but "[t]o this date that matter was never resolved."

Unlike allegation (1), allegations (2) and (3) appear to have been actual

assignments for which appellant could have been selected. We note,

however, that the Commission's regulations require that an aggrieved

person initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the

date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a

personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.

29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1).

The 45-day time limit to seek counseling, however, is subject to extension

under the continuing violation rule. In Sabree v. United Brotherhood

of Carpenters and Local Joiners, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990), two

types of continuing violations were identified: serial violations and

systemic violations. Id. at 400. Generally, a serial violation consists

of a number of discriminatory acts emanating from the same discriminatory

animus, each act constituting a separate wrong actionable under Title VII.

Id. at 400.<2> Hereinafter, in this decision, the term continuing

violation will only pertain to the serial type of violation.

When a continuing violation is properly alleged, the normal time limit

for filing a formal EEO complaint is suspended. Rowan v. Department of

Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05940661 (February 24, 1995). If at

least one of the acts complained of falls within the limitations period,

a complaint filed at any time within this period is timely filed with

respect to all acts which are part of the continuing violation. Id.

An essential ingredient of a continuing violation is an analogous theme

uniting the timely and untimely acts of alleged discrimination by the

employer into a continuous pattern. Id.

In the present case, appellant maintained that the agency engaged in a

pattern of denying his promotion applications and opportunities over a two

year period of time. We find that appellant has failed to establish that

a continuing violation has occurred. As previously noted, a continuing

violation requires that at least one of the alleged discriminatory

acts must fall within the time limitation period. Appellant sought EEO

counseling on April 2, 1996; therefore, the time limitation period began

45-days earlier, on February 17, 1996. Allegation (1) was the only matter

that occurred during the period in question. Since, however, we have

affirmed the agency's dismissal of allegation (1) on the grounds that

it failed to state claim, we find that appellant no longer has a timely

allegation remaining. Therefore, he has failed to establish a continuing

violation in this case. Consequently, we find that appellant's April 2,

1996 counselor contact was untimely with regard to both allegations (2)

and (3).

After a review of appellant's request to reconsider, the agency's

response, the previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission

finds that appellant's request fails to meet the criteria of 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and it is the decision of the Commission to deny

the request. The Commission, however, has decided to reconsider the

decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01966742 (July 16, 1997) on its own motion.

The decision, as MODIFIED, remains the Commission's final decision.

There is no further right of administrative appeal from that portion of

our decision pertaining to allegation (1).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

RECONSIDERATION (M0795), modified

With regard to that portion of our decision pertaining to allegations

(2) and (3), the Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider its

determination if the appellant or the agency submits a written request

containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS - ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS

THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY

HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

August 19, 1999

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1We advise appellant that an agency may dismiss a complaint, for reasons

outlined in 29 C.F.R. �1614.107, without conducting an investigation

into the actual merits of the complaint. Likewise, although he argued

on appeal that he suffered an economic and emotional harm, and a loss of

reputation, the Commission has held that where an allegation fails to

state a claim, a request for compensatory damages will not render the

complainant aggrieved. Girard v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940379 (September 9, 1994).

2With regard to systemic violations, the court held that there need not

be an identifiable discrete act of discrimination transpiring within

the limitations period. Id. at 400. According to the court, "[a]

systemic violation has its roots in a discriminatory policy or practice;

so long as the policy or practice itself continues into the limitations

period, a challenger may be deemed to have filed a timely complaint."

Id. at 400.