Jared Miller et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 2, 2020

2020003532 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/634,459 12/09/2009 Jared Miller 32188/50298 7590
4743 7590 12/02/2020
MARSHALL, GERSTEIN & BORUN LLP
233 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE
6300 WILLIS TOWER
CHICAGO, IL 60606-6357
EXAMINER
TALLMAN, BRIAN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mgbdocket@marshallip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JARED MILLER and MICHAEL DENNIS GROMAN
____________

Appeal 2020-003532
Application 12/634,459
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, JAMES P. CALVE, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
Non–final rejection of claims 1–4, 6–9, 13–17, 19, 20, 24, and 26–29. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We affirm.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies United Airlines, Inc., as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.

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THE INVENTION
Appellant states the problem addressed by the application is, “what is
needed in the art is a technique for facilitating automated online check-in for
a passenger in a manner that complies with relevant security regulations and
also allows for airline business rules regarding such matters as seat
assignments, upgrades, etc. to be implemented.” Spec. ¶ 7.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method for remotely checking-in to a flight in
advance of a prescribed check-in period through an improved
airline reservation system, comprising:
creating travel reservations for passengers with a
computer system, each of the travel reservations including at
least one leg with a departure time;
storing the travel reservations for the passengers in
memory associated with the computer system, wherein check-
ins by the passengers for the at least one legs are restricted at
least until check-in times prior to the departure times;
obtaining, via a web-based interface, check-in
information with the computer system for the passengers at the
creation of the travel reservations from at least one of the
passengers or from a frequent flyer database communicatively
coupled to the computer system, the check-in information
including a first set of automatic check-in indications for a first
set of the passengers indicating a request for automatic check-
ins and including a second set of automatic check-in indications
for a second set of the passengers indicating a request not to use
automatic check-ins;
storing the check-in information and first and second
automatic check-in indications from the first and second sets of
automatic check-in indications for the passengers in the
memory via an automatic check-in database;
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for at least one of the first set of the passengers, linking
the first automatic check-in indication to a user profile for the at
least one of the first set of the passengers;
for the at least one of the first set of the passengers upon
the obtaining and the storing the check-in information for the at
least one of the first set of passengers, receiving a request to
change travel reservations to a different flight for the at least
one leg;
retrieving the first automatic check-in indication from the
automatic check-in database linked to the user profile for the at
least one of the first set of the passengers;
monitoring with the computer system for each of the
check-in times;
automatically checking-in the first set of the passengers
for the at least one changed leg with the computer system using
the stored check-in information in response to the monitored
check-in times by prioritizing the automatic check-ins for the
first set of the passengers based on one or more priority rules,
including automatically checking-in the at least one of the first
set of the passengers for the different flight with the computer
system without any further input from the at least one of the
first set of the passengers;
generating a first set of boarding passes for the at least
one changed leg with the computer system for the first set of
the passengers based on the prioritization without any further
input from the first set of the passengers; and
subsequently checking-in and generating a second set of
boarding passes for the second set of the passengers with the
computer system in response to check-in requests from the
second set of the passengers at least after the check-in times;
wherein the automatic check-in database causes the
computer system to automatically check-in the first set of the
passengers at the check-in times.

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THE REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review:
Claims 1–4, 6–9, 13–17, 19, 20, 24, and 26–29 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea
without significantly more.
FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 13–29 in the
Non-Final Office Action1 and on pages 3–18 in the Examiner’s Answer2,
concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 1–4, 6–9, 13–17, 19, 20, 24,
and 26–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues independent claims 1, 17, 19, 20, and 26 as a
group. (Appeal Br. 17). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for
this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract

1 All references to the Non-Final Office Action refer to the Non-Final Office
Action mailed on September 9, 2019.
2 Answer mailed on Feb. 21, 2020.
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
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(“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.4
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior
to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should
not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent
those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance.
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two
prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception,
and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the
claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception,
such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see
also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05.
Accordingly, we find:
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The Specification states:
In many cases, customers with reservations may not avail
themselves of the services for which they have made a
reservation. Again using the airline industry as an example, a
passenger’s plans may change, or he may be caught in traffic,
stuck in a meeting, etc. To avoid having substantial unused
services, many service providers take more reservations than
they have capacity to handle. In this way, the service providers
can ensure that the full capacity of the service will be used when
the no-shows are accounted for. In such situations, customers
who fail to check-in by a predetermined time will effectively
have their reservation cancelled so that a later reserving customer
may have their space. Again, the airline industry’s “oversell” is
an excellent example of this process.
Spec. ¶ 3

The preamble of claim 1 states it is “for remotely checking-in to a flight
in advance of a prescribed check-in period.” Appeal Br., Claims App. A-1.
Understood in light of the Specification, claim 1 recites in pertinent
part,
creating travel reservations for passengers . . . , each of the
travel reservations including at least one leg with a departure
time;
storing the travel reservations for the passengers in
memory . . . , wherein check-ins by the passengers for the at least
one legs are restricted at least until check-in times prior to the
departure times;
obtaining . . . check-in information . . . for the passengers
at the creation of the travel reservations from at least one of the
passengers or from a frequent flyer database . . . , the check-in
information including a first set of automatic check-in
indications for a first set of the passengers indicating a request
for automatic check-ins and including a second set of automatic
check-in indications for a second set of the passengers indicating
a request not to use automatic check-ins;
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storing the check-in information and first and second
automatic check-in indications from the first and second sets of
automatic check-in indications for the passengers . . . ;
for at least one of the first set of the passengers, linking the
first automatic check-in indication to a user profile for the at least
one of the first set of the passengers;
for the at least one of the first set of the passengers upon
the obtaining and the storing the check-in information for the at
least one of the first set of passengers, receiving a request to
change travel reservations to a different flight for the at least one
leg;
retrieving the first automatic check-in indication from the
automatic check-in database linked to the user profile for the at
least one of the first set of the passengers;
monitoring . . . for each of the check-in times;
. . . checking-in the first set of the passengers for the at
least one changed leg
. . . using the stored check-in information in response to
the monitored check-in times by prioritizing the automatic
check-ins for the first set of the passengers based on one or more
priority rules, including automatically checking-in the at least
one of the first set of the passengers for the different flight . . .
without any further input from the at least one of the first set of
the passengers;
generating a first set of boarding passes for the at least one
changed leg . . . for the first set of the passengers based on the
prioritization without any further input from the first set of the
passengers; and subsequently checking-in and generating a
second set of boarding passes for the second set of the passengers
. . . in response to check-in requests from the second set of the
passengers at least after the check-in times;
wherein the automatic check-in database causes the
computer system to automatically check-in the first set of the
passengers at the check-in times.
Appeal Br., Claims App. A-1 (some paragraphing added).
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The Examiner found, “[t]he claims as a whole recite methods of
organizing human activities and/or mental processes.” Non–Final Act. 15.
The steps of obtaining automatic seat selection indications with
the computer system for the first set of the passengers at the
creation of the travel reservations; and automatically assigning
seats to the first set of the passengers for the at least one legs
with the computer system... are further directed to a method of
organizing human activity (i.e. commercial interactions, sales
activities, managing interactions between people, following
rules or instructions) as described in the independent claims.
Id. at 12.
Accordingly, we find that all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1
recites a way of transferring check-in information associated with a
passenger who seeks automatic check–in for a multi-leg trip, to a travel leg
different from that which was originally booked. This is consistent with the
Examiner’s determination. Limitations such as, “generating a first set of
boarding passes for the at least one changed leg with the computer system
for the first set of the passengers based on the prioritization without any
further input from the first set of the passengers,” connote sales
activities/commercial interactions which are ones of certain methods of
organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
We also find the limitations such as, “linking the first automatic
check-in indication to a user profile for the at least one of the first set of the
passengers” and “using the stored check-in information in response to the
monitored check-in times by prioritizing the automatic check-ins for the first
set of the passengers based on one or more priority rules, including
automatically checking-in the at least one of the first set of the passengers
for the different flight,” constitute examples of concepts performed in the
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human mind, perhaps aided by paper and pencil, because the steps of
linking, prioritizing, and following rules mimic human thought processes of
observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, where the data interpretation
is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent
Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “a computer system” and “a web based interface.”
These components are described in the Specification at a high level of
generality. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 31, 32, 33, Fig. 3b. We fail to see how the
generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a
system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53.
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a certain
method of organizing human activity and a mental process.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to travel reservations does not make them any less abstract. See OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
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include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at
72–73).
Concerning this step, the Examiner found the following:
Since the machines are general purpose computers that apply a
judicial exception or generic computer functions, are additional
elements that invoke computer or other machinery merely as a
tool to perform an existing process, function solely as an obvious
mechanism for permitting a solution to be performed more
quickly[] (e.g. automatic check in at the earliest possible time)
and only nominally or insignificantly to the execution of the
claimed method (e.g. data gathering / data storage / field-of-use),
the machines as claimed do not represent a particular machine
that is a practical application or significantly more.
Non–Final Act. 5. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify
the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of
the most basic functions of a computer. Limitations such as, “using the
stored check-in information in response to the monitored check-in times by
prioritizing the automatic check-ins for the first set of the passengers based
on one or more priority rules” are not steps, but are recitations of data
characterization, viz. an expectation, which are aspirational. All of these
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computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive
Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. In addition, the claims do not effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification
spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied
using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing
would entail based on the concept of information access under different
scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ ¶ 31, 32, 33, Fig. 3b). Thus, the claims at issue
amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract
idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that
is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (creating,
storing, obtaining, storing, monitoring, checking, executing) and storing is
equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
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access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters.
We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept itself.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer
components configured to implement the same idea. This Court
has long ‘warn[ed] ... against’ interpreting § 101 “in ways that
make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any
particular machine.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal Br. 16–28, Reply Br. 2–8. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues:
The additional elements described above do not merely
link the alleged abstract idea to a technical field, but instead add
meaningful limitations. More specifically, the additional
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elements include a web-based interface to obtain check-
information for a passenger that includes a request for automatic
check-ins. The additional elements also include automatically
checking-in the passenger at the monitored check-in time for a
different flight without any input from the passenger, and
generating a boarding pass for the changed leg for the passenger
without any further input from the passenger.
This addresses the Internet-centric challenge of checking-
in online when the passenger is unable to connect to the Internet.
Appeal Br. 18–19.
We disagree with Appellant. As described above, the only claim
elements beyond the abstract idea are “a computer system” and “a web
based interface.” Appellant cannot reasonably deny that the operation of
these elements are well-understood, routine, or conventional. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the
absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been
defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of
using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes,
with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc, 890
F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
That claim 1 invokes the use of a network, e.g., the Internet, is not
sufficient, in our view, to transform Appellant’s otherwise patent-ineligible
abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Narrowing the abstract idea
to online transactions merely limits the use of the abstract idea to a particular
technological environment, which the Court made clear in Alice is
insufficient to transform an otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 222.
We further fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Appeal
Br. 19) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR
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Holdings6. In DDR Holdings, the court evaluated the eligibility of claims
“address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to
the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol,
would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d. at 1257. There, the court found that the claims were patent
eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink
typically functions to resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet
analog.” Id. at 1258. In contrast, the problem to be resolved in the case on
appeal here is “facilitating automated online check-in for a passenger in a
manner that complies with relevant security regulations and also allows for
airline business rules regarding such matters as seat assignments, upgrades,
etc. to be implemented.” Spec. ¶ 7. This is a problem related to an
interaction between parties to a commercial transaction, and not to an
innovation in technology, such as an improvement in hyperlink functions.
Appellant argues, “the claimed invention is an improvement
over conventional airline reservation systems which only allow the user to
check-in to one particular flight, and do not include automatic check-in at
all, much less an automatic check-in indication which can be tracked to a
new flight.” Appeal Br. 21.
We do not find this argument persuasive. Again, the asserted
improvement over a conventional airline reservation process is an
abstraction as discussed above, and “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,

6 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90). The question is
whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that
itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, claim 1 as a whole is focused on
satisfying certain contingencies for “a way of transferring check–in
information associated with a passenger who seeks automatic check–in for a
multi leg trip to a travel leg different from that which was originally
booked.”
Concerning Appellant’s citations (Appeal Br. 22) to non–precedential
decisions by the Board, we decline to be bound by decisions that are not
binding precedent of the Board.
Appellant lists various claim limitations (Appeal Br. 23–24) as
examples of improvements in the functionality of the computer as a result of
implementing the claimed reservation process, but our reviewing court has
held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general purpose computer “do[] not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012). The steps of claim 1 do not recite technological implementation
details for any of the steps. Nor does claim 1 recite “a particular way of
programming or designing the software . . . , but instead merely claim[s] the
resulting system.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); see also Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 Fed. App’x
950, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid of
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any implementation details or technical description that would permit us to
conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the
abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
Appellant argues, “by referring to the process for passengers without
automatic check-in as being handled in a conventional manner and
contrasting this with the process for passengers with automatic check-in,
Appellant’s specification at least implies that the process for passengers
without automatic check-in is unconventional.” Appeal Br. 25.
We disagree with Appellant. As found above, the claimed sequence
of data reception-analysis (creating, storing, obtaining, storing, monitoring,
checking, executing) is conventional, or otherwise held to be abstract.
Appellant cannot reasonably deny that the claimed operations of the
“computer system” is well-understood, routine, or conventional. To the
extent that Appellant is arguing that the claimed manner of flight check-in is
unconventional, that argument fails because flight checkin/passenger
processing is a human interaction which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”).
For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no
deficiencies in the Examiner’s prima facie case of patent ineligibility of the
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rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection
of claims 1–4, 6–9, 13–17, 19, 20, 24, and 26–29.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4, 6–9,
13–17, 19, 20, 24, and 26–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–9,
13–17, 19,
20, 24, 26–
29
101 Eligibility 1–4, 6–9,
13–17, 19,
20, 24, 26–
29

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED