Janicev.Matthews, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 2013
0120131814 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2013)

0120131814

09-17-2013

Janice V. Matthews, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.


Janice V. Matthews,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southwest Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120131814

Hearing No. 46020130023X

Agency No. 4G770010912

DECISION

On April 6, 2013, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March 4, 2013, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Full-Time City Carrier at the Agency's Houston-Fairbanks facility in Houston, Texas.

On May 22, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of disability (back, right hand and major depression) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when, on February 1, 2012, she received a Notice of Separation (on OWCP1 Rolls for More than One Year), dated January 26, 2012, with an effective date of February 17, 2012. Complainant further alleged that Agency officials maliciously provided fraudulent information to Agency headquarters in order to slander her name, defame her character and adversely influence the decision to separate her from employment.

The Agency accepted the complaint for investigation. The investigation established that due to the residual effects of on-the-job injuries sustained on January 10, 2001 and March 29, 2004, Complainant had been continuously absent from duty and on the periodic rolls of the OWCP since May 26, 2007. The record further indicates that in letters dated August 11, 2011, and November 11, 2011, Complainant's Psychiatrist indicated that Complainant had been evaluated in his office and continued to be "incapacitated and unable to perform any work duties as a result of both on the job injuries." The August 2011 letter stated that Complainant's return to work date was undetermined, but would be no sooner than December 21, 2011. However, the November 2011 letter predicted that Complainant would not be ready to return work until at least May 31, 2012.

The investigative record contains a memorandum from the Health and Resource Manager, dated November 26, 2011, sent to the Agency's Health and Resource Management Headquarters, requesting concurrence with the decision to separate Complainant from the postal rolls. The memo explained that Complainant had been off work for 4 and 1/2 years following her injuries. According to the record, Complainant's doctor kept supplying a return to work date in the future, but she was never released to work. The Separation was approved by the Agency's District Manager. The Agency determined also that pursuant to Agency policy, because Complainant had been in a leave without pay (LWOP) status for more than one year, separation was required.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing but the AJ denied the hearing request on the grounds that Complainant failed to respond to the Agency's request for an affidavit. The AJ remanded the complaint to the Agency, and the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

The instant appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Here, we agree with the Agency's finding of no discrimination. Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd , 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The Agency may then rebut any initial inference of discrimination raised by articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the disputed actions. To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).

Even assuming arguendo that Complainant satisfied the above elements to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, we find further that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct as alleged in this matter, and Complainant failed to show that those reasons are pretext for discrimination. Complainant failed to establish that the Agency's action was based on retaliatory motives.

With regard to Complainant's disability discrimination claim, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. See 29 C.F.R. Part 1630. A qualified individual with a disability is an "individual with a disability" who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). The term "position" is not limited to the position held by the employee, but also includes position that the employee could have held as a result of reassignment. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act No. 915.002 at Question 24 (rev. Oct. 17, 2002).

An Agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9. The Commission shall assume without deciding for the purposes of this decision that Complainant is an individual with a disability.

However, the evidence clearly establishes that Complainant was not a "qualified" individual with a disability as the record reflects that Complainant was not able to return to work in any capacity for more than four years, and there was no indication of when she would be able to successfully return to work.

In addition, to the extent Complainant alleges that the Agency's conduct in providing information in support of its request for separation constituted discriminatory harassment, the Commission notes that harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court has stated that: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

After a review of the record, the Commission finds that Complainant's claims do not constitute discriminatory harassment. The Commission concludes that Complainant did not prove that she was subjected to conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment and that she also failed to prove that the Agency's actions were unlawfully motivated by her protected classes. Accordingly, Complainant has not shown that she was subjected to a discriminatory hostile work environment.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final Agency decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney

with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 17, 2013

__________________

Date

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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