Janice L. Cagle, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 17, 2011
0120112880 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 17, 2011)

0120112880

10-17-2011

Janice L. Cagle, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.




Janice L. Cagle,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120112880

Hearing No. 430-2010-00045X

Agency No. 2004-0318-2009100832

DECISION

On May 13, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s April

13, 2011, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order which found that Complainant

was not discriminated against when she was not selected for two positions.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented in this case are whether the EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing and whether

Complainant established that she was subjected to discrimination on the

bases of age and reprisal when she was not selected for two positions

for which she applied.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant

worked as a GS-7, Program Support Assistant at the Agency’s Salisbury

Veterans Affairs Medical Center facility in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Complainant applied for the position of Veteran’s Service Representative

(VSR), GS-7 target 11 under vacancy announcement numbers 2008-496A

and 2008-91A-WS. For these positions, each applicant was required to

complete a Knowledge, Skills and Abilities, and Qualifications (KSAQ)

questionnaire. Each component of the KSAQs was graded on a scale

of 1-5. Applicants with qualifying scores were then interviewed and

their interview responses were rated on a scale of 1-5. Applicants’

educational backgrounds were also considered and rated on a scale of

1-5. Based on KSAQs, interview performance, and educational background,

applicants could receive a total of 55 points. Complainant was

not selected for either position. For the position listed under

VAN 20008-496A, Complainant was assessed a total of 13 out of 25

possible points. Among the 32 qualified candidates, Complainant did

not qualify for an interview because of her low KSAQ scores. Therefore,

Complainant was not interviewed, her application was not presented to the

selecting official for consideration, and she did not proceed through

the application process. Sixteen candidates were eventually selected

for this position.

For the position advertised under 2008-91A-WS, Complainant’s KSAQs

were sufficient of qualify for an interview. Complainant was assessed

a total of 28 out of 55 points. Specifically, Complainant received 14

points for her interview, 11 points for her KSAQs, and 3 points for her

Bachelor's degree. Approximately 30 candidates, including Complainant,

were then forwarded to the selecting official, for consideration.

The selecting official reviewed the KSAQs and interview assessments for

all of the candidates forwarded to her. After a review, she selected

the 18 highest scoring applicants. All of the applicants selected had

received at least 30 points from the selection panel. Because Complainant

only received 28 points, she was not one of the higher scoring candidates

and was not selected.

Complainant asserts that she should have been awarded one of the VSR

positions at issue because of her 33 years of government service,

her educational background (Bachelor's degree), and her two previous

“Exceptional” annual performance evaluations.

Therefore, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency

discriminated against her on the bases of age (56) and reprisal for

prior protected EEO activity when:

1. On October 27, 2008, she was notified by Human Resources that she was

not selected for the Veteran’s Service Representative, GS-7 target 11,

listed under Vacancy Announcement Number 2008-496A; and

2. On February 16, 2009, she was notified by Human Resources that she

was not selected for the position of Veterans Service Representative,

GS-7 target 11, under Vacancy Announcement Number 2008-91A-WS.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. When the Complainant did not object,

the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s December 10, 2010,

motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without

a hearing on March 30, 2011. The AJ found that Complainant failed to

establish a claim of reprisal because she was unable to show a causal

connection between her prior EEO activity, which occurred two years

earlier and the present case. Moreover, the AJ found that the selecting

officials in this case were different from those of the last case and

the selecting officials in this case affirmed that they were not aware of

Complainant’s prior EEO activity. Next, the AJ found that Complainant

failed to establish a claim of age discrimination. First, the AJ found

that Complainant did not present any real evidence in support of her clam

other than pointing out that she is older than several of the selectees.

However, for Vacancy Announcement 2008-496A, 9 out of 16 selectees were

over the age of 40. For Vacancy Announcement 2008-91A-WS, 6 out of 11

candidates were over the age of 40. The AJ found that overall more

than 50% of the selectees for both positions were over 40 years of age,

with five of those selectees also being over the age of 50.

Notwithstanding, the AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that Complainant was

not selected for either position because she had a number of grammatical

errors on her KSAQs. Based on the numerous errors, Complainant was

deemed to be deficient in terms of grammar, spelling, word usage, and

punctuation. Further, the AJ found that Complainant failed to show

that she was obviously the most qualified candidate, as the record

did not support that she was so plainly superior to the selectees,

as to justify reversing the Agency’s decision. The AJ found that in

the absence of evidence indicating a discriminatory motive, and Agency

was free to choose between candidates who have different but equally

desirable qualifications. The AJ determined that Complainant failed

to show that the Agency’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons were pretext for discrimination. The Agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to

prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant did not submit a brief on appeal but did submit a copy of

a Final Agency Decision from another case, which showed that she had

not been selected for previous positions. The Agency requests that its

decision, finding no discrimination, be affirmed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision

on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de

novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge’s “decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo”). This essentially means that we should look at

this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if

accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual

conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of

whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard

of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without

regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision

maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony

of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. §�

�1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not

to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine

issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue

of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential

to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to

properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could

order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion

for a decision without a hearing).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the instant case, the Commission finds that the AJ properly issued

a decision without a hearing as there are no material facts at issue

in this case. We also find that the AJ correctly determined that

Complainant failed to show that she was discriminated against as was

alleged. Specifically, we find that even if we assume arguendo that

Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on age

and prior EEO activity, the evidence shows that the Agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions with respect

to both nonselections. The record shows that the selecting official

for each VAN found that Complainant’s KSAQs contained a number of

grammatical errors. The selecting officials explained that based on

the duties and responsibilities of the VSR positions, they were seeking

candidates with strong writing skills, and based on Complainant’s KSAQs,

they deemed her deficient in terms of grammar, spelling, word usage, and

punctuation. We find that Complainant has not provided any persuasive

evidence, indicating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not

motivated management. In fact, the record shows that management offered

to help Complainant with her KSAQs for future positions but she refused.

We also find, that the prior case that Complainant provided in support

of this complaint also shows that it was Complainant’s low KSAQs

that prevented her from getting the position she desired. We find that

Complainant has not shown that the Agency’s articulated legitimate,

reasons were pretext for discrimination.

Lastly, we find that Complainant has not shown that the disparities in

qualifications between her and the selectees are “of such weight and

significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial

judgment, could have chosen the [selectee] over [her] for the job

in question.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 Fed.Appx. 924, 88

Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,608 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1154

(Jan. 22, 2007). Accordingly, we find that Complainant has failed to

show that the actions taken by the Agency involved discriminatory animus

against her age and/prior EEO activity.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record, we AFFIRM the Agency’s Final

Order which found that Complainant failed to show that she was subjected

to discrimination as alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney

with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_10/17/11_________________

Date

2

0120112880

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120112880