James T. Volz, Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 23, 2002
07A10026 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 23, 2002)

07A10026

08-23-2002

James T. Volz, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.


James T. Volz v. Department of Justice

07A10026

August 23, 2002

.

James T. Volz,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

Agency.

Appeal No. 07A10026

Agency No. F-96-8457

Hearing No. 100-97-7702X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Following its November 6, 2000 final order, the agency filed a timely

appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the agency properly rejected the

EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding that the agency discriminated

against complainant on the bases of retaliation (prior EEO activity)<1>

and adopted the AJ's finding of no discrimination based on his age

(DOB 7/15/38).

BACKGROUND

Complainant, a Special Agent, GS-13, was employed by the agency and

assigned to the Oklahoma City Division (OCD). Complainant was reassigned

to work on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task force (OKBOMB

task force) to work on the investigation of the bombing of the Alfred

P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19,

1995. Complainant's duties while on the OKBOMB task force included

serving as a team leader. Complainant's other auxiliary duties at the

FBI included being an EEO counselor, principal firearms instructor,

and SWAT team leader. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. � 8335, FBI agents are

subject to mandatory retirement at the age of 56. Complainant was

initially subject to retirement on July 31, 1995. On May 31, 1995,

due to his assignment to the OKBOMB task force, the Director of the

FBI granted complainant a six month waiver. The record indicates

that the Director of the FBI has the authority to waive the mandatory

retirement for employees if their service is required by public interest.

A second waiver was initiated by complainant's Inspector in Charge (IC).

On January 2, 1996, the Director of the FBI granted complainant a second

waiver which extended his retirement date to July 31, 1996.

On May 27, 1996, complainant requested a third waiver. The following day,

the IC submitted a memorandum to the Director of the FBI recommending

that complainant's waiver request be denied. The memorandum noted the

complainant engaged in auxiliary duties such as EEO which at times were

�counterproductive.� On July 1, 1996, complainant submitted to the

Director of the FBI a memorandum refuting the IC's recommendation and

alleging discrimination and retaliation. On July 25, 1996, the Director

of the FBI denied complainant's request for a waiver beyond July 31, 1996.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant filed a formal

EEO complaint with the agency on September 4, 1996, alleging that the

agency's denial of the additional waiver from mandatory retirement was

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ.

Prior to the hearing, on August 8, 1997, the agency made a Motion

for Findings and Conclusions without a Hearing. Complainant filed

his opposition on October 9, 1997, and both parties filed responsive

pleadings. Based upon a review of the motion and opposition to the

motion, the AJ indicated her intent to grant the agency's motion solely

with regard to the basis of age. Therefore, no evidence was taken at

the hearing on the basis of age.

Following a hearing, the AJ found that complainant's claim of

discrimination based upon reprisal required a mixed motive analysis.

The record indicates that complainant filed a prior EEO complaint

against his previous Supervisor when he was allegedly discriminated

against when he was denied night differential pay in September 1995.

That complaint was based upon reprisal for complainant's prompting

an Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigation of his

Supervisor for allegedly attempting to tamper with witness testimony

in a race discrimination case before an EEOC Administrative Judge.

Complainant had been the EEO Counselor in the race discrimination case

and had been an approved witness at the hearing. Further, complainant

testified to two incidents that the AJ determined to constitute direct

evidence of reprisal for protected EEO activity.

In the first incident, complainant testified about a short meeting which

was held between the IC, the Inspector in Place (IP), an Acting Special

Agent in Charge (ASAC), and himself after December 5, 1995. At the

meeting, the IC showed complainant a retirement form with his name typed

on it and told him that if he did not back off or stop complaining against

his previous Supervisor, the IC would submit the form. Complainant also

averred that the IP told him that a substantial monetary award might

be available for work on the OKBOMB task force and complainant should

not �rock the boat.� The AJ noted that complainant's EEO counselor

testified that complainant had told him about the threat of retirement

if he did not back off from his EEO complaint. The AJ found that the

IC, IP, and ASAC stated in their affidavits that complainant was shown

retirement papers in a meeting in October 1995, in which complainant was

told to focus on the OKBOMB investigation. The IC also testified that

the meeting in October was to address complainant's attitude toward the

ASAC and his previous Supervisor. The IP testified at the hearing that

there were two meetings during which complainant was told to focus on

OKBOMB but did not address the content of the meeting. Complainant did

not deny that there was a meeting in October but he states that he was

not shown retirement papers at that time. The IC, IP, and ASAC did not

deny that there was a meeting in December 1995.

The AJ also found a second incident and determined that it constituted

direct evidence of reprisal. According to complainant, on or about

April 9, 1996, the IC showed complainant a document related to his EEO

complaint against his previous Supervisor and said �I thought we had an

understanding,� or �I thought we had a deal.� In his affidavit, the IC

denied making such a statement however he acknowledged that he received

a notice that complainant had filed a formal complaint requiring him

to retain records. The IC also averred that he told complainant about

receiving the notice. The IC did not testify as to this conversation.

Therefore, as to the April 1996 meeting, the AJ determined that

complainant's testimony was credible and that the meeting took place as

he described it, noting that the IC's testimony lacked credibility due to

the contradictions between his testimony and other evidence in the record.

The AJ further found that the agency failed to rebut complainant's

contentions regarding the December and April meetings. Accordingly,

the AJ determined that complainant had established direct evidence of

discrimination.

The AJ also determined that the agency articulated a lawful,

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. The agency showed that

complainant's services were no longer required and, therefore, that he did

not meet the statutory criterion for a waiver, i.e. that he was necessary

to a continuing investigation or that he had unique skills. The record

indicates that the IC's recommendation denying complainant's request for a

waiver was reviewed by three levels of officials (Reviewing Officials).

The AJ found that although the IC's recommendation was suspect, she

concluded that the Reviewing Officials did not have the same animus.

Aside from the IC's recommendation, the AJ concluded that the Reviewing

Officials would have denied complainant's continued waiver from mandatory

retirement even absent the IC's discriminatory motive. The AJ then found

that complainant failed to demonstrate that his continued waiver was in

the public interest.

As for relief, the AJ ordered that the agency post a notice that

discrimination was found, require the IC to undergo training in the

provisions of Title VII prohibiting retaliation, and award complainant

reasonable attorney's fees and costs. On September 25, 2000, the AJ

issued a decision on complainant's claim for attorney's fees and costs.

Based on the AJ's review of the record, she determined that complainant's

attorney is entitled to compensation for 125.6 hours at a rate of

$150 per hour and thirteen hours for travel at a rate of $75 per hour.

The total fee award was $19,815.00.

The agency's final order adopted the AJ's finding of no discrimination

as to the basis of age and rejected the AJ's finding of discrimination

as to the basis of reprisal. The agency simultaneously appealed

the AJ's decision to the Commission. On appeal, the agency argues

that the AJ erred in her decision. The agency noted that there is no

evidence of a similarly situated individual outside of complainant's

protected group who was treated differently nor was there evidence to

establish that retaliation was the motivating factor. Further, the

agency contends that the AJ improperly used the mixed-motive analysis.

In particular, the agency claims that the IC was merely a recommending

official and other Reviewing Officials determined whether or not to grant

complainant's request for a waiver. Accordingly, the agency argues that

the AJ's conclusion that the agency retaliated against complainant is

not supported by the record.

As to the issue of the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs, the agency

argues that complainant is not entitled to them based on the merit of

the case. Further, the agency reiterates its arguments raised before

the AJ spotlighting what it characterized as the attorney's misleading

billing practices. The agency also noted that the degree of complainant's

success was negligible so should be his award of fees and costs.

Complainant argues that the AJ correctly determined that the IC's

decision to not waive him was based on his prior protected EEO activity.

He, however, contends that the AJ incorrectly determined his award for

attorney's fees and costs. In particular, he noted that he is a member

of the Oklahoma State Bar and therefore, his hours should not have been

struck from the fee petition.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Findings on Discrimination

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's finding of discrimination. We also find the agency's argument

that the AJ improperly applied a �mixed motive� analysis unpersuasive.

In essence, the agency asserts that complainant did not establish that

reprisal was a �substantial factor� in the agency's decision on the

waiver issue. Upon review, we find that the substantial evidence of the

record supports the AJ's determination that complainant had established

through direct evidence that reprisal was a �substantial factor� in the

agency's decision. Accordingly, we conclude that the �mixed motive�

used by the AJ to analyze the case at hand was appropriate. We also

determine that the AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence, and that the AJ correctly applied the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws.

Attorney's Fees and Costs

The Commission may award complainant reasonable attorney fees and other

costs incurred in the processing of a complainant regarding allegations

of discrimination in violation of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e).

A finding of discrimination raises a presumption of entitlement to an

award of attorney's fees. Id. Attorney's fees shall be paid for services

performed by an attorney after the filing of a written complaint. Id.

Complainant, on appeal, argues that he is entitled to attorneys fees

and costs for his ours spent on his case which were struck by the AJ.

The Commission notes that an attorney who represents himself is not

entitled to an award of fees. Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 11-2. (November 9, 1999)

(citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991)). Therefore, we find that

complainant is not entitled to fees for his services.

As to the amount determined by the AJ, an award of attorney's fees

is determined by calculating the lodestar, i.e., by multiplying a

reasonable hourly fee times a reasonable number of hours expended. Hensley

v. Eckerbart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B).

A reasonable hourly fee is the prevailing market rate in the relevant

community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). The agency reiterated

the challenges it made to the AJ regarding the attorney's fee petition.

Upon review, we find that the AJ properly addressed the agency's

arguments. Accordingly, we find that the AJ's award of $19,815.00 in

attorney's fees and costs to be appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's adoption of the AJ's finding of no age discrimination

and REVERSES the agency's final order rejecting the AJ's finding of

discrimination based upon reprisal. The Commission orders the agency

to take corrective action in accordance with this decision and the

ORDER below.

ORDER (C0900)

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

Consider taking disciplinary action against the IC for the discriminatory

action perpetrated against complainant. The agency shall report

its decision. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action, it

shall identify the action taken. If the agency decides not to take

disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision

not to impose discipline.

The agency shall provide remedial training for the IC to ensure that

discrimination does not recur, that no retaliatory acts are taken

against any employee who opposes unlawful discrimination, and that

persons reporting incidents of alleged discrimination are treated in

an appropriate manner.

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is final,

the agency shall issue complainant attorney's fees and costs in the

amount of $19,815.00.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Oklahoma City Division facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 23, 2002

__________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, dated , which

found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

The Department of Justice, Oklahoma City Division, supports and will

comply with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals

because they have exercised their rights under law.

The Department of Justice, Oklahoma City Division, has been ordered

to remedy an employee affected by the Commission's finding that he was

subjected to unlawful retaliation. As a remedy for the discrimination,

the Department of Justice, Oklahoma City Division, was ordered to

provide training to and consider discipline for the agency officials

found to have retaliated against the affected employee. The Department

of Justice, Oklahoma City Division, was also ordered to to ensure that

unlawful retaliation will not occur again. The Department of Justice,

Oklahoma City Division, will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws.

The Department of Justice, Oklahoma City Division, will not in any

manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual

who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by,

or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment

opportunity law.

________________________

Date Posted: ________________

Posting Expires: _____________

29 C.F.R. Part 16141 The record indicates that complainant was an EEO

Counselor and had been called as a witness in an EEO complaint alleging

a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Complainant has also filed an

EEO complaint alleging that his previous Supervisor violated the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq.