James Stanley, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 13, 2003
01A31714_r (E.E.O.C. May. 13, 2003)

01A31714_r

05-13-2003

James Stanley, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


James Stanley v. United States Postal Service

01A31714

May 13, 2003

.

James Stanley,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A31714

Agency No. 4A-070-0241-00

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final agency

decision dated December 24, 2002, finding that it was in compliance

with the terms of an October 18, 2000 settlement agreement. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The October 18, 2000 settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part,

that:

(1) Management per this mediation agrees to reduce the �seven days

suspension� dated 6/22/00 to a �letter of warning� with a retention to

expire and be removed from the counselee's OPF [official personnel file]

as of 2/1/01;

. . .

(4) Management pledges to make all effort to maintain the counselee's

work activities with his bid assignment.

By letter to the agency dated October 5, 2002, complainant alleged

that the agency breached the settlement agreement, and requested that

the agency specifically implement its terms. Regarding provision (1),

complainant alleged that on October 23, 2002, the agency improperly

issued him a disciplinary action that made reference to the June 22,

2000 suspension that had been reduced to a letter of warning.<1>

Regarding provision (4), complainant claimed that on October 8, 2002, he

was given a �drastic change� of starting time, by two hours. Complainant

acknowledged that the two-hour change in starting time in and of itself

�is not a non-compliance� with provision (4). Complainant asserts,

however, that the two-hour change resulted in the change of his job in

such a manner that led to breach of provision (4).

In its December 24, 2002 final decision, the agency acknowledged that it

failed to comply with provision (1), by issuing a disciplinary action on

October 23, 2002, that improperly made reference to the suspension reduced

to a letter of warning identified in that provision. The agency stated,

however, that the management official who issued complainant the October

23, 2002 discipline was not aware of the subject settlement agreement.

The agency stated that any breach of provision (1) was cured when the

agency amended the October 23, 2002 discipline by omitting the June

22, 2000 reference to the suspension in the elements of complainant's

past record. The agency presented evidence reflecting the amendment

of the October 23, 2002 discipline, omitting the June 22, 2000 reference.

Regarding complainant's arguments concerning provision (4), the agency

found that by complainant's own admission, this matter was not a

compliance issue, and that complainant has raised the new incident of

alleged discrimination in a separate mediation.

On appeal, complainant does not address the agency's decision regarding

provision (1), but states instead that he is �filing this issue dealing

with #4 . . .� Complainant further states that he would discuss his

allegation of breach of provision (4) with a new manager �who realizes

what a [mess] has been made of the assignment and hopefully the issue

will be resolved.�

In response, the agency restates the position it took in the final

decision. In addition, the agency states that complainant's breach claim

of provision (4) occurred more than two years following the execution of

the agreement and that it has no bearing on the agreement. The agency

further states that complainant has requested counseling on these matters

(Agency No. 4A-070-0017-03).

The record contains a letter to complainant from an agency Supervisor,

Customer Service, dated December 19, 2002. Therein, the Supervisor

stated that complainant's fourteen-day suspension dated October 23,

2002, has been amended. The Supervisor further stated that complainant's

notice of seven-day suspension dated June 22, 2000, has �been removed,�

pursuant to the October 18, 2000 settlement agreement.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Provision (1)

Regarding provision (1), we note that the agency admits that it did not

comply with the subject provision within the time frame specified in the

agreement. However, to the extent that the agency breached provision (1)

of the agreement, the record indicates that the agency cured its breach

by amending the October 23, 2002 discipline, omitting the June 22, 2000

reference to the suspension in the elements of complainant's past record,

and removed complainant's notice of seven-day suspension dated June 22,

2000, from his file. Complainant does not allege that he suffered any

harm as a result of the delay and on appeal, focuses exclusively on the

breach claim regarding provision (4), which is discussed further below.

We determine that the agency has substantially complied with provision

(1) of the agreement.

Provision (4)

Regarding provision (4), we find no evidence supporting a finding that the

agency breached this provision. Provision (4) provided for an affirmative

agency obligation to make all efforts to maintain complainant's work

activities with his bid assignments. We discern nothing in the record

reflecting that the agency has failed to comply with this provision.

Furthermore, the Commission has held that if a settlement agreement does

not include specific duration terms for the employment relationship

which could have been agreed upon, it would be improper to interpret

the reasonable intentions of the parties as binding the agency to the

terms thereof forever. See Parker v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05910576 (August 30, 1991). We determine that the agency's decision

to alter complainant's starting time by two hours, approximately two

years after the agreement was executed, cannot be construed as an action

that breached provision (4).

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that it did not breach the

settlement agreement is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 13, 2003

__________________

Date

1The Commission notes that although

complainant's breach claim is dated October 5, 2002, it makes reference

to a disciplinary action dated eighteen days later, on October 23, 2002.