01a42781
09-09-2004
James Maples, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Southeast Area, Agency.
James Maples v. United States Postal Service
01A42781
September 9, 2004
.
James Maples,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Southeast Area,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A42781
Agency No. 1-H-351-0008-03
Hearing No. 130-2003-08286X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms
the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, a Mail Processing Clerk at
the agency's Birmingham, Alabama District Office, filed a formal EEO
complaint on November 8, 2002, alleging that the agency had discriminated
against him on the bases of race (African-American), sex (male), and
disability (chronic muscle spasm), when management refused to assist
him in completing his disability retirement application and because he
was not allowed to remain in paid status pending the disposition of his
disability retirement application.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the
investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no
discrimination. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ's decision was based upon
erroneous and incomplete information and documentation provided to the
AJ by the agency. Complainant argues that there are genuine issues
of material fact in dispute. Specifically, he contends that he had
medical documentation showing he was able to work. He contends that a
similarly situated female clerk who was awaiting the disposition of her
disability retirement application and was on leave without pay (LWOP),
had been offered the opportunity to be in paid status. He further asserts
that the AJ's decision on complainant's ability to work was based upon
incorrect documentation. Further, he contends that the agency failed
to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his treatment.
The agency makes no contentions on appeal.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision
without a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative
proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without a
hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately
developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
For purposes of further analysis, we assume, arguendo, and without
finding, that complainant established that he is a qualified individual
with a disability and is entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation
Act. Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually
focuses on whether the complainant has established a prima facie
case, following this order of analysis is unnecessary when, as here,
the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition
No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from
whether the complainant has established a prima facie case to whether he
has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's
reasons for its actions merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.;
see also United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714-17 (1983).
The agency provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not
assisting complainant in completing his disability retirement application
and not allowing him to remain in paid status pending the disposition
of his disability retirement application. Specifically, the Plant
Manager stated that complainant asked him for assistance in applying for
disability retirement. Thereafter, the Plant Manager discussed the matter
with the District Manager of Human Resources who advised him not to assist
employees on their disability retirement because it was not his field
of expertise, and if he made mistakes, the agency could be held liable.
He noted that the District Manager of Human Resources further stated that
employees could take their disability retirement questions to the Human
Resources staff who were well versed on retirement issues. He stated that
he had previously assisted a Clerk on his disability retirement prior
to being advised not to by the District Manager of Human Resources.
He contended that he did not assist any agency employees with their
disability retirement applications subsequent to the admonishment by
the District Manager of Human Resources. With respect to complainant's
allegation regarding not being allowed to remain in pay status while
awaiting the disposition of his disability retirement application,
the agency stated that complainant was placed in LWOP status because
his physician wrote a letter stating that he was unable to work.
We find that complainant failed to present persuasive evidence that the
agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext for race,
sex or disability discrimination. Complainant contends that he submitted
medical documentation showing he was able to work. The records cited by
complainant were agency letters, dated in April of 1998, stating that he
was offered and accepted a permanent rehabilitation job since he could
work up to ten hours a day. Complainant's physician's wrote a letter,
on June 18, 2002, stating that complainant was unable to work. In denying
complainant work, the agency reasonably relied upon medical documentation
from complainant's physician showing complainant's current medical status
instead of documentation showing his status over five years ago.
The record revealed that there were two similarly situated White clerks
(male and female) who were employed by the agency and waiting for the
disposition of their disability retirement applications. The records
showed that the male clerk was allowed to work four hours a day in
accordance with medical documentation showing that he was physically able
to work four hours a day. Evidence of record further showed that the
female clerk was not allowed to work because of her health conditions and
she was placed on LWOP without pay during the pendency of her disability
retirement application. With respect to complainant's contention
that the female clerk was given the option of remaining in pay status,
a review of the agency medical records and documentation submitted by
complainant does not reveal that the female clerk was given the option
of remaining in pay status. Aside from complainant's statement, there
is no evidence to support his contention. Consequently, we find that
the AJ properly found no discrimination.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine
dispute of material fact exists. See Petty v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We find that the AJ's decision
properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. Further, construing the evidence to
be most favorable to complainant, we conclude that complainant failed
to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated by
discriminatory animus toward complainant's protected classes.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 9, 2004
__________________
Date