James M. Moynihan, Complainant,v.Roderick R. Paige, Secretary, Department of Education, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 27, 2002
01A13060 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 27, 2002)

01A13060

08-27-2002

James M. Moynihan, Complainant, v. Roderick R. Paige, Secretary, Department of Education, Agency.


James M. Moynihan v. Department of Education

01A13060

August 27, 2002

.

James M. Moynihan,

Complainant,

v.

Roderick R. Paige,

Secretary,

Department of Education,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A13060

Agency No. ED-9932000

DECISION

Complainant, who is congenitally blind with zero visual acuity,

timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision concerning his

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The record reveals that complainant began

working in the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the agency's Kansas

City, Missouri facility in 1980. In March 1999, he was employed as a

GS-12 Equal Opportunity Specialist. Complainant applied for a GS-13

Equal Opportunity Specialist position and was included on the best

qualified list. All of the applicants participated in oral interviews.

An allegation arose that one of the applicants had prior notice of the

specific questions that were going to be asked during the oral interview.

Although an internal investigation concluded that this was not true,

it was decided that a written examination would also be administered.

According to the agency, the scheme devised for administering the

written questions had two basic features: protection against the advance

disclosure of the questions or even when the examination was to be

administered and assurance that the written responses would be judged

without identification of the applicant. The agency believed that the

anonymity of the applicants was so important to the integrity of the

process that �a somewhat elaborate� system was put in place to ensure that

the identity of the applicant was not revealed to the individual who would

be scoring the responses. Specifically, a test identification number was

assigned so that the applicants' names would not appear on the responses.

The applicants were also given a choice whether to handwrite or word

process their responses. The handwritten responses were then transcribed

by the OCR Director's secretary so that the individual scoring the answers

(the �scorer�) could not identify the applicants by their handwriting.

Finally, the transcribed responses were proofread by the applicants

before being submitted to the scorer, who, after evaluating and scoring

the responses, submitted them to the selecting official.

During complainant's tenure with the agency, he was provided with

various forms of accommodation, including assistive devices, readers

and private office space. In order for complainant to take the written

examination, he was provided a computer with synthesized speech, and

the examination was administered by a proctor in complainant's office.

The role of the proctor was to read the questions to complainant and to

monitor the exam. The agency found that it was not clear from the record

whether the computer's synthesized speech caused complainant's responses

to be audible to the proctor or simply visible on screen and in print.

Either way, the agency found that the record supported a finding that

there was sufficient exposure, whether visual or auditory, to make

complainant's responses recognizable to the proctor. Because the proctor

was the same individual as the scorer, complainant did not enjoy the

anonymity enjoyed by the other applicants during the scoring process, a

process which, because it required the scorer to evaluate the applicants'

responses, was inherently subjective. Five of the nine applicants were

selected for the position based on their overall scores from the oral

interviews and the written examinations. Complainant's score was the

sixth highest score, and he was not selected.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on July 6, 1999, alleging that he was discriminated against

on the basis of his disability when he was not selected for a GS-13

Equal Employment Opportunity Specialist position in March 1999. The

investigative report also supports a finding that complainant claimed

he was denied reasonable accommodation during the selection process.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant declined a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge and requested that the agency issue

a final decision.

In its final decision, the agency found that complainant was a qualified

individual with a disability insofar as he has a vision impairment

which substantially limits his ability to see and that he was included

on the certificate of eligibles for the GS-13 position at issue.

The agency found that although complainant established a prima facie

case of disability discrimination in regard to his non-selection, he

did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting complainant,

namely that his score was not one of the five highest scores, was a

pretext for discrimination. However, the agency found that complainant

was denied reasonable accommodation during the application process and

that he was discriminated against under a theory of disparate treatment

when he was denied anonymity. As a result, the agency ordered the OCR to

revise its reasonable accommodation procedures; to provide eight hours

of disability awareness and reasonable accommodation training to all

supervisors and managers in its Kansas City, Missouri facility; and to

post an appropriate notice. The agency did not award complainant with

retroactive placement in the position with back pay and did not address

whether complainant was entitled to the compensatory damages he requested

in his formal complaint.

On appeal, complainant requests that the Commission award him individual

relief. In a brief submitted by counsel, complainant requests that

the complaint be remanded for the �development of facts sufficient

for the fact finder to make appropriate credibility determinations.�

In this regard, complainant argues that one of the selectees had prior

knowledge of the �type� of questions, although not the specific questions

themselves, which were going to be asked during the oral interview.

Complainant argues that this is relevant because the OCR's internal

investigation was conducted by the scorer, and it is complainant's

contention that the scorer's �evasive� answers to questions posed by

the EEO investigator indicate discriminatory animus. The agency did

not respond to complainant's brief.

We accept complainant's appeal and examine the agency's final decision

under a de novo standard of review to determine whether a preponderance of

the evidence supports a finding of unlawful disability discrimination.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). We find that it does. In reaching this

conclusion, we discern no reason to disturb the agency's own finding that

it denied complainant reasonable accommodation during the selection

process when it denied him anonymity.<2> We note that the agency

specifically found that under the circumstances, it was not sufficient

for the agency to simply allow complainant to use equipment necessary

for him to generate a written response because a critical element of

the application process with regard to the written examination involved

safeguarding anonymity. Thus, to have been reasonable, the accommodation

had to provide complainant with anonymity. The agency further found that

to provide such an accommodation would not have caused an undue hardship.

29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o) and (p).

Having determined that complainant was discriminated against when he was

denied reasonable accommodation during the selection process, we find

the agency erred in requiring complainant to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

not selecting him was a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this

conclusion we note that EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501 provides

in part that:

When an agency, or the Commission, finds that an employee of the agency

was discriminated against, the agency shall provide relief, which shall

include, but need not be limited to, one or more of the following actions:

(1) Nondiscriminatory placement with back pay computed in the manner

prescribed by 5 C.F.R. 550.805, unless clear and convincing evidence

contained in the record demonstrates that the personnel action would

have been taken even absent the discrimination.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(c)(1). The burden is on the employer to show by

clear and convincing evidence that even in the absence of discrimination,

complainant would not have been selected for the GS-13 position. See

Pryor v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05980405 (August

6, 1999); Gimbel v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982882

(September 5, 2001). Placing such an onerous burden on the employer is

proper, inasmuch as the employer's unlawful act caused the difficulty in

determining what would have resulted if there had been no discrimination.

See Dereyna et al. v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01980077

(January 19, 2001). Thus, in a case such as this one, complainant is

entitled to retroactive placement in the position, "unless clear and

convincing evidence contained in the record" demonstrates that, even

absent discrimination, complainant would not have been selected for the

position he desired. See Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

In its final decision, the agency refused to concede that complainant's

anonymity was compromised by the scorer's dual role as the proctor.

However, we find under the facts set forth above, that complainant's

anonymity was compromised by the proctor's dual role as the scorer.

We further find that, in light of the emphasis the agency placed on the

importance of anonymity and the �somewhat elaborate� ends to which it went

to ensure anonymity for the other applicants, complainant's anonymity was

central to the integrity of the subjective scoring process. Accordingly,

since the agency's only explanation for not selecting complainant was

because of his score, we find that the agency has failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that had complainant enjoyed the anonymity

provided to the other applicants, it would not have selected him for

the GS-13 position. We therefore find that complainant is entitled to

retroactive promotion to the GS-13 position with appropriate back pay.

We note that complainant has raised a cognizable claim for compensatory

damages which are available in the federal sector EEO process. West

v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999). When an agency fails to provide an

individual with reasonable accommodation for his disability, the agency

will not be relieved of its obligation to pay appropriate compensatory

damages, to the extent proven, unless it acted in good faith in attempting

to make reasonable accommodation. See Teshima v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961997 (May 5, 1998). Upon review of the

record before us, the Commission concludes that although the agency

ultimately failed to make reasonable accommodation during the selection

process, its efforts to do so were made in good faith. See Ghannam

v. Agency for International Development, EEOC Appeal No. 01990574

(November 9, 2000), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request

No. 05A10146 (August 2, 2001). We therefore conclude that complainant

is not entitled to compensatory damages.

The agency's final decision, finding that complainant was denied

reasonable accommodation, is affirmed, and the relief granted complainant

is modified for the reasons set forth above. The agency is directed to

take action consistent with the Order below.

ORDER

1. Within sixty (60) days of this decision becoming final, the agency

shall offer complainant the GS-13 Equal Opportunity Specialist position.

Complainant shall be given a minimum of fifteen days from receipt of the

offer within which to accept or decline the offer. Failure to accept

the offer within the time period set by the agency will be considered a

rejection of the offer, unless complainant can show that circumstances

beyond his control prevented a response within the time limit.

2. The agency shall award complainant back pay with interest and other

benefits due, for the period from March 1999 to the date he accepts

or declines to accept the GS-13 position. The agency shall determine

the appropriate amount of back pay with interest and other benefits

due complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty

(60) days after the date this decision becomes final. The complainant

shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back

pay and benefits due, and shall provide relevant information requested

by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back

pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant

for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date

the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant

may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

�Implementation of the Commission's Decision.�

To the extent it has not already done so, the agency shall provide eight

hours of disability awareness and reasonable accommodation training to

the appropriate supervisors and managers in its Kansas City, Missouri

facility and shall review its reasonable accommodation procedures to

insure against violations of the Rehabilitation Act.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Kansas City, Missouri facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e).<3> The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 27, 2002

__________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that a

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. has occurred at the agency's Kansas City,

Missouri facility (hereinafter this facility).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

This facility was found to have denied an employee reasonable

accommodation for a disability during a competitive selection process.

The agency was ordered to award the employee retroactive promotion with

back pay and to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The agency was

also ordered to provide appropriate training to this facility's managers

and supervisors. This facility will ensure that officials responsible

for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will

abide by the requirements of all federal equal employment opportunity

laws and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment

opportunity law.

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 16141 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply

the standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints

of discrimination by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 After determining that complainant was denied reasonable accommodation,

the agency then determined that complainant was discriminated against

when he was deprived of anonymity while the other applicants were

granted anonymity. We find that, in so doing, the agency framed the

claim concerning the denial of reasonable accommodation as a claim of

disparate treatment. We find that this was inappropriate because the

claims are distinct, as are the theories of liability that flow from them.

To establish discrimination under a reasonable accommodation theory, no

showing of intent is required while under a theory of disparate treatment,

a showing of intentional discrimination is required. Moreover, we

find that the agency's analysis of the �reasonable accommodation turned

disparate treatment claim� is incorrect whether the adverse treatment

sustained by complainant is considered as either a denial of accommodation

(because complainant was not similarly situated to applicants who did

not need accommodations, thereby defeating his prima facie case) or a

denial of anonymity (because the denial of anonymity does not state a

claim for which relief can be granted).

3 A prevailing party, for purposes of obtaining attorney's fees, is

one who succeeds on any significant issue, and achieves some of the

benefit sought in bringing the action. Because complainant has obtained

personal relief, he is a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees.

See Davis v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05970101

(February 4, 1999).