James King, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 25, 2002
01A12479 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 25, 2002)

01A12479

07-25-2002

James King, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


James King v. United States Postal Service

01A12479

July 25, 2002

.

James King,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12479

Agency No. 4D-280-0011-00

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Window/Distribution Clerk at Concord Post Office, Concord, North

Carolina facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaints on December 14, 1999 and January 21, 2000<1>,

alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of race (Black)

when:

(1) from October 17,1999, and ongoing, he was not allowed to perform

maintenance on the CBS (Carrier Sequence Bar Code Sorter) machine;

from September 1999, he was harassed by co-workers and from October 17,

1999, a manager allowed co-workers to follow complainant around the

building and slander his name;

on November 15, 1999, a manager allowed a casual employee to perform

preferential duties; and

on November 15, 1999, complainant became aware that he was going to be

reassigned to the Main Post Office.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant did not established a

prima facie case of race discrimination. Specifically, the agency noted

that complainant failed to cite any similarly situated individuals outside

of his protected group who were treated more favorably than himself,

under similar circumstances.

Regarding claim (1), the agency noted that complainant stated that

after receiving training on the maintenance of the CSBCS machine he

was not assigned duties that would allow him to use the training.

The agency alleged that complainant complained of pain in his back,

therefore, complainant was used on distribution to pick up his speed

and rest his back. The agency concluded that complainant failed to cite

any individuals who complained of back pain and were assigned duties to

perform maintenance on the CSBCS machine.

Regarding claim (2), the agency concluded that complainant failed to

prove a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment. Specifically,

the agency noted that complainant failed to demonstrate he was subjected

to unwelcome harassment; the harassment complained of was based on his

race; or that the harassment complained of affected a term or condition

of employment, and/or had the purpose of or affect of unreasonably

interfering with his work environment and/or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment. The agency noted that complainant

merely alleged that two employees told other employees that he was lazy,

and one of the employees followed him into the bathroom to see where

complainant was. The agency stated that complainant advised a manager

and that manager spoke with them about complainant's concern, and there

were no further incidents. Therefore, the agency concluded that there is

no evidence nor has complainant proffered any evidence of a continuing

pattern or series of harassing events. The agency concluded that there

is no concrete evidence that the alleged harassment was severe.

Regarding claim (3), the agency noted that complainant compared himself

with a Casual Employee, and that at the time of the instant matter,

complainant was a Part-Time Flexible Employee. The agency concluded

that complainant cannot be considered similarly situated to the named

comparison employee. The agency further concluded that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

Regarding claim (4), the agency concluded that complainant failed to

cite any similarly situated individuals outside of his protected group

who were treated more favorably than himself, under similar circumstances.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment

As a general matter, in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination,

claims of discrimination alleging disparate treatment are examined

under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analytical framework,

the complainant must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited reason was a factor

in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action(s). Texas

Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). After the

agency has offered the reason for its action, the burden returns to the

complainant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's reason was pretextual--that is, it was not the true reason,

or the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria. Burdine,

450 U.S. at 253. However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the agency intentionally discriminated against complainant

remains at all times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

Even assuming arguendo that complainant established prima facie case

of discrimination on the basis of race, we conclude that the agency

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Specifically, the record reveals that complainant was allowed to perform

some maintenance work on the machines eleven times from September 2,

1999 through November 9, 1999, but complainant complained about pain

in his back and that he was placed in distribution. The record also

reveals that management did not show favoritism, but rather placed

individuals where the skills and abilities could be utilized best.

The record further reveals that complainant was reassigned to the Main

Office, because no one bid on the position and that the complainant,

who was the senior part-time flexible employee, was offered the job.

Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed

directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Chouteau

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01973853 (Mar. 10, 2000).

Accordingly, we next examine whether complainant has presented sufficient

evidence to prove the agency's reasons are merely pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Complainant argued that he did receive CSBCS machine

training but was discriminated against by not being given the opportunity

to work on the machines, complainant argued that he was not allowed

to utilize the training. Complainant also argued that management gave

preference to a White employee (CW1) and that management let CW1 do

as he pleased. Finally, complainant argued that since he did not bid

on the job at the Main Post Office, he would have been placed at the

bottom of the part-time flexible list.

We find that complainant failed to show pretext. Complainant did not

rebut the agency's reason for its actions. For example, complainant

did not rebut that he had back pains, nor he was allowed to perform some

maintenance work on the machines.

Harassment

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion

is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14,

1998) (citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of hostile

environment harassment, a complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to

a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the

form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected

class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily

protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of

employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering

with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile,

or offensive work environment. 29 C.F.R.� 160.

Regarding complainant's claim of harassment, we find that complainant

failed to established a prima facie case of hostile environment

harassment. We find that even if complainant's allegations are true,

there are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter complainant's

condition of employment.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 25, 2002

__________________

Date

1These matters were a consolidation of agency cases nos. 4D-280-0011-00

and 4D-280-0073-00.