James D. Stewart, Complainant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 14, 1999
01990500_r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 14, 1999)

01990500_r

12-14-1999

James D. Stewart, Complainant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


James D. Stewart, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01990500

) Agency No. 980895

Daniel R. Glickman, )

Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

On October 9, 1998, after failing to receive a response from the

agency regarding his claim of breach of a June 17, 1998 settlement

agreement, complainant filed an appeal with this Commission for a

compliance determination.<1> See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659, 37,660

(1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulations

29 C.F.R. ��1614.402, .504(b)); EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the agency

agreed to:

(4) Approve [complainant's] requests for six (6) training classes over

the thirty-six (36) months immediately following the execution of this

agreement, in accordance with applicable law and regulations.

(6) Take necessary steps to ensure that [complainant] is treated equitably

and that he is free from unlawful discrimination, harassment, or reprisal

actions in the workplace.

By letter to the agency dated August 11, 1998, complainant alleged

that the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and

requested guidance as to his options to specifically implement the

terms of the agreement, or, as later requested in his appeal to the

Commission, to reinstate contact with an EEO counselor at the point

it was terminated in the informal complaint process. Specifically,

complainant alleged in his claim of breach that the agency failed to

�live up� to item number (6) in the agreement, and attached a detailed

complaint �outlining a systematic process of reprisal and fostering of

a hostile work environment� by the �individual against whom I lodged my

original complaint.� In his appeal to the Commission and in a subsequent

November 23, 1998 letter to the agency, complainant also alleged that

the agency failed to implement the training provisions of item (4)

of the settlement agreement, and that the EEO Counselor was responsible

for certain improprieties that affected the settlement. With respect to

item (4) of the agreement, complainant asserted that he had submitted a

training plan, but had received no response. Regarding the EEO Counselor

allegations, complainant maintained that the EEO Counselor made comments

that prejudiced the settlement and tainted management's view of the

complaint, misrepresented what issues could be resolved by settlement,

and that he was pressured to withdraw his request for anonymity and

confidentiality - which were later violated in the counseling process.

Specifically, complainant in effect asserts that the settlement should

be voided because the EEO Counselor made comments that prejudiced the

settlement, including that the complaint looked like revenge, and

that several of the agency's actions were within supervisory authority.

Complainant also contends that he was pressured to withdraw his request

for anonymity and confidentiality, which he asserts were violated by

the EEO Counselor, and that the EEO Counselor misrepresented what issues

were timely and could be resolved at settlement.

Although, as noted above, complainant had already filed an appeal with the

Commission, on November 5, 1998 the agency issued a final decision (FAD)

in reply to complainant's initial August 11, 1998 claims of reprisal. The

agency's decision stated that, according to EEOC Regulations and guidance,

claims that subsequent acts of discrimination and reprisal violate a

settlement agreement shall be processed as separate complaints rather

than a complaint of noncompliance. Consequently, the FAD found that

any alleged incidents of reprisal occurring after the signing of the

settlement were new issues that must be pursued through a new complaint.

On March 24, 1999, the agency also acknowledged complainant's claim of

breach of item (4), and in a May 18, 1999 letter to complainant, asserted

agency compliance with all of the terms of the settlement agreement.

Enclosed with the May 18 assertion of compliance, was an April 12, 1999

letter from the complainant to the agency's Regional Director discussing

the six training courses referenced in item (4) of the settlement.

Complainant's letter submitted five classes for agency approval, stating

he could not find a sixth class that met his needs, but that he would

forward a request for approval if he could find an additional class.

The signature of the agency's Regional Director indicated approval

of complainant's requested courses as of the April 12, 1999 date of

the letter.

Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a)) provides that any

settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties,

reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both

parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes

a contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that if a complainant

believes that the agency has failed to comply with the terms of a

settlement agreement, he may request that the terms of the agreement

be specifically implemented, or, alternatively, that the complaint be

reinstated for further processing. However, the Commission has held

that a complaint which alleges reprisal or further discrimination in

violation of a settlement agreement's "no reprisal" clause, is to be

processed as a separate complaint and not as a breach of settlement.

Bindal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900225

(August 9, 1990); 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(c).

In the instant case, we concur with the agency's determination that it was

in compliance with the settlement agreement. First, we find that item (6)

in the settlement agreement clearly constitutes a �no reprisal clause� as

contemplated by EEOC precedent. As such, any alleged violation of this

provision must be processed as a separate complaint of discrimination

rather than as a breach of settlement. Complainant is therefore advised

to seek counseling concerning any incidents that he feels are retaliatory

in nature.<2>

With respect to complainant's claim that the agency failed to provide

training classes as stated in item (4) of the agreement, we also find that

the agency has not breached the settlement. The June 17, 1998 settlement

called for the agency to �[a]pprove Employee's requests for six (6)

training classes over the thirty-six (36) months immediately following the

execution of this agreement.� The record indicates that complainant's

April 12, 1999 request for five training courses was immediately approved,

and it provides no evidence that he has requested approval of a sixth

course. In any event, the agency has the entire thirty-six-month time

frame provided in the agreement to meet its obligations, a time frame

not ending until June 17, 2001. The agency is therefore in compliance

with item (4) of the settlement.

Finally, we find that complainant's claims of impropriety on the

part of the EEO Counselor do not rise to the level necessary to void

the settlement agreement. As noted above, a settlement agreement

between an EEO complainant and a federal agency is a contract subject

to ordinary principles of contract interpretation and construction.

Thus, a settlement agreement may be voidable in some circumstances

if a complainant can show that there was coercion, misrepresentation

or mistake in the making of the agreement. Terracina v. Department of

Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05910888 (March 11, 1992).

Despite complainant's claims, however, he has not submitted any evidence

to establish that the EEO Counselor or agency either coerced him into

signing the settlement agreement or committed any other unlawful action so

that he would sign the agreement. Moreover, he offers no evidence that

the EEO Counselor intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented facts

or information to him; or that the parties entered into the agreement

based on a mutual mistake of a material fact. Therefore, we find that

complainant failed to demonstrate that any coercion, misrepresentation,

or mistake occurred. In the absence of such evidence, the Commission

finds no basis to deem the agreement null and void.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that it was in compliance with

the settlement agreement is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth above.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE

FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR

DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

December 14, 1999

____________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date Equal Employment Assistant 1On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2We note that complainant stated in his November 23, 1998 letter to the

agency that he had indeed filed a separate reprisal complaint concerning

the instant issues, �as suggested� in the agency's November 5, 1998 FAD.