James C. York, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 9, 2005
01a50314 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 9, 2005)

01a50314

09-09-2005

James C. York, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


James C. York v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A50314

September 9, 2005

.

James C. York,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A50314

Agency No. 200K-1403, 200K-1174

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) by the agency dated September 10, 2004, finding that

it was in compliance with the terms of the July 11, 2001 settlement

agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402;

29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

(3) The agency agrees to place the complainant in an Individual

Development Plan [IDP] that is designed to assist him plan and carry out

an organized approach to enhance his current job performance, as well

as a means to achieve any career goals he may have. The complainant can

choose either his supervisor or his own personal mentor to work with him

through this program. The IDP is designed to train the complainant to

enable achievement in career goals, but does not guarantee placement in

any designated or specific position. It is the responsibility of the

complainant to conform to and comply with the requirements of the IDP.

By letters to the agency submitted in May 2004 and July 2004, complainant

alleged that the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement.<1>

Specifically, complainant alleged that the agency failed to afford him

the opportunity to achieve his career objective. Complainant asserted

that he had been denied a path to the Senior Executive Service (SES)

and that he had been denied any position beyond the GS-11 level despite

having met the requirements of the IDP. Complainant indicated that

he had watched less qualified, less senior white employees obtain

high management positions while he was denied positions for which he

was qualified. Complainant noted that he had not previously alleged a

breach of settlement because he wanted to give the agency the benefit

of the doubt, until he became aware of the hiring of a white individual

he considered to be a less qualified employee.

In its September 10, 2004 FAD, the agency concluded that complainant had

abandoned his right to pursue his claim under the doctrine of laches.

The FAD further found that, absent the untimeliness of complainant's

breach claim, the agency had not breached the settlement agreement because

the settlement agreement did not guarantee complainant placement in any

designated or specific position.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, we find the agency did not breach the terms of the

July 11, 2001 settlement agreement when complainant was not selected

for a higher level position. We note that the terms of the settlement

agreement indicate that the IDP �is designed to train the complainant

to enable achievement in career goals, but does not guarantee placement

in any designated or specific position. It is the responsibility of

the complainant to conform to and comply with the requirements of the

IDP.� Therefore, while the terms of the agreement require the agency to

place complainant in an IDP and help him achieve his career objectives,

the agreement does not obligate the agency to provide complainant with

an actual position/promotion. If the complainant wanted the agency

to guarantee a promotion, he was free to negotiate with the agency to

include this provision in the settlement agreement. See Jenkins-Nye

v. General Service Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01851903 (March

4, 1987). Thus, we find the agency complied with provision (3) of the

settlement agreement. Because we find the agency did not breach the July

11, 2001 settlement agreement, we do not address whether complainant's

claim is barred by the doctrine of laches.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no breach of the settlement

agreement is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 9, 2005

__________________

Date

1The record reveals that complainant initially alleged breach of

settlement in a formal complaint filed on March 25, 2004, which also

alleged discrimination based on race (African American) and reprisal for

prior EEO activity. Complainant and his representative subsequently

submitted letters on May 28, 2004 and July 8, 2004, addressing the

specifics of complainant's breach allegation.