James A. Burns, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 17, 1999
01970379 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 17, 1999)

01970379

06-17-1999

James A. Burns, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency


James A. Burns v. United States Postal Service

01970379

June 17, 1999

James A. Burns, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01970379

v. ) Agency No. 4F-926-1386-95

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et

seq, Accordingly, the appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order

No. 960,001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly found appellant failed

to prove a prima facie case.

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed a formal complaint on January 4, 1996, alleging

discrimination on the basis of retaliation (prior EEO activity) when on

September 18, 1995 he was issued a letter placing him on administrative

leave, prohibiting him from entering the Irvine Post Office, and requiring

him to submit additional medical documentation before returning to duty;

and a copy of the letter was faxed to his attorney.

Appellant was on extended medical leave due to stress,<1> and states

that his doctor cleared him for return to duty in a letter sent to the

agency on September 18, 1995.<2>

The investigative file contains an affidavit from the District Manager

(the Manager) stating that appellant was placed on administrative leave

after a Postal Inspection Service administrative investigation found

financial and other irregularities at the Irvine office that occurred

under appellant's supervision,<3> and that to allow appellant onto

the premises while the investigation continued would be imprudent.

The manager states he consulted with the manager of Human Resources and

Injury Compensation before placing appellant on administrative leave

In its final agency decision the agency found that appellant failed

to prove a prima facie case based on retaliation when he was unable

to demonstrate that he had been treated differently than any other

comparable employee. The agency further asserts that it stated legitimate

and nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Appellant requested in

numerous EEO complaints filed that all communication be forwarded to

his attorney of record.

Postal Service rules and regulations state that any employee returning

to work after 21 or more days of sick leave must provide

medical evidence of their ability to return to work. Employees returning

to work after certain illnesses including mental and nervous conditions

must submit a physician's statement stating unequivocally that they are

fit for full duties without hazard to themselves or others.

On appeal, appellant submitted as proof of the manager's animus toward him

copies of letters including a February 1996, Proposed Notice of Removal

sent by the agency to the Manager for sexual harassment complaints filed

by female postal workers; the Manager's attorney's response which refers

to the agency's efforts to remove appellant; and an April 1996, Letter

of Decision demoting the Manager.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an

allegation of reprisal, appellant must show: 1) that he engaged in

protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding; 2)

that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected

activity; 3) that he was disadvantaged by an action of the agency

contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and 4)

that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), affirmed,

545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F. 2d

80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burrus v. United telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,

683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

Appellant lists agency actions which disadvantaged him subsequent to

and contemporaneous with his EEO activity. The record indicates that

appellant filed numerous prior EEO complaints, one of which was pending

at the time appellant filed the instant complaint, and that agency

officials were aware of that activity. The Commission finds that a

causal connection can be inferred based on the proximity in time between

the protected activity and the adverse action. Thus, appellant states

a prima facie case of reprisal.

The Commission finds that appellant's assertion of discrimination based

on reprisal is not, however, borne out by the affidavits of the parties,

which indicate that appellant was placed on administrative leave and

prohibited from the Irvine premises per a Postal Inspection Service

investigation. The agency sought certain medical documentation prior

to appellant's return as required by the agency's regulations and the

letter was faxed to appellant's attorney as per his earlier request.

Appellant fails to demonstrate that the reasons articulated by the

agency for its actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981).

Appellant provided a copy of a letter from the manager's attorney to

the agency alluding to the agency's and the manager's desire to remove

appellant, however there is nothing in the letter to suggest that any

animus toward appellant was based on his prior EEO activity.

We find that appellant has failed to show that the agency's actions

were in reprisal for his protected activity. Therefore, the agency's

determination that appellant failed to establish that the agency

retaliated against him or that its actions were based on discriminatory

animus was correct.

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION

June 17, 1999

________________________ _______________________

DATE Carlton Haddon, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 The record indicates appellant is being treated for stress, however,

appellant does not raise mental disability as a basis in his complaint.

2 The record does not contain a copy of the letter.

3 Appellant was Postmaster at the Irvine office.