Jacqueline Carter, Complainant,v.Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 11, 2002
01A12970_r (E.E.O.C. Oct. 11, 2002)

01A12970_r

10-11-2002

Jacqueline Carter, Complainant, v. Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.


Jacqueline Carter v. Department of the Interior

01A12970

.October 11, 2002

Jacqueline Carter,

Complainant,

v.

Gale A. Norton,

Secretary,

Department of the Interior,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12970

Agency Nos. FNP-99-113

FNP-00-003

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal from an agency final decision on

the captioned complaints, claiming unlawful employment discrimination

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, the agency employed

complainant as a GS-5 Realty Clerk at its Northeast Regional Office in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After EEO counseling, complainant filed

the captioned complaints, which the agency accepted and consolidated

for processing. In these complaints, complainant claims that the agency

retaliated against her due to her current and prior EEO activity, as

evidenced by the following incidents:

(1) On June 11, 1999, complainant received an e-mail from her first

line supervisor (S1) criticizing her performance on a recent assignment;

On August 24, 1999, certain named co-workers received a $500.00

on-the-spot award for working on a special project, but complainant,

who also worked on the same special project, did not receive the award;

On August 26, 1999, without prior notice, the agency removed

complainant's computer from her desk, sending four employees into her

office to do so, including an armed guard; and

On September 10, 1999, S1 improperly issued complainant a Notice of

Reprimand.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency notified complainant

of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its decision, the agency determined that complainant established

a prima facie case of retaliation regarding each of her four claims.

Specifically, the agency found that the concurrent processing of

complainant's additional EEO complaints at the time the incidents at

issue occurred, which all involved the same responsible agency officials,

established the required nexus under the applicable legal standards.

However, the agency also determined that the agency proffered legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions in each of the four claims,

and that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that these reasons were a mere pretext for retaliation.

In addressing claim 1, the agency determined that it proffered legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons because of S1's statement that she sent

complainant the e-mail at issue due to her displeasure with complainant's

preparation of a deed package, averring that she had to obtain all the

necessary materials for complainant, and even then had to return the

package to complainant several times for corrections. The agency then

found that complainant's statements that she was unfamiliar with deed

package preparation, and that S1 also made errors, failed to establish

that the criticisms were either untrue or retaliatory.

Regarding claim 2, the agency found that it proffered legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for not providing complainant with an

on-the-spot award. Specifically, the agency determined that only

the three Cartographic Technicians who served on the special project

team received that award, and that it was given to them because their

work on the project was outside of their normally performed duties.

By contrast, complainant's work on the team (typing cover memoranda), as

well as that of a Realty Specialist who also did not receive an award,

were routine and clerical in nature, and fell within their usual daily

work assignments. The agency then determined that complainant failed to

provide any evidence showing that this reason was untrue or a pretext

for reprisal.

With respect to claim 3, the agency found that the day before

complainant's computer was removed from her office, S1 discovered that it

had a secure database on it, one which complainant did not have clearance

to use, such that S1 viewed it as a security risk. Although the agency

acknowledged that it should have handled the removal itself in a less

confrontational manner, and that it intended to provide its managers with

training on improving communications, the agency nonetheless determined

that the removal was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons;

specifically, to ascertain whether there had been a security breach.

As further evidence of the legitimacy of this reason, the agency noted

that after confiscation, it delivered the computer to the computer

expert who designed the secured program at issue so that he could

determine whether complainant used the program to gain access to the

secure database. The agency then determined that complainant failed

to produce any evidence that this reason was a pretext for retaliation,

finding that although the removal took place a day after she attempted

to have her previous complaints mediated by the agency, there was no

evidence to show that the responsible management officials involved in

the removal of the computer were aware of this development.

In addressing claim 4, the agency determined that it demonstrated that

S1 properly issued the Notice of Reprimand based on her assessment that

it was warranted due to complainant's insubordinate behavior, namely,

her failure to explain the presence of the secured database on her

computer, her failure to report to the office of a named management

official in connection with the presence of the database, her failure

to report to S1's office to discuss certain training, her failure

to comply with a direct order, and her failure to accomplish tasks

assigned to her. The agency then determined that complainant failed to

produce sufficient evidence to show that these reasons were a pretext

for discrimination, noting in particular that S1 and complainant gave

contradictory accounts about the circumstances surrounding the discovery

of the secured database icon, finding that it was impossible to know who

was telling the truth, but that complainant ultimately failed to show

pretext by a preponderance of the evidence. The agency additionally

found that although complainant averred that she had never received a

reprimand prior to this Notice of Reprimand, the record demonstrated

that she received a Letter of Warning in 1998, for insubordination,

which was the subject of one of her pending complaints.

On appeal, complainant contends that S1 distorted the circumstances

concerning the preparation of the deed package in claim 1 as well as

the incidents in the Notice of Reprimand, and avers that S1 undertook

these actions in retaliation for naming her in the pending complaints.

Complainant further argues that S1 refused to recommend her for an

on-the-spot award only because of the pending complaints, contending that

she did far more work than the Realty Specialist assigned to the special

project. Regarding the icon on her computer, complainant contends that S1

set her up, placing the icon and secured program on the computer herself,

and then orchestrated its removal in a confrontational and humiliating

manner as a means of retaliation. Complainant argues that given the

close temporal proximity of the incidents at issue and the occurrence of

certain developments in the processing of her pending EEO complaints,

there can be no other conclusion but that these actions were motivated

by retaliatory animus.<1>

In response, the agency disputes the accuracy of complainant's factual

contentions on appeal, and further avers that while the temporal

proximity asserted by complainant establishes a prima facie case,

creating an inference of discrimination, it does not, without more,

prove retaliatory intent by a preponderance of the evidence.

After careful review, we concur with the agency that complainant

established a prima facie case of retaliation, given that she named the

same responsible management officials in several pending complaints,

and the on-going processing of these other complaints at the same time

the incidents in her claims occurred. Notwithstanding this clear nexus,

we find that complainant nonetheless failed to present sufficient

evidence that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for

its actions were a pretext for retaliation. See Hochstadt v. Worcester

Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass.), aff'd

545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) .

Regarding claim 1, we find that while complainant contends she did

not know how to prepare a deed package, and that S1 distorted the

circumstances of this incident, the record shows that this type of

assignment is within complainant's position description. Moreover, the

record also shows that in recognition of complainant's concern about her

inexperience with deed packages, S1 asked her to obtain assistance from

a co-worker if she needed help. However, the record shows that due to

complainant's lack of effort, it ultimately fell to S1 to obtain all the

materials for complainant, and that even after substantial assistance,

the work had to be returned to complainant for corrections. Therefore,

given that the record shows that complainant made little effort to

attempt the assignment, resulting in S1 performing much of the task,

even to include obtaining materials, we find that the agency proffered

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for S1's e-mail to complainant

expressing her displeasure at complainant's lack of effort. Moreover,

even in light of any contemporaneous involvement by S1 in complainant's

pending complaints, we find that without more, complainant has failed

to demonstrate a retaliatory motive in sending the e-mail.

Regarding claim 2, we find that the record confirms the agency made the

awards at issue in recognition that the award recipients performed work

outside of their normal duties, and did so in an exemplary fashion.

By contrast, witness affidavit testimony reflects that complainant

performed only routine clerical duties, and, notwithstanding her arguments

to the contrary, did not contribute greatly to the project. Therefore,

again, while it is true that complainant's other EEO complaints were

being processed at the time that the same responsible management officials

decided to make these awards, we find that in light of the evidence that

complainant's contribution to the project did not warrant an award,

she fails to demonstrate a retaliatory motive in her exclusion from

receiving an award.

In claim 3, we find that the record confirms that complainant, as a

Realty Clerk, should not have had the secured database at issue on her

computer, and that only approximately half of the staff had access to

this database. Therefore, while complainant claims that everyone had

the database on their computers, we find that this statement is not

supported by the record. Moreover, in light of the affidavit testimony

of the computer expert who examined the computer and determined that it

had only recently been installed, on August 10, 1999, we must question

the veracity of complainant's claim that she had the database on her

computer for about one year without any question about it until she filed

EEO complaints. We also find that complainant's claim that S1 set her

up, by installing the database on her computer and then removing the

icon, is mere speculation. Moreover, we find that the agency's method

of removal appears to be the result of the absences of key management

officials, combined with the inexperience of those assigned to implement

the removal. Accordingly, we find that the agency acted in response

to a legitimate concern of unauthorized access to a secured database

when it removed complainant's computer, and that complainant failed to

submit sufficient evidence to show that this reason is untrue or that

the removal was motivated by retaliation.<2>

Finally, regarding claim 4, we find that the evidence of record confirms

that complainant received prior discipline for insubordination in the

previous year. Therefore, we discount complainant's claim that she

never received discipline of any kind prior to the September 1999 Notice

of Reprimand, as well as her argument that the agency only disciplined

her for the first time by issuing her this Notice of Reprimand after

she filed EEO complaints. Moreover, while complainant disputes the

agency's insubordination charge, and alleges that S1 issued the Notice

of Reprimand as a �cover-up,� we find that the record nonetheless

demonstrates that the identified incidents occurred, and that the

agency's version of these events is credible. Accordingly, we find

that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency improperly issued her a Notice of Reprimand and that

this action was motivated by retaliation.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission AFFIRMS the

agency's final decision that complainant failed to prove her retaliation

claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 11, 2002

__________________

Date

1On appeal, complainant requests that we consolidate the instant appeal

with two other appeals she has before the Commission, docketed as EEOC

Appeal Nos. 01992260 and 01A03335. However, we note that the Commission

consolidated these two appeals and issued a decision on August 15,

2002, finding no discrimination. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the

claims raised by complainant in her previous complaints, FNP-98-114,

FNP-99-028, and FNP-99-039, which are the subject of the consolidated

appeals, and fully taken them into consideration in rendering the instant

appeal determination.

2We note that the computer expert determined that the icon for the secured

program was deleted, but that the database was added to complainant's

computer on August 10, 1999, and that it was still on complainant's

computer at the time of its removal. However, the computer expert

ultimately determined that complainant did not use the system to access

or change the secured files.