J. Weingarten, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 16, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 446 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J. Weingarten, Inc. and Retail Clerks Union, Local
Union No. 455, Retail Clerks International Associ-
ation, AFL-CIO. Case 23-CA-4401
March 16, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
On November, 21, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Joseph I. Nachman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and
the Respondent filed exceptions and supporting
briefs.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, J. Weingarten, Inc.,
Houston, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order and that the complaint herein,
to the extent that it alleges a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act, be, and it hereby is, dismissed;
provided however, that:
Jurisdiction of this proceeding is hereby retained
for the limited purposes stated in The Remedy
section of the attached Decision.
i We note and correct the following error in that section of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision entitled "Findings of Fact" which in
no way affects the results of this case The Administrative Law Judge
correctly found that Collins testified that her request that a representative of
the Union be present was refused, but stated that her request was allegedly
refused by Perry, rather than by York
2 Members Fanning and Jenkins, for the reasons set forth in their
dissents in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No 150, and Radioear
Corporation, 199 NLRB No 137, dissent from the recommendation of the
Administrative Law Judge that the alleged 8(a)(5) violation be deferred to
arbitration and they would proceed to determine the dispute on its merits
Member Kennedy, for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinions in
Quality Manufacturing Company, 195 NLRB No 42, and Mobil Oil
Corporation, 196 NLRB No 144, dissents from the conclusion of the
Administrative Law Judge that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Sec 8(a)(I) of the Act by denying Collins' request
for union representation during her interview
Member Penello would also dismiss the 8(a)(1) allegation because it is
clear from the record that Respondent was merely conducting an
investigative rather than a disciplinary interview. See Western Electric
Company, Hawthorne Works, 198 NLRB No 82, and National Can
Corporation, 200 NLRB No 156
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This
case tried before me at Houston, Texas, on September 28,1
with all parties present and duly represented, involves a
complaint2 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), which
alleges in substance that J. Weingarten, Inc. (herein
Respondent or Company), (a) in the course of interviewing
Leura Collins, an employee whom Respondent suspected
of having engaged in an act of dishonesty, refused Collins'
request that a representative of Retail Clerks Union, Local
No. 455, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO
(herein Union or Local 455), the collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees in an appropn-
ate unit, be present at such interview, thereby violating
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and (b) unilaterally changed a
term and condition of employment of employees in the
unit represented by Local 455, thereby violating Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. For reasons hereafter stated I find and
conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by denying Collins' request for union representation at
her interview, and that the issue with respect to the alleged
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act should be deferred to
arbitration in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
At the trial all parties were afforded full opportunity to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce rele-
vant and material evidence, to argue orally on the record,
and to submit briefs. Oral argument was waived. Briefs
submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent,
respectively, have been duly considered. Upon the plead-
ings, stipulations of counsel, the evidence, including my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
A. Background
Respondent operates a chain of approximately 100 retail
stores. Some years ago'each store had a lunch counter, but,
as new stores opened, so-called lobby operations were
substituted for the lunch counter operation. The Union has
been recognized for many years as the collective-bargain-
ing representative of Respondent' s sales personnel. The
i This and all dates herein are 1972, unless otherwise stated
2 Issued August 8, on a charge filed June 20, and amended July 17.
3 No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented The
complaint alleges, and by answer Respondent admitted, facts which
establish those jurisdictional elements I find those facts to be as pleaded.
202 NLRB No. 69
J. WEINGARTEN, INC 447
last contract between Respondent and the Union, applica-
ble to such employees, was entered into September 9, 1971,
effective through September 9, 1974. The contract contains
the following pertinent provisions:
Article 4-Discharge and Discrimination
B. An employee may be discharged for proper
cause, and the Employer shall give notice in writing of
such discharge to the Union. The employer shall not
discharge any employee without proper cause and shall
give at least one (1) written warning, notice of the
specific complaint or complaints against such employee
to the employee and to the Umon, except that no
warning notice need be given to an employee, before
discharge, if the cause of such discharge is dishonesty.. .
Article 18-Dispute Procedure
A. The Union shall have the right to designate
store stewards for each store.
B. Should any differences , disputes, or complaints
arise over the interpretation or application of the
contents of this Agreement , there shall be an earnest
effort on the part of both parties to settle such
promptly through the following steps:
Step 1 . By conference between the aggrieved
employee and/or store steward , Umon business
representative , or either , and the manager of the
store
Step 2 . By conference between the Umon
business representative and/or store steward and
the District or Zone Manager.
Step 3 . By conference between an official of the
Union and the President of the Employer or his
designate.
Step 4 . In the event the last step fails to settle
satisfactorily the complaint , it may be referred to
arbitration by either party.
C. In the event the parties cannot agree upon the
selection of an arbitrator within fifteen ( 15) days from
the date of referral of the controversy to arbitration, the
arbitrator shall be selected in the following manner.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
shall be jointly requested by the parties to name a panel
of seven (7) arbitrators . The parties shall then choose
the arbitrator by alternately striking a name from the
list until one ( 1) name remains as the arbitrator chosen
by the parties and empowered to arbitrate the dispute.
The arbitrator shall be authorized to rule and issue a
decision and award in writing on any issue presented
for arbitration , including the question of the arbitrabili-
ty of such issue. His decision and award shall be final
and binding upon the parties to this Agreement. Where
more than one employee is a part of a common
grievance, it shall be heard as a single grievance. The
fees of the arbitrator shall be borne one-half (1/2) by
the Umon and one-half (1 /2) by the Employer party to
the arbitration.
The arbitrator shall have no power to add to,
subtract from, alter, amend, modify or project beyond
its meaning any of the terms and provisions of this
Agreement.
The time limit set forth in this Article may be
extended upon mutual agreement of the parties.
D. No grievance will be considered or discussed
which is presented later than fifteen (15) calendar days
after such has happened excepting for any and all
claims involving wages, which may be presented within
six (6) months. Grievances that have progressed
through Step 1 of the, dispute procedure must be
submitted in writing to be considered in Step 2.
E. The parties agree that grievances may arise of a
general nature affecting or tending to affect several
employees, and that such grievances may be initiated at
any of the above mentioned steps deemed appropriate
by the parties.
To guard against loss due to dishonesty on the part of
employees and/or the public, the Company employs a
number of persons classified as "Loss Prevention Special-
ists" who work mainly undercover among the several
stores. These operatives carry no arms nor are they
identified with any law enforcement agency. At all times
material, Don Hardy was employed in the capacity
mentioned and his immediate superior was Company Vice
President Hal Burnett.
B. The Instant Case
Denial of union representation
Leura Collins was initially employed by Respondent
about 1961, for work at store 2. This is a store which has a
lunch counter and Collins was told at the time of her hire
that she would be entitled to a lunch and a drink each day
she worked, free of cost to her. Collins availed herself of
this privilege. About October 1970, when store 98 first
opened for business, Collins was transferred to that store
and was working there at the time of the events hereafter
referred to. Store 98, being of the lobby type, does not have
a lunch counter and Collins was assigned to work in the
lobby. According to Collins' uncontradicted and credited
testimony, she was never told that the free lunch situation
at store 98 would be any different from that which had
prevailed at store 2, and the evidence shows that she, as
well as most if not all the employees in the lobby
department, including the manager of that department,
took lunch from the lobby without paying for it.4
4 Respondent introduced evidence to the effect that, prior to opening a
new store , a management official conducts an indoctrination course for the
employees of each department, at which it would have been his duty to
inform employee of the provisions of Respondent 's manual which requires
that employees purchase such items as milk and cookies for lunch while off
the clock , and that such items must be consumed in designated lunch areas,
with the purchase receipt retained by the employee Collins credibly
testified that she did not attend such a meeting and there is no evidence that
the manual provision was in fact brought to her attention or the attention of
any other employee. Although the testimony shows that a copy of the
(Continued)
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On or about June 15, Loss Prevention Specialist Hardy
was directed by his superior to investigate a complaint that
an employee in the lobby at store 98 was taking money
from the cash register. The name given Hardy as the
suspected employee was Leura Collins. Hardy spent the
rest of that day and the following day observing the lobby,
but saw nothing to indicate dishonesty on the part of
anyone. The following day, just before noon, Hardy went
to the store, introduced himself to Manager York, whom
he had not theretofore known, and told the latter that he
had observed the lobby department for about 2 days, but
had found nothing wrong. At this point York told Hardy
that just that morning employee Moody had told him that
she had observed Collins purchasing a box of chicken
which sold for $2.98 and for which she had paid $1. After
lunch, Hardy and York called Moody to an area of the
second floor where York's desk is located, and where they
interviewed her relative to the report York had received.
Moody confirmed that she had observed what she had
therefore reported to York. Moody was then excused and
York sent for Collins.
Before Collins came upstairs to where Hardy and York
were, they moved away from York's desk and more into
the center of the area used primarily as the employee
lounge. No employees were in the area at the time. York
testified this was done to make the conversation more
private. When Collins arrived, Hardy was introduced as a
representative of Respondent's security office .5 Hardy
began questioning Collins about the purchase of the
chicken. She readily admitted that, before going to work on
June 15, she purchased some chicken, a loaf of bread, and
a cake, which she paid for and donated to her church for a
dinner the latter was giving. When questioned about the
quantity of chicken she had purchased, Collins explained
that she purchased four pieces for which the price was $1,
but that because the store was out of the small size boxes,
the chicken was put into the larger box normally used
when a greater quantity is purchased. At this point Hardy
went to the selling floor and asked Moody if the store was
in fact out of the smaller size boxes. Moody confirmed that
this was a fact, and that they had been unavailable in the
store when Collins purchased the chicken. Hardy then
asked Moody if she knew how many pieces of chicken
were in the box that Collins purchased. When Moody
replied that she did not have such information, and only
knew that it was the large size box, Hardy returned to the
interview area and told Collins that he had verified the
information she had given and that he was sorry if she had
been inconvenienced, but that the matter had been cleared
up and was now closed.6
Collins testified that several times while she was being
questioned by Hardy about the purchase of the chicken,
she asked Store Manager York that Union Steward
Brockett, or some other representative of the Union be
present, and that Perry refused saying this was a private
matter between her and the Company, and that his
presence was all that was necessary. Both Hardy and York
manual was kept in the lobby department , there is no testimony that Collins
in fact referred to it, and she credibly testified that she did not do so.
5 Throughout her testimony, Collins referred to Hardy as the detective. I
find nothing in the evidence to warrant the inference that Collins had any
reason to believe that Hardy had any official authority, or that he was
testified that Collins did not ask for union representation
during the questioning, but only asked shouldn' t someone
from the Union be there, and that had she in fact requested
such representation during the questioning, the interroga-
tion would have been promptly terminated. I do not regard
this as a conflict in the testimony. Even assuming that
Collins used the words that Hardy and York attributed to
her, while perhaps not quite as articulately expressed as by
one more fluent in the English language, it was her way of
expressing herself-a request that a representative of the
Union be present during her interrogation-and York's
reply that he did not regard this as necessary was
legitimately understood by her to be a denial of her
request.
C. The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violation
When Hardy returned to the interview area and told
Collins, as above stated, that the matter of her purchase of
the chicken was closed, Collins began crying and spontane-
ously remarked that the only thing she had ever gotten
from the store without paying for it' was her free lunch.
Both Hardy and York expressed astonishment that
employees were getting a free lunch and questioned Collins
closely about the practice, what employees were getting a
free lunch, the frequency with which she got such lunch,
and the nature thereof. Hardy began preparing a statement
of the facts, particularly trying to compute how much
Collins owed Respondent for the free lunches she had
gotten, arriving at a figure of about $160. Because Collins
continued to insist that she was entitled to her lunch free of
charge, Hardy left the area and made a telephone call to
his superior, Hal Burnett. Hardy told Burnett about
Collins' claim that she was entitled to a free lunch, and
Burnett said he would look into the matter and call Hardy
back. While Hardy was making his call to Burnett, Collins
again asked York if she could have a union steward with
her, but York again refused . When Hardy returned from
his call to Burnett, he continued taking his statement from
Collins, but she informed York that she would not sign it.
About this time Hardy went to take Burnett's return call
and was told by Burnett that it was the practice in some
stores for employees to get free lunches, but that he had
been unable to ascertain what the practice was at store 98.
With this information Hardy returned to where Collins and
York were and terminated the interrogation of Collins.
When the interrogation of Collins ceased, York asked
Collins not to discuss the matter with anyone because he
considered it private between her and the Company and of
no concern to others. Collins did, however, report all
aspects of the incident first to her shop steward and
immediately thereafter, at the steward's suggestion, to a
representative of the Union. Immediately following the
interrogation of Collins, Manager York discussed the
matter of free lunches with Lobby Department Manager
Odoms. She told York that the practice of free lunches in
the department did exist and that in fact she took free
anything other than what he was introduced to be.
6 My findings to this point are based on a composite of the credited
testimony of Collins, Hardy, and York, which, to the extent mentioned, is
not in material dispute.
J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
lunches. The following day York issued orders that the
practice cease immediately . As a result of this the Union
filed a grievance with the Company , pursuant to the terms
of the contract , which , in pertinent part , reads:
6. Details of grievance, etc: The employees in the
Lobby Department of Weingarten # 98 have always
received their lunches and drinks free , as of Friday,
June 16 , 1972 this practice was discontinued . This is a
reduction in benefits that these employees are entitled
to.
7. Settlement requested. That these employees be
given their lunches and drinks as it has always been
done in the past.
Respondent accepted the aforementioned grievance and
expressed its willingness to process it pursuant to and in
accordance with the grievance procedure provided in the
contract. Umon Agent Phillips testified that the Union
decided to defer processing of its said grievance until the
outcome of this proceeding is known to it.
II. CONTENTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Alleged Denial of Union Representation
In Mobil Oil Corporation, 196 NLRB No. 144, the
Board, relying on its prior decision in Quality Manufactur-
ing Company, 195 NLRB No. 42, held that:
... it is a serious violation of the employee's
individual right to engage in concerted activity by
seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if
the employer denies the employee's request and
compels the employee to appear unassisted at an
interview which may put his job security in jeopardy.
Such a dilution of the employees' right to act
collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view,
unwarranted interference with his right to insist on
concerted protection, rather than individual self-pro-
tection, against possible adverse employer action.
Applying the principles enunciated in Mobil Oil, supra, to
the facts of the instant case, I must and do find and
conclude Respondent's interrogation of Collins, under the
facts of this case, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Having heretofore found that Collins requested union
representation at the interview, and that her request was
denied by York, the only real question to be decided is
whether under all circumstances Collins could reasonably
conclude that the interview might put her job security in
jeopardy. I find that she could so reasonably conclude.
Although Collins, when first notified that she was
wanted upstairs, thought that the subject to be discussed
with her was the possibility of a transfer to another store,
the interview had not proceeded very far before she
learned that Hardy, as a representative of Respondent's
secunty department, was questioning her concerning a
possible act of dishonesty on her part, relating to the
performance of her duties as an employee. Under these
circumstances, Collins could certainly reasonably conclude
Particularly in a retail store, dishonesty on the part of an employee,
when established to an employer's satisfaction, is normally regarded as an
unpardonable offense, and the penalty imposed therefor, except under the
most unusual circumstances, is discharge. Even Respondent's witness, Joe
449
that action might be taken by Respondent which would
put her job secunty in jeopardy.7 That neither Hardy nor
York had authority to impose discipline on Collins, as
Respondent argues, is beside the point. To Collins the
possibility of discipline was just as real whether the
discipline that might be visited upon her was imposed
immediately by Hardy and/or York, or at some future time
by the president of the Company. Equally beside the point
is Respondent's argument that Collins was not in fact
"afraid of her job," that she was not afraid of being
accused of something because she knew she had done
nothing wrong and that the concern she expressed in her
testimony for her job was merely an afterthought on her
part. As the Board held in Quality Manufacturing, supra, in
determining whether an employee has reasonable ground
to fear that an interview may adversely affect his continued
employment is to be measured by objective standards in
light of all the circumstances of the case. As heretofore
indicated, that standard was clearly satisfied here.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that by denying
Collins' request for union representation at the interview
conducted by Hardy and York, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The 8(a)(5) Allegations
As heretofore indicated, when York ascertained, as a
result of the interview with Collins, that many if not all the
employees in the lobby department were obtaining their
lunch in the store without paying for it, he gave orders that
the practice be forthwith terminated. That there was no
notice to or bargaining with the Umon concerning this
change is conceded. The General Counsel contends that
this was a unilateral change in wages, hours, terms, and
conditions of employment, and hence violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. However, the evidence also
shows that promptly upon learning of York's order that
employees could no longer have free lunches, the Umon
filed a grievance thereon pursuant to the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, requesting that the status quo ante be restored. In
support of its position that on this aspect the Board should
defer to the arbitration procedures, Respondent relies upon
the Board's decision in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB
No. 150, and the subsequent line of cases following it,
while the General Counsel argues that the matters here in
dispute are not covered by the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. As heretofore indicated,
Respondent accepted the grievance and, in its answer
herein, reiterated at the trial, expressed its willingness,
indeed its desire, that the matter in dispute be determined
in the manner specified in the contract. The Union,
however, has not pursued its grievance because it first
wishes to ascertain what relief it will obtain in the instant
proceeding.
In Collyer, supra, and the later cases refining its
application, the Board has made it clear that the Collyer
rule will be applied where two basic conditions have been
Perry, virtually admitted as much, and to the extent that his testimony may
be regarded as indicating that Respondent follows a more lenient policy, I
regard it as mere puffing, which I do not credit
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
met, namely (1) the dispute is in fact susceptible of
resolution under the operation of the grievance procedure
agreed to by the parties, and (2) there is no reason to
believe that resort to the procedures agreed upon by the
parties will not bring about resolution of the issues in a
manner compatible with the purposes of the Act. Eastman
Broadcasting Company, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 58. The
dispute procedure set up in the contract between the
parties provides that it shall apply to "any differences,
disputes, or complaints ans[ing] over the interpretation or
application of the contents of this agreement," which is to
be resolved through a four-step procedure culminating in
binding arbitration. Although the arbitrator is prohibited
from making any award which has the effect of subtracting
from, altering, amending, or modifying any term or
provision of the agreement, the arbitrator is authorized to
make a final and binding award "on any issue presented
for arbitration, including the question of the arbitrability
of such issue." This language, if there is any practical
distinction between it and the contract language in
Eastman Broadcasting, supra, is even broader in that in the
instant case the arbitrator is authorized to determine the
arbitrability of the dispute.8 Nor do I find on this record
any reason to believe that the machinery provided by the
parties will not result in a resolution of the instant dispute
in a manner compatible with the purposes and policies of
the Act. At least it will be time enough for the Board to
intervene if and when future events demonstrate that the
anticipated result has not been accomplished.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that without deciding
the merits of the dispute concerning the entitlement of the
lobby employees to free lunches, and without prejudice to
any party, this aspect of the complaint herein should be
dismissed, but that jurisdiction over that issue should be
retained solely for the purpose of entertaining appropriate
and timely motions for further consideration upon a
proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with
reasonable promptness, been resolved by amicable settle-
ment in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to
arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures
have not been fair and regular or have reached a result
which is repugnant to the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record
in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
8 Even if, as the General Counsel argues, "the prime requirement for
deferral is that the subject matter must be the subject of the terms
of [the] contract,"-a contention apparently in conflict with the Board's
decision in Eastman Broadcasting, supra, and the cases there cited in In
14-we have in the instant case , by virtue of the grievance filed by the
Union for processing pursuant to contract procedure, and Respondent's
acceptance of that grievance, for processing in accordance with the
contract, an ad hoc agreement to resolve the instant dispute in the manner
specified in the agreement between the parties
9 Respondent argues that, as the alleged 8(a)(5) violation must be
deferred to arbitration, the alleged 8(a)(1) violation should also be so
deferred Respondent cites no authority for this position and simply argues
that the arbitrator will thus be able to dispose of the entire dispute The
General Counsel, on the other hand, argues that as the Board must in any
event take jurisdiction of the 8(a)(1) violation, it should also decide the
8(a)(5) allegations, and thus decide the entire controversy, citing Metal
Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By denying Collins' request for union representation
at an interview conducted by Respondent under circum-
stances from which Collins could reasonably conclude that
her job security was in jeopardy, Respondent interfered
with, coerced, and restrained employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. It would best effectuate the policies of the Act if,
without prejudice to any party and without deciding
whether the termination of free lunches for the lobby
employees violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, the parties
be relegated to the grievance arbitration procedures of the
contract.9
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed: 10
ORDER
Respondent, J. Weingarten, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from requiring any employee to
take part in an interview or meeting without union
representation, if such representation has been requested
by the employees and if the employee has reasonable
grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed may
result in his being subject to disciplinary action.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its store 98, Houston, Texas, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
Worker's International Association (George Kock Sons, Inc), 199 NLRB No.
26 Language in that decision appears to support the General Counsel's
position However, on the facts of this case , I find applicable the Board's
decision in Joseph T Ryerson & Sons, Inc, 199 NLRB No 44 There the
Board decided one aspect of the case, but deferred another aspect to
arbitration
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes
ii In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
23 after being signed by an authorized representative, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein, to the
extent that it alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, be, and the same is, dismissed; provided, however,
that jurisdiction of this proceeding is hereby retained for
the limited purpose of entertaining an appropriate and
timely motion for further consideration upon a proper
showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable
promptness after issuance of this Decision, either been
resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure
or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance
or arbitration procedure has not been fair and regular or
has reached a result which is repugnant to the Act.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
451
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT require that any employee take part in
an interview or meeting without union representation if
the employee requests such representation and if the
employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the
matters to be discussed at such interview or meeting
may result in his being subject to disciplinary action.
J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office , Dallas-Brazos Building,
1125 Brazos Street , Houston , Texas 77002, Telephone
713-226-4296.