J. Houston. Cook et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 26, 2019

12540932 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/540,932 08/13/2009 J. Houston Cook 15548.0210 2297
27890 7590 12/26/2019
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
1330 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
EXAMINER
SCHMUCKER, MICHAEL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
hfox@steptoe.com
ipdocketing@steptoe.com
lfielding@steptoe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte J. HOUSTON COOK, SCOTT M. PETERS, and
TRAVIS C. VANLANDINGHAM

____________

Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932
Technology Center 3600

____________

Before PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–18 and 20–25. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION pursuant
to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Regions
Financial Corporation. (Appeal Br. 3.)
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to “[a] method and system for
incentivizing savings . . . by awarding a bonus upon receiving a number of
recurring transfers during a period of time.” (Spec. Abstract.)
Claims 1, 8, and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites (bracketed matter and emphasis added):
1. A computer-implemented method for incentivizing saving
comprising:
[(a)] directing a programmed recurring electronic transfer
from a first account to a second account through a computer
program containing instructions directing the transfer,
[(b)] receiving data representing the programmed
recurring electronic transfer from the first account to the second
account, the second account being a savings account,
[(c)] initiating and controlling the programmed recurring
electronic transfer through a computer-based calculation module
in communication with both the first account and the second
account via a communication device,
[(d)] determining, by a processor, a number of
programmed recurring electronic transfers received by a
computer-based calculation module, the calculation module
recording only the transfers controlled by another process,
[(e)] transmitting the data over a communications data
channel through a server,
[(f)] adding, by a processor, a bonus to the second account
when the number of recurring transfers received is above a
threshold during a period of time, thereby generating a loyalty
reward, the bonus calculated by the calculation module, and
[(g)] displaying data regarding the programmed recurring
electronic transfer on a client display screen.

Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

3
REJECTIONS2
Claims 1–18 and 20–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
as anticipated by Tucker (US 2015/0081411 A1, pub. Mar. 19, 2015).
Claims 2, 5, 6, 9, 12–18, and 20–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Tucker.

ANALYSIS
The § 101 rejection
Appellant does not separately argue the claims. We select claim 1 as
representative. Claims 2–18 and 20–25 will stand or fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
“‘contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural

2 The rejection of claims 1–11 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
was withdrawn. (See Answer 4.)
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

4
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. If the
claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine
if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. at 221 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 79).
With regard to step one of the Alice framework, we apply a “directed
to” two-prong test to: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether
the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 54 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”).
Here, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to “a ledger
system that could be performed with pen and paper.” (Advisory Action
mailed Feb. 9, 2018.) The Examiner also determines that claim 1 “as a
whole [is] directed to Loyalty systems to incentivize user actions. A Loyalty
System is a Targeted Advertising System to specific users and advertising
falls under ‘Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity.’” (Final
Action 5.)
Appellant argues that “[t]he claimed subject matter do [sic] not recite
a general use of loyalty awards, but are [sic] directed to specific interactions
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

5
with a processor and a communications data channel in a computerized
system.” (Appeal Br. 8.)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The ‘directed to’ inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to
claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether
‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’ Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Guidance at 54–55.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that “[t]he invention
relates to a method for incentivizing savings.” (Spec. 1, l. 7.) Claim 1
provides further evidence. Claim 1 recites a “method for incentivizing
saving comprising: directing a . . . recurring electronic transfer from a first
account to a second account,” “receiving data representing the . . . recurring
electronic transfer,” “initiating and controlling the . . . recurring electronic
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

6
transfer,” “determining . . . a number of . . . recurring electronic transfers
received,” “transmitting the data,” “adding . . . a bonus to the second account
when the number of recurring transfers is above a threshold during a period
of time,” “and displaying data regarding the . . . recurring electronic transfer
on a client display screen.”
In short, claim 1 recites a recurring transfer from a first account to a
second account, determining the number of such transfers, and adding a
bonus (i.e., “a loyalty reward”) to the second account when the number of
transfers exceeds a threshold. Courts have found claims directed to similar
subject matter to be directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (managing an account by performing calculations and
manipulating the results determined to be directed to an abstract idea); see
also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (“creat[ing] electronic records, track[ing]
multiple transactions, and issu[ing] simultaneous instructions” identified as
within the realm of abstract ideas).
The steps recited in claim 1 are performed by directing an electronic
transfer, receiving data, initiating and controlling the transfer, determining a
number of transfers, transmitting data, modifying data in an account (adding
a bonus when the number of transfers is above a threshold), and displaying
data. Claim 1 performs these steps using a generic “computer-based
calculation module,” a generic “processor,” a generic “communications data
channel . . . [and] server,” and a generic “display screen.” (See, e.g.,
Spec. 6, l. 8 – 8, l. 4; see also Answer 5.)
The claim limitations do not recite technological implementation
details for any of the steps. Nor does claim 1 recite “a particular way of
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

7
programming or designing the software . . . , but instead merely claim[s] the
resulting [method].” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1 merely recites functional results to be achieved by
any means. Additionally, Appellant’s Specification makes clear that the
computing components and systems were well known. (See, e.g., Spec. 6,
l. 8 – 8, l. 4.) In short, claim 1 does not recite a specific asserted
improvement to computer technology.
In view of the above evidence, we determine that claim 1 is directed
to a method for incentivizing savings, i.e., “advertising, marketing or sales
activities or behaviors” and “managing personal behavior.” (See 2019
Guidance at 52.) Thus, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity. (See id.) This is in accord with the
Examiner’s determination. (See Final Action 5.) Also, we agree with the
Examiner that the method recited in claim 1 could be performed with a pen
and paper. (See Advisory Action mailed Feb. 9, 2018.) Thus, claim 1 is
also directed to the abstract idea of mental processes. (See 2019 Guidance
at 52.)
Moreover, we do not see how the recitation of a generic “computer-
based calculation module,” a generic “processor,” a generic
“communications data channel . . . [and] server,” and a generic “display
screen,” even in conjunction with the recited functions, “ensure[s] ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 77.)
Nonetheless, Appellant argues that the “computer initiated and
controlled methods reflect improvement to computer software functionality
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

8
that are significantly more than routine and conventional methods.” (Appeal
Br. 9.) We do not find this argument persuasive.
Claim 1 does not recite how the initiating and controlling step is
performed. Claim 1 simply recites “initiating and controlling the
programmed recurring electronic transfer through a computer-based
calculation module in communication with both the first account and the
second account via a communication device.” In other words, claim 1
recites initiating and controlling through the calculation module by any
means. Claim 1 is similarly deficient in reciting, e.g., how the directing,
determining, and adding steps are performed. See, e.g., BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A]n improvement
to the information stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement
in the database’s functionality.”).
In cases involving software innovations, such as we have here, the
inquiry as to whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea “often turns
on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities . . . or, instead on a process that qualifies as an
“abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’” Finjan,
Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Enfish LLC, 822 F.3d at 1335–36). Even if we consider claim 1 to be
limited to a particular technological environment, “limiting the claims to [a]
particular technological environment . . . is, without more, insufficient to
transform them into patent-eligible applications of the abstract idea at their
core.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. Moreover, “[n]o matter how
much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the advance lies
entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

9
in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant seeks to analogize the pending claims to the claims in
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Reply Br. 4.) Specifically, Appellant argues that
“[t]he calculation module with customizable features to initiate and control
the transfer is analogous to the custom filter of BASCOM.” (Id.) We
disagree.
In BASCOM, the court determined that “an inventive concept can be
found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional pieces.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. Specifically,
BASCOM’s content filter could be “installed remotely in a single location”
and this “particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement
over the prior art ways of filtering.” Id. Here, however, it is unclear how
the calculation module is arranged in the system. Moreover, claim 1 does
not recite “customizable features to initiate and control the transfer.” Thus,
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Appellant also seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). (Reply Br. 6.) Appellant argues that “the claimed subject matter
represents a significant improvement by saving the user from manually
initiating or controlling transfers.” (Reply Br. 5.) We do not find this
argument persuasive.
Unlike claim 1 here, the claims in Core Wireless were directed to
improved functionality in a user interface. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362.
Moreover, “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

10
more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” See OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Thus, under prong one of the two prong test in the 2019 Guidance,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea; and, under prong two, additional elements in
claim 1 do not “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
(See 2019 Guidance at 54.) As such, under step one of the Alice framework,
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, and we move to step two.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘ “inventive concept” ’ –i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed by the
generic “computer-based calculation module,” generic “processor,” generic
“communications data channel . . . [and] server,” and generic “display
screen” are purely conventional. (See, e.g., Spec. 6, l. 8 – 8, l. 4.) Directing
the adjustment of account data, receiving data, determining a number of
transfers, transmitting data, modifying data in an account, and displaying
data are well-understood, routine, and conventional functions previously
known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (The claims
“do not include any requirement for performing the claimed functions of
gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real time by use of anything but
entirely conventional, generic technology. The claims therefore do not state
an arguably inventive concept . . . .”); see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

11
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming.”).
Considered as an ordered combination, the generic computing
components of Appellant’s claimed invention add nothing that is not already
present when the limitations are considered separately. (See e.g., Spec.,
Fig. 1.) For example, claim 1 does not, as discussed above, purport to
improve the functioning of the computing components themselves. Nor
does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.
Instead, claim 1 amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to
apply the abstract idea using generic computing components performing
routine computer functions. That is not enough to transform an abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1. Claims 2–18 and 20–25 are not separately argued and fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

The §§ 102(b) and 103(a) rejections and new ground of rejection
Tucker teaches a system and method for “processing a financial
transaction that includes determining an automatic savings amount and
rewards amount payments. The system may comprises [sic] a checking
account, a savings account, an account of a merchant, and one or more
computer systems.” (Tucker ¶ 11.)
With regard to limitations (c) and (d) of claim 1, the Examiner finds
that
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

12
Tucker details counting a recurring transfer from one account to
another via a recurring auto-transfer in at least paragraph 0067
and Tucker discloses recording the transfers via standard banking
[procedures] where transfers in and out of an account are noted
in the statements in at least paragraph 0064 and since the
payments are for auto payments the transfer is controlled by the
biller who request [sic] payment of the amount of the bill and is
paid. Hence the creditor (“another process”) controls the
transfer.

(Final Action 11.)
Appellant disagrees and argues that “the biller in Tucker is not using
another process, but the same automatic payment. Moreover, there is
nothing in Tucker that shows the calculation module recording only the
transfers controlled by another process.” (Appeal Br. 9–10.)
Appellant’s Specification discloses that “[t]he calculation module 105
monitors the transfers from the first account 101 to the second account 103.
The calculation module 105 may initiate or control the transfers, or may only
record transfers that are initiated and controlled by another process.”
(Spec. 5, ll. 19–21.)
In relevant part, claim 1 recites (bracketed matter and emphasis
added):
[(c)] initiating and controlling the programmed recurring
electronic transfer through a computer-based calculation module
in communication with both the first account and the second
account via a communication device,
[(d)] determining, by a processor, a number of
programmed recurring electronic transfers received by a
computer-based calculation module, the calculation module
recording only the transfers controlled by another process,
. . .
[(f)] adding, by a processor, a bonus to the second account
when the number of recurring transfers received is above a
Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

13
threshold during a period of time, thereby generating a loyalty
reward, the bonus calculated by the calculation module.

It is unclear from claim 1 if the computer-based calculation module
recited in limitation (c) is the same or different from the computer based
calculation module recited in limitation (d). It is also unclear to which
computer-based calculation module the phrase “the calculation module” (in
limitations (d) and (f)) refers. If “a computer-based calculation module” in
limitation (c) is separate from “a computer-based calculation module” in
limitation (d), then the computer-based calculation module in limitation (c)
may represent “another process” as that term is used in limitation (d). If not,
then the computer-based calculation module in limitation (c) may not
represent “another process” as that term is used in limitation (d). We note
that independent claims 8 and 12 suffer a similar infirmity. Indeed, claim 12
recites, in relevant part (and emphasis added):
a computer-based calculation module in communication
with both the first account and the second account; and
a communication device connecting the first account, the
second account and the calculation module;
the computer-based calculation module configured to:
determine a number of programmed recurring
electronic transfers received via a processor;
initiate and control the transfer through a computer-
based calculation module in communication with both the
first account and the second account via a communication
device and record only the transfers controlled by another
process; and
add a bonus calculated by the calculation module to
the second account when the number of recurring transfers
received is above a threshold during a period of time to
generate a loyalty reward, the second account being a
savings account.

Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

14
“We employ a lower threshold of ambiguity when reviewing a
pending claim for indefiniteness than those used by post-issuance reviewing
courts.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008)
(precedential). Specifically, “if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible
claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to
more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by
holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite.” Id.; see also In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection under § 102(b) of
independent claims 1, 8, and 12, and dependent claims 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11,
because this rejection is necessarily based on speculative assumptions as to
the meaning of the claim. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA
1962). For the same reason, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 2, 5, 6, 9, 12–18, and 20–25 under § 103(a).
It must be understood, however, that our decision regarding these
rejections is based solely on the ambiguity of the claims and does not reflect
in any manner on the adequacy of the prior art evidence relied on in the
Examiner’s rejection.
Further in view of the above, and pursuant to our authority under
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION against
claims 1–18 and 20–25 under 35 U.S.C § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite with regard to the recitation of the term “computer-based
calculation module.”

Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

15
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–18 and 20–25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 5, 6, 9, 12–18, and 20–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a NEW
GROUND OF REJECTION against claims 1–18 and 20–25 under 35 U.S.C
§ 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that, “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” Section 41.50(b) further provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both,
and have the matter reconsidered by the Examiner, in which event the
proceeding will be remanded to the Examiner.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under
§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same record.

Appeal 2018-008764
Application 12/540,932

16
Specifically:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1–18, 20–25 101 eligibility 1–18, 20–25
1, 3, 4, 7, 8,
10, 11
102(e) Tucker 1, 3, 4, 7,
8, 10, 11

2, 5, 6, 9, 12–
18, 20–25
103(a) Tucker 2, 5, 6, 9,
12–18,
20–25

1–18, 20–25 112, second
paragraph
indefiniteness 1–18, 20–25
Overall
Outcome
1–18, 20–25 1–18, 20–25

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)